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In November 1978 the Austrian Electorate, in a nationwide referendum, decided 
against the commissioning of the first Austrian Nuclear Power Plant in Zwentendorf. 
History proved this decision having been rather forward-looking. 
Today, 40 years later, having experienced the severe accidents of Chernobyl 
in 1986 and of Fukushima in 2011, both with far ranging and long lasting severe 
impacts, quite a number of countries is phasing-out, or has decided to phase-out, 
nuclear power. Nevertheless, other countries are determined to continue the use of 
nuclear power, or have decided to embark on a nuclear power programme. 
From our point of view, nuclear power cannot be considered compatible with the 
concept of sustainable development. Consequently, reliance on nuclear power must 
not be considered a viable option to combat climate change. Sustainable development, 
if fully applied to the energy sector, would require substantial increases in energy 
efficiency and in energy saving as well as switch to renewable sources of energy. 
However, the global debate on the potential role of nuclear power in the decar-
bonisation of our energy systems is ongoing. This debate urgently needs to benefit 
from sound scientific evidence. This book highlights various important aspects of 
nuclear power from an up-to-date perspective. Thus, we are convinced that this book 
will serve as an important input to the debate and that it will have a lasting impact.
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Introduction:  
Why Discuss Nuclear Power Today?
Reinhard Haas, Lutz Mez, and Amela Ajanovic1
Introduction
Commercial nuclear power was once depicted as an infinite source of energy to 
meet growing energy demand. In spite of costs increases, several reactor accidents 
and remaining challenges regarding radioactive waste, nuclear reactors still play an 
important role in the energy policy of several countries. However, the future use of 
nuclear power is a disputed issue in the policy community. There is wide disagree-
ment about the scale of the future use of nuclear power for electricity generation. 
While the interest in new nuclear power plants (NPP) in the Western EU-coun-
tries and the USA is very modest with few or no plants under construction and 
planned, there are still talks about new-build in Eastern Europe (Poland, Hungary, 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Belorussia, Ukraine), in the Middle East, in Russia, in 
China and in South-Eastern Asia. 
According to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 454 NPP are 
“operational” in 31 countries (as of 11 December 2018). Moreover, 54 reactors 
were under construction end-2018, with the largest number of new-build in China. 
The major arguments brought forward in favor of nuclear power are: 
1 Reinhard Haas, Technische Universität Wien, Austria, haas@eeg.tuwien.ac.at; Lutz Mez, 
Freie Universität Berlin, Germany, lutz.mez@fu-berlin.de; Amela Ajanovic, Technische 
Universität Wien, Austria, ajanovic@eeg.tuwien.ac.at
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1. There are urgent and huge needs for energy especially for electricity;
2. Nuclear energy is necessary to provide base load
3. Nuclear power is indispensable for combatting global warming.
However, an unofficial argument in some countries is to retain (or build up) their 
military nuclear applications, particularly weapons but also nuclear submarines. 
Other non-outspoken drivers can be geo-political interests and mere status symbols, 
as belonging to the rather exclusive club of three dozen countries—15% of United 
Nation member states—and mastering what is still considered supreme science 
remains a goal for some countries or rather regimes.
To understand current and future role of NPP in different countries it is im-
portant to learn from the history of nuclear power in electricity generation from a 
technological and economic point of view. Already in the 1950s, when the econo-
mies of many countries (e.g. USA, Europe, Japan, Russia) started to grow fast, and 
electricity demand grew with the economic development. At that time a desperate 
need for additional sources for electricity generation beyond limited fossil fuels 
was seen as essential for continued economic growth. The promises of the nuclear 
dream emerging in the 1950s were to have cheap electricity in abundance.
In the USA after the early military applications, there was the announcement of 
the nuclear program “Atoms for Peace” by Eisenhower in 1953. As a consequence, 
the USA exported reactors to a number of key countries at low prices, launching 
nuclear ordering. Countries included Germany, France, Spain, Japan, India. The 
first nuclear plants started operation in the period 1954–1956 in the UK, the Soviet 
Union and the USA. In the USA “Atoms for Peace” was accompanied by the slogans 
“too cheap to meter” and the “all-electric home”. The idea was that most efforts 
in households, agriculture and other sectors could be managed by electricity and 
that electricity could be produced at such low marginal cost that metering would 
not be justified. 
However, as described in this book – given a broad range of subsidies revealed 
– it is more than doubtful whether such cheap nuclear power has ever existed and 
prospects of the future competitiveness of nuclear energy appears jeopardized by 
competition from the surprisingly rapid expansion of renewable energies. 
Yet, up to the mid-1970s, nuclear power was booming in many countries and 
plant by plant was added. Hopes were strong that costs would start coming down 
with increasing experience.
In the history of nuclear power, there have been three major shocks to the system: 
The first was the accident in Three Mile Island in the USA in 1979. While reduced 
economic support slowed construction already before, this accident stopped new 
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nuclear power plants constructions in the USA for a long time. The catastrophe 
beyond the maximum credible accident in Chernobyl in 1986 was a major set-back 
for the nuclear power industry in Europe. However, the list of large orders has 
ended already before Chernobyl. The accident in Fukushima in 2011 accelerated 
Germany’s program of phasing-out completely all NPPs by 2022, and profoundly 
impacted other countries, e.g. Belgium, China, South Korea, Switzerland, Taiwan. 
Many other accidents with radioactive contamination have happened in the past, 
however without getting the same attention, e.g. the Kyshtym disaster, and the 
Windscale fire both in 1957.
Yet the issue of safety is only one amongst a series. Aside from the issue of safety, 
technical risks, security issues and the unsolved problem of nuclear waste disposal 
and the economic performance are currently the major barriers for acceptance of 
NPP. Costs, especially the construction costs of NPP have been increasing since the 
1970s and in recent decades they have skyrocketed especially in European coun-
tries and North America. Construction time has also become even more subject 
to overruns. At the same time the costs of renewable energy technologies such as 
photovoltaics and wind turbines have significantly decreased. 
In light of these still falling costs the economic performance of nuclear power 
in comparison to these renewable technologies is also getting worse. It already 
has become much harder for nuclear investors to recover money in competitive 
electricity markets The ”base-load” concept has lost its meaning in these markets 
when low cost renewable sources outperform any thermal power plant. Even the 
pure operation & maintenance costs are difficult to recover in today’s electricity 
markets leading to more unfavorable prospects for future nuclear competitiveness. 
The increasing construction costs and durations have exacerbated the major 
problems faced by nuclear power plant vendors. The French vendor AREVA went 
bankrupt, was bailed out and broken up by the government in 2017. In the same 
year, the US-based Westinghouse (then owned by Toshiba) declared bankruptcy 
and, apart from Russian and Chinese vendors, none of the historic vendors has a 
healthy order book. 
Around the turn of the century there were forecasts of a ‘nuclear renaissance’ 
or at least of ‘rising expectations’ based on reactor designs evolved from existing 
ones, so-called Generation III+. This temporarily revived interest in nuclear power 
but this new interest has generally not been translated into firm orders. This was 
sometimes supported by vision of new ”cheap and safe” radical new technologies of 
a so-called generation IV reactors that have been discussed since the early 2000s. 
“Small Modular Reactors” (SMRs) are the most recent flavour of the year, but they 
are still technologically underdeveloped, and financially out of reach.
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The core objective of this book is to provide a comprehensive appraisal of the 
technical and economic aspects of nuclear power in the next decades. It discusses 
whether the claimed renaissance of nuclear is really on the horizon or whether 
the eroding economics as well as technical, legal and industry/vendor issues will 
continue to close the curtain for this technology. It is organized as follows.
In the next chapter a historical review of the Nuclear Dream is conducted by 
Rosaria di Nucci from military to early civilian applications. In the following a 
comprehensive analysis of recent developments and the current state of the world 
nuclear industry is provided by Mycle Schneider. The collision of atomic and flow 
renewable power in decarbonization of electricity supply is analyzed by Aviel Ver-
bruggen and Yuliya Yurchenko. 
One of the most heavily discussed current issues – costs and economics – are 
analysed by Reinhard Haas, Steve Thomas and Amela Ajanovic. The major focus 
of this chapter is on the question, why the real investment costs of NPPs have 
increased at such a high rate. The specific aspects of one of the most prominent 
disputed new planned NPP – Hinkley Point C – and its economics compared to 
renewable energy technologies are investigated by Gustav Resch and Demet Suna 
in the chapter following.
Another economic issue, which is often ignored, is the cost of nuclear decom-
missioning. It is treated in two chapters – Wolfgang Irrek analyzes the problem of 
“financing nuclear decommissioning”, and Christian von Hirschhausen, Jan Paul 
Seidel, and Ben Wealer investigate the decommissioning of NPP, storage of nuclear 
waste and provide the experiences from Germany, France, and the UK.
Dörte Fouquet reflects on the legacy around the setup and foundation of the 
EURATOM treaty, the clashing economic nuclear interests of France and the 
United States on civil use of nuclear power and the respective technologies, the 
limits and shortcomings of this treaty and its strong support angle at odds with 
the liberalization of the European energy market.
Tomas Kåberger analyzes the legislation of the economic liability for accidents 
and back-end costs. David Reinberger, Amela Ajanovic and Reinhard Haas provide 
a historical overview on nuclear technologies with special focus on the intended 
new concepts of Generation IV.
The problem of nuclear waste and its long-term disposal is investigated by Gordon 
MacKerron. As China is currently the most important country world-wide for the 
development of nuclear power in this book it is treated by M.V. Ramana.
Regarding the large accidents in Chernobyl and Fukushima, three chapters are 
dedicated to these negative highlights in nuclear history. Nikolaus Müllner anal-
yses the technical versus the human causes about three decades after Chernobyl. 
The reality after Fukushima in Japan with focus on actual damage to local people 
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is investigated by Tadahiro Katsuta. Eri Kanamori and Tomas Kåberger analyze 
Japan’s experience the distribution of the costs of nuclear core melts about six years 
after Fukushima.
An outlook on the prospects of a future democratic and sustainable electricity 
generation system is provided in the last chapter by Reinhard Haas and Hans Auer.
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons  Attribution 
4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits 
use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long 
as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the 
 Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s 
 Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If 
material is not included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license and your intended 
use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to 
obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.
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From Military to Early Civilian Applications
An Appraisal of the Initial Success of the Light  
Water Reactor Technology
Maria Rosaria Di Nucci1
Abstract
The article presents a historical overview of the development path of nuclear 
technology, from its military application to its civilian start up (Atoms for 
Peace) and early commercialisation of nuclear power plants. The chief aim is 
to demonstrate and analyse the commercial exploitation of nuclear energy and 
the beginnings of the nuclear industry by means of the link with the military 
research and development and production and its success based on tight indus-
try-government integration. We describe the gradual growth of national nuclear 
frameworks and of the industry as a result of a combination of exogenous and 
endogenous factors originating with the military spill-over effects. These factors 
evolved during the subsequent phases of the technology development following 
the transfer of technological know-how from military establishments to civilian 
atomic agencies and the creation of a private industry.
1 Maria Rosaria Di Nucci, Freie Universität Berlin, Germany, dinucci@zedat.fu-berlin.
de
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1 Introduction
This chapter presents a historical overview of the development path of nuclear 
technology, from its military application to its civilian start up, under the aegis of 
Atoms for Peace and early commercialisation of nuclear power plants. The chief 
aim is to demonstrate and analyse the commercial exploitation of nuclear energy 
and the beginnings of the nuclear industry by means of the link with the military 
research and development and its success based on tight industry-government 
integration. Military nuclear technology and production issues were decisive not 
only in the USA, but also in the UK and in France, where fissionable material was 
indispensable for nuclear weapons.
The gradual growth of national nuclear frameworks and of the industry are de-
scribed as a result of a combination of exogenous and endogenous factors originating 
with the military spill-over effects. These factors evolved during the subsequent 
phases of the technology development, following the transfer of technological 
know-how from military establishments to civilian atomic agencies (occurring 
first in the US in 1946, and later in France and the UK in 1954), and the creation 
of an independent private industry. 
The key development stages of military and civilian applications will be analysed 
chronologically. The primary concern will be the US, British and French experi-
ences, due to their early start and close military ties. In addition to technology 
development, we briefly describe the agreements, policies and regulations of the US 
government and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) which affected 
the domestic and international marketing of nuclear power plants. Looking at 
the international framework will allow us to consider the role of the international 
organisations fostering the development of nuclear power such as the IAEA, the 
European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) and the schemes that acted as 
vehicles for the international sale of nuclear power plants. Afterwards, we look 
briefly at two national frameworks. Britain receives more attention because initially 
it was the only country competing with the US in size and government backing in 
the international market. 
The discussion of early military and civilian deployment of nuclear energy will 
be roughly subdivided into the following stages:
1. Initial military applications characterised by US leadership of the allies who 
took part in the Manhattan project leading to the A-bomb (Britain, Canada, 
France and the US), roughly corresponding to 1940–47;
2. Co-existence between military and civilian applications preceding commer-
cial development, characterised by the creation of a national public civilian 
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Atomic Agency. Knowledge accumulated under the military was transferred 
to the Atomic Agency, but tight military control was maintained in the choice, 
implementation, and deployment of the technology. During this stage, basic 
and applied research leading to reactor prototypes was conducted and several 
different technologies were concurrently tested with the primary goal of obtaining 
plutonium for military purposes;
3. Exclusively civilian applications. Here the focus is on the evolution of a specific 
industrial autonomy and the establishment of the market duopoly by West-
inghouse and General Electric (GE). Their marketing policy was articulated 
through pre-existing and newly established licensing agreements with European 
countries and Japan.
In analysing the success of Light Water Reactor (LWR) – the American technol-
ogy par excellence – and its establishment in the world market, we argue that the 
success of LWR can be explained by examining the interplay of various factors at 
work in the US market, along with certain exogenous influences in both domestic 
and export arenas. 
The early technological and economic success of LWR technology can be attributed 
to a rather heterogeneous set of interdependent factors. In this analysis, however, 
we find it useful to separate these factors and determine which had the greatest 
impact at any given time. Some of them, like the military spill-over effect, can be 
considered exogenous to the industry or as a socialisation of its costs. Others, like 
the industrialisation nurtured under the US Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), 
can be viewed as the result of a dynamic interrelation between organisational, in-
dustrial and institutional factors. Although at these stages, the industry’s role was 
limited to receiving government contracts and procurements and/or working under 
strict military control, this period marks the beginning of a close interdependence 
between the military establishment (and later the atomic agencies) and industry 
that enhanced growth of internal capabilities and nurtured what can be called the 
military-industrial complex.
10 Maria Rosaria Di Nucci
2 Early military and civilian applications in the USA2
Early military applications 
With the US entry into war in 1942, and amid widespread fears that Nazi Germany 
was progressing in atomic research for military ends, the American authorities 
stepped up research on the military application of nuclear physics. In September 
1942, the US Army formed an organisation known as the “Manhattan Engineering 
District” under General Grove. The District’s task was to reorganise work formerly 
undertaken by the National Defence Research Committee, which was established in 
1940, and subsequently part of the office for Scientific Research and Development. 
The “Manhattan Project” pooled together the best scientists of North America and 
Western Europe. The programme of the Manhattan District was initially managed 
by the Army Corp of Engineers, before responsibility was entrusted entirely to the 
US Army in 1943.
The discovery of Plutonium 239 in December 1940 and its devastating explosive 
potential catalysed great efforts to build nuclear reactors whose main purpose 
was the production of plutonium. It should be noted that the military-scientific 
establishment encountered severe problems in obtaining self-sustaining nuclear 
chain reactions. In particular, the production of sufficient quantities of uranium 
and graphite in the state of purity required by laboratory and industrial operations 
was well beyond that currently available. By 1942, the first chain reaction took place 
at Fermi ś Chicago Pile-1 (CP-1) using natural uranium as fuel and graphite as a 
moderator, with a power of 200 Watts.3 This experiment demonstrated the feasibility 
of using atoms as an energy source, although applications for civilian use were to 
be a long time in the making.
In fact, a period of strict secrecy was ushered in, during which the atomic 
project had top military priority which led to a pooling of scientific and financial 
resources. The construction of additional, larger reactors quickly followed, such as 
the reactor at Oak Ridge and a second “Chicago Pile”. A third offspring of Fermi ś 
pile used enriched uranium and heavy water (in place of graphite as a moderator) 
to produce 300 kW of power. To put it with Wellersten (2017) “virtually overnight, 
the University of Chicago had become a major wartime contractor”.
Subsequently, several additional plutonium reactors of the so-called “Hanford” 
type were built under the control of the Manhattan District and under manage-
ment of the DuPont Company. Natural uranium was deployed in the form of 
2 This section draws on my dissertation (Di Nucci 1986), on Sanger and Wollner (1995) 
and De Wolf Smyth (wd).
3 http://www.atomicarchive.com/History/firstpile/firstpile_01.shtml
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rods encased in aluminium, with graphite as a moderator and water as a coolant, 
while uranium concentrate was obtained from a diffusion plant at Oak Ridge. This 
work was backed up by scientific research performed at the University of Chicago 
(Argonne National Laboratories), Ames Laboratories and other universities. The 
chemistry of plutonium was studied at the University of California in Los Angeles 
(UCLA) while Columbia University handled the experimental nuclear data central 
to the uranium technology. Reactor construction and the entire nuclear fuel cycle 
were characterised by a close interaction and cooperation between scientific and 
university establishments and supported by industrial groups responsible for the 
production of key equipment (bound by military secrecy).4 
This spectacular pooling of resources led to a rapid advance in pure and applied 
scientific knowledge and in engineering skills as well as innovative production 
techniques. Increased confidence in the programme ś potential paved the way for 
a special group based out of UCLA to take charge of the design, construction and 
testing of the atomic bomb. This project, known as the Los Alamos Laboratory, began 
operation in 1943. At its disposal were minimal amounts of fissionable materials, 
before more could become available from the first working reactor. 
By 1944, Los Alamos had its own reactor for use in research on the A-Bomb. Ura-
nium was present as a solution in the form of uranyl sulphate, rather than in metallic 
form. The reactor was referred to as the “water boiler”. Its explosive properties were 
rapidly exploited and brought under control, culminating in the successful nuclear 
test in New Mexico in July 1945. In August 1945, the first uranium 235 bomb fell 
on Hiroshima, to be followed by a plutonium bomb on Nagasaki three days later. 
The transition period 
With the end of World War II, it became clear that nuclear energy would open a new 
era. Under President Truman, the US decided to keep the development of nuclear 
energy under secrecy and control in the name of national and international security. 
To ensure this, a domestic regulatory framework was required. It was provided by 
the May-Johnston Atomic Energy bill of 1945, which advocated military control 
over atomic technology and information. The bill further underlined the military 
use of the new technology and confined industrial application within highly re-
stricted boundaries. Against the background of the Soviet hydrogen bomb tests in 
the 1950s, nuclear weapons remained a highly delicate and divisive political issue. 
Conservatives feared the loss of US military supremacy while liberals feared nuclear 
war. The scientific community was similarly divided. 
4 See news releases about Argonne’s nuclear science and technology legacy, http://www.
ne.anl.gov/About/hn/
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Meanwhile, the countries that had contributed to the Manhattan Project were 
denied access to the technology, due to the American fear of espionage. This put an 
end to US-UK nuclear cooperation in 1946, except in the field of uranium ore pro-
curement. While there was no evidence to suggest that the other countries involved 
in the Manhattan Project could not independently handle the theoretical aspects of 
nuclear energy, the predominant view was that the US would retain its leadership 
through its greater experience and sheer weight of human capital, infrastructure, 
overall organisation, industrial planning and supply. However, the scientific com-
munity, including many scientists and engineers who collaborated on the project 
leading to the bomb, saw the military supervision and control as an unjustifiable 
interference. The critique and subsequent protest against the May-Johnston Bill 
led to a compromise in the form of a committee composed of scientists, engineers, 
industrialists and politicians chaired by Senator McMahon. After many hearings, 
the committee concluded that nuclear energy was essential for both national defence 
and industrial growth. It recommended that this development be entrusted to a 
civilian commission with access to the knowledge obtained through the A-bomb 
research. The resulting bill went through various amendments before being passed 
in August 1946 as the “Atomic Energy Act”.
The United States Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) was established to nurture 
and control the development of nuclear science and technology and its civilian 
applications. The McMahon Atomic Energy Act, signed on August 1, 1946, trans-
ferred the control of nuclear matters from military to civilian hands. The AEC 
was entrusted with the control of the plants, equipment and laboratories which 
were involved in the production of the atomic bomb. The transfer of the atomic 
establishment into civilian hands hardly diminished the conflicts between the 
military and working scientists, a considerable number of which resigned from 
the laboratories and plants.5 The transfer of knowledge, plants and equipment was 
to be overseen by five commissioners who were approved by the military and the 
president. Yet, disagreements were rife and the commission sometimes refused to 
approve the requests made by army officials for exemptions from transfer. When 
General Eisenhower became president in 1953, the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the armed 
forces recommended that the president emphasise the superiority of the US stock-
pile of nuclear weapons, while science advisors recommended a programme called 
“Operation Candor” to communicate the dangers of nuclear war (Etzkowitz. 1984: 
419). The concept of a nuclear industry was then proposed.
5 President Truman signed an executive order to transfer the Manhattan Engineering 
District on December 31, 1946.
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The start of the civilian applications
A civilian nuclear industry was established in part to legitimatise the development 
of nuclear weapons. Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” speech to the United Nations 
on December 8, 1953, marked the beginning of large-scale US government funding 
to develop civilian nuclear power plants (Camilleri 1977).
Most applications were developed through the government’s national laboratory 
system, in which Argonne played a key role. The AEC launched the “Power Reactor 
Demonstration Program” (PRDP), and within this framework a number of various 
demonstration reactors (light water, gas cooled and breeder reactors) were built.
At the time the AEC was born, the US assets in nuclear energy were constituted by:
1. The Oak Ridge and Clinton Laboratories, working on gaseous diffusion and 
producing enriched uranium;
2. The Chicago Group, which continued to carry out work on the Hanford reactor 
but also handled research on the fast breeder reactor (Argonne Laboratories), 
with General Electric taking over from DuPont. In Chicago, there was also a 
project using natural uranium and heavy water as a moderator, in addition to 
fabrication techniques for producing and testing alternative moderators such 
as beryllium;
3. The Manhattan District, which had also begun studies on various combinations 
of fuel-moderator-coolant for different types of reactors, in particular the gas-
cooled natural uranium reactor deemed feasible for civilian use;
4. The Knoll Atomic Power Laboratory at Schenectady, which had been organised 
in 1949 under contract for civilian development in the years to come; and 
5. GE, to promote nuclear power for ship propulsion, under direct control of the 
Navy6.
Ahead of Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” speech, the AEC started considering ci-
vilian nuclear power in 1952. By 1953, it was making plans to build a power reactor 
in collaboration with industry. Plans to develop nuclear-powered surface ships were 
abandoned in order to provide funds for the civilian project (Cowan 1990: 561).
In 1961, the AEC Development Program was upgraded to include the subsidisa-
tion of large scale reactors (400 MWe and larger), in an effort to realise economies 
of scale and reduce capital costs. In 1962, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy 
responded to growing pressures from industry and utilities by specifically allotting 
6 A similar project was undertaken at Oak Ridge under the Air Force, the Manhattan 
District and the Fairchild Aircraft and Engine Corporation’s control. Finally shelved 
in 1961, the project was known as NEPA: Nuclear Energy Propulsion for Aircraft.
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$20 million in subsidies from the AEC to the design, construction and operation 
of large scale LWRs (Burness et al. 1980: 189).
3 Military spill-over: LWR as by-product of submarine 
research
The development of LWR technology is intimately connected with military appli-
cations. Companies involved in its development are positioned to profit from the 
economic advantages and scientific know-how nurtured within the military-indus-
trial establishment (Di Nucci 1986, Cowan 1990). Following World War II, Navy 
submarine’s reactors and their operating procedures became the prototype for the 
most widespread commercial nuclear power plants.7 
The spill-over effect by the US Navy significantly influenced technological 
development in the years to come, and military officials played a key role in this 
new development pathway. Admiral Rickover, known as the “Father of the Nuclear 
Navy”, was put in charge of the US naval propulsion programme in 1946. In May 
1946, Rickover, who originally had been assigned to work with General Electric 
(GE) at Schenectady to develop a nuclear propulsion plant for destroyers, started 
pushing the idea of nuclear marine propulsion. Subsequently, Rickover became 
chief of a new section in the Bureau of Ships, the Nuclear Power Division, and be-
gan work with Weinberg, the Oak Ridge director of research, both to establish the 
Oak Ridge School of Reactor Technology and to begin the design of the pressurised 
water reactor for submarine propulsion (The Economist 2012).
While the earliest studies were performed at Oak Ridge, work was transferred to 
Argonne in 1948 and development was jointly taken over by Argonne and Westing-
house.8 That same year, Argonne’s Naval Reactor Division was established. Whereas 
Argonne scientists and engineers performed much of the early research, design and 
feasibility studies, Westinghouse improved and implemented the designs, first in 
the S1W prototype at NRTS, and then in the Nautilus submarine reactor. The first 
test reactor plant, a prototype referred to as S1W, began operations in 1953 at the 
7 The difference between a submarine reactor and a PWR for electricity generation is 
that they have a high power density in a small volume and run either on low-enriched 
uranium (as do some French and Chinese submarines) or on highly enriched uranium 
(>20% U-235). U.S. submarines use fuel enriched to at least 93%. (Wiki) 
8 Argonne is a direct successor of the University of Chicago’s Metallurgical Laboratory, 
where Fermi supervised construction and testing of the Chicago Pile 1.
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Naval Reactors Facility in Idaho. Bettis Laboratory and the Naval Reactors Facility 
were in charge of the reactor operation and were managed by Westinghouse.
According to official documents (Argonne, w.d.), researchers faced difficulties 
in designing a high-efficiency nuclear reactor small enough to fit in a submarine 
hull and still produce enough energy to drive the vessel. They used high-pressure 
water to cool the reactor core, a breakthrough in reactor technology. The first 
prototype, Submarine Thermal Reactor Mark I, was completed in 1953 by West-
inghouse. STR Mark II was installed in 1954 in the USS Nautilus, the world’s first 
atomic-powered submarine. 
A second type of reactor was installed on the submarine USS Seawolf (SSN-
575). It was initially powered by a sodium-cooled S2G reactor and supported by 
the land-based S1G reactor at the Kesselring site, under Knolls Atomic Power 
Laboratory and operated by GE. An additional S2G was also built, but never used. 
USS Seawolf was plagued by super-heater problems and thus the higher-performing 
USS Nautilus was selected as the standard US naval reactor type. Even though GE’s 
technology was not a success, the corporation gained the experience necessary to 
enter the civilian market with the LWR technology through its participation in the 
Navy programme. (Di Nucci 1986; Cowan 1990). The efficient safety and control 
methods mandated by the Naval Reactor Program were transferred to the civilian 
market: another notable spill-over from military research. 
By 1962, the US Navy had 26 nuclear submarines in operation and 30 under 
construction. Further development of LWR technology was based on the experience 
from the naval nuclear programme and on a series of experiments performed using 
the nine Argonne research reactors (Argonne, w.d.). 
The early choice of LWR for the US Navy Program provided for substantial 
learning about this technology at a very early stage. Thus, by the time the civilian 
programmes started in the early 1960s, the LWR technology was “well advanced 
along its learning curve while the other technologies were late entrants which failed 
to catch up” (Cowan 1990: 545). LWR submarine technology was shared with the 
United Kingdom, while technological development in France, China and the Soviet 
Union proceeded independently.9 
9 Rolls Royce built similar units for Royal Navy submarines and then developed the design 
further to the PWR-2. The Soviet Union concentrated also on PWR in submarines and 
never engaged in the development of Boiling Water Reactors (BWR).
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4 The establishment of the international atomic 
framework10
At the time of the first Geneva Conference in 1955, there were roughly 100 different 
kinds of reactors under scrutiny (Cowan 1990). Approximately 70% of the devel-
opment programmes for nuclear reactors were in military hands. However, by the 
second Geneva Conference, only 12 reactor types were being seriously considered 
(Mullenbach 1963: 38–39). 
At the second conference, negotiations began for the establishment of an In-
ternational Atomic Energy Agency under the auspices of the UN. Also under way 
were negotiations for a set of bilateral agreements between the US and other nations 
for cooperation on the development of civilian use of atomic energy. The US set 
aside 200 kg of Uranium 235 to assist in international R&D under the aegis of the 
“Atoms for Peace” programme. 
By the end of 1961, 37 bilateral agreements were in effect between the US and 
other countries and 24 grants were available for the construction of research and 
experimental reactors as well as laboratory equipment. Though the 1955 Geneva 
conference was hailed as a breakthrough for the peaceful exploitation of the atom, 
its outcome was rather limited in terms of transfer of technology and international 
cooperation. What it did achieve was the legitimation of nuclear power, inducing 
an optimism in many parts of the world that a plentiful supply of cheap energy 
was around the corner. Difficulties with the new technology, especially on the 
production side, were downplayed or overlooked. As a result of the strict secrecy 
of the previous military development stage, the industry was not yet in a position 
to master the technicalities associated with scaling up from the prototype stage to 
commercial sized plants (Cohn 1997, Di Nucci 1986).
In the years following the Geneva Conferences, numerous international organ-
isations were established with the aim of fostering cooperation between countries. 
Following the New York Conference on Atomic Energy, the International Atomic 
Agency (IAEA) was created in 1956. Based in Vienna, its goal was to enhance and 
increase the contribution of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Of the initiatives 
involving Western Europe, many can be considered as extensions of the Marshal 
Plan and of the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). OEEC 
countries gave life to a European Nuclear Energy Agency in 1957, unifying their 
legal restrictions and nuclear regulations. 
10 This section draws heavily on Di Nucci (1986).
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Alongside this development, the six countries that formed the Coal and Steel 
Community set up the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) in 1958.11 
Though the IAEA was not to substitute for cooperative agreements between coun-
tries, this agency was expected to establish safeguards, foster the growth of nuclear 
energy and the exchange of information and serve as a supply agent for materials, 
services and equipment. Despite its ambitious aims, the agency achieved limited 
results. It drew up regulatory procedures for nuclear reactors, but never had the 
power to implement them, nor did it achieve concrete results in connection with 
third party liability. Euratom launched an ambitious nuclear programme envisag-
ing 15 GWe by 1967, but this was revised in 1960 to 10 GWe of installed capacity 
by 1970. In addition to the establishment of four joint research centres, a number 
of initiatives were adopted within the Euratom framework; the most important of 
which was the joint programme with the US.12 This established the terms of coop-
eration between the US and Euratom member states in nuclear R&D and reactor 
construction. Notably, US manufacturers willing to participate were then obliged to 
supply design and cost specifications to Euratom and to set up licensing agreements 
or subsidiaries within Euratom countries. The latter took place between 1957 and 
1960. Although minor in terms of American penetration in the European market 
(the programme resulted in the sale of only three nuclear power plants, partly 
backed by the Export-Import Bank), it was of great significance for the transfer of 
LWR technology to Europe. 
The first invitation for proposals on nuclear plant construction was jointly made 
by Euratom and the US AEC in 1959. This joint programme was decisive for the US 
industry because it required that proposals for nuclear plant construction include 
a reactor type on which R&D had already been carried out to an advanced stage 
in the US. For projects to qualify and be approved, one or more US manufacturers 
and one or more Euratom member countries had to pay a determinant role in the 
construction of the nuclear plants. The selected and approved projects were eligi-
ble for loans from the Export-Import Bank at preferential rates. The fuel could be 
purchased by Euratom from the US AEC on a deferred payment basis, while the 
US AEC provided fuel burn-up guarantees. The Euratom Supply Agency entered 
into long term contracts with the reactor operators.
11 The signing of the Treaty was preceded by the release of the report “A Target for Euratom” 
which recommended the cooperation between Euratom and the U.S. nuclear reactor 
programme. This cooperation can be seen as another vehicle for the penetration of 
LWR technology, ousting the French and British gas-cooled technology (Cowan 1990, 
Di Nucci 1986)
12 For details, see Lucas (1977) and the inquiry known as “The three wise men report” 
leading to the establishment of Euratom.
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Given the availability of technical information, the “joint programme” went 
further than previous initiatives, for it worked exclusively through licensing agree-
ments and joint ventures which allowed European firms to achieve a gradual build-
up of nuclear capabilities and to carry out subsequent autonomous nuclear R&D. 
5 Other national frameworks
In the late 1950s, the United Kingdom and France were independently developing 
gas graphite reactors – drawing knowledge and experience from the Manhattan 
Project – and Canada was working on heavy water reactors. In both European 
countries, the technological option was also influenced by military concerns. The 
US’ near monopoly on uranium enrichment technology left France and the UK no 
other choice but to develop natural uranium technologies for their civilian power 
programmes. In the following, we analyse the political and technical contexts in 
these two countries.
Significant emphasis has been laid on certain factors which are the success of 
the US nuclear framework and technological choice, as compared with other na-
tional paths such as the British one. In this context, the work of Burn (1967, 1978) 
provides a detailed and complete analysis which represented a reference for those 
advocating the benefits of free market forces for technological development. Burn 
attributes successes to policies inspired by a mixture of free market criteria and 
industrial promotion, but hardly considers that the US reactor vendors strongly 
profited from the R&D and subsidy support within AEC “infant industry” devel-
opment strategy (Cohn 1997: 75).
In the USA, nuclear fuel and uranium enrichment remained a government 
preserve and was highly subsidised (Mullenbach 1963), a fact which gave the US 
industry a kind of artificial competitiveness vis-à-vis other countries that at that time 
could not hope to match. A questionable feature of Burń s analysis is his account of 
the handing-over of the US AEC ś knowledge to the market and the “industriali-
sation” of the experience matured under the US AEC. Burn (1967) shares the same 
criticism as Mullenbach (1963) that the technological choice was functional to the 
possibilities of the national industry and that the US nuclear policy was in some 
sense subordinate to the interests prevailing in the industry. Our claim, rather, is 
that while it is true that the American industry displayed internal economies, it is 
also the case that this was achieved on the heels of a phase in which military targets 
received absolute priority. Only later was it possible to pursue the needs for a civilian 
development of nuclear power. The high priority assigned to military targets in the 
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USA remains therefore one of the chief factors explaining the development. Britain, 
France and Canada were countries which – like the USA – had a military nuclear 
experience, but one that began later, was more limited in the extent of its operations 
and thus lagged behind the USA in terms of its developments and spill-over effects. 
Another factor distinguishing the European from the US development – one 
which Burn (1978) emphasises – is the incubation period provided for nuclear 
technology. While the US authorities allowed for the parallel development of the 
most promising projects before the most feasible technologies – in the economic, 
military and technical sense – emerged in the market, France and Britain ventured 
into a sort of technological wager which led to the pursuit of single projects to an 
advanced stage, beyond the point at which they could be easily be shelved in the 
case of limited commercial and technical success.
The United Kingdom13
As in the US, nuclear power in the UK began with the military. In 1941, a team of 
British scientists established the general feasibility of a bomb design and reactor 
construction. By 1942, it had become clear that research cooperation with the US 
would significantly benefit both nations. Once the Manhattan Project fell under a 
cloud of strict secrecy, however, Britain had difficulties accessing US laboratories 
and was forced to rely on independent R&D. The US Atomic Energy Act of 1946, 
with its tight security restrictions, thus effectively deprived Britain of access to the 
technology following World War II. 
A British Atomic Energy Act became effective in November 1946 and allowed 
for nuclear development under largely similar conditions to those in the US, 
though without the same harsh penalties for security violations. Responsibility 
for production, use and disposal of nuclear material was assigned to the Ministry 
of Supply (MoS). Government authorities established a strictly centralised control 
over all the activities connected with the development of nuclear energy. In 1948, 
the Radioactive Substance Act entrusted to the MoS complete authority over the 
control and use of all radioactive substances, including the regulation of their 
import and export.
Nuclear power development was pursued by the Atomic Energy Production 
Division of the Atomic Energy Department of the MoS at Risley. The first scale 
reactors were built at the Atomic Energy Research Establishment at Harwell in 
Oxfordshire, which was the established in 1946 under the MoS. The reactors were 
planned as prototypes exclusively to produce plutonium for military purposes. 
They used natural uranium and graphite as a moderator; they were first cooled 
13 This section draws on Burn (1978; 1967) and on Williams (1980).
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by air, then by gas. The original plan to have water cooling, as in the US Hanford 
reactors, was dropped for safety reasons and for the lack of suitable sites (Gowing 
1964; Williams 1980). By the end of the 1940s, British efforts had resulted in a plant 
for the manufacture of uranium, located at Springfield, and facilities for uranium 
enrichment and the production and separation of plutonium.
In 1948, Britain’s Harwell Group initiated a project to study the steam aspects 
of dual reactors, with the aim of awarding a construction contract to the most 
successful firm. However, conflicts with the Risley group impeded the project. The 
main objections were based on the need for plutonium for military applications 
and the fact that Lord Hinton – who would a decade later become the first head 
of the newly created Central Electricity Generating Board – and the Risley group 
mistrusted the industry ś reliability (Gowing 1964: 185–190). All the same, data 
was accumulated at Harwell from feasibility studies that lasted from 1951 to 1953. 
This resulted in the design of a dual-purpose reactor to be used jointly for the pro-
duction of electricity and plutonium. With the growing demand for plutonium, 
the government approved a proposal to build the Harwell-designed reactor in 
February 1953, a decision that led to the first Calder Hall reactor, known first as 
Pippa and later as Magnox. It used natural uranium, graphite as a moderator and 
carbon-dioxide as a coolant. According to Gowing (1964), while there was plenty 
of support for the LWR option and for later development of Heavy Water Reactors 
(HWR) and High Temperature Reactors (HTR), the LWR solution was dropped 
because its potential for being scaled up was not recognised. Thus, what Burn (1967) 
calls the “Lord Hinton approach” set in, namely a concentration of efforts on the 
gas-graphite technology with an eye towards fast breeder reactor technology, and, 
importantly, fissile material production for the UK’s developing a nuclear warhead 
programme. The Calder Hall reactor began producing electricity in July 1956. The 
work itself was the Harwell and the Risley Groups, since all development of the 
technology had been fully centralised in government establishments.
In 1954, and in parallel to the change in the US Atomic Act, a new legal frame-
work was established in Britain. The change was less radical than that in the US 
since it amounted to amending and extending some points of the existing acts in 
order to establish a civilian atomic energy authority and assign suitable power 
and liabilities. Unlike the US, there were no special provisions for declassification 
of information; the 1946 Act had already laid guidelines for an automatic process 
of declassification for matters of no strict significance for defence purposes. The 
UK Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA) was created to embrace both civilian and 
military atomic activities and to act as a consulting agency on all nuclear affairs. 
The new agency was entrusted with R&D, including fuel elements, the prototype 
stage and the phase leading up to the construction of the first commercial plant. 
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Only at that point was it envisioned that industrial firms would enter in the field 
and realise projects based on UKAEA R&D results. With the Calder Hall plant in 
its early stage of development, it was nevertheless decided that this would constitute 
the grounds for a large scale nuclear power programme. The provisional nuclear 
power programme was announced in a government White Paper in February 1955 
and anticipated the construction of 12 plants with a total capacity of 1,500-2,000 
MW by the end of 1965. The first plant was to be of the Magnox type.
The Harwell Group ś experience in design, research and preliminary work pointed 
to the advantages of an integrated system in which the civilian, mechanical and 
nuclear parts of the plant would be jointly designed. Difficulties arose, however, in 
developing the industry and in establishing a coordinated approach for design and 
construction. The industry was handicapped by its virtual ignorance of almost nine 
years of nuclear growth, and further limited by the lack of a precise framework for 
collaboration with the UK AEA.14
The UK AEA retained for itself most of the reactor development and prototype 
construction; industry was allowed to undertake further design and development in 
connection with its role in full scale plant construction. Thus, when contracts were 
awarded to the chosen consortia, the UK AEA acted as a consultant on a turnkey 
basis and the industrial consortia undertook most of the R&D required to improve 
the Calder Hall technology. The UK AEA began R&D on other technologies like 
the advanced gas cooled reactor (AGR), but it simultaneously encouraged industry 
to take on its own R&D with the aim of contracting successful technologies in the 
future. Following the Suez crisis, the atomic energy plan was tripled and the power 
of projected plants was raised to 5,000-6,000 MW by 1966, with E each plant to be 
as large as technically feasible with the expectation of reducing costs (Burns 1978). 
The five plants using Calder Hall Magnox technology were built by five different 
groups and involved design changes such that each could be regarded as a proto-
type. The first “commercially” operated Magnox plant was technically modified, 
at the instruction of the Ministry of Supply to optimise plutonium production for 
future UK military use, and later export to the U.S military nuclear programme 
run by the U.S AEC (Lowry 1989). At the end of 1957, the introduction of a new 
AGR technology was announced. It was based on the Magnox design but used 
enriched uranium. With this, a second nuclear programme began in 1965 with 
the contracting of the Dungeness B plant. While the choice of AGR received some 
criticism, it was preferred to LWR for technical and political reasons. However, the 
14 According to Burn (1978: 277–78) some of the consortia were seeking a greater degree 
of freedom and eventually to take up licensing arrangements with US companies.
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emphasis on this technology over all others brought the UK AEA to technological 
and commercial disaster.
According to Burn (1967, 1978), the commercial failure of the British technol-
ogy can be attributed to both design and project management. The AGR reflected 
three fundamental mistakes in decisions made between 1955 and 1957. They were: 
1. to have started a nuclear plan exclusively based on the Magnox technology; 
2. to have tripled it by 1957; 
3. to have limited the subsequent R&D to gas-graphite reactors. 
The results of the implementation of AGR technology was to concentrate the industry 
on the production of systems without a secure future. The public monopoly over 
R&D was responsible for the excessive rigidity of the structure, which according 
to the plans, should have been highly dynamic.15
Although the UK AEA assisted potential buyer countries in obtaining credits 
extended for five years from the commissioning of the nuclear plant, the only suc-
cessful bilateral agreements were the two signed contracts with Italy and Japan. 
These resulted in the sale of a 200MW and a 150MW Magnox plant, respective-
ly. Thereafter, Britain failed to capture any orders on the international market. 
Officials often justified this failure by alleging unfair competition from the US 
government, citing the US’ preferential loans for construction, artificially low fuel 
prices, exceptionally good terms for reprocessing the fuel and guarantees backed 
by the federal government. 
France16
Like Britain and the US, France had a military start to atomic energy development. 
The early French nuclear reactors were designed and built to produce plutonium. 
Unlike the US, which attempted to separate civil and military uses of nuclear power, 
France has never separated the organisation of nuclear energy and nuclear weap-
ons. “This has remained the underlying rationale until today” (Schneider 2008:8).
Following the end of WW2, the Commissariat à l’énergie atomique (CEA) 
was established as a highly efficient agency regulating the use of nuclear energy. 
However, the general orientation of the agency, with its strong military bias in 
R&D, led to the retirement of Juliot-Curie who had been among the pioneers of 
15 For a detailed analysis of the policy aspects and the role of the government in the de-
velopment of AGR technology, see Williams (1980).
16 This section draws on Scheinman (1965), Di Nucci (1986) and Schneider (2008).
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the nuclear discovery, but whose political convictions were incompatible with the 
military emphasis of the CEA.
In 1952, the first 5-year plan for atomic energy was launched by the Secretary of 
State. It was based on the production of plutonium for military ends by dual purpose 
reactors. Around the same time, a Commission for the production of electricity of 
nuclear origin (PEON) was established to liaise with the CEA, the nationalised electric 
utility Électricité de France (EdF) and the industry engaged in the production of nu-
clear components. In response to General de Gaulle ś ambitious pursuit of grandeur, 
the atomic agency objectives became to further the country as a military power by 
means of atomic weapons and, given its limited internal resources, to free it from 
dependence on foreign supply and technology. Due to the excessive cost of uranium 
enrichment plants and to the US ban on the export of enriched uranium, France 
faced similar limitations as Britain in its choice of moderator, fuel and coolant.17
Cost considerations ruled out the heavy water option and with it, the need for 
fissionable material for military purposes. France, like Britain, settled on gas-graphite 
reactors. The first was built at Marcoule and the plutonium it produced charged 
the first French atomic bomb, exploded in 1960. And just as in the UK, the first 
large scale gas-graphite reactors, as Chinon, were presented publicly as civilian, 
and named EDF-1 and EDF-2 (Davis 1988). Major challenges for the establishment 
of a French commercial nuclear system resulted from the weakness of the power 
generation equipment industry. Thus, it was only with the cooperation between 
CEA and EdF that the industry could participate in the construction of three GCR s 
similar to Marcoule (38 MW, completed at the end of 1959). Prior to 1968, all plants 
were of the gas-cooled reactor (GCR) type, with exception of a 10% participation 
by EdF in the planned SELNI project in Italy. This project was to use the PWR 
commercial technology from Westinghouse. Framatome entered into licensing 
agreements with Westinghouse in 1958.18
While France was developing gas-graphite reactors as a long term strategic 
option, other technologies were being experimented with, including heavy wa-
ter-moderated reactors (HWR) and the light water technology, pressurised water 
reactors (PWR). Following President ś de Gaulle death in 1969, the gas-graphite 
technology was replaced by the LWR, mostly developed under licence agreements 
with the US duopoly. Akin to the US experience, this development had its origins 
17 Uranium supply was guaranteed through Niger and Gabon, at that time still French 
colonies. 
18 Framatome (Societe Franco-American de Construction Economique) was established 
in 1958 by seven companies of the Empain Schneider Group. Framatome terminated 
its licence in 1981 and negotiated a new agreement.
24 Maria Rosaria Di Nucci
in research on nuclear submarine reactors. The establishment of the French civil-
ian nuclear framework was entrusted to two main actors, the CEA and EdF. They 
served as the executive arm of the Ministry of Industry, which was responsible for 
energy policy. The CEA was responsible for the entire nuclear fuel cycle as well as 
research in nuclear physics. Its “Direction des Applications Militaires” (DAM) was 
responsible for bomb testing at Mouroa. CEA also built the plutonium production 
plants at Marcoule and La Hague (Schneider 2008).  
On the whole, the French civil nuclear programme has largely profited from 
the military programme and vice-versa; the link with the military has remained 
strong. For instance, La Hague reprocessing plant was financed in equal shares 
by the civil and military budgets of the CEA. Schneider (2008: 8) describes this as 
military cross-subsidisation, which he considers a leading benefactor throughout 
the entire French nuclear programme. 
From national technological options to LWR technologies under 
licensing agreement
Following the so-called “bandwagon market” of 1966–67 and massive investment 
in nuclear projects, the US industry compromised the European efforts to develop 
alternative technologies to LWR and nuclear energy was marketed as “too cheap to 
be metered” (Cohn 1997).19 Between 1962 and 1976, the installed nuclear capacity 
approximately doubled every two years, with a growth rate of over 40% per year. 
Burness et al. (1990) consider this the fastest sustained growth rate for a US industry 
in the history of the country.
Because of the technical and commercial success of US LWR technology, Eu-
ropean policymakers were torn between resisting the American marketing attack 
and simply taking up licensing agreements with leading US companies. Economic 
wisdom led the majority of European companies to strengthen their existing ties 
with Westinghouse and GE, with the aim of refining their internal capabilities by 
first gaining access to technical knowledge and then internalising the licence and 
solving technical problems on their own. Governments similarly made efforts to 
carve out and direct growth paths using a set of intermediate targets and instru-
ments to foster technological autonomy as a final objective.
Naturally, the relative position of each country with regard to licence assimila-
tion varied and was influenced by economic and political factors. With hindsight, 
however, one can say that licences brought about advantages when the recipient 
industries were able to pursue technological improvements on the “product” under 
19 In such fixed price contracts, the reactor vendors had responsibility for design, con-
struction and testing of a reactor, including regulatory guidelines.
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licence. Given Euratom’s failure to promote a European technology, it had become 
apparent that any nationalistic grounds for a country ś autonomous technological 
path would have been inadequate in the face of the intrinsic fragmentation of the 
European market and the American oligopoly in the international arena.20
Once the LWR option had become the most widely chosen worldwide, both PWR 
and BWR (boiling water reactor) technology coexisted in national markets for more 
than a decade. France was the first country to abandon the BWR technology path 
and concentrate solely on PWRs in 1975.
6 Determinant factors of success for LWR market 
penetration21
The role of enriched uranium
The availability of enrichment technology and of enriched uranium has often been 
underestimated as a critical factor contributing to the success of the US technological 
path. Therefore, here we stress the importance of this element and the way in which 
pricing policy by the American authorities assisted the US industry’s expansion 
throughout the 1970s and its imposition of LWR technology on the world market.
The availability of enriched uranium can be considered another spill-over from 
the military activities, and an example of the socialisation of costs as significant 
as that deriving from the knowledge and experience nurtured under the US AEC 
and Navy programme applications. The availability of enrichment facilities had a 
direct influence on the choice of LWR technology. Its impact was immediate, since 
the employment of enriched uranium permitted some degree of freedom in the 
alternative nuclear technologies. It also allowed for a certain latitude in the choice 
of materials and in reactor design, which prevented the “high construction costs 
and poor material economy” observed in the British case (Burn 1978).
One reason why little interest has been shown in uranium as a leading success 
factor may be the difficulty of ascertaining the start-up costs of uranium enrichment 
programmes exclusively for civilian reactor development projects. However, one may 
reasonably conjecture that whatever the hypothetical cost of such a programme, the 
expense would have been such that no economic or technical considerations would 
20 Commercial strategies and paths differed in the case of experimental reactors and FBR. 
This field represents an atypical situation, especially for the high degree of European 
cooperation in R&D and as these projects were carried out independently of the USA.
21 This section draws heavily on Di Nucci (1986).
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have justified developing a technology like LWR. On these grounds, countries like 
Canada, Britain and France, which used different moderators and coolants had no 
choice for fuel: it had to be natural uranium.
The crucial role played by enriched uranium is underlined by the fact that attempts 
to privatise the industrial phase of enrichment were unsuccessful, despite early 
promises by the US AEC that it was prepared to do so, until 1963–64. Moreover, 
the public monopoly over enriched uranium did not constitute a bottle-neck for 
the American industry abroad, even with the constraints on the international sale 
and re-purchasing of uranium. On the contrary, it allowed the industry to transfer 
costs to the taxpayer for a highly expensive operation. These incentive prices for 
uranium ore and plutonium were criticised by contemporary observers, but at the 
same time this move was justified with the need to accelerate the development of 
a civilian nuclear industry in order to support the uranium production industry 
(Mullenbach 1963:122). 
The US remained the only Western nation where the home industry could 
benefit from strong military-linked government support. In Europe, the absence 
of a massive military programme left little hope for the autonomous and parallel 
development of European technologies. It might be objected that Britain and 
France also had this support at a later stage uranium enrichment plants, but the 
Capenhurst and Pierrelatte facilities were designed for military purposes. Their 
production was modest and insufficiently influenced a change in the preferred 
technology. While a mix of economic and military considerations (such as the costs 
of fuel moderators like heavy water and the need for plutonium) had motivated 
European countries to adopt gas-graphite technology, this proved to be a technical 
and economic flop. Subsequently, European nations entered into licence agreements 
with the US LWR vendors.
The search for the optimisation of the whole nuclear system
An additional success factor in the selection of technologies and the industrialisation 
of military nuclear assets was the active involvement of the US private industry in 
the fuel cycle. Reactor suppliers could profit from an efficient fuel industry because 
of their participation in the US AEC promotion programmes; this integration 
contributed to the optimisation of the system. 
Compared to other technologies, nuclear power involved a greater degree of 
consideration in terms of creating an industry with high organisational and tech-
nological standards that were intricately linked to the political and institutional 
structures. In this respect, the growth of the industry and the progress of LWR 
technology in the US is an exemplary case of the development of an intimate re-
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lationship between industry and the institutional framework, and of the key role 
that public and private actors played in all aspects of the industry ś development.
As a consequence of the many synergies created, the US nuclear system was 
able to reach a broad turn-key capacity guaranteeing plant construction, fuel rods, 
and further supplies of uranium as well as reprocessing. Being able to offer such 
a package from the outset meant that the US industry had a clear comparative 
advantage for its LWR technology. Our claim is that success did not depend – at 
least not exclusively – on the characteristics of the reactor offered for sale, but on 
the system of which the reactor was a part of. The case of Britain clearly shows that 
the lack of commercial success was mainly due to a nuclear framework which was 
self-sufficient and closed around its reactor, which ultimately confined national 
nuclear technology to a single domestic scene.
The British failures demonstrate that a pluralistic approach to technological 
development in which several alternative strategies are simultaneously pursued 
may be less costly, in terms of research outcomes, than a monistic approach con-
centrating on a single project. In the case of the US, the decisive factor in success 
was not the selection of LWR technology, but the compatibility of that option, of 
the many explored, with the industrial system that has to accommodate it.
The pragmatic approach by US authorities, what Burn (1978) calls the “selection 
principle” played an important role. But, unlike Burn, we argue that the choice 
itself was, in a certain sense, piloted rather than the result of market forces. The 
choice mechanism is evident from both the Five Year Programme and the various 
rounds of the Power Demonstration Reactor Programme. On the other hand, the 
best experimental results were obtained with prototypes that were later abandoned. 
In fact, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy concluded in 1954 that of the five 
different reactor technologies developed for civilian use, the PWR appeared to be 
the least promising due to its conservative design (Cowan 1990). How then, was it 
able to emerge as the dominant technology? To address this question, the first thing 
to consider is that the LWRs, though less advanced than other technologies, were 
chosen for their commercial viability. Unlike other technologies, they presented 
fewer obstacles to being scaled up from the prototype stage. LWR was thus the only 
design ready for full-scale construction. Moreover, its deployment was necessary 
as a demonstration of the potentials of commercial nuclear power and to promote 
the “Atoms for Peace” Programme. With Cowan (1990: 566), we maintain that the 
first-comer technology which can advance along its learning curve will dominate 
the market.
This, of course, is not the whole story. An additional and more fundamental 
explanation is that unlike many national nuclear programmes, where the failure to 
export reactors was largely due to the inability to internationalise their productive 
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structure, the US’ technology was the only one to offer continuity and a greater 
flexibility. Any strategy can be adopted for the commercialisation of a product, but 
when an entire technological system is to be exported, the strategy which pays off is 
that which best fits what has been named the principle of technological-industrial 
continuity (Di Nucci and Pearce 1989). Solutions and systems that are too far from 
current technological frontiers are unlikely to succeed, since they would require the 
greatest amount of technical and industrial adjustment and transformation. The 
strength of the US nuclear system was its ability to be exported as a reactor-and-ser-
vice- package, satisfying the technological-industrial continuity criterion. 
The pull of the market
The success factors outlined thus far would have been of little avail if steps had 
not been taken to turn potential demand into orders. Such policies in the US and 
Europe differed not only in their manner of creating internal demand, but also in 
the paths pursued to reach this target. European strategies, at least initially, were 
inspired less by export and commercial criteria than by the urge for technological 
and energy autonomy. In contrast, the US AEC tried to stimulate demand from 
electric utilities by offering advantageous conditions and incentives, such as sub-
sidies and a pricing policy for enriched uranium. With this approach, the size of 
the US domestic and export market were directly influenced by government policy 
until the mid-1960s.
A major turning point occurred in 1964, at the time of the third Geneva Confer-
ence. GE had established itself domestically and internationally as a reactor vendor. 
The company had moved quickly in improving the original design and scale-up 
of prototypes and offered turnkey contracts for large scale reactors at fixed prices. 
Thirteen reactors were ordered on a turnkey basis by electric utilities (Burness et 
al. 1980). Thus, when GE published its price list for BWRs in 1964, the price quoted 
for the Oyster Creek plant had already set new cost targets that neither national nor 
European competitors could ignore. This enabled the company to present themselves 
as having the most feasible and economic design (Cohn 1997).
GE’s price list had an enormous impact. It represented a nuclear power plant 
as an “autonomous” commercial good and placed potential clients in a position 
to refer to a definite product with a definite price, much lower than those of its 
competitor, Westinghouse. Of course, the venture resulted in corporate losses; 
however, it also indicated that GE was not only likely to reap the benefits of cost 
socialisation of the early development phases, but that it was also prepared to take 
risks in commercial ventures.
Another important success factor is that in 1964, an amendment of the Atomic 
Energy Act granted the US AEC permission to lease nuclear fuel directly to market 
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actors. The timing of the GE price campaign coincided with the readiness of the US 
utilities to begin adjusting to previous under-capacity. The combination of demand 
and of the low, seemingly competitive prices for power generation, plus the kind 
of contracts for which the vendor guaranteed a fixed turnkey supply, triggered a 
boom in US plant orders. Seven units were ordered in 1965 and eight in the first 
half of 1966, to be followed by 13 in the second half of 1966 and 31 in 1967 (Burness 
et al. 1980:190). Though turnkey projects were costly investments for vendors, the 
completion of the turnkey units stimulated demand for new reactors and subsequent 
sales. The time period which followed was characterised by a tremendous flow of 
new orders, so much so that this era has been referred to as the ‘Great Bandwagon 
Market.’ Whereas 78 reactors had been ordered over the 12-year period between 
1955 and 1967, 166 reactors were ordered for projects across the USA between 1968 
and 1973, with 38 units ordered in 1972 alone (Bernd and Aldrich 2015).
A key observation is that in the decade 1963–1973, the US domestic demand alone 
offset the aggregate demand of the world market. The size of the internal market 
enabled the industry to pass the minimal threshold in physical and investment terms 
necessary for an autonomous take off, and to speculate on the promise of possible 
economies of scale including learning effects, which was hoped to trigger success 
on the export market. Two aspects of this cumulative effect are illustrated by the 
widespread network of licence agreements that US companies started in Europe 
and Japan. The third Geneva Conference therefore marked the establishment of 
the US commercial and technological supremacy. It simultaneously dealt a blow 
to the commercial aspirations of many autonomous national nuclear technologies 
in Europe. Licences became the major vehicle in US export policy. 
The scale of the reactors increased dramatically and most of the plants within the 
‘Great Bandwagon Market’ were considerably larger than older reactors (400MWe 
or greater). By the end of 1970, the entire nuclear industry had only accumulated 
11 years of operating experience on units of this size. As the demand for electricity 
in the US decreased dramatically in 1973, the first signs of the industry’s problems 
emerged. Most reactors faced construction delays and massive cost overruns; orders 
for nuclear power plants started being cancelled, with 12 projects called off before 
the end of 1973 (Bernd and Aldrich 2015). In 1975, only four reactors had been 
ordered, and just nine more were ordered in the three years that followed. The last 
order for a new nuclear power plant came in 1978. A year later, in 1979, the Three 
Mile Island’s accident occurred and the collapse of industry began.
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7 Conclusions
Our analysis has pointed out exogenous and endogenous factors affecting the long-
term development and diffusion of the LWR technology: the military spill-over effect; 
the use of enriched uranium and its restrictions; the subsidised price of enriched 
uranium; the choice of a commercial reactor based on the industry’s capacity to 
accommodate the technology and internationalise the whole system; and, last but 
not least, the scale of the nuclear programmes. The causal interactions at work here 
were unidirectional, but their influences have been mutual. New nuclear technology 
was not simply tested and then integrated within a system; its development was 
embedded in interactions with this system. Although there are similarities between 
national experiences, very distinct national stories have emerged. 
The US: The first-comer in enhancing the leading LWR technology was an 
innovator that benefited from early government infrastructure and support to 
commercialise the technology and benefited from military spill-over effects.
The UK: An example of the failure of a nuclear system based on a domestic 
autonomous technological pathway. The centralised framework and the idea that 
technical progress could occur despite negative signals from the international 
market, combined with institutional inertia, had a strong adverse effect on the 
industry. Ultimately, it could not rely on any suitable instruments to compensate 
for an international market that opted for LWRs.
France: A latecomer in the development of LWR technology. Its experience 
indicates the timeliness of giving up a national technology without a commercial 
future and taking on the risk of starting practically from scratch under licence. 
The extremely integrated decision-making framework, the nurturing attitude of 
the French government and the national electric utility bestowed a steadily growing 
market and learning economies. 
The initial nuclear development in these leading countries was characterised by 
a plurality of base technologies, following the experience gained through strategic 
and military activities. National differences in these experiences led to correspond-
ingly different national civilian frameworks and technological choices. In the initial 
development phase, the US enjoyed a virtual monopoly on uranium enrichment, 
backed by military financial support. It could opt for LWR technology accordingly. 
The availability of enriched uranium is arguably the most crucial factor in the 
US’ comparative technological success and market advantage. This can therefore 
be regarded as the cornerstone of the US export policy and success. In contrast, the 
absence of enrichment facilities in Europe, along with the need for plutonium for 
military purposes, guided France and the UK to pursue gas-graphite and Canada 
to select heavy water as a moderator. 
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Although the US was not alone in early nuclear development, its emphatic 
leadership came about through a series of crucial factors. The US AEC’s financing 
of almost all nuclear R&D, along with its direct role in funding and subsidising 
the majority of the early plants, proved to have a decisive and positive influence on 
the industry ś development. Domestic contracts became a key vehicle for eventual 
export sales, even though government regulations and administrative controls 
initially limited the scope of power plant export. The marketing of nuclear reactors 
occurred within a framework determined by international organisations, treaties, 
bilateral agreements and national laws, and was also influenced by economic and 
political relations with the recipient countries. The transfer of nuclear technology, 
mainly to Europe and Japan, was assisted by a certain liberality on the part of the 
licensors, but also by restricting expertise on the nuclear fuel cycle for military 
purposes. In this process, Britain was to suffer most and France was also adversely 
affected. Both countries eventually opted for LWR technology in 1979 in the former 
case, and a decade earlier, in 1969, in the latter.
The inherent characteristics of the nuclear plant as a saleable good, and the 
resulting implications for its development required a special role that only national 
governments could fill. At the same time, the industry needed specific government 
support, whether for selling abroad (as in the case of GE and Westinghouse), or for 
its engagement in the manufacturing of components imported from technology 
leaders (in the case of Europe). Either way, backing and promotion by govern-
ments was essential for various reasons, military development and spill-over and 
the nationalist incentive that made the industry desirable even before economic 
competitiveness had been achieved.
We have tried to separate the progressive attack by the US oligopoly on the na-
tional and international market into distinct temporal phases. The marketing of the 
US power plants followed two strategies: one amounting to the sale and later export 
of the nuclear reactor as a product; the other as the export of the entire nuclear 
productive structure. The former strategy applies to the period 1963–72, and in 
particular between 1962 and mid-1966. During this period, GE and Westinghouse 
sold turnkey plants to US public utilities and the contracts were available under 
fixed price terms (Burness et al. 1980; Bernd and Aldrich 2015). 
GE ended its turnkey contracts sale offensive to US electric utilities in June 1966. 
According to Burness et al. (1980), GE and Westinghouse took combined losses 
on the contracts upwards of $1 billion. However, the financial losses they suffered 
during the turnkey era can be considered an investment “in obtaining information 
through “learning by doing” in an effort to capture rents from the second generation 
of reactors” (Burness et al. 1990: 189). Finally, the US companies ceased offering 
turnkey contracts because of the cost risks.
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The second stage occurred through the transfer of knowledge via the sale of patent 
rights and licences, without direct industrial investment abroad, and by establishing 
subsidiaries and internationalising industrial capital via direct investment of risk 
capital in a foreign country. 
As we have explored in this chapter, there are good grounds for claiming that 
the early commercial success of LWR and the establishment of the US oligopoly 
(first domestically and then in the global market) is a rich example of the combined 
effects of a technology push (via the US AEC activities and military spill-over ef-
fects), market pull (bandwagon market) and market push (via competition among 
utilities to improve technical standards through innovation). A civilian nuclear 
industry was created in part to legitimatise the continued development of atomic 
weaponry. In the haste to develop nuclear power plants, economic and technical 
considerations were often secondary. A military model was selected for civilian use 
because it initially provided a dual purpose fissile material production capacity, 
rather than simply because it was immediately available (Bupp and Derian 1978). 
Alleging the importance of a production system which is common all over the 
world, Cowan (1990: 552) claims that “it is occasionally suggested that network 
externalities are also important in nuclear power. The network in this case has 
to do with information. Information about operating performance, appropriate 
accident response, and safety regulations can be passed among users of the same 
technology. This was seen (at least in retrospect) as a key factor in the explanation 
of the Belgian and Swedish decisions to adopt light water”. In the US, the choice 
of technology to be pursued in commercialisation encouraged autonomous tech-
nological advances for the options which could be developed while maintaining a 
certain continuity with the pre-existing industrial structure (Di Nucci 1986). Other, 
more “innovative” paths were to stay at the experimental level and be undertaken 
under governmental support, not directly by the industry – and they have remained 
“experimental” until today.
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The Current Status of the World Nuclear 
Industry
Mycle Schneider, and Antony Froggatt1
Abstract
The following chapter is based on the World Nuclear Industry Status Report 
2018 (WNISR2018). The annual WNISR is a comprehensive assessment of the 
status and trends of the global nuclear power industry.
1 Introduction
Heat. The planetary, record-breaking heatwave in 2017 gave a daunting hint on 
what the future on earth will almost certainly look like. 
Water. The food system is the most sensitive to lack of water. As of early August 
2017, it is already clear that the draught will severely impact harvests in many parts 
of the world. 
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Heat, water and nuclear power. Thermal power plants need vast amounts of 
cooling water. It is estimated that in France 51 percent of freshwater takeout or 
about 10 percent of precipitation is absorbed in thermal power plants, with roughly 
three-quarters of its electricity generated by nuclear power over the years. No other 
electricity generating source needs more water than atomic fission energy. David 
Lochbaum, Director of the Nuclear Safety Project at the Union of the Concerned 
Scientists (UCS), who has produced a fact sheet on “Nuclear Power and Water”2, 
stated: “We’ll have to solve global warming if we want to keep using nuclear power”.3
The European Pressurized Water Reactor (EPR) under construction at Flamanville 
on the coast of Normandy will have its own desalination plant to cope with freshwater 
needs. Four in-land reactor sites along French rivers with no cooling towers—Bugey 
(2 units), Fessenheim (2 units), St. Alban (2 units), Tricastin (4 units)—take out 
about 70 percent of all thermal power plant cooling water in the country. The two 
oldest French reactors at Fessenheim alone take up about 18 percent of all 17 billion 
cubic meters of France’s annual freshwater takeouts.4 While these sites consume a 
large portion of the nation’s surface freshwater, they return about 90 percent back 
to the environment, but significantly heated up. 
And that is a problem. In order to make sure reactors can be appropriately cooled, 
the uptake water temperature is limited for safety reasons, and to avoid excessive 
heating of the rivers, the operating licenses impose limits to downstream water 
temperatures. Consequently, as of 1 August 2018, operators in several countries, 
including Finland, France, Germany, Sweden and Switzerland, had put operational 
restrictions on some of their nuclear power plants. While in most cases, regulations 
required to lower the output of the reactors by 10 percent or so, some reactors were 
shut down, including at least four reactors in France, to deal with the problem.
The heat symptom occurred just after the first EPR (European Pressurized Water 
Reactor) and the first AP1000 had started up within 24 hours interval—both in 
China—end of June 2018. A shift towards better times for the global nuclear in-
dustry? By no means. On every piece of positive development follows an avalanche 
of bad news. For now, the heat wave is only a secondary problem for the industry. 
2 UCS, “Nuclear Power and Water”, 2011, see https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default /files/l 
egacy/assets/documents/nuclear_power/fact-sheet-water-use.pdf accessed 2 August 2018.
3 Commons, “Amid climate concerns, nuclear plants feel the heat of warming water”, 
Energy News Network, see https://energynews.us/2016/09/09/midwest/nuclear-plants-
feel-the-heat-of-warming-water/ accessed 1 August 2018.
4 CGDD, “Les prélèvements d’eau par usage et par ressource”, 21 June 2017, see http://www.
statistiques.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/lessentiel/ar/234/1108/prelevements-deau-us-
age-ressource.html accessed 1 August 2018.
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The general malaise about the uncertain future of the industry remains deep and 
disconcerting.
While China proudly presents the prowess of its construction industry with the 
completion of the first Generation-III reactors—designed by western companies, the 
EPR by Framatome-Siemens and the AP1000 by Westinghouse, the now-bankrupt 
worldwide largest historic builder—the rest of the world wonders at what rhythm 
the country will continue to expand its nuclear program. No new commercial 
reactor construction was launched in China since December 2016.
In France, the sub-standard pressure vessel of the Flamanville EPR was declared 
fit to operate by the safety authority, but the vessel head will have to be replaced 
after only six years of operation. Startup was delayed again by several months after 
numerous faulty welds were identified in the main steam supply system. After the 
technical bankruptcy, subsequent government bailout, breakup and name-change 
of AREVA to Orano, the new company renews with the old pattern and has been 
losing money again in 2017.
In Japan, the utilities managed to increase the number of operating reactors 
from zero in 2014 to nine by mid-2018. But this remains a very limited success 
with the plants contributing just 3.6 percent of the national electricity generation 
and 26 reactors remaining in Long-Term Outage (LTO, see definition below). Local 
populations and the general public remain overwhelmingly opposed to the restart 
of reactors. The attempts of the Japanese government to declare certain Fukushima 
evacuation zones as “decontaminated” and suitable for return did not convince 
many evacuees and most of them will likely never go back.
In the United Kingdom (U.K.), the Hinkley Point C project is underway but 
strangely still not officially under construction. After having spent at least €3 billion 
and thousands of workers on-site, apparently, the base-mat of the reactor building 
has still not being concreted—that marks the official construction start. Latest news 
on new-build in the U.K. is that Toshiba—former owner of Westinghouse—has 
stripped Korea Electric Power Company (KEPCO) of the preferred bidder status to 
acquire 100 percent of the company NuGen set up to build a nuclear power plant at 
the Moorside site in Cumbria.5 KEPCO had been seen as the most promising candi-
date for the takeover, after other potent potential investors like the French Engie or 
Spanish Iberdrola left the U.K. new-build playing field. Toshiba got severely burnt 
in the Westinghouse bankruptcy and will not build any reactors any more. Prof. 
John Loughhead, Chief Scientist at the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy 
5 WNN, “Kepco loses preferred bidder status for NuGen”, 1 August 2018, see http://www.
world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Kepco-loses-preferred-bidder-status-for-NuGen, 2 
August 2018.
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Ministry (BEIS), stated at a conference at the UK Royal Society on “Decarbonising 
UK energy”: “There are clear issues with nuclear technology at present. The nuclear 
industry has created a product so expensive that no one can afford to buy it.”6
In the United States (U.S.)., many reactors remain threatened to shut down long 
before their licenses expire because they cannot compete in the market. The nuclear 
industry and its supporters are clearly now focusing on efforts to come up with 
innovative subsidizing schemes, in particular on state level, to help avoiding “early 
closures” of uneconomic reactors. Science Daily titles a research paper7: “The vanishing 
nuclear industry” and is asking: “Could nuclear power make a significant contribution 
to decarbonizing the US energy system over the next three or four decades?”, only 
to provide the answer: “Probably not.” In May 2018, William Von Hoene, Senior 
Vice President and Chief Strategy Officer with Exelon, the largest nuclear operator 
in the U.S., had this to say: “I don’t think we’re building any more nuclear plants in 
the United States. I don’t think it’s ever going to happen... They are too expensive 
to construct, relative to the world in which we now live.”8 The recent revelation by 
the Wall Street Journal is therefore barely surprising: “A major donor to President 
Trump agreed to pay US$10 million to the president’s then-personal attorney if he 
successfully helped obtain funding for a nuclear-power project, including a $5 billion 
loan from the U.S. government...”9 The project in question is the Bellefonte plant in 
Tennessee, where the construction of two reactors was launched in the 1970s and 
abandoned in the 1980s—two of 42 nuclear construction sites abandoned in various 
stages of advancement in the U.S. alone. In 2016, the site was purchased by a private 
company for US$111 million with the stated-intention to invest up to US$13 billion 
to complete construction. Obviously, the project needed government support, as 
everywhere else, thus the willingness to pay President Trumps long-time fixer the 
extraordinary amount of US$10 million to help obtain a government loan.
Nuclear new-build is simply not competitive under ordinary market economy 
rules anywhere. Worse, like in the U.S., similar economic constraints continue to 
6 David Lowry, personal communication, 4 October 2017.
7 Science Daily, “The vanishing nuclear industry”, ScienceDaily, 2 July 2018, see https://
www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2018/07/180702154736.htm, accessed 7 July 2018.
8 With 23 operational reactors, Exelon is the US’ largest nuclear operator. S&P Global 
Platts, “No new nuclear units will be built in US due to high cost: Exelon official”, 18 
April 2018, see https://www.platts.com/latest-news/electric-power/washington/no-new-
nuclear-units-will-be-built-in-us-due-26938511, accessed 22 May 2018. 
9 WSJ, “Top Trump Donor Agreed to Pay Michael Cohen $10 Million for Nuclear Project 
Push”, 2 August 2018, see https://www.wsj.com/articles/top-trump-donor-agreed-to-pay-
michael-cohen-10-million-for-nuclear-project-push-sources-say-1533245330, accessed 
3 August 2018.
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press owners of currently operating, amortized reactors around the world, leading 
to an increasing number of units being closed permanently earlier than anticipated. 
Finally, maybe the largest barrier to nuclear power development or its mere sur-
vival is still the time factor. The German electrical and electronics giant Siemens has 
just raised the stakes to an unprecedented level. In June 2018, Siemens connected 
14.4 GW of turnkey natural gas combined cycle power capacity to the grid in Egypt 
27.5 months aft construction start, three years after contract signature, boosting 
the national electricity generating capacity by 45 percent. An intermediate step of 
4.8 GW, the first of the three giant plants, started up after only 18 months. With 
over 60 percent efficiency, these combined-cycle gas plants are almost twice as 
efficient as nuclear reactors. The next step is the implementation of up to 600 wind 
turbines with a total capacity of up to 2 GW, part of the goal of 7.2 GW wind power 
capacity spinning by 2020.10 
2 General overview worldwide
The role of nuclear power
As of mid-2018, 31 countries were operating nuclear power reactors. That number 
has remained stable since Iran started up its first reactor in 2011. 
The world nuclear fleet generated 2,503 net terawatt-hours (TWh or billion kilo-
watt-hours) of electricity in 201711, a one percent increase, but still less than in 2001 
and four percent below the historic peak nuclear generation in 2006 (see Figure 1). 
Without China—which increased nuclear output by 35 TWh (+18 percent), more 
than the worldwide increase of 26 TWh—global nuclear power generation would 
have slightly decreased again in 2017. This is the third year in a row that China alone 
made up for the global decrease outside the country. In fact, in the past decade, 
only three years would have seen a global increase without China, 2010, 2013 and 
2014, the year before 3/11 triggered the Fukushima disaster, and the two years after 
the 284 TWh (11 percent) production slump in 2011–2012. 
10 Siemens, “Completion of world’s largest combined cycle power plants in record time”, 
24 July 2018, see https://www.siemens.com/press/en/feature/2015/corporate/2015-06-egypt. 
php accessed 2 August 2018.
11 If not otherwise noted, all nuclear capacity and electricity generation figures based on 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Power Reactor Information System (PRIS) 
online database, see http://www.iaea.org/programmes/a2/index.html. Production figures 
are net of the plant’s own consumption unless otherwise noted.
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Fig. 1 Nuclear Electricity Generation in the World... and China
Sources: WNISR, with IAEA-PRIS, 2018, p. 28
Close to half of the world’s nuclear power countries are located in the European 
Union (EU), and, in 2017, they accounted for 31.5 percent of the world’s gross 
nuclear production, with half of the EU generation in France.
Nuclear energy’s share of global commercial gross electricity generation remained 
almost stable over the past five years (–0.5 percent over the period), after dropping 
below 11 percent in 2012, for the first time in over three decades. The nuclear share 
declined slowly but steadily from a peak of about 17.5 percent in 1996 to 10.3 percent 
in 2017. Nuclear’s primary energy remained rather stable after hitting a 30-year 
low at 4.4 percent in 2014.12
In 2017, nuclear generation increased in 13 countries, declined in 11, and re-
mained stable in seven.13 Five countries (China, Hungary, Iran, Pakistan, Russia) 
achieved their greatest lifetime nuclear production in 2017. Of these, China and 
Pakistan connected new reactors to the grid. China started up three units, and 
Chinese companies built the one that was commissioned in Pakistan. 
As in previous years, in 2017, the “big five” nuclear generating countries—by rank, 
the United States, France, China, Russia and South Korea—generated 70 percent 
12 BP, “Statistical Review of World Energy 2017”, June 2018, see https://www.bp.com/
content/dam/bp/en/corporate/pdf/energy-economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-
2018-full-report.pdf accessed 28 July 2018.
13 Less than 1 percentage point variation from the previous year.
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of all nuclear electricity in the world (see Figure 2, left side). In 2002, China held 
position 15, in 2007 it was tenth, before reaching third place in 2016. Two countries, 
the U.S. and France, accounted for 47.5 percent of global nuclear production in 2017.
Seven countries’ nuclear power generation peaked in the 1990s, among them 
Belgium, Canada, Japan, and the U.K. A further eleven countries’ nuclear generation 
peaked between 2001 and 2010 including France, Germany, Spain, and Sweden. 
Fourteen countries generated their maximum amount of nuclear power in the past 
seven years, five of which peaked in 2017.
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Fig. 2 Nuclear Electricity Generation and Share in Global Power Generation 
Sources: WNISR, with IAEA-PRIS, 2018, p. 29
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In many cases, even where nuclear power generation augmented, the development 
is not keeping pace with overall increases in electricity production, leading to a 
nuclear share below the respective historic maximum (see Figure 2, right side). 
It is therefore remarkable that in 2017, there were 19 countries that maintained 
their nuclear share at a constant level (change of less than 1 percentage-point), six 
countries increased and six decreased the relative share of their nuclear portion.
There were three exceptions in 2017, where countries peaked their respective 
nuclear share in power generation: 
• Starting up three new reactors throughout the year, augmenting production by 
18 percent, China increased the 2016 maximum of 3.6 percent, to reach a new 
record 3.9 percent nuclear share. 
• Iran’s only commercial reactor started up in 2011 after 33 years of construction 
but it took another five years to reach a reasonable grid-connection time and load 
factor in 2016. Increasing production by 7.6 percent, the nuclear share increased 
again slightly from 2.1 percent to 2.2 percent in 2017.
• Pakistan has been increasing production of existing units and started up a new 
one, which led the nuclear to jump from 4.4 percent to 6.2 percent.
3 Operation, power generation, age distribution
Since the first nuclear power reactor was connected to the Soviet power grid at 
Obninsk on 27 June 1954, there have been two major waves of startups. The first 
peaked in 1974, with 26 grid connections in that year. The second reached a historic 
maximum in 1984 and 1985, just before the Chernobyl accident, reaching 33 grid 
connections in each year. By the end of the 1980s, the uninterrupted net increase 
of operating units had ceased, and in 1990 for the first time the number of reactor 
shutdowns outweighed the number of startups. The 1991–2000 decade showed far 
more startups than shutdowns (52/30), while in the decade 2001–2010, startups 
did not match shutdowns (32/35). Furthermore, after 2000, it took a whole decade 
to connect as many units as in a single year in the middle of the 1980s. Between 
2011 and mid-2018, the startup of 48 reactors—of which 29 (60 percent) in China 
alone—outpaced by six the closure of 42 units over the same period (see Figure 3).
After the startup of 10 reactors in the world in each of the years 2015 and 2016, 
only four units started up in 2017, of which three in China and one in Pakistan. 
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Three reactors were closed in 2017, respectively the oldest unit in Germany 
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Fig. 3 Nuclear Power Reactor Grid Connections and Shutdowns 
Sources: WNISR, with IAEA-PRIS, 2018, p. 30
In the first half of 2018, five reactors started up in the world, more than in the entire 
year of 2017, while none has been closed. Three units were connected to the grid in 
China, including the first EPR (Taishan-1) and the first AP1000 (Sanmen-1) to start 
up in the world (see Figure 4). And two reactors started up in Russia, Leningrad 2-1, 
and Rostov-4 that began construction 35 years ago.15
14 WNISR considers shutdowns from the moment of grid disconnection—and not from 
the moment of the industrial, political or economic decision—and as the units have not 
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Fig. 4 Nuclear Power Reactor Grid Connections and Shutdowns – The China Effect 
Sources: WNISR, with IAEA-PRIS, 2018, p. 31
The IAEA continues to count 42 units in Japan in its total number of 453 reactors “in 
operation” in the world16; yet no nuclear electricity was generated in Japan between 
September 2013 and August 2015, and as of 1 July 2018, only nine reactors were 
operating. Nuclear plants provided only 3.6 percent of the electricity in Japan in 2017.
The WNISR keeps calling for an appropriate reflection in world nuclear statis-
tics of the unique situation in Japan. The attitude taken by the IAEA, the Japanese 
government, utilities, industry and many research bodies as well as other govern-
ments and organizations to continue considering the entire stranded reactor fleet 
in the country as “in operation” or “operational” remains a misleading distortion 
of facts. Steve Kidd, long-time industry strategist, agreed in a WNISR2016 review 
in Nuclear Engineering International: 
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Including reactors as “operable” along with those definitely in service, when they 
have not generated power for many years (and don’t even have a licence to do so) is 
clearly ridiculous.17 
Maybe as a result of such criticism, the World Nuclear Association (WNA), in its 
second “World Nuclear Performance Report”, has distinguished between “generating” 
and “not generating” nuclear generating capacity.18. The IAEA actually does have a 
reactor-status category called “Long-term Shutdown” or LTS.19 Under the IAEA’s 
definition, a reactor is considered in LTS, if it has been shut down for an “extended 
period (usually more than one year)”, and in early period of shutdown either restart 
is not being “aggressively pursued” or “no firm restart date or recovery schedule 
has been established”. The IAEA lists zero reactors in Japan in the LTS category.
The IAEA criteria are vague and hence subject to arbitrary interpretation. 
What exactly are extended periods? What is aggressively pursuing? What is a firm 
restart date or recovery schedule? Faced with this dilemma, the WNISR team in 
2014 decided to create a new category with a simple definition, based on empirical 
fact, without room for speculation: “Long-term Outage” or LTO. Its definition:
A nuclear reactor is considered in Long-term Outage or LTO if it has not generated any 
electricity in the previous calendar year and in the first half of the current calendar 
year. It is withdrawn from operational status retroactively from the day it has been 
disconnected from the grid.
When subsequently the decision is taken to permanently close a reactor, the shut-
down status starts with the day of the last electricity generation, and the WNISR 
statistics are modified retroactively accordingly.
Applying this definition to the world nuclear reactor fleet, as of 1 July 2018, 
leads to considering 26 Japanese units in LTO. Over the past year, four additional 
reactors were restarted and three more were officially closed. WNISR considers all 
ten Fukushima reactors shut down permanently—while the operator Tokyo Electric 
17 NEI, “Nuclear power in the world – pessimism or optimism?”, 13 October 2016, see http://
www.neimagazine.com/opinion/opinionnuclear-power-in-the-world-pessimism-or-op-
timism-5031270/, /, accessed 13 August 2017.
18 The World Nuclear Performance Report was launched by WNA in 2016, “perhaps as a 
reaction to the success of successive WNISRs”. In fact, in its September 2015 “Update 
for Members”, WNA reported that its Fuel Report Working Group “discussed the 
merits of producing an annual nuclear capacity scenario update. Such an update would 
be a useful communications tool and a counter to the industry-critical World Nuclear 
Industry Status Report”. 
19 See IAEA Glossary, at www.iaea.org/pris/Glossary.aspx, accessed 1 July 2016.
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Power Company (TEPCO) has written off  the six Daiichi units, it keeps the four 
Daini reactors in the list of operational facilities. However, it is expected that the 
Daini plant will shortly be offi  cially released for decommissioning. 
As of 1 July 2018, besides the 26 Japanese reactors, two reactors in India 
(Kakrapar-1 and -2), and one each in China (CEFR), France (Paluel-2)20 and Taiwan 
(Chinshan-1) met the LTO criterion. Besides the restarts in Japan, one reactor each 
in France (Bugey-5) and Switzerland (Beznau-1), that were categorized as being in 
LTO status in WNISR2017, were reconnected to the grid, and thus moved back to 
operational status. Th e total number of nuclear reactors in LTO as of 1 July 2018 is 
therefore 32; yet all are considered by the IAEA as “in operation”. 
Fig. 5 World Nuclear Reactor Fleet, 1954–2018
Sources: WNISR, with IAEA-PRIS, 2018, p. 33
As of 1 July 2018, a total of 413 nuclear reactors are operating in the world. Th e 
current fl eet has a total nominal electric net capacity of 363.4 gigawatts (GW or 
thousand megawatts), see Figure 5.
For many years, the net installed capacity has continued to increase more than 
the net increase of numbers of operating reactors. Th is is a result of the combined 
20 Aft er many delays, Paluel-2 was reconnected to the grid on 23 July 2018. 
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effects of larger units replacing smaller ones and, mainly, technical alterations 
at existing plants, a process known as uprating.21 In the United States alone, the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has approved 164 uprates since 1977. The 
cumulative approved uprates in the United States total 7.9 GW, the equivalent of 
eight large reactors.22 
A similar trend of uprates and major overhauls in view of lifetime extensions of 
existing reactors has been seen in Europe. The main incentive for lifetime exten-
sions is economic but this argument is being increasingly challenged as alternatives 
become cheaper.
4 Overview of current new-build
As of 1 July 2018, 50 reactors are considered here as under construction, the lowest 
number in a decade, three fewer than a year earlier, and 18 less than in 2013 (five of 
these projects have already been abandoned since). Four in five reactors are built in 
Asia and Eastern Europe, and China alone has nearly a third of all reactors under 
construction (16 out of 50). In total, 15 countries are building nuclear plants (see 
Table 1).
Five building projects were launched in 2017, two of which in India, and one 
each in Bangladesh, China (a non-commercial, demonstration fast breeder) and 
South Korea. As of 1 July 2018, there were two construction starts in the world so 
far in 2018, one in Russia, (Kursk-2-1) and Turkey (by a Russian company). Just 
prior to the official construction start in Turkey, the Turkish investors pulled out. 
It is remarkable that China has not launched a single new construction site for a 
commercial nuclear plant since December 2016.
Fifty is a relatively small number compared to a peak of 234 units listed as 
under construction—totalling more than 200 GW—in 1979. However, many of 
those projects (48) were never finished (see Figure 6). The year 2005, with 26 units 
under construction, marked a record low since the early nuclear age in the 1950s.
21 Increasing the capacity of nuclear reactors by equipment upgrades e.g. more powerful 
steam generators or turbines.
22 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), “Approved Applications for Power 
Uprates”, Updated 4 May 2018, see http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/licensing/
power-uprates/status-power-apps/approved-applications.html, accessed 28 July 2018.
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Fig. 6 Nuclear Reactors Under Construction 
Sources: WNISR, with IAEA-PRIS, 2018, p. 34
Tab. 1 Nuclear Reactors “Under Construction” (as of 1 July 2018)
Country Units Capacity
MW net
Construction Starts Grid Connection Behind 
Schedule
China 16  15 450 2009 – 2017 2018 – 2023 8-9?
India 7  4 824 2004 – 2017 2018 – 2023 5
Russia 5  3 378 2007 – 2018 2019- 2022 4
South Korea 4  5 360 2009 – 2017 2018 – 2022 4
UAE 4  5 380 2012 – 2015 2020 – 2021? 3-4?
Belarus 2  2 218 2013 – 2014 2019 – 2020 1-2?
Pakistan 2  2 028 2015 – 2016 2020 – 2021 -
Slovakia 2  880 1985 – 1985 2018 – 2019 2
USA 2  2 234 2013 – 2013 2021 – 2022 2
Argentina 1  25 2014 – 2014 2020 1
Bangladesh 1  1 080 2017 – 2017 2023 -
Finland 1  1 600 2005 – 2005 2019 1
France 1  1 600 2007 – 2007 2020 1
Japan 1  1 325 2007 – 2007 ? 1
Turkey 1  1 114 2018 – 2018 2023 -
World 50  48 496 1985- 2018 2018 – 2023 33-36
Note: Th is table does not contain suspended or abandoned constructions.
Sources: Compiled by WNISR, 2018, p. 35
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5 Construction times
Construction times of reactors currently under construction
A closer look at projects listed as “under construction” illustrates the level of uncer-
tainty and problems associated with many of these projects, especially given that 
most constructors initially assume a five-year construction period: 
• As of 1 July 2018, the 50 reactors being built have been under construction for 
an average of 6.5 years, many still far from completion.
• All reactors under construction in at least seven (possibly nine) out of a total 
of 15 countries have experienced mostly year-long delays. At least two thirds 
(33-36) of all building projects are delayed. Most of the remaining units under 
construction in the world, were begun within the past three years or have not 
yet reached projected startup dates, making it difficult to assess, whether or not 
they are on schedule.
• Of 33 reactors behind schedule, at least 14 have reported increased delays over 
the past year since WNISR2017.
• At the beginning of the year, 16 reactors were scheduled for startup in 2017, 
only four made it. Four reactors were scheduled to start up in the second half 
of 2017, only one did do so, the other three were connected to the grid in the 
first half of 2018.
• As of mid-2017, a total of 19 reactors were scheduled for startup in 2018. As of 
mid-2018, only three of these reactors were connected to the grid (one of which 
was already connected in 2017) and seven have been officially delayed until at 
least 2019.
• Two projects have been listed as “under construction” for more than 30 years, 
Mochovce-3 and -4 in Slovakia. Rostov-4 in Russia was finally connected to the 
grid in February 2018, 35 years after construction start. 
• Four reactors have been listed as “under construction” for a decade or more, the 
Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR) in India, the Olkiluoto-3 reactor project 
in Finland, Shimane-3 in Japan and the French Flamanville-3 unit.
It should be stressed that the actual lead time for nuclear plant projects includes not 
only the construction itself but also lengthy licensing procedures in most countries, 
complex financing negotiations, site preparation and other infrastructure develop-
ment. As the U.K.’s Hinkley Point C illustrates, a significant share of investment 
and work can be carried out before even entering the official construction phase.
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Construction times of past and currently operating reactors
There has been a clear global trend towards increasing construction times. National 
building programs were faster in the early years of nuclear power. As Figure 7 illus-
trates, construction times of reactors completed in the 1970s and 1980s were quite 
homogenous, while in the past three decades they have varied widely. The four units 
completed in 2017 by the Chinese nuclear industry in the homeland (3 units) and 
in Pakistan (1 unit) average an excellent 4.9 years construction time. This is only 
the second time since 2005 that world average construction time dropped below 
5-year average. However, the five units that started up in the first half of 2018 show 
a much lower performance with an average of 13.4 years construction.
The longer-term perspective illustrates that short construction times remain 
the exceptions. Nine countries completed 55 reactors over the past decade after an 
average construction time of just over ten years (see Table 2). While the average has 
hardly moved since 2014, the range increased from 3.8–36.3 years to 4.1–43.5 years 
(the Watts Bar-2 in the U.S. record, which will remain the upper limit for some 
time to come).
Tab. 2 Reactor Construction Times 2008–2018
Construction Times of 55 Units Started-up 2008–7/2018
Country Units Construction Time (in Years)
Mean Time Minimum Maximum
China 31 6 4.1 11.2
Russia 7 24.0 8.1 35.1
India 5 9.8 7.2 14.2
South Korea 5 5.3 4.1 7.2





World 55 10.1 4.1 43.5
Sources: WNISR, with IAEA-PRIS, 2018, p. 37
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Fig. 7 Average Annual Construction Times in the World
Sources: WNISR, with IAEA-PRIS, 2018, p. 37
6 Construction starts and cancellations
Th e number of annual construction-starts23 in the world peaked in 1976 at 44, 
of which 12 projects were later abandoned. In 2010, there were 15 construction 
starts—including 10 in China alone—the highest level since 1985 (see Figure 8). 
Th at number dropped to 10 in 2013, eight in 2015, fi ve in 2017 and two in 2018 as 
of mid-year.
Seriously aff ected by the Fukushima events, China did not start any new building 
site in 2011 and 2014. While Chinese utilities began constructing six more units in 
2015, the number shrank to two in 2016, only a demonstration fast reactor in 2017 
and none in 2018 as of mid-year (see Figure 9). In other words, since December 2016, 
China has not started building a new commercial reactor.
23 Generally, a reactor is considered under construction, when the base slab of the reactor 
building is being concreted. Site preparation work, excavation and other infrastructure 
developments are not included.
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Fig. 8 Construction Starts in the World
Sources: WNISR, with IAEA-PRIS, 2018, p. 38
Over the decade 2008–2017, construction began on 76 reactors in the world (of which 
fi ve have been later cancelled), that is twice the rate of the decade 1998–2007, when 
work started on 38 units (of which three have been abandoned). However, close 
to half (51) of these 114 building starts over the past two decades were in China 
alone (see Figure 9).
In addition, past experience shows that simply having an order for a reactor, or 
even having a nuclear plant at an advanced stage of construction, is no guarantee 
of ultimate grid connection and power production. Th e abandonment of the two 
V.C. Summer units at the end of July 2017 aft er four years of construction and a 
multi-billion-dollar investment is only the latest example in a long list of failed 
nuclear power plant projects.
French Atomic Energy Commission (CEA) statistics through 2002 indicate 
253 “cancelled orders” in 31 countries, many of them at an advanced construction 
stage (see also Figure 10). Th e United States alone accounted for 138 of these or-
der cancellations.24
24 French Atomic Energy Commission (CEA), “Elecnuc—Nuclear Power Plants in the 
World”, 2002. Th e section “cancelled orders” has disappeared aft er the 2002 edition.
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Fig. 9 Construction Starts in the World/China
Sources: WNISR, with IAEA-PRIS, 2018, p. 39
Fig. 10 Cancelled or Suspended Reactor Constructions (Note: Th is graph only includes 
constructions that had already offi  cially started).
Sources: WNISR, with IAEA-PRIS, 2018, p. 39
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Of the 762 reactor constructions launched since 1951, at least 94 units (12 percent) 
in 20 countries had been abandoned as of 1 July 2018. The past decade shows 
about half of the historic abandoning rate of one in eight constructions, as five in 
76 building sites officially started during that period were later given up at various 
stages of advancement. 
Close to three quarters (66 units) of all cancelled projects were in four countries 
alone—the U.S. (42), Russia (12), Germany and Ukraine (six each). Some units were 
actually 100 percent completed—including Kalkar in Germany and Zwentendorf 
in Austria—before the decision was taken not to operate them. 
There is no thorough analysis of the cumulated economic loss of these failed 
investments.
7 Operating age
In the absence of any significant new-build and grid connection over many years, 
the average age (from grid connection) of operating nuclear power plants has 
been increasing steadily and at mid-2017 stands at 29.9 years (see Figure 11).25 A 
total of 254 reactors (61.5 percent) have operated for 31 and more years, including 
77 (18.5 percent) reaching 41 years and more.
Some nuclear utilities envisage average reactor lifetimes of beyond 40 years up to 
60 and even 80 years. In the United States, reactors are initially licensed to operate 
for 40 years, but nuclear operators can request a license renewal for an additional 
20 years from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). As of 4 May 2018, 87 of 
the 99 operating U.S. units have received an extension, with another four applica-
tions for five reactors under NRC review.26
25 WNISR calculates reactor age from grid connection to final disconnection from the grid 
and “startup” is synonymous with grid connection and “shutdown” with withdrawal 
from the grid..
26 NRC, “Status of License Renewal Applications and Industry Activities”, Updated 
4 May 2018, see http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/licensing/renewal/applications.
html, accessed 29 July 2018.
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Fig. 11 Age Distribution of Operating Reactors in the World
Sources: WNISR, with IAEA-PRIS, 2018, p. 41
In the U.S., only two of the 34 units that have been shut down had reached 40 years 
on the grid—Vermont Yankee, closed in December 2014, at the age of 42, and Fort 
Calhoun, shut down in October 2016, after 43 years of operation. Both had obtained 
licenses to operate up to 60 years but were closed only two and three years into 
lifetime extension respectively, mainly for economic reasons. In other words, at least 
a quarter of the reactors connected to the grid in the U.S. never reached their initial 
design lifetime of 40 years. On the other hand, of the 99 currently operating plants, 
44 units have operated for 41 years and more; thus, half of the units with license 
renewals have already entered the life extension period, and that share is growing 
rapidly with the mid-2018 average age of the U.S. operational fleet at 38.1 years.
Many other countries have no specific time limits on operating licenses. In France, 
where the country’s first operating Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) started up in 
1977, reactors must undergo in-depth inspection and testing every decade against 
reinforced safety requirements. The French reactors have operated for 33.4 years 
on average, and the oldest have completed the process with the French Nuclear 
Safety Authority (ASN) evaluating each reactor before allowing a unit to operate 
for more than 30 years. They could then operate until they reach 40 years, which 
is the limit of their initial design age. However, the assessments are years behind 
schedule. The French utility Électricité de France (EDF) clearly prioritizes lifetime 
extension to 50 years over large-scale new-build. In a recent presentation, EDF states: 
“Continuing operation beyond 40 years means allowing for the progressive increase 
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of renewable energies while guaranteeing a lasting, quasi entirely decarbonized 
and continuous electricity supply thanks to the flexibility of the nuclear fleet.”27
EDF’s general approach to lifetime extension is currently under review by ASN’s 
Technical Support Organization, the Institute for Radiation Protection and Nu-
clear Safety (IRSN) and is now scheduled to be examined by its expert committees 
(Groupes Permanents) in 2018 and 2019. ASN plans to provide its opinion on the 
general assessment outline by 2020. In addition, lifetime extension beyond 40 years 
requires site-specific, time-consuming public enquiries. 
Current French energy legislation requires planning to limit the nuclear share in 
power production to 50 percent by 2025. The implementation of this legislation—
even if the 2025 target was to be delayed as is currently discussed—in a context 
of stagnating electricity consumption, would mean the closure of about one third 
of the French reactor fleet. In other words, many of the lifetime extensions would 
become obsolete. No point in investing large amounts of money into upgrading if 
the plant is shut down shortly after. A particularly difficult aspect of the lifetime 
management in France is that the units licensed to use plutonium-uranium mixed 
oxide fuel (MOX) are also amongst the oldest reactors. The criteria for selection of 
reactors to be closed remain under discussion.
In assessing the likelihood of reactors being able to operate for 50 or 60 years, it is 
useful to compare the age distribution of reactors that are currently operating with 
those that have already shut down (see Figure 11 and Figure 12). As of mid-2018, 77 
of the world’s reactors have operated for 41 years and more, and a total of 81 that 
have already passed their 40-year lifetime are considered in lifetime extension.28 
As the age pyramid illustrates, that number could rapidly increase over the next 
few years. A total of 254 units have already reached or exceeded age 31.
The age structure of the 173 units already shut down completes the picture. In 
total, 60 of these units operated for 31 years and more, and of those, 20 reactors 
operated for 41 years and more (see Figure 12). Many units of the first-generation 
designs only operated for a few years. Considering that the average age of the 
173 units that have already shut down is about 25 years, plans to extend the opera-
tional lifetime of large numbers of units to 40 years and far beyond seemed rather 
optimistic. However, the operating time prior to shutdown has clearly increased 
continuously. But while the average annual age at shutdown got close to 40 years, 
it only passed that age in two years so far: in 2014, when the only such unit shut 
27 EDF, “Le parc nucléaire en exploitation en France : Exploitation, maintenance et Grand 
Carénage”, 11 January 2018.
28 WNISR considers the age starting with grid connection, and while figures used to be 
rounded by half-years, as of WNISR2016 they are rounded by the tenth of the year.
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down that year (Vermont Yankee in the U.S.) after 42 years of operation; and in 
2016, with two reactors shutting down at age 43 (Fort Calhoun, U.S.) and 45 (No-
vovoronezh, Russia) respectively.
Fig. 12 Age Distribution of Shut Down Nuclear Power Reactors
Sources: WNISR, with IAEA-PRIS, 2018, p. 43
As a result of the Fukushima nuclear disaster, more pressing questions have been 
raised about the wisdom of operating older reactors. The Fukushima Daiichi units 
(1 to 4) were connected to the grid between 1971 and 1974. The license for unit 1 
had been extended for another 10 years in February 2011, one month before the 
catastrophe began. Four days after the initial events in Japan began, the German 
government ordered the shutdown of seven reactors that had started up before 
1981 (plus one commissioned in 1983). The sole, decisive selection criterion was 
operational age. Other countries did not adopt the same approach, but it is clear 
that the 3/11 events had an impact on previously assumed extended lifetimes in 
other countries as well, including in Belgium, Switzerland, and Taiwan. And more 
recently, in the first half of 2017, South Korea’s incoming President Moon shut down 
the country’s oldest reactor (Kori-1), explicitly at the age of forty, ruling out lifetime 
extensions in the future. Sweden also closed its oldest unit, Oskarshamn-1 at age 
46. And Germany shut down its then oldest reactor, Gundremmingen-B, at year-
end 2017, at age 33. The average age of these three units remains with 39.9 years 
again just below 40.
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8 Potential newcomer countries
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) assumes that to meet their pre-
diction of more than doubling of current capacity in the higher nuclear scenario, 
considerable new construction will occur in existing nuclear countries, such as 
China, South Korea and India, but also envisages significant capacity build-up in 
newcomer countries. 
The industry’s lobby organisation WNA suggests that there are 20 countries in 
which nuclear power is being planned for the first time, with an additional 20, where 
the nuclear option is under consideration. Notwithstanding any reality check of 
these assumptions, this is small compared to renewable energy, as at end of 2015, 
targets had been established in 173 countries at the national or state/provincial 
level.29 The WNA further categorizes those countries in which nuclear power is 
being planned into five separate groups30:
• Power reactors under construction: United Arab Emirates (UAE), Belarus.
• Contracts signed, legal and regulatory infrastructure well-developed or devel-
oping: Lithuania, Turkey, Bangladesh, Vietnam (but deferred).
• Committed plans, legal and regulatory infrastructure developing: Jordan, 
Poland, Egypt.
• Well-developed plans but commitment pending: Thailand, Indonesia, Kazakh-
stan, Saudi Arabia, Chile; or commitment stalled: Italy.
• Developing plans: Israel, Nigeria, Kenya, Laos, Malaysia, Morocco, Algeria.
The following section will look at the countries, in which WNA considers nuclear 
power plants are at least ‘committed plans’. 
Under construction
Bangladesh
On 30 November 2017, Bangladesh officially began construction of the first unit of 
the Rooppur nuclear plant.31 Unit 1 is now scheduled to begin operation in 2023 
29 REN21, “Renewables 2016—Global Status Report”, Renewable Energy Policy Network 
for the 21st Century, 2016.
30 WNA, “Emerging Nuclear Energy Countries”, January 2018, see http://www.world-nuclear.
org/information-library/country-profiles/others/emerging-nuclear-energy-countries.
aspx.
31 WNISR, “Construction Start at First Nuclear Power Plant in Bangladesh”, 5 April 2018, 
see https://www.worldnuclearreport.org/Construction-Start-at-First-Nuclear-Power-
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followed by unit 2 in 2024.32 The idea of building nuclear reactors at Rooppur goes 
back to even before Bangladesh became an independent country, to a 1963 plan by 
the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission to build one reactor in West Pakistan 
and one in East Pakistan.33 
The current reactor deal dates back to November 2011 when the Bangladeshi 
Government announced that it was prepared to sign a deal with the Russian Gov-
ernment for two 1000 MW units—the first of which was to start up between 2017 
and 2018—at a total cost of US$1.5-2 billion.34 Since then, although negotiations 
have reportedly been ongoing, the startup date has been continually postponed 
and the expected construction cost has risen sharply. 
By 2015, the Bangladeshi Finance Minister was quoted as saying the project was 
then expected to cost US$12.65 billion.35 A December 2015 agreement was said to 
be signed between the Bangladesh Atomic Energy Commission and Rosatom for 
2.4 GW of capacity, with work then expected to begin in 2016 and operation to 
start in 2022 and 2023.36 According to the deal, Russia would provide 90 percent of 
the funds on credit at an interest rate of Libor plus 1.75 percent. In late May 2016, 
negotiations were concluded over the US$12.65 billion project, with Russia making 
available US$11.385 billion.37 In April 2017, Tass, the Russian news agency, report-
ed that permission to start construction had been granted and that work would 
commence in the second half of 2017.38 
Plant-in-Bangladesh.html, accessed 29 June 2018.
32 NEI, “Work begins on foundation for unit 1 of Bangladesh NPP”, see http://www.
neimagazine.com/news/newswork-begins-on-foundation-for-unit-1-of-bangladesh-
npp-6107152/, accessed 22 April 2018.
33 IAEA, “Bangladesh”, Country Nuclear Power Profiles, 2012, see https://www-pub.iaea.
org/mtcd/publications/pdf/cnpp2012_cd/countryprofiles/Bangladesh/Figures/Bangla-
desh%20CNPP.pdf, accessed 8 May 2018.
34 Srinivas Laxman, “Bangladesh & Russia Sign N-Plant Deal For Two Reactors At Roop-
pur, Asian Scientist”, Asian Scientist, 4 November 2011, see https://www.asianscientist.
com/2011/11/topnews/rooppur-nuclear-power-project-bangladesh-russia-sign-nucle-
ar-agreement-2011/, accessed 22 April 2018.
35 WNN, “Bangladesh, Russia ink $12.65 billion Rooppur plant deal”, 29 December 2015, 
see http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN-Bangladesh-Russia-ink-12.65-billion-
Rooppur-plant-deal-29121501.html, accessed 22 April 2018.
36 WNN, “Bangladesh, Russia Ink $12.65 Billion Rooppur Plant Deal” (ref. 4).
37 NEI, “Russia initials credit agreement with Bangladesh for Rooppur NPP”, 30 May 2016, 
see http://www.neimagazine.com/news/newsrussia-initials-credit-agreement-with-ban-
gladesh-for-rooppur-npp-4907672/, accessed 22 April 2018.
38 TASS, “Rosatom plans to launch construction of Ruppur power plant in Bangladesh”, 
19 April 2017, see http://tass.com/economy/942156.
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The project’s economics have been widely questioned. Earlier in 2017, a retired 
nuclear engineer who had been involved in advising the Bangladesh Atomic Energy 
Commission (BAEC), argued in one of the leading English-language newspapers 
in Bangladesh that the country was “paying a heavy price” for BAEC not having 
“undertaken a large-scale programme of recruitment, and training of engineers”; 
he also charged that Bangladesh was buying reactors at the “unreasonable and un-
acceptable” price of US$5,500/kW because its “negotiators didn’t have the expertise 
to properly scrutinise the quoted price”.39 
Belarus
Construction started in November 2013 at Belarus’s first nuclear reactor at the Os-
trovets power plant, also called Belarusian-1. Construction of a second 1200 MWe 
AES-2006 reactor started in June 2014. In November 2011, the Russian and Bela-
rusian governments agreed that Russia would lend up to US$10 billion for 25 years 
to finance 90 percent of the contract between Atomstroyexport and the Belarus 
Directorate for Nuclear Power Plant Construction. In July 2012, the contract was 
signed for the construction of the two reactors for an estimated cost of US$10 bil-
lion.40 The project assumes liability for the supply of all fuel and repatriation of 
spent fuel for the life of the plant. The fuel is to be reprocessed in Russia and the 
separated wastes returned to Belarus. When construction started, it was stated that 
the reactors will be completed until 2018 and 2020 respectively.41 In August 2016, 
the reactor pressure vessel of unit one slipped and fell two meters before hitting 
the ground, during installation. This lead to an eight-month delay, while it was 
replaced.42 In March 2018, the head of the reactor division at the power plant said 
that it was then expected that electricity would be supplied to the grid in the 4th 
Quarter of 2019 with the second one online in July 2020.43
39 Abdul Martin, “The economics of the Rooppur Nuclear Power Plant”, The Daily Star, 2 
March 2017, see https://www.thedailystar.net/op-ed/economics/the-economics-the-roop-
pur-nuclear-power-plant-1369345, accessed 22 April 2018.
40 NIW, “Belarus, Aided by Russia and Broke, Europe’s Last Dictatorship Proceeds With 
NPP”, 28 September 2012.
41 WNN, “Ostrovets plant meets construction safety rules”, 7 November 2014, see http://www.
world-nuclear-news.org/NN-Ostrovets-plant-meets-construction-safety-rules-07111401.
html, accessed 21 April 2018.
42 NIW, “Briefs-Belarus”, 7 April 2017.
43 Belarus News, “Belarusian nuclear power plant to give electricity to national power 
grid in Q4 2019”, Belarus News, 28 March 2018, see http://eng.belta.by/economics/
view/belarusian-nuclear-power-plant-to-give-electricity-to-national-power-grid-in
-q1-2019-110418-2018/.
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The official cost of the project has increased by 26 percent, to 56 billion Russian 
roubles, in 2001 prices (US$20011.8 billion).
44 However, the falling exchange rate of 
the rouble against the dollar significantly affects the dollar price of the project. 
The project is the focus of international opposition and criticism, with formal 
complaints from the Lithuanian government, that has published a list of fundamental 
problems of the project.45 The Belarussian government, in order to allay European 
concerns about Ostrovets submitted the project to a post-Fukushima nuclear stress 
test and it produced in 2017 a national report, which is currently submitted to 
peer-review by a commission from the European nuclear regulators group ENSREG 
and the European Commission. In July 2018, the European Commission announced 
that the report had been presented to the Belarussian authorities and the executive 
summary was made public, which concludes that “although the report is overall 
positive, it includes important recommendations that necessitate an appropriate 
follow up”.46 The next step is these recommendations need to be incorporated into 
the next draft of the National Action Plan.47
Belarus has historically been an importer of electricity from Russia and Ukraine. 
But in May 2018, Vice-Premier Vladimir Semashko stated: “In 2018 we stopped 
electric energy import, because we had upgraded our own power grid. We are 
self-reliant and can provide ourselves with our own electric energy.”48 In fact, 
Semashko claims that in the first four months of 2018, Belarus exported 0.4 TWh. 
The startup of the Ostrovets nuclear plant would significantly increase excess 
capacity. Lithuania has said it will not accept any electricity from Belarus and is 
trying to get is neighbours to follow the ban. Currently this has not been successful, 
44 Charter 97, “Astravets NPP Becomes 12 Billion More Expensive In One Day”, see https://
charter97.org/en/news/2016/12/30/236059/, accessed 21 April 2018.
45 Bryan Bradley, “Lithuania Urges Belarus to Halt Nuclear Project on Safety Issues”, 
Bloomberg, 20 August 2013, see https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-08-20/
lithuania-urges-belarus-to-halt-nuclear-project-on-safety-issues, accessed 22 April 2018.
46 ENSREG, “Belarus Stress Tests Peer Review – Executive summary”, European Nuclear 
Safety Regulators Group, July 2018, see http://www.ensreg.eu/sites/default/files/attach-
ments/hlg_p2018-36_156_belarus_stress_test_prt_report_-_executive_summary_0.
pdf accessed 5 July 2018.
47 European Commission, “Comprehensive risk and safety assessments of the Belarus 
nuclear power plant completed” (Press Release), 3 July 2018, see http://europa.eu/rapid/
press-release_IP-18-4347_en.htm, accessed 4 July 2018.
48 Belarus News, “Belarus ramps up electricity export in 2018”, 14 May 2018, see http://
eng.belta.by/economics/view/belarus-ramps-up-electricity-export-in-2018-111638-2018/, 
accessed 3 July 2018.
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although there has been an agreement to introducing an electricity import tax.49 
Russia is currently upgrading its grid connection between the Leningradskaya and 
Smolensk nuclear power stations, thus potentially also enabling a better connection 
of Ostrovets to the West-Russian electricity grid, circumventing the Baltic States. 
Vice-Premier Semashko is confident: “Our energy is cheaper, and it will be on 
demand on this market.”50
Turkey
In Turkey, three separate projects are being developed with three different reactor 
designs and three different sets of financial sources. Despite this, in early 2018, 
construction formally began on the first of these projects.
Some four decades after the first ideas came up for a nuclear power plant at 
Akkuyu, in the province of Mersin on Turkey’s Mediterranean coast, construction 
started in April 2018, a day before President Putin of Russia visited Turkey for the 
official launch of the project.51 The power plant is to be implemented by Rosatom 
of Russia under a Build-Own-Operate- (BOO) model. In February 2018, only two 
months prior to the official construction start, Rosatom’s Turkish partners pulled out. 
The consortium of private companies Cengiz Holding, Kolin Insaat Turizm Sanayi 
ve Ticaret et Kalyon Insaat Sanayi ve Ticaret, which was to hold 49 percent of the 
shares, quit the project because they expected too little benefits from the project.52
A company, JSC Akkuyu Nuclear has been established to ensure construction 
of the project and has been designated as the Strategic Investor. According to the 
establishing agreement, at least 51 percent of shares in the finished project should 
belong to Russian companies and up to 49 percent of shares can be available for 
sale to outside investors. Negotiations with potential Turkish investors continue 
49 Reuters, “Baltics to cooperate on Belarus nuclear power tax”, 14 December 2017, see 
https://www.reuters.com/article/baltics-energy/baltics-to-cooperate-on-belarus-nu-
clear-power-tax-idUSL8N1OC3QD, accessed 22 April 2018.
50 Belarus News, “Belarus ramps up electricity export in 2018”, op.cit.
51 Tuvan Gumrukeu and Orhan Coskun, “Turkey grants Rosatom construction license 
for first unit of Akkuyu...”, Reuters, 2 April 2018, see https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-turkey-russia-nuclearpower/turkey-grants-rosatom-construction-license-for-first-
unit-of-akkuyu-nuclear-plant-idUSKCN1H91OY, accessed 22 May 2018.
52 AFP, “Un consortium turc se retire du projet de la centrale nucléaire d’Akkuyu”, see 
https://www.romandie.com/news/887776.rom, accessed 4 July 2018.
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after the three prospective partners withdrew.53 However, Rosatom has stated that it 
would be able to complete the project even if it is unable to attract local investors.54 
An agreement was signed in May 2010 for four VVER1200 reactors (Generation 
III+), with construction originally expected to start in 2015. At the heart of the pro-
ject is a 15-year Power Purchase Agreement (PPA), which includes 70 percent of the 
electricity produced from units 1 and 2 and 30 percent of units 3 and 4. Therefore 
50 percent of the total power from the station is to be sold at a guaranteed price for 
the first 15 years, with the rest to be sold on the market.
After a fresh series of delays, on 3 March 2017, Akkuyu JSC applied for a con-
struction license.55 Rosatom stated: “According to the Intergovernmental Agreement, 
the commissioning of the first power unit must take place no later than 7 years after 
the issuance of all permits for construction by the Republic of Turkey.”56
In July 2017 the European Parliament adopted a resolution which called on the 
Turkish Government to halt the plans for the construction of the Akkuyu project 
due to its location in a region prone to severe earthquakes and called on “the Turkish 
Government to involve, or at least consult, the governments of its neighbouring 
countries, such as Greece and Cyprus.”57 
In April 2018, a construction license was awarded, and the first concrete was 
poured, with first electricity expected to be in 2023 (the 100th anniversary of the 
founding of the modern state of Turkey), with all four units to be operational 
by 2025.58 (See “Contract Signed” section hereunder for information on further 
projects in Turkey.)
53 Rosatom, “JSC Akkuyu Nuclear designated strategic investor in Turkey”, 2 April 2018, 
see http://www.rosatom.ru/en/press-centre/news/jsc-akkuyu-nuclear-designated-stra-
tegic-investor-in-turkey/, accessed 20 April 2018.
54 Reuters, “Russia is able to complete Akkuyu nuclear power plant construction: Russian 
minister”, 6 April 2018, see http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/russia-is-able-to-com-
plete-akkuyu-nuclear-power-plant-construction-russian-minister-129886, accessed 6 
April 2018.
55 WNN, “Akkuyu project receives production licence”,” see http://www.world-nuclear-news.
org/NN-Akkuyu-project-receives-production-licence-16061701.html, accessed 22 April 
2018.
56 Coskun, “Turkey’s First Nuclear Plant Facing Further Delays – Sources” (ref. 32).
57 European Parliament, “P8_TA(2017)0306, 2016 Report on Turkey European Parliament 
resolution of 6 July 2017 on the 2016 Commission Report on Turkey (2016/2308(INI))”, 
6 July 2017, see http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONS-
GML+TA+P8-TA-2017-0306+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN, accessed 22 April 2018.
58 NEI, “Construction of Turkey’s Akkuyu NPP begins”, 4 April 2018, see http://www.
neimagazine.com/news/newsconstruction-of-turkeys-akkuyu-npp-begins-6102914/, 
accessed 22 April 2018.
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United Arab Emirates
In the United Arab Emirates (UAE), construction is ongoing at the Barakah 
nuclear project, 300 km west of Abu Dhabi, where there are four reactors under 
construction. At the time of the contract signing in December 2009 with Korean 
Electric Power Corp., the Emirates Nuclear Energy Corp (ENEC), said that “the 
contract for the construction, commissioning and fuel loads for four units equalled 
approximately US$20 billion, with a high percentage of the contract being offered 
under a fixed-price arrangement”.59
The total cost of the project is at least €24.4 billion (US$28.2 billion). The fi-
nancing for this was US$16.2 billion Abu Dhabi’s Department of Finance, equity 
financing US$4.7 billion, US$2.5 billion through a loan from the Export-Import 
Bank of Korea, with loan agreements from the National Bank of Abu Dhabi, First 
Gulf Bank, HSBC and Standards Charter making up the remainder.60 In Octo-
ber 2016, Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO) took an 18 percent equity 
stake in Nawah Energy Company that owns the four reactors, with ENEC, holding 
the remaining 82 percent.61
In July 2010, a site-preparation license and a limited construction license were 
granted for four reactors at Barakah, 53 kilometres from Ruwais62 A tentative sched-
ule published in late December 2010, and not publicly altered since, suggested that 
Barakah-1 would start commercial operation in May 2017 with unit 2 operating 
from 2018, unit 3 in 2019, and unit 4 in 2020. Construction of Barakah-1 officially 
started on 19 July 2012, of Barakah-2 on 28 May 2013, on Barakah-3 on 24 Septem-
ber 2014 and unit 4 on 30 July 2015.63 As late as October 2016, Korean press was 
reporting unit 1 to be still scheduled for completion by May 2017.64 In May 2017, 
59 ENEC, “UAE Selects Korea Electric Power Corp, as Prime Team as Prime Contractor for 
Peaceful Nuclear Power”, Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation, 27 December 2009, see 
https://www.enec.gov.ae/news/uae-selects-korea-electric-power-corp-as-prime-team-
as-prime-contractor-fo/, accessed 22 April 2018.
60 NIW, “Kepco takes 18% of Barakah”, 21 October 2016.
61 NEI, “Kepco and Enec set up joint venture for Barakah NPP”, 25 October 2016, see http://
www.neimagazine.com/news/newskepco-and-enec-set-up-joint-venture-for-barakah-
npp-5647366/, accessed 22 April 2018.
62 Arabian Business, “ENEC Welcomes Regulator’s License Approval”, 11 July 2010, see 
http://www.arabianbusiness.com/enec-welcomes-regulator-s-licence-approvals-306150.
html, accessed 22 April 2018.
63 Ibid.
64 Lee Hyo-sik, “KEPCO to operate UAE nuclear plant for 60 years”, The Korean Times, 
20 October 2016, see http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/biz/2016/10/123_216466.
html, accessed 22 April 2018.
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ENEC announced it had “completed initial construction activities for Unit 1” and 
the “handover of all systems for commissioning”; the plant as a whole would be 
81 percent complete, with Barakah-1 at 95 percent finished. At the same time, ENEC 
stated: “The timeline includes an extension for the start-up of nuclear operations 
for Unit 1, from 2017 to 2018, to ensure sufficient time for international assessments 
and adherence to nuclear industry safety standards, as well as a reinforcement of 
operational proficiency for plant personnel.”65 In March 2018, the extent of the 
delay was confirmed with Nawah reporting that the startup of Unit 1 would only 
be in 2019.66 But only a few months later, in July 2018, a new delay was announced, 
so that startup would be in late 2019 or early 202067, so that commercial operation 
would not be undertaken until 2020, three years behind schedule. 
The UAE released a long-term energy plan in February 2017, which proposes 
that by 2050 renewable energy will provide 44 percent of the country’s electricity, 
with natural gas 38 percent, “clean fossil fuels” 12 percent and nuclear six percent.68 
The nuclear share is in line with expected output from the Barakah nuclear power 
plant, so it seems that no further nuclear power plants are envisaged at this point. 
In September 2017, Government officials confirmed that there were no plans to 
build a second plant.69
65 ENEC, “ENEC Announces Completion of Initial Construction Work for Unit 1 of 
Barakah Nuclear Energy Plant & Progress Update Towards Safety-led Operations”, 
Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation, 5 May 2017, see https://www.enec.gov.ae/enec-
announces-completion-of-initial-construction-work-barakah-unit-1-progress-update/, 
accessed 22 April 2018.
66 Nawah, “Next phase of preparations for Barakah Unit 1 Nuclear Operations starts” 
(Press Release), 28 May 2018, see http://www.nawah.ae/en/news/Nextphaseofprepara-
tionsforBarakah.html, accessed 29 May 2018.
67 Arabian Business, “UAE further delays launch of first nuclear reactor”, 4 July 2018, see 
https://www.arabianbusiness.com/energy/400041-uae-further-delays-launch-of-first-nu-
clear-reactor, accessed 8 July 2018.
68 LeAnne Graves, “UAE Energy Plan aims to cut CO2 emissions 70% by 2050”, The 
National, 10 January 2017, see https://www.thenational.ae/uae/uae-energy-plan-aims-
to-cut-co2-emissions-70-by-2050-1.51582, accessed 22 April 2018.
69 Amena Bahr, “UAE Abu Dhabi Unlikely to Build a Second Nuclear plant”, Nuclear 
Intelligence Weekly, 29 September 2017.
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Contracts signed 
Egypt
In Egypt, the government’s Nuclear Power Plants Authority was established in the 
mid-1970s, and plans were developed for 10 reactors by the end of the century. Little 
development occurred for several decades. Then, in February 2015, Russia’s Rosatom 
and Egypt’s Nuclear Power Plant Authority eventually did sign an agreement that 
was expected to lead to the construction and financing of two reactors and possibly 
two additional ones. In November 2015, an intergovernmental agreement was signed 
for the construction of four VVER-1200 reactors at Dabaa, 130 km northwest of 
Cairo. In May 2016, it was announced that Egypt concluded a US$25 billion loan 
with Russia for nuclear construction.70 According to the Egyptian official journal, 
the loan is to cover 85 percent of the project cost, with the total investment thus 
estimated at around US$29.4 billion. 
In December 2017, Rosatom Director General Alexey Likhachov and Mohamed 
Shaker, Egypt’s Energy Minister signed a notice to proceed with construction as 
well as an agreement that “spans the power plant’s entire life cycle, i.e. 70 to 80 
years”.71 The total cost of the project was now reported to be US$60 billion, of 
which US$30 billion for the reactor construction. Three other deals were signed 
to cover the supply of nuclear fuel for 60 years, operation and maintenance for the 
first 10 years of operation and operating and training of personnel.72 Russia would 
supply a loan of US$25 billion, at three percent interest for 85 percent of the con-
struction cost. The Egyptian government agreed to pay back over 22 years starting 
in 2029. The next two and half years will focus on site preparation and licensing. 
With construction expected to take five years, the completion of the project is now 
expected in 2026/27.73 
70 Asma Alsharif, “Russia to lend Egypt $25 billion to build nuclear power plant”, 
Reuters, 1 May 2016, see http://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-russia-nuclear-
idUSKCN0YA1G5, accessed 23 May 2016.
71 WNN, “‘Notice to proceed’ contracts signed for El Dabaa”, 11 December 2017, see 
http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN-Notice-to-proceed-contracts-signed-for-El-
Dabaa-1112178.html, accessed 24 April 2018.
72 Phil Chaffee, “Rosatom Locks in $30 Billion Nuclear Deal in Egypt”, NIW, 15 December 
2017.
73 Dan Yurman, “Egypt’s $60 Billion Bet on Nuclear Energy”, The Energy Collective, 23 
April 2018, see https://theenergycollective.com/dan-yurman/2431718/egypts-60-billion-
bet-on-nuclear-energy, accessed 24 April 2018.
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Turkey
Besides Akkuyu (see above), Turkey has two other nuclear projects under devel-
opment – Sinop and İğneada.
Sinop is on Turkey’s northern coast and is planned to host a 4.4 GW power 
plant of four units of the ATMEA reactor-design. If completed this would be the 
first reactors of this design, jointly developed by Japanese Mitsubishi and French 
AREVA.74 In April 2015, Turkish President Erdogan approved parliament’s ratifi-
cation of the intergovernmental agreement with Japan.75
The estimated cost of the project was initially US$22 billion and involved a con-
sortium of Mitsubishi, AREVA NP (now known again as Framatome), GDF-Suez 
(now known as Engie), and Itochu, who between them would own 51 percent of 
the project, with the remaining 49 percent owned by Turkish companies including 
the State-owned electricity generating company EÜAS.76 
The division between the international partners remains in fact undecided. The 
ongoing financial problems of new-old Framatome after the absorption by EDF 
are affecting its ability to invest in the project, as does the review by Engie of its 
involvement in nuclear projects across its portfolio. Furthermore, concerns remain 
about site suitability given its seismic conditions.77 
In March 2018, reports from Japan suggest that the expected cost of the project 
has doubled and is now expected to be US$37.5 billion and that it would be difficult 
to see completion by 2023.78 Then in April 2018, press reports from Japan suggested 
that Itochu would no longer be willing to participate due to the exploding cost 
estimates, which have risen to more than JPY5,000 billion (US$46.2 billion) from 
JPY2,000 billion (US$19 billion) in 2013.79
74 WNN, “Turkish utility eyes large stake in Sinop project”, 12 May 2015, see http://www.
world-nuclear-news.org/C-Turkish-utility-eyes-large-stake-in-Sinop-project-12051501.
html, accessed 22 April 2018.
75 WNN, “Ground broken for Turkey’s first nuclear power plant”, 15 April 2015, see http://
www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN-Ground-broken-for-Turkeys-first-nuclear-power-
plant-1541501.html, accessed 22 April 2018.
76 WNN, “Turkish Utility Eyes Large Stake in Sinop Project”, op.cit.
77 NIW, “Akkuyu’s Prospects Pull Past Sinop”, 22 July 2016.
78 Yasuaki Oshika, “Japan’s nuclear export to Turkey in doubt as costs estimate doubles”, The 
Ssahi Shimbun, 15 March 2018, see http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201803150046.
html, accessed 22 April 2018.
79 NEI, “Japan’s Itochu pulls out of Turkish nuclear project – Nuclear Engineering Inter-
national”, see http://www.neimagazine.com/news/newsjapans-itochu-pulls-out-of-turk-
ish-nuclear-project-6133206, accessed 15 May 2018.
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In October 2015, the Turkish government suggested it was aiming to build a third 
nuclear power plant, at the İğneada site. The most likely constructors would be West-
inghouse and the Chinese State Nuclear Power Technology Corporation (SNPTC). 
Chinese companies are said to be “aggressively” pursuing the contract, reportedly 
worth US$22-25 billion.80 In September 2016, China and Turkey signed a nuclear 
co-operation agreement, a similar mechanism used to develop the other nuclear 
projects in the country.81 However, the financial collapse of Westinghouse, makes 
their current involvement in the project unlikely.
Vietnam
A decision by the Prime Minster of Vietnam of July 2011 stated that by 2020 the 
first nuclear power plant will be in operation, with a further 7 GW of capacity to be 
in operation by 2025 and total of 10.7 GW in operation by 2030. In October 2010, 
Vietnam had signed an intergovernmental agreement with Russia’s Atomstroyexport 
to build the Ninh Thuan-1 nuclear power plant, using 1200 MW VVER reactors. 
Construction was slated to begin in 2014. However, numerous delays have occurred 
and the national electricity development plan, approved by the government in 
March 2016, envisioned the “first nuclear power plant put into operation in 2028”.82 
Vietnam’s nuclear power ambitions were severely curtailed in November 2016, when 
92 percent of the members of the National Assembly approved a government motion 
to cancel the proposed nuclear projects with both Russia and Japan, due to slowing 
electricity demand increases, concerns of safety and rising construction costs.83
80 NEI, “Turkey finalizes site for third NPP”, 18 March 2016, see http://www.neimagazine.
com/news/newsturkey-finalizes-site-for-third-npp-4843161/, accessed 26 April 2017.
81 Herguner Ozeke, “Turkey Looks to China for Third Nuclear Power Plant”, Lexology, 
3 January 2018, see https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=d0b6672d-14e1-
43d0-a5b3-c9750552f521, accessed 22 April 2018.
82 VietNamNet, “Vietnam needs US$148 billion to develop national electricity until 
2030”, 20 March 2016, see http://english.vietnamnet.vn/fms/society/152739/viet-
nam-needs-us-148-billion-to-develop-national-electricity-until-2030.html, accessed 
22 April 2018.
83 NIW, “Briefs – Vietnam”, 28 November 2016.




Lithuania had two large RBMK (Chernobyl-type) reactors at Ignalina, which were 
shut down in 2004 and 2009, a requirement for joining the European Union. Since 
then there have been ongoing attempts to build a replacement, either unilaterally 
or with neighbouring countries. However, in October 2012, a consultative national 
referendum on the future of nuclear power was held and 63 percent voted against 
new nuclear construction, with sufficient turnout to validate the result.84 Prior to 
his appointment as Prime Minister, Algirdas Butkevicius stated that legislation 
prohibiting the project would be submitted once the new parliament convenes and 
that “the people expressed their wish in the referendum, and I will follow the people’s 
will”.85 In early 2016, the Energy Minister of Lithuania, Rokas Masiulis, said that 
the project had been shelved indefinitely, due to unfavorable market conditions.86
Jordan
Influential policy makers in Jordan have long desired the acquisition of a nuclear 
power plant. In 2007, the government established the Jordan Atomic Energy Com-
mission (JAEC) and the Jordan Nuclear Regulatory Commission. JAEC started 
conducting a feasibility study on nuclear power, including a comparative cost/benefit 
analysis.87 And in September 2014, JAEC and Rosatom signed a two-year develop-
ment framework for a project, which was estimated to cost under US$10 billion and 
generate electricity costing US$0.10/kWh.88 After lengthy unfruitful negotiations, 
in May 2018, an unnamed government official revealed to The Jordan Times that 
the plan to build two 1000 MW “is now over”, and that “Jordan is now focusing on 
small modular reactors”.89 This was confirmed the following month by the Jordan 
84 Christian Lowe, “Lithuanians send nuclear plant back to drawing board”, Reuters, 15 
October 2012, see http://www.reuters.com/article/us-lithuania-nuclear-idUSBRE89E-
0BW20121015, accessed 22 April 2018.
85 NIW, “Lithuania—Prospective PM Wants to Scrape Visaginas”, 9 November 2012.
86 The Baltic Course, “Masiulis: Visaginas NPP project has been shelved for now”, 20 
January 2016, see http://www.baltic-course.com/eng/energy/?doc=115564, accessed 22 
April 2018.
87 Mark Hibbs, “Jordan reactor siting study to be done in 2009, JAEC says”, Nucleonics 
Week, 27 September 2007.
88 NIW, “Briefs – Jordan”, 18 April 2014.
89 Mohammad Ghazal, “Jordan to replace planned nuclear plant with smaller, cheaper 
facility”, Jordan Times, 26 May 2018, see http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/
jordan-replace-planned-nuclear-plant-smaller-cheaper-facility, accessed 1 June 2018.
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Atomic Energy Commission. The development suggests not only that Jordan was 
unable to secure financing for the two 1000 MW proposal, but also that Russia was 
unable to provide low-interest financing. 
In the last couple of years, JAEC has signed a series of MOUs and agreements on 
SMRs.90 The most recent announcement to come from JAEC Chairman Toukan, in 
April 2018, is that the organization is in “serious and advanced” talks with China 
National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) to build a 220 MW High Temperature Gas-
Cooled Reactor (HTR) in Jordan.91 Although SMRs could be cheaper in terms of 
total cost, they are expected to be more expensive on a per-MW basis and would 
pose a range of problems such as siting.92
Poland 
Poland planned the development of a series of nuclear power stations in the 1980s 
and started construction of two VVER1000/320 reactors in Żarnowiec on the Baltic 
coast, but both construction and further plans were halted following the Chernobyl 
accident. However, on 28 January 2014, the Polish Government adopted a document 
with the title “Polish Nuclear Power Programme” outlining the framework of the 
strategy. The plan includes proposals to build 6 GW of nuclear power capacity with 
the first reactor starting up by 2024.93 
In January 2013, the Polish utility PGE (Polska Grupa Energetyczna) had se-
lected WorleyParsons to conduct a five-year, US$81.5 million study, on the siting 
and development of a nuclear power plant with a capacity of up to 3 GW.94 At that 
time, the project was estimated at US$13–19 billion, site selection was to have been 
90 WNN, “Jordan to consider deployment of X-energy SMR”, 29 November 2017, see 
http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN-Jordan-to-consider-deployment-of-X-energy-
SMR-2911175.html, accessed 24 April 2018; “Russian Sweep in the Middle East”, NIW, 
15 December 2017.
91 Mohammad Ghazal, “Jordan, China in ‘serious talks’ to build gas-cooled $1b reactor”, 
Jordan Times, 28 April 2018, see http://ftp.jordantimes.com/news/local/jordan-china-
serious-talks%E2%80%99-build-gas-cooled-1b-reactor, accessed 8 May 2018.
92 M.V. Ramana and Ali Ahmad, “Wishful Thinking and Real Problems: Small Modular 
Reactors, Planning Constraints, and Nuclear Power in Jordan”, Energy Policy, 26 March 
2016.
93 Lukasz Kuzniarski, “Polish Nuclear Power Programme”, Ministry of Economy, 17 March 
2014, see https://www.iaea.org/NuclearPower/Downloadable/Meetings/2014/2014-
03-17-03-21-WS-INIG/DAY2/COUNTRY/L_Kuzniarski_POLAND_IAEA_work-
shop_Seoul_2014.pdf, accessed 24 April 2018.
94 NIW, “Briefs-Poland”, 8 February 2013.
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completed by 2016, and construction was to begin in 2019.95 However, financing 
remained a key barrier. And in December 2017, the rating agency Fitch, warned 
that “if the utilities decide to get involved in building the nuclear power plant and 
put it on their balance sheets then certainly we will have a close look as this may be 
negative for the ratings.” This is because Polish utilities are already “substantially 
leveraged” and the massive cost of nuclear investment would be problematic. Fur-
thermore, the agency suggested that offshore wind, with falling technology costs 
would be more economic.96
In late 2017, the Energy Minister, Krzysztof Tchorzewski, said that he would 
like to see Poland build three nuclear reactors, at five-yearly intervals, the first to 
operate in 2029, with each unit costing US$7 billion.97 The Government, in Jan-
uary 2018, announced that it would decide during the year, if it did proceed with 
nuclear power, with a decision “definitely, in the first half”.98 That did not happen.
Conclusion on potential newcomer countries
The history of potential nuclear newcomer countries is a history of delays, cost esti-
mate increases and abandoned projects before they even get started on the ground. 
While construction is under way in Bangladesh, Belarus, Turkey and the UAE, 
projects have been suspended or cancelled in most of the other candidate countries. 
Two countries, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, both in the Middle East, appear to have 
made some progress in the deployment of nuclear power but the next few years will 
determine whether this will result in the actual commencement of construction.
95 Economist, “Polish Energy, Going nuclear”, 31 January 2014, see http://www.economist.
com/blogs/easternapproaches/2014/01/polish-energy, accessed 24 April 2018.
96 Reuters, “Funding nuclear project could hit Polish utilities’ ratings: Fitch”, 8 December 
2017, see https://www.reuters.com/article/us-poland-nuclear/funding-nuclear-proj-
ect-could-hit-polish-utilities-ratings-fitch-idUSKBN1E21YM accessed 30 June 2018.
97 Reuters, “Poland may have first nuclear power plant by 2029”, 6 September 2017, see 
https://www.reuters.com/article/poland-nuclear/poland-may-have-first-nuclear-power-
plant-by-2029-idUSL8N1LN222, accessed 24 April 2018.
98 Reuters, “Poland to decide later this year on building nuclear plant | Reuters”, 29 January 
2018, see https://www.reuters.com/article/us-poland-nuclear/poland-to-decide-later-
this-year-on-building-nuclear-plant-idUSKBN1FI1Q8, accessed 30 June 2018.
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Bangladesh Rooppur Rosatom Nov 2017 April 2018 2023
Belarus Ostrovets Rosatom 2016/18 2019 (Q4)/2020 
(Q3)
Turkey Akkuyu Rosatom 2015 2018 2023
UAE Barakah KEPCO 2017/18/19/20 2019/2020
Contract Signed or Advanced Development








Vietnam Ninh Thuan Rosatom 2020 Suspended -
Committed Plans
Egypt Rosatom 2019 2018 2026/2027
Jordan Rosatom 2019 2024
Poland ? 2029
Well Developed Plans
Chile 2024 Suspended -







Saudi Arabia 2020 ? 2027
Thailand 2020-8 ? -
Sources: Various, compiled by WNISR, 2018
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9 General conclusions
The global nuclear industry is struggling with a combination of factors that severe-
ly impact its competitiveness. The continuous ageing of the reactor fleet induces 
longer maintenance outages and costlier upgrades. In many wholesale markets, the 
price-level is lower than the operating and maintenance costs of amortized reactors. 
The incumbent nuclear utilities are facing ferocious competition from new players 
that enter the market following sector liberalization measures. For example, the 
largest nuclear operator in the world, the French EDF, is losing 100,000 clients per 
month. In the U.S., many uneconomic reactors are only surviving on the grid with 
massive direct subsidies on state level. While nuclear generating costs are increasing, 
costs of competing technologies, in particular solar, wind and natural gas, have 
been falling dramatically over the past decade. It has turned out impossible to build 
a new nuclear power plant under market economy conditions and massive govern-
ment support is indispensable. But even then, the nuclear industry is suffering from 
excessively long lead times compared to its competitors. So the renewal rate of the 
fleet is below the minimum necessary for survival. Nuclear power is turning into 
an endangered species that, in addition, is increasingly threatened by an invasive 
species, cheap and abundant renewables.
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The Collision of Atomic and Flow  
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Abstract
Transitions to sustainable, renewable energy supply are the major components of 
serious climate policy framed by the aims and constraints of sustainable develop-
ment. The Paris Agreement does not provide the strategy, actions, instruments, 
or means to boost the transition processes in global North and South. The world’s 
rich countries and people continue to exert rights to pollute the atmosphere 
with greenhouse gases. A spearhead climate policy can trigger fast elimination 
of energy-related carbon dioxide emissions, with full de-carbonization of the 
electricity supply as priority. Atomic power and flow renewable power (wind, 
solar, running water) are simply juxtaposed as the two major low-carbon sup-
ply options. In reality they are mutually exclusive in fully decarbonized power 
generation systems. They are hard to match technically while their major mutual 
impact is that they undermine the economic case for each other. 
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1 Introduction
COP21 was widely celebrated as a global achievement in tackling climate change 
certainly is a milestone in climate talks but does not bear enough thrust to spearhead 
enough action of enough urgency. It carries many endemic problems of previous 
international climate change agreements i.e., ambiguity of wording, lack of binding 
obligations, room for interpretation, etc. Too many concessions were made to turn 
it into text that all parties were ready to sign (Verbruggen, 2015). It came at a sacri-
fice of drafting the foundations of urgently needed frameworks for governing the 
global climate commons. The problem of differentiated responsibility for the current 
state and contamination of those very commons is not addressed in a meaningful 
way. By putting a price on GHG emissions, environmental destruction is traded, 
normalized and not addressed; inviting those who can afford i.e., rich countries 
whose industrialization destroyed the planet in the first place, to continue polluting. 
A lot of energy intensive and contaminating production of industrialized coun-
tries has been allowed to move to newly industrialized and industrializing ones who 
are not economically strong to control and mitigate polluting or make polluters 
pay – something that too will not be solved without coordinated global action and 
a binding framework. Fast elimination of energy-related CO2 emission is needed. 
Two main low-carbon options are seen as a solution here: renewable power (solar, 
water, wind) and atomic. In this chapter we start from a brief comment on the 
COP21 Paris Agreement (section 2). In section 3 we focus on the question of rights 
to emit greenhouse gases and ‘the polluter pays principle’. Section 4 presents the 
headlines of spearhead action in climate policy by fast elimination of energy-related 
CO2 emissions. It is followed by section 5 where we show that there are but few 
low-carbon energy supply options, with nuclear and flow renewable energy supply as 
the main contenders for providing electricity. Moreover, low-carbon is only one of 
energy supply options, which too need to be assessed for their overall sustainability 
performance as we discuss in section 6. Nuclear power fails on crucial sustainability 
aspects and collides with the full expansion of flow renewable energy supply (wind, 
solar, running water) since, as we show in Section 7, the two low-carbon contenders 
undermine economic profitability of the other. The Conclusion summarizes our 
main arguments and recommendations.
The Collision of Atomic and Flow Renewable Power … 79
79
2 Paris Agreement: winners and losers
On December 12, 2015, French minister L. Fabius forged the general approval of 
the Paris Agreement after days and nights of tedious negotiations. Evaluations of 
the agreement range from ‘historical success’ to ‘epic failure’. The 31 pages text of 
the Paris Decision & Agreement is grey, vague, and silent about how UNFCCC will 
govern the global climate commons. It holds boundless opportunities for differen-
tiated interpretation. PwC director J. Grant talked of “constructive ambiguity, or 
even woolly wording in some areas”, and L. Fabius stated: “this allows all countries 
the ability to take the deal home and declare success”. Ambiguity and woolly wording 
means that every party can read the text as their success and this speaks of a shaky 
contract. Without mastering COP’s 24-year history and its jargon language, the 
Paris text is difficult to understand. For satisfying all COP delegations, the text is 
stripped of content, leaving voluntary efforts, voluntary contributions, and vol-
untary transfers as fillings for patchwork of voluntary projects. It is not clear who 
undertakes which projects, how and with whom, as the final decisions are under 
the discretion of “all Parties and non-Party stakeholders, including civil society, the 
private sector, financial institutions, cities and other subnational authorities, local 
communities and indigenous peoples”. Does an agreement, allowing willing people 
to set up voluntary initiatives, generate sufficient thrust for drastic and urgent 
change? In our view it does not.
The unanimous adoption of the Paris text prompted praise, high expectations, 
and certainly relief for the club of veteran COP participants. The process was widely 
applauded by most media and societal groups: the many people and organizations 
concerned about derailing climate change, involved scientists, active governments, 
social organizations, banks, industrial companies, up to corporates with significant 
activities and assets related to fossil fuels and to atomic power. 
Popular enthusiasm over marginal accord in the light of previous COP failures 
obscures the danger of agreements where interests of participants are too diverging, 
even opposite, and not reconcilable in the practical realization of the agreement. 
One tends to forget that the day-to-day economic priorities and limitation as well as 
ecological plans – or absence of such – in the participant countries will inevitably 
sour the optimism of the agreement. Industrialized countries’ actions and inten-
tions since the COP21 ovation do not appear assuring of their changing course. 
And these are the parties who should be global leaders of positive change due to 
their economic capacity and because of their role in destroying the environment in 
the first place. Instead, Norway, for example, plans exploitation of all its fossil fuel 
resources. The EU ETS permit prices per ton CO2 emitted hovered back to the €5 
waiting dock, after a ripple beyond €8 during 2015. France’s investment in renewable 
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energy fell from €6.2 billion in 2014 to €2.9 billion in 2015. After post-Chernobyl 
stalling, atomic power was brought back in as a solution to the inability to effec-
tively reduce CO2 emissions (Mez, Schneider, and Thomas 2009) and is still on the 
table. The French nuclear conglomerates see the COP21 outcome as a window of 
opportunity for more atomic power projects. France is an important exporter of 
atomic power production with the state’s heavy involvement in atomic producer 
ownership – AREVA and EDF are some 90% and 85% state owned and are world 
leaders in atomic exports (World Nuclear Association 2016). It is then not surprising 
that the French government promotes atomic energy as a “green option” at home 
and abroad (Ibid.). The option is, however, neither green, nor cheap in the short 
and long run alike as some £18 billion budgeted – with a very realistic prospect of 
adding £2.7 billion (EDF 2016) – Hinkley Point C project in the UK confirms (see 
also Schneider, Froggatt, and Thomas (2011) on high costs of atomic power). What 
the atomic option may do is pull urgently needed resources from being invested 
into truly sustainable, green projects.
COP21 did not establish the elementary conditions and instruments for starting 
an effective UNFCCC governance of the global commons atmosphere and climate 
(Verbruggen, 2015). Overall, major industrial, financial, and political interests have 
swindled good-meaning activists, environmental NGOs, and developing countries. 
Mass outsourcing of production to low-income countries and internationalization 
of production chains makes it harder to trace which country and whose companies 
pollute while it is the governments and end consumers who are being made to pay. 
IPCC, among other, document that ‘a growing share of CO2 emissions from fossil 
fuel combustion in developing countries is released in the production of goods and 
services exported, notably from upper-middle-income countries to high-income 
countries’ (IPCC 2014)
The economic and political ideologies and interests that created the energy and 
climate problems after World War II, continue to occupy the pole positions, now 
controlling the sort, price, and pace of the low-carbon energy transitions further 
jeopardizing possibilities for a progressive change.
3 Rights to CO2 pollution or applying ‘the Polluter Pays 
Principle’
Addressing the annual 50Gt ton GHG emissions must be prioritised because climate 
change causes or aggravates the other daunting global problems (UNDP 2007). 
Governments and companies tend to convert the +2°C limit into a spendable carbon 
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emissions budget, considered and handled as ‘rights to emit’. This practice rises the 
likelihood of transgressing the +2°C limit to near certainty and is geared towards 
appropriation by present rich countries and by carbon-intensive lifestyles, and is 
uncritically propagated by mainstream economists and media as a message that 
reads: ‘by mitigating emissions, present generations deliver efforts and make expenses 
for the benefit of future generations’. This unwarranted rights position conflicts with 
a civilized status of environmental policy. Emitting CO2 in the atmosphere is an 
activity of dumping without hindsight or ‘gaseous littering’. Industrialized socie-
ties acknowledge the ‘Polluter Pays Principle’ and polluters face two obligations: 
pollution must immediately stop and polluters must bear responsibility for the 
mess caused. Due to the atmosphere being the global commons, it is difficult to 
impose and enforce the actual implementation of the polluter pays principle. The 
way in which responsibilities are allocated in terms of ‘right to pollute’ and ‘price 
of pollution’ is ridden with problems. It is undisputable that ‘both international 
and national decision making must aim to take account of income and wealth 
differentials and regional disparities within as well as between nations’ (Newell 
et al 2015: 239). However, there is also the issue of difficulty to trace who pollutes 
what in internationalized production chains where countries, not companies, are 
held responsible for pollution that affects their geographic territory or the global 
atmospheric commons, while the profits from production more often than not 
escape those countries’ controls.
4 Spearheading climate policy by fast elimination of 
energy-related CO2-emissions
Since the UN Framework Convention (1992), over the Kyoto Protocol (1997) and 
the Copenhagen Accord (2009), yearly global GHG emissions continued to grow, 
as did the annual use of commercial energy (IEA’s yearly Outlook). About 4/5th of 
GHG emissions are the result of present energy supply and use practices. In 2015 
CO2 emissions growth stalled due to a global expansion of renewable energy supply. 
Presumably more than 4/5th of the climate policy studies focus on energy-related 
CO2 emissions and their mitigation. Climate policy goes beyond the issue of ener-
gy (e.g., other GHG than fossil fuel related CO2, land-use, adaptation) but is also 
influenced by fossil fuels use (for example methane emissions, changing land-uses 
affected by low-priced supply of fossil fuels).
Ongoing climate policy is little effective partly because there are many goals on 
several aspects that are prioritized at the same time. Contrary to the widespread 
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opinion that UNFCCC must mainstream and simultaneously solve multiple major 
problems of the world2, rational climate policy should detect spearhead issues func-
tioning as locomotive in accelerating mitigation or adaptation. Strategic advance 
requires forcing change via a selected issue for breaking the locks on needed techno-
logical, industrial and societal transitions. Thorough transformation of energy supply 
and use is widely recognized as the predominant change to perform (IPCC 2012). 
When COP Parties are serious about not crossing the +2°C as a dangerous, they 
design and agree on Individual Parties’ Emissions Contraction Scenarios (IPECS). 
For this, the focus is on Cpp = the average energy-related CO2 annual emissions 
per person in a nation. The Cpp indicator is a well-known Sustainable Development 
Indicator. Cpp is yearly assessed for all UN members and ranges from less than 
100 kg in least developed countries to more than 20,000 kg in a few wealthy, oil 
intensive economies (IEA 2015). 
Decomposing Cpp in three, still highly aggregated, factors provides insight 
and opens the entry to more detailed, hands-on information. The three indicators 
can be devolved further to reach detailed groups of actors emitting CO2 in specific 
conditions, offering neat hands-on policy targets3. Respective Cpp calculation is 
a multiplication of respectively wealth intensity, energy intensity of wealth, and 
CO2 intensity of energy use: 
Figure 1 presents a stylized view of Cpp ‘contraction & convergence’ scenarios 
for a few typical Parties with the agreed upon upper limit of Cpp, which contracts 
to a low point in 2050, e.g., a maximum of 500 kg Cpp. Every Party’s scenario starts 
at its recently verified Cpp value. Every Party designs its Cpp path, respecting the 
constraint of staying below the commonly agreed upper limit. The actual Cpp 
contraction scenarios for sixteen, major CO2 emitting nations are documented in 
the Deep Decarbonization Pathways Project4 2015 report. 
2 Paris Agreement p.1: “Parties should, when taking action to address climate change, 
respect, promote and consider their respective obligations on human rights, the right to 
health, the rights of indigenous peoples, local communities, migrants, children, persons 
with disabilities and people in vulnerable situations and the right to development, as well 
as gender equality, empowerment of women and intergenerational equity.”
3 The decomposition can go on by splitting GDP in its major composing activities, by 
identifying actors related to the various activities, by specifying the types of energy 
used, etc. At UN level the higher aggregate suffices and further detailing is the task of 
the Parties to design the policies for controlling the values of the aggregate indicators. 
Agnolucci et al. (2009) and Verbruggen (2011) provide examples and suggestions of 
deeper decompositions.
4 An international consortium of research centers investigates ‘deep decarbonization 
pathways’ for a set of countries, together emitting three quarters of the global ener-
gy-related CO2 tonnage (http://deepdecarbonization.org).
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Fig. 1 Individual Parties’ Emissions Contraction Scenarios materialize respect 
for the maximum +2°C average temperature increase; stylized examples of 
representative cases, selected by the authors. 
Decomposing energy-related CO2 emissions in constituent factors is a widespread 
practice (IEA 2015). IPCC reports take advantage of this decomposition for explain-
ing the evolution of energy-related CO2 emissions (e.g. 2014 Assessment report, 
working group 3, chapter 6). Th e SE4All initiative of the General Assembly (UN 
2011) wants to half the energy intensity (factor 2 of the equation) and double the 
use of renewable energy (factor 3) in developing countries. Th erefore, it is amazing 
that offi  cial COP policy-making neglects the opportunities of decomposition for 
addressing the ‘complex’ and ‘wicked’ policy matters. Also MRV (Monitoring-Re-
porting-Verifi cation) becomes really practical because numerical indicators are 
every year available for every factor:
1. Th e Budget Reform Index (BRI) for wealth intensity (GDP/person). 
Th e BRI should irrevocably increase year aft er year. Budget reform is fi nancially 
promoting sustainable low-carbon activities and charging non-sustainable ac-
tivities, leading to restructuration of the GDP. Th e monetary total of the GDP 
may increase or decrease by the restructuring. Th e discretionary power of how 
to practically organize the restructuring remains fully with the Parties. Th e 
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BRI only gauges the overall net monetary pressure or thrust of policies for the 
promotion of sustainable low-carbon technologies and practices.
2. Energy intensity (energy/GDP) is a long-time documented indicator (Schipper 
et al. 1992, 2001; Geller and Attali 2006) and widely used by national and in-
ternational energy administrations. Energy intensity combines the structure of 
an economy (how much of which activities take place) with energy efficiency 
(how much commercial energy is used by one unit of activity). The first factor is 
affected by budget reform (BRI); the second is mainly technological. Lowering 
energy intensity is generally high on the list of (proposed) energy and climate 
policies (IEA, EU, China). More effective progress is part of energy transitions.
3. Carbon intensity (emitted CO2 per unit of supplied energy) is the keystone for 
controlling CO2 emissions. Transitions to zero or almost zero carbon emitting 
energy uses by 2050 is the mission for all nations in the coming decades. Their 
transitions will be specific, due to differentiated endowment in resources, applied 
technologies, installed infrastructures, etc. However, all energy transitions are 
constrained by a small set of energy supply options [Figure 2]. 
The spearhead approach respects UNFCCC’s ‘common but differentiated responsi-
bilities and respective capabilities’ in emission reductions. ‘Common responsibility’ 
here is: all countries’ Cpp stays below the upper limit scenario. ‘Differentiated’ 
here means: high value Cpp countries must contract first and at a fast rate (‘deep 
cuts’); low value Cpp countries (mostly developing and least developed countries) 
can grow in Cpp value with the obligation to continue to respect the contracting 
upper limit values in future years.
5 Few low-carbon energy supply options
For performing activities, the right type and quantity of energy must be sup-
plied at the right place and time. All energy supply are a combination of some 
energy source with particular technologies for exploration, generation, conver-
sion, and transmission of energy to the end-users. In sequence of importance, 
available sources are: renewable flows and stocks in the natural environment, 
fossil fuel deposits in mines, wells, and shales, and uranium deposits (Figure 2)5. 
The environment supplies for free many energy end-use services with little technol-
ogy required for extraction or conversion, e.g., phenomena and processes such as 
5 The overview does not include the manufacturing of synfuels.
The Collision of Atomic and Flow Renewable Power … 85
85
daylight, ambient heat, natural ventilation and drying. Natural processes concentrate 
diff use renewable fl ows (photosynthesis, the water cycle). Over the last decade, the 
costs of man-made technologies harvesting renewable fl ows dropped signifi cantly
(IPCC 2012). Photovoltaics demonstrate strong performance on cost reduction in 
comparison with atomic (Haas 2012). Globally speaking, atomic has been showing 
a slowdown on new installations and decrease of capacity as an industry since 1988 
(Schneider, M., Froggatt, A. and S. Th omas 2011). Technological capability announces 
further cost cuts, for example levelized kWh prices of conventional PV conversion 
to €ct. 4 to 6 by 2025 and €ct. 2 to 4 by 2050, although dependent on fi nancial and 
regulatory conditions (Fraunhofer 2015). More innovative technologies can further 
reduce the costs. Costs distribution however needs to be further examined and 
refl ected in any future policies as EU cross-country research suggests that it is still 
the households who bear most of the burden ‘due to higher costs of direct energy 
effi  ciency expenditures in appliances, vehicles and insulation’ (Haas et al. 2014).
Fig. 2 Overview of energy supply categories, with energy sources in [.] Source: 
authors’ graph.
Nuclear fuel is produced from refi ned and enriched uranium, dense deposits of which 
are limited (American Nuclear Society, 2001). Uranium shortage may be overcome 
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by breakthroughs in breeder or fusion technology. Commercial new breeder and 
fusion plants are not expected before 2050, the year wherein carbon free electricity 
systems should be operational. Most essential is the high evidence that atomic 
fission power is not a sustainable power supply option (Verbruggen et al. 2014).
Fossil fuels cover a market share of above 85% of commercially traded energy 
supply (BP 2015). Their success is due to their versatility, density, (for all scales) 
divisibility, abundance, storability, and ability to perform on command. However, 
fossil fuel combustions cause various environmental damages and inevitably fetch 
CO2. In a low carbon future their use will be stifled (IEA 2014) but ‘carbon lock-in’ 
and related interests are exceptionally strong. A smooth phasing-out of fossil fuels 
is rather unlikely to happen (Verbruggen and Van de Graaf, 2013). Hydrogen is 
a carbon free fuel but is not naturally available on earth and difficult to manage 
safely. New industrial infrastructure may manufacture hydrogen from low carbon 
electricity but its deployment would be a costly, long-range undertaking. Other 
non-fossil solutions and options on storage and supply systems integration, some 
already available, need more investment for the successful and sustainable green 
energy transition. Electricity plays a central role in that transition as major renew-
able energy supply (PV, wind, water) and atomic energy is generating heat, mostly 
medium-pressure steam that is converted to electricity and delivers only power. 
The electricity sector transformation is the inevitable vanguard of the low-carbon 
energy transition.
6 Climate change urges sustainable energy transitions
The nuclear renaissance strategy is mostly argued in terms of necessity of atomic 
power in future low-carbon scenarios. Without public money continuing to subsidize 
new nuclear power projects, few projects will be started. Also with high subsidies, 
private investors in industrialised countries remain highly reluctant to invest in 
risk-prone nuclear projects. In order to obtain public support, the atomic hubris of 
the past century is shelved by a popular new slogan “Nuclear power is not the only 
solution, but there is no solution without”. However, a majority of EU population 
prefer energy efficiency and renewable power (Eurobarometer 2015). Published 
statistics prove the fast diffusion of flow renewable power supply by technological 
innovation resulting in continuously declining generation costs. It has become the 
survival strategy of the atomic conglomerates to publicly propose co-habitance 
with renewable power while actually undermining its development because there 
is no compatibility for lots of renewable flow power and lots of atomic power in 
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the same power system (Verbruggen, 2008). The exclusivity is technically due to 
physical attributes of electric currents and to the inflexibility of both atomic and 
flow renewable supply. The options perform differently on sustainable development 
criteria at the global societal level too.
Notwithstanding many regards towards sustainable development, IAEA skips 
the true sustainability assessment of atomic power (Verbruggen and Laes, 2015). 
The UK conservative government substituted the single low-carbon attribute for the 
spectrum of sustainability criteria covering Planet, People, Prosperity, Politics, and 
Risks as specific concerns. This reductionist interpretation equals the circumvention 
and obscuration of sustainable development also observable in the 2014–15 energy 
and climate policies of the EU (EC 2014a, EC 2015). Sustainability is, however, the 
primary attribute that future energy supply and use systems should have. 
One aspect is the readiness of energy transition pathways for emulation by 
developing countries that is essential for global CO2 emissions reductions in the 
coming decades. Low-carbon energy systems composed of non-sustainable nuclear 
power and of centralized large-scale, capital-intensive renewable plants are not 
ready for emulation by the majority of developing countries. For the elimination 
of energy-related CO2 emissions, richer countries should develop and deploy 
renewable energy supply of the kind and size also applicable and affordable by 
developing countries. Indeed, there has already been progress made on the level of 
low-carbon energy transition assistance by World Bank and USAid. Power Africa 
(PA) is an initiative launched by the Obama administration in 2013 that ‘works with 
African governments and private sector partners to remove barriers that impede 
sustainable energy development in sub-Saharan Africa and unlock the substantial 
wind, solar, hydropower, natural gas, biomass, and geothermal resources on the 
continent’ (USAID 2013). The program’s goal is stipulated as to ‘increase electricity 
access by adding more than 30,000 megawatts of cleaner, more efficient electricity 
generation capacity and 60 million new home and business connections across 
sub-Saharan Africa’ (USAid 2014). The Beyond the Grid sub-initiative aimed at 
expansion of rural electrification and providing ‘access to small scale and off-grid 
technology’ is also included in PA. One main recent project is the ‘Lighting Africa’ 
program – a ‘joint initiative of IFC [International Finance Corporation] and the 
World Bank, [aimed to] help increase access to affordable, clean and safer lighting 
for more than 30 percent of Nigeria’s population who live in rural areas, and have 
low incomes and no access to grid electricity’ (IFC/WB 2015). The program focuses 
purely on private sector participation in electrification reform and expansion of the 
sector however the renewably sourced energy focus makes it more hopeful than 
the Power Africa initiatives. 
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There are two big problems with the above initiatives. First is the involvement of 
private sector in delivery – usually associated with less reliability and higher costs 
(Yurchenko and Thomas 2015). The second is the inclusion of the fossil fuel natural 
gas as an energy source option, which is not a sustainable option. The two leave us 
skeptical of the potential final economic costs and effects of the program which 
seems to mimic typical issues of climate change politics governance discussed by 
Newell et al (2015) i.e., more of the same conventional approach.
A comprehensive sustainability assessment of nuclear fission power (Verbruggen 
et al., 2014) reveals that nuclear power fails on most sustainability criteria. The needs 
of countries with poor grid development and dispersed unsatisfied household elec-
tricity demand emphasize the shortfall of nuclear power as sustainability option.
7 Flow renewable power and atomic power supplies  
are incompatible
There is a growing literature on how integrated power generation systems may 
embed both flow renewable power (solar, wind, running water) and atomic power. 
At the outset, this literature adopts the present non-sustainable systems as the de-
fault position, with wind and solar power as disturbing newcomers. The incumbent 
position is: intermittent and stochastic renewable energy supplies disturb the reliable 
delivery of power; power on command is the reference. For a more effective and 
efficient transition the opposite viewpoint is needed: i.e., the future sustainability 
goal situation must be treated as a benchmark for assessing present states and re-
quired evolutions. Then the overarching guidance in the transition of the electricity 
sectors must be as follows: Intermittent and stochastic renewable energy deliver the 
most sustainable supply and merit priority over the non-sustainable supply; with 
respect for this sort of lexicographic priority, the supply of reliable power is organized, 
requiring extended load management capabilities, energy storage facilities, adapted 
transmission links to convey and match renewable power supply.
The atomic power and flow renewable supplies are mutually exclusive on five 
major directions of future power systems. First: atomic power is part and parcel 
of the expansive “business-as-usual” energy economy since the 1950s. Second, 
nuclear and renewable power need very different add-ons provided by fossil-fueled 
or bio-energy power plants, or by dam hydro power; for nuclear the add-on is large 
and expansive, for renewable power it is distributed, flexible and contracting over 
time. Third, power grids for spreading bulky nuclear outputs are of another con-
stellation than the interconnection between millions of distributed power sources 
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requires. Fourth, the risks and externalities of atomic power make this technology 
non-sustainable and therefore without a future. There is no safe or permanent way 
of disposing of nuclear waste – a problem that requires an international solution (Di 
Nucci and Losada 2015), effects of potential accidents are insurmountable, climate 
effects of ore mining are underestimated, emission of radioactive isotopes ‘such as 
tritium or carbon 14 and the radioactive noble gas krypton 85’ are not discussed, 
etc. (Brunnengräber, et al., 2015; Smith, 2006; Mez, 2016); while efficiency/renew-
able power are still in their infancy particularly in terms of market shares. Fifth, 
the antagonistic competition for R&D resources and for production capacities and 
capabilities (e.g., trained experts) will intensify. Nuclear power and renewable power 
have no common future in safeguarding “Our Common Future” (Verbruggen, 2008).
Fully sustainable renewable energy systems are not just technologically and 
economically feasible but also the cheapest and only sustainable option for the 
world’s population. Like every successful transition, sustainable energy transitions 
need profound change in the minds, thinking, beliefs, preferences, etc. to adopt the 
novel paradigm, perspectives, technologies, and practices. Progressive thinking and 
actions are unlikely to be delivered by those with vested interests as we mentioned 
in the case of France, AREVA, and EDF. Although detailed technical analysis of 
dynamic power systems reveals the incompatibility of flow renewable and atomic
Tijd 
Atomic base-load power 
Flow renewable power 
MW – reduced loads MW – expansive loads 
hours hours 
Add-on with fuel 
or with stock  
renewable power 
Fig. 3 Atomic versus flow renewable supply as separately serving electric loads
Source: Verbruggen (2008)
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power supplies, the prevailing discourse repeats the mantra of a simple juxtapo-
sition of both kinds of supplies (IPCC, 2014; UNFCCC, 2015; Verbruggen and 
Yurchenko, 2017). 
This discourse can be continued when the contenders are embedded in separate 
power systems with ancillary supplies from fossil fuel based, bio-energy or hydro-
power dam electricity. However, when 100% carbon-free power in a particular power 
system is due, flow renewables and atomic power will collide. Both supplies are 
characterized by inflexibility, although of a different kind and for different reasons. 
There is a need for add-on current to fill the power loads from the supplied base 
onwards. Stapling supplies is the principle in merit order loading, not juxtaposing 
supplies, because electric power is an ephemeral phenomenon switching fifty times 
per second. Figure 3 shows the juxtaposition of atomic and flow renewable supplies 
in separately serving electric loads. Figure 4 illustrates that the two contenders will 




Priority for Atomic 
base-load power 
Priority for Flow 
renewable power 
Fig. 4 Atomic and flow renewable supplies mutual impact when operational in the 
same power system. 
Source: Compiled by the authors on the basis of Verbruggen (2008, 2016).
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As is shown in Figure 3, atomic power and flow renewable supplies serve separate 
power loads. They request add-on services from flexible power supply (fossil fuel 
or bio-energy based power or dam hydropower). Now more flexibility options are 
added like load management and storage in batteries (IEA, 2014). Supply from other 
areas in interconnected power systems is considered as a solution, although when 
the exchange becomes intense and frequent, the power systems become deeper 
interpenetrated. Figure 4 highlights how atomic and renewable supplies within 
one electric system ruin the business case for each other as their load factors are 
eroded when they cannot deliver the base loads. Researchers are looking into 
possibilities to enhance the load following capability of nuclear power plants, 
or to cut off sharp peak supply by wind or solar plants, or curtail their outputs 
for other reasons. Most studies focus on cases of limited annual supply by flow 
renewables (e.g., 20%, or max.45% of total annual power generated in the system) 
with a significant share coming from company owned larger scale plants (off-
shore wins parks; MW-scale PV fields; concentrated solar power). Our evaluation 
is that prosumers and cooperatives will become the predominant generators of 
flow renewable supply. The incompatibility between atomic and flow renewable 
power is stronger in terms of sustainability, economics, and involved agents than 
in technical operability.
8 Conclusion
The global climate policy process as deployed by the UNFCCC at the yearly COPs 
is slow and vague. The participants and most media acclaim COP21, but empirical 
and theoretical literature on the commons (Hardin, 1968; Ostrom, 1990) and prob-
lems of governance (Newell et al., 2015) predicts little positive results (Verbruggen 
2015) without a comprehensive reconstruction of the governance regime altogether. 
‘Energy transition’ is a term covering a spectrum of realities, from thorough 
and sustainable to superficial, deferring and non-sustainable lock-in. One slips in 
the latter without a clear definition, vision, mission or strategy of sustainable and 
thorough change. The incurred delays by the slips make the thorough path steeper, 
and the irreversibility of climate change more probable.
The sustainable renewable energy alternative as such is not costly when fully 
developed and deployed. Atomic power is and will be more expensive especially 
in the long run. Evidently, the transition process itself is challenging. Depending 
on the scores by progressive, viz. reactive strategies, forces, and public support, 
the transition difficulties and costs will be modest or high. In order to overcome 
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the impasse, urgent transitions bring earlier depreciation of sunk investments. 
The latter are more significant when incumbent energy companies reacted little 
or very late to the 1992 Rio summit and ensuing conventions. For example, after 
2000, incumbent electricity companies have still built coal power plants in the 
Netherlands and in Germany (two countries of high exposure in energy transition 
literature and practice). This happened under the cover of the low CO2 emission 
permit prices of the failing EU ETS.
An assessment on nineteen sustainability criteria concluded that atomic fission 
power is not a sustainable option (Verbruggen et al., 2014). A full expansion of flow 
renewable and atomic power supplies too are mutually undermining in terms of 
reliability of supply and economic cost alike. A conclusion thus can be made that 
sustainable transition and sustainable power supply must focus and rely exclusively 
on renewable energy and renewable flow energy in particular as the main option to 
tackle climate change. The shift towards that option must happen quickly and will 
require coordinated efforts of countries globally. For this to be effective and making 
all parties responsible, a new, more binding, and clearly formulated framework of 
governance for the global environmental commons will need to replace the Paris 
Agreement and the business-as-usual functioning of the COPs.
Acronyms and Glossary: COP=Conference of Parties at the UNFCCC (yearly since 1995); 
Cpp = a Party’s average energy-related CO2 annual emissions per person; EPR= European 
Pressurized reactor; IAEA=International Atomic Energy Agency; INDC=Intended Nationally 
Decided Contributions (by Parties); IPCC=Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change; 
PV=Photo-Voltaic; RE=Renewable Energy/Electricity; SD=Sustainable Development; UN-
FCCC=United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (1992).
This text uses mostly ‘atomic’ rather than ‘nuclear’ because splitting (or fusion) of atoms 
generates other atoms, as recognized in the 1950–60s.
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The Historical Development of the Costs  
of Nuclear Power 
Reinhard Haas, Stephen Thomas, and Amela Ajanovic1
Abstract
One of the major historical arguments of the promoters of the use of nuclear 
power was its low cost compared to other electricity generation technologies. For 
a long time, it was argued that a strong nuclear power contribution to electricity 
supplies was the best way to achieve a reliable and affordable electricity supply. 
However, from the first wave of nuclear reactors deployed, construction costs 
have been on an escalation course.
The core objective of this paper is to analyze the historical development of the 
costs – especially the investment costs – of nuclear power plants. With respect 
to these in recent years in Western countries there is a strong perception: Re-
alized costs has always been higher than forecast costs and construction times 
promised have almost never been met. Given the reasons identified for these 
cost increases – and their irreversibility – we conclude that the time of “cheap” 
electricity from nuclear power is undoubtedly over if it has ever existed and for 
the next years there are no signs of a reversal of the current upward cost trend. 
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1 Introduction
One of the major historical arguments of the promoters of the use of nuclear power 
was its low costs compared to other electricity generation technologies. For a long 
time, it was argued that it is impossible to retain a secure and affordable and low-
cost electricity supply without nuclear power. However, it has to be debated whether 
that argument was ever valid and from the first wave of nuclear reactors deployed, 
construction costs have been on an escalation course. 
Looking back to the economic promises of the “nuclear dream” of the 1950s 
and 1960s, these focused on very cheap electricity to be provided by nuclear power 
plants (NPP), electricity even “too cheap to meter” (Lewis Strauss2, Cohn, 2007). 
This idea was based on the rather low investment costs and short construction times 
(4-6 years) in the early days of the civilian use of nuclear power. Indeed, at this time 
NPP generated electricity at costs as low as 2–3 cents2010
3 per kWh (Cohn, 2007).4 
Yet, over time the costs of nuclear, especially the investment costs, have increased 
continuously. In recent decades the high and still increasing costs of nuclear power 
have become a key barrier to the construction of new reactors around the world. It 
is clear that in the long run nuclear power will only succeed if its generation costs 
are lower than those of competing technologies (MIT 2003). This is especially true 
as electricity systems become increasingly exposed to competitive markets in many 
parts of the world. 
The core objective of this paper is to analyze the historical development of the 
costs – especially the construction costs – of nuclear power plants. Specific derived 
objectives are to analyze (i) why the investment costs have increased, (ii) why the 
construction times have increased, (iii) why the construction costs as well as the 
construction times have been underestimated systematically, and (iv) whether the 
reasons for construction cost and time increases are irreversible.
In this context it is important to note that there is a difference between actual 
investment costs and so-called overnight costs (ONC). The major difference is that 
the investment costs include also the costs for interest and represent the whole capital 
costs while the ONC represent the expenses for the technology and construction 
work only (incl. labor and material cost). Overnight costs are useful for analytical 
2 Reference to the full text of what Lewis Strauss said: https://public-blog.nrc-gateway.
gov/2016/06/03/too-cheap-to-meter-a-history-of-the-phrase/
3 This means value in terms of money of 2010
4 One could argue strongly whether there was ever an era of cheap nuclear power. The 
perception of cheapness was based either on cost forecasts that were not fulfilled or on 
a perception that costs would come down over time and make nuclear power cheap.
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purposes especially for international comparisons because the interest rate is pro-
ject and country specific but consumers pay the cost including the interest. The 
European Commission estimated that Hinkley would cost in total £24.5bn when 
the overnight cost was estimated at £16bn5. 
Of absolutely core interest is why the investment costs increased by such high 
rates. So far, there is no sound and comprehensive analytical evidence that explains 
the skyrocketing of the real costs that have occurred since the beginning of nuclear 
power. An obvious component referred to above but in little clarity is the longer 
construction times, leading to ever higher interest accrued and to „natural“ cost 
escalation“ of labor and equipment The automatic intuitive assumption is that these 
extra costs arise from the additional safety requirements resulting from accidents 
at Browns Ferry, Three Miles Island and Chernobyl. There might also be a need 
for better quality materials, for example Westinghouse steam generators of the 
1970s used a material that corroded too quickly. The reason why the vendors used 
cheaper material was because costs were too high. This proved a false economy. If 
raw materials like steel and concrete have gone up faster in real terms than inflation, 
that would also have increased real costs. Another factor is that reactors seem to 
have become more prone to cost escalation from the pre-construction forecast, 
again no analysis to back this up. This raises the issue whether construction costs 
have gone up because real costs have gone up or because things have gone wrong 
without the intrinsic cost going up, e.g. how far is the higher than estimated cost 
of OLK-3 due to the forecast being an underestimate and how far because things 
have gone wrong, including increases in construction duration. 
Another issue is initial price dumping by construction companies. The question 
would be whether the pre-construction costs have become more realistic again ap-
pearing to raise the real cost. Certainly the prices quoted in the 1960s were horrible 
underestimates (e.g. the 12 US turnkey plants). One problem with pre-construction 
cost estimates is that unless the vendor gives a fixed price contract (turnkey) and 
no vendor in its right mind would give a genuinely fixed price contract, the vendors 
know they can’t be held to the pre-construction estimate so they have an incentive 
to underestimate to get the business.
Other possible reasons for the construction cost increases could be:
• increase in interest rates for financing and an increase in construction duration 
(which influences the interest costs but not the ONC);
5 See the state aid case verdict
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• changes in design generation6, and changes in the engineering design see Grubler 
(2014), other than extra safety costs covered above.
In addition, in the past it could be suspected that high subsidies such as public 
subsidies, financial subsidies (low interest rates that did not reflect the economic 
risk) and government subsidies to industry could have led to much lower costs than 
have actually been true (Cohn (1997)). Another reason for present day construction 
cost increases would be that the pre-construction costs have become more realistic 
thereby appearing to raise the real cost. Certainly, the prices quoted in the 1960s 
were dramatic underestimates. After the experience of vendors facing heavy losses 
with the 12 US ‘turnkey’ projects of the mid-60s, vendors were only willing to sign 
‘cost-plus’ contracts so there were no direct financial consequences to them when 
costs overran. Utilities, in turn, were generally able to pass on whatever costs were 
incurred to consumers. So neither the vendor nor the buyer generally had to bear 
the additional costs, they fell on consumers.
So far, studies conducted on the costs and economics of nuclear have focused 
mainly on the analysis of single plants and cohorts of NPP. In this work we take the 
results of other studies, add own analyses, e.g. on OLK3, FLA3 and the UK’s Hinkley 
Point C project (HPC) and derive major findings. To the best of our knowledge 
so far, no such a systematic analysis of cost developments has yet been conducted. 
Regarding the literature on costs and economics the following work is most 
relevant. The very first studies on cost analyses were already conducted at the end of 
the 1970s by Tybout (1975), Mooz (1978), Mooz (1979), Mooz (1982) and Komanoff 
(1981). They already provide very early, sound analyses on the reasons for cost in-
creases and an early outlook on what is looming today, which is that nuclear power 
will not become a cheap power source at any time. 
Cohn (1997) provides a comprehensive corresponding analysis including cost 
analyses. He explains from a philosophical and economic point-of-view why the 
nuclear dream has failed to come true. Cohn is the first to describe, why nuclear 
costs were systematically underestimated, what were the economic problems al-
ready in the early years of nuclear and how the word “market” was systematically 
misused by the major utilities and vendor companies. This work also provides 
an interesting summary on nuclear spending and costs of NPP in the early days 
1955 to 1969 in the US. He showed that these were financed almost completely by 
the utilities with the incentive to gain know-how. He also documents that even at 
that time it was generally expected to have higher generating costs than available 
fossil fuel alternatives and was undertaken as a technology-promoting investment. 
6 See Reinberger et al. in this book explaining the change in generations of nuclear
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Another major contribution of Cohn’s work is that he was the first to provide a 
critical discussion on the issue of subsidies and cost deferments. He documents in 
detail for the time-period from 1950 to 1979 direct expenditure (incl. R&D outlays, 
uranium supply and enrichment subsidies, and regulatory subsidies) and implicit 
subsidies (e.g. tax exemptions and tax benefits) as well as the cost deferments due to 
e.g. neglecting nuclear waste disposal charges (see Cohn 1997, p.79 for more details).
MIT (2003) conducted a sensitivity analysis and showed under which conditions 
NPP could become competitive again.
The issue of pre-announced construction costs and actual ones was already 
discussed by Koomey/Hultman (2007). They present a reactor-by reactor analysis 
of historical busbar costs for 99 nuclear reactors in the US and compare those costs 
with recent (2007) projections for next-generation US reactors. Their analysis sug-
gests that projections of capital costs, construction duration, and total operation 
and maintenance costs are quite low – far away from the historical medians and 
that additional scrutiny may be required to justify using such estimates in current 
policy discussions and planning.
Grubler (2010) provides a seminal contribution and a very comprehensive 
analysis on the developments in France. Grubler’s major point of criticism is that 
lack of standardization and new engineering approaches have avoided the learn-
ing and standardization effect. He points out that it is worth saying that France is 
widely, but wrongly seen as having a fully standardised programme. Actually its 
58 reactors are spread over at least 3 main designs (900MW, 1300MW, 1450MW) 
and 7 variants. Hence, many of the plants used a new untested design.. The scope 
for learning was restricted because the new variants were ordered before there was 
any operating experience with their predecessors. There was no conscious decision 
by France not to standardize, design changes were required because of experience 
elsewhere, e.g. the need to learn lessons from the Three Mile Island disaster and 
the need to improve the economics, e.g. by scaling up.
Harris et al. (2012) provide cost estimates for nuclear power in the UK. Their 
motivation is to analyze the actual cost developments in Europe and derive major 
conclusions for the future of investment costs in the UK: The primary finding of this 
paper is that the capital cost for an NPP may be higher than recent UK government 
reports have indicated and may therefore require greater levels of financial support 
than policymakers might have originally envisaged. As Harris et al. (2012) state 
further, due to the significant uncertainties that surround cost estimates for NPP in 
general it is very difficult to give a high level of confidence to levelised cost estimates. 
Rothwell (2015) discusses the basics of economics of nuclear power. Lovering et al. 
(2016) present an overview on overnight costs (ONC) of 58% of the nuclear reactors 
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world-wide. Koomey et al. (2017) heavily criticize the work by Lovering et al. (2016) 
claiming that they cherry pick data and include misleading data on early reactors.
This work is organized as follows. In the next chapter we look at the basic cost 
structure of NPP. Then we analyze the development of investment costs. A specific 
focus is dedicated to the development of Technological Learning (TL). We discuss 
why it took place for different technologies for electricity generation but apparently 
not for NPP. Finally, we argue why the argument that nuclear electricity is cheap is 
not valid. We explain and show the wrong predictions regarding investment costs 
and how construction times look like for some recent projects. A summary of the 
major reasons for investment costs increases of NPP and conclusions complete 
this chapter.
2 The cost structure of nuclear power plants
In principle the cost structure of every power plant consists of investment costs, 
fuel costs and O&M costs. In addition, for nuclear plants, significant costs for 
decommission and backend activities have to be considered, see Irrek (2018) and 
Wealer et al. (2018) in this book. The specific cost structure of nuclear plants is 
shown in Fig. 1. Specific features are: 
• A very high share of capital costs
• High turnkey costs, actually the highest among all types of power plants 
• An (unknown) share of decommissioning costs 
Figure 1 shows that the largest amount of the costs – about 80%– are capital costs 
resulting from initial investments. In 2004 the IAEA estimated 60% construction 
costs, today the share is likely to be even higher because constructions have esca-
lated faster than the other elements. Harris (2012) estimate 80% share of capital 
costs and also according to Rangel et al. (2013) NPP competitiveness depends on 
its capital costs representing on average 80% of the levelized cost of electricity. 
However, from the first wave of nuclear reactors construction costs have been on 
an escalation course and the share of capital costs in total cost increased.
One might ask whether the cost components in Figure 1 are complete and whether 
all important components are included. Schneider (2006) suggests it is not, stating 
“The total costs of a nuclear kWh most likely will never be known. Costs for waste 
management, decommissioning and clean-up are constantly on the rise and are 
generally expected to be paid by the taxpayer.”



















Cost structure of nuclear power plants 
Fig. 1 Typical nuclear electricity generation cost breakdown (based on IAEA (2004) 
and other sources)
3 The historical development of investment costs
As seen from Fig. 1 investment costs contribute the largest share to the electricity 
generation costs of NPP. In this chapter we put special focus on the analysis of the 
historical development of investment costs. We provide a dynamic comparison 
of the investment costs extracted from different studies, with an emphasis on the 
explanations for reasons for their increase. 
The rising investment cost of building nuclear reactors is a well-established fact. 
It has been studied in detail for installed capacity in the USA and France. However, 
sound explanations for these cost increases are difficult to find.
The key literature on investment costs is presented below. The first comprehensive 
analysis of these was conducted by Koomey (2007). Cohn (1997) describes the devel-
opment of utilities nuclear investments in the U.S. from the 1950s to the 1970s. He 
states that utilities nuclear spendings/investments can be divided into four clusters 
(1) the first investor-owned utilities financed and owned projects (1955-1963); (2) 
the three rounds of the AEC’s Power reactor demonstration program (1955-1963); 
(3) the turnkey years (12/63-1966); and (4) the bandwagon market (1966-1969). An-
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other important work was done by Harding (2007), who analyzed about 60 plants 
in the U.S. with respect to their investment costs. His findings show that a rapid 
growth in investment costs took place already over the period from 1955 to 1995. 
For the USA the overnight construction costs (ONC) of the first reactors built 
in the early 1970s was about $10002008 per kW. It has increased steadily ever since 
reaching $50002008 per kW for the recent reactors built in the early 1990s (Rangel 
et al. 2013). In other words, a one-to-five ratio in constant USD. The increase in the 
overall construction costs is even more striking. The average construction duration 
has increased with time, so interest during construction has increased too. The 
time taken to build an NPP has risen from between four and six years for the first 
plants to more than twice as long for the most recent units. 
With respect to investment costs an important aspect is the difference between 
so-called ONC and actual investment costs. It is important to note, that there 
is a fundamental difference between ONC and the net present value (NPV) of 
the investment costs, the major difference being that the overnight costs do not 
include the interest costs of financing depending on the plant construction time. 
As already said the plant construction time does not in itself increase costs other 
than the interest costs, although if delays reflect difficulties in construction, these 
might also increase costs. 
Of specific relevance in this context is interest during construction (IDC). Dur-
ing the 80s, there were big battles in the USA between regulators and utilities with 
utilities trying to get consumers to pay IDC before the plant was on line. Mostly the 
regulators (rightly) did not give in. US regulation should require utilities to build 
facilities and only when the facility is complete and the regulator has applied the 
test of ‘used, useful and costs prudently incurred’ should the utility be allowed to 
start to recover its costs from consumers. If a utility fails the test, some or all of 
the money spent by the utility should not be included in the regulatory asset base 
and these costs must come out of profits. It was regulators applying this test and 
threatening to disallow costs that stopped nuclear ordering in its tracks in the USA 
in 1979 (and led to the cancellation of 100+ orders placed after 1974). So, from an 
economics point of view this was very important. Without the guarantee of cost 
pass-through, the banks, credit rating agencies etc made it clear to utilities that 
building a nuclear plant would be potentially ruinous.
For the financial institutions, delays in construction times and corresponding 
increases in interest payments play a major role. In addition, almost all modern 
reactor programs analyzed in detail to date have experienced significantly length-
ened construction times particularly in the USA and Europe. Use only of overnight 
construction costs e.g. by Lovering et al., 2016 means that some of the financial 
consequences of construction delays is ignored.
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ONC has been used in the utility industry for decades (Koomey et al., 2017, EPRI, 
1993; Rothwell, 2015), and they attempt to show a cost that is “meant to isolate the 
cost invariant to construction duration (Koomey et al., 2017) and interest rate, in 
order to capture the cost intrinsic to the reactor technology”, as Lovering et al., 2016 
put it. Despite the use of the term “overnight costs” having a long history, there is 
simply no economic basis for comparing the costs of reactors without including the 
cost of capital and the construction duration. However, it is not invalid to look at 
overnight costs. The argument is that adding in interest costs muddies the picture 
because you don’t know if costs have gone up because interest has increased or 
because the underlying construction cost has gone up. 
A key aspect of nuclear reactors that makes them such high-risk investments 
are that they are large scale, complex, and pre- dominantly site-built. Hence con-
struction takes years (even in the best case) and can extend over a decade or more 
(Koomey et al., 2017). 
Given that financing constitutes a significant part of the electricity generation 
costs of an NPP, and that the very nature of nuclear power as a large scale, capi-
tal-intensive technology makes it particularly sensitive to financial risks, a study 
that does not take account of interest during construction cannot give a true picture 
of the costs of nuclear power.
Another major historical analysis on the development of investment costs of NPP 
has been conducted by Grübler (2010). He investigated all 58 of the French plants 
in service in 2018 based on an analysis of costs presented in annual reports by the 
French government. Of specific interest is Civaux in France a N4 type reactor with 
extremely high costs. However, regarding the four N4 plants (two each at Civaux 
and Chooz in France) there were clearly design issues that delayed them. They 
might have been part of the trend but without these plants the trend is still there. 
There was a trend of cost escalation amongst the other 54 that did not have these 
design issue problems. For the French case the cost assessment done by Grubler 
(2010) pointed out that the units completed after 1990 were 3.5 times more costly 
than the reactors installed in the 1970s. This finding led to the conclusion that cost 
escalation was inherent to reactors, given that even under the best conditions, as 
prevailing in France the construction costs have also risen significantly. These 
favourable factors included more standardization than was achieved elsewhere, 
predictable series production allowing efficient production line methods to be used 
to manufacture parts and learning was concentrated in only one reactor vendor 
and one utility, which also managed the construction process.
Grubler’s analysis was a seminal contribution because it led to the publication of 
the actual costs of the French nuclear power plants by plant. The so-called negative 
learning found by Grubler for the French case was shocking and led to discussion 
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of this concept. However, the term “negative learning” may lead the reader to think 
too narrowly. We are skeptical that lost skills account for much of the increased cost 
and rather think that it is much more about increased scope of the plants, greater 
complexity which makes the power plants more difficult to build.
Rangel et al. (2013) revisited the French nuclear experience using the actual 
construction costs of the French nuclear fleet that had been published in a report 
by Cour de Comptes and they found positive learning effects when building the 
same type of reactors as a result of Grubler’s work. With this information they have 
tried to identify investment costs’ main drivers and found some lessons to explain 
the cost escalation phenomena. Regarding ‘same type of reactors’ it is important to 
state that there were 4 different ‚tranches‘ of 900MW reactors, Programme 1970 (6 
reactors), CP900-1 (16), CP900-2 (8), Tranches 900 (4). And there was CP-1300-1 
(20) and N4 (4), Thomas (1987).
They stated the importance of recognizing that the centralized nature of the 
French NPP programme not only allowed a fast deployment of this technology but 
also shielded its costs from private eyes and public scrutiny. As argued by Rangel et 
al. (2013) the cost escalation with the Cour de Comptes (CdC) data was less severe. 
On the basis of the analysis of the Cour de Comptes report there would be reason to 
believe that the construction cost escalation in France is mainly due to the increase 
in the labor costs but also due to the scaling-up strategy. No economies-of-scale 
were observed, rather diseconomies of scale. However, Grubler (2014) argues that 
the CdC data are heavily biased and omit arbitrily important construction costs 
components. He compares his estimates with CdC (corrected for omissions) criti-
cizes that Rangel and Leveque (2013) have compared the lowest CdC numbers (73 
billion) to the best-guess model estimates 89 billion reported in Grubler (2010), 
and that Rangel et al. (2013) reached the pre-mature conclusion of a significant 
overestimation of costs and resulting cost escalation of the Grubler costing model. 
The low end of the range uses the CdC’s original estimate excluding construction 
engineering and labour costs, and considers the Tricastin 3,4 versus the Chooz 1,2 
reactor costs as reported in CdC 2012: 22–23; the high end of the range uses the 
CdC costs adjusted to include construction engineering and labour, plus the 13 to 
23 billion Euro2010 accrued interest during construction
Another specific phenomenon is the issue of economies-of-scale. It has generally 
been assumed that nuclear power plants would be amenable to scale economies. 
The bigger the cheaper was a basic approach. However, there has not appeared any 
empirical evidence to prove this assumption. On the contrary, studies from the 1970s 
showed no evidence of scale economies. E.g Cantor/Hewlett (1988) calculated that 
a 1% increase in the size of a reactor resulted in a 0.13% rise in the ONC per kW. 
Following Leveque (2015), for France the increase in the reactor size was accompa-
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nied by greater complexity and lead-times which in turn led to higher investment 
costs per MW. How far this greater complexity was the result of increased scale and 
how far it was due to the larger reactors being more recent and therefore requiring 
additional safety systems, for example to take account of Three Mile Island, is dif-
ficult to determine. In addition, a key potential influence is so-called economies of 
number, ie the more per year you make of a particular item, e.g. a unit of a power 
plant (same size) the cheaper the production is because the fixed costs of production 
lines is spread more thinly and more efficient production methods can be used.
In 2016 Lovering et al. conducted an analysis on the ONC of 58% of the nuclear 
reactors world-wide. In that article the authors purport to show that using this larger 
dataset yields more representative results than analyses that focus on individual 
countries explicitly citing Koomey et al. (2007) for the United States and Grübler 
(2010) for France as examples of country-level treatments. This work was heavily 
critiziced by Koomey et al. (2017). Koomey et al. argue that construction duration 
and interest payments are integral parts of the overall construction costs. Another 
issue with the work by Lovering (2016) raised by Koomey et al. was the reliability 
of the data they added. They included reactors of several designs, eg heavy water 
reactors (HWRs) going back a long way to prototype and demo plants and from 
countries like India, Korea, China where there must be doubts about the reliability 
of the data.
The big picture with respect to a comparison of major studies on the historical 
development of investment costs of nuclear power plants is provided in Fig. 2. It 
provides a descriptive analysis of data of different studies and single plants. As seen 
over time a considerable uptake took place. An important aspect is that for OLK3 
and FLA3 initially much lower costs were expected than reported before e.g. by 
Grubler (2010) for France in 2000. The latest data suggest that the ONC for Olkiluoto 
3 will be about €8bn, the latest estimate for Flamanville is €10.9bn.7 These are plants 
where almost everything possible to go wrong has gone wrong yet they are cheaper 
than Hinkley Point C (HPC) which is only expected to start construction between 
2019–21 and whose latest cost estimate is £9.8-10.15bn per reactor or about €12bn. 
Is that because HPC is really more expensive than FLA3 or OLK3 or because the 
HPC estimate is so padded to prevent cost escalation falling on the owner? 
7 https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-edf-flamanville/edfs-flamanville-reactor-start-again-
delayed-to-2020-idUKKBN1KF0VN (Accessed August 22, 2018)
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Fig. 2 The big picture: A comparison of major studies on the historical development of 
investment costs of nuclear power plants 
It is important to state that Hinkley Point is unusual amongst nuclear projects 
because the investment costs and total cost are in advance set relatively high. It is 
the first time, that the investment costs of a NPP are in advance estimated to be on 
a higher level than all NPP constructed so far (or under construction).
4 Technological Learning
The next issue we discuss is Technological Learning. It goes in principle along with 
the dynamic development of investment costs of any technology. The idea is that it 
is well known that the cost of a technology is expected to drop as it is deployed more 
widely. That is to say, it is of interest to identify whether with increasing capacities 
deployed a decrease in investment costs took place. Some major references is in 
this context are Wene (2000), McDonald/Schrattenholzer (2001), Kobos (2006), 
Wiesenthal et al. (2010). On learning, one has to be careful. The original Arrow 
definition (Arrow 1962) was very narrow and encompassed better performance 
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using the same capital stock. In short the workers simply got better at using the 
equipment. This may be too narrow but it is probably useful to distinguish between 
design changes that arose because technical change/progress allowed new options to 
be pursued and design changes that resulted from experience with existing designs.
Nuclear technology displays the opposite trend to reductions in cost. We think 
that there are four factors that would lead to lower costs for a normal successful 
technology: economies of scale, economies of number, learning by doing and tech-
nical progress. Actually, we are convinced that learning has taken place, but it either 
hasn’t reduced costs or other factors have swamped learning cost reductions. For 
example, the experience at Three Mile Island was certainly learning but it increased 
costs. We think it is important to really distinguish and accurately separate these 
effects which are quite distinct. Of course, this is not easy. A key phrase may be ’a 
successful technology‘. It might be that technologies that do not have scope for these 
effects fail for that reason. The problem with nuclear is that it was not allowed to 
fail. In addition, as Leveque states, all other things being equal, the more powerful 
the reactor, the smaller the number of identical units built.
With respect to Technological Learning for NPP the following is important: Even 
in the times of booming plant construction in the 1970s and the 1980s nuclear was 
one of the few exceptions in the sense that additional capacities constructed did not 
lead to resulting cost reductions. They are mainly that for the early plants no real 
costs were revealed. Costs were distorted by public subsidies, subsidies from industry 
(from the constructors of plant to get into the market) and of financing subsides 
due to very favourable interest rates. Over the course of time these subsidies were 
gradually removed and costs increased instead of following the classical learning 
theory. In addition, it is worth mentioning that learning could increase costs, e.g. 
if a cheap material is not good enough, or existing designs are not safe enough.
5 Historical developments of construction times 
One major reason for the increases in nuclear generation costs is the increase of con-
struction times. As an example Grubler (2010) analyzed the historical development 
of construction times of nuclear power plants in France between 1965 and 2005. 
His results show that up to 1985 the majority of construction times were between 
60 and 84 months. After 1985 the average duration increased in a virtually linear 
way. In this view for France also the first announcement for the construction time 
of FLA-3 was included. It is by no means clear what was the intention beyond this 
cost announcement and the corresponding construction time of five years (see 
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later) because the construction times for the plants built in the years before were 
already significantly higher, twice as high and more. Obviously, the intention was 
to convince decision makers that FLA-3 would be economic. The forecast cost 
(€3.2bn) and construction time (five years) for Flamanville were significantly lower 
than the most recent experience but more realistic figures would have made the 
project hard to justify. Fig. 3 shows the increase in estimated construction times 
for five typical cases world-wide. The graph should be read as follows: On the 
vertical axis are the construction times indicated in months. The lines show how 
they increased or remained stable over time. E.g. for OLK-3 in 2004 the estimate 
for the construction time was 60 months in 2018 it is 200 months (Source: Platts, 




















Olkiluoto-3 (FI) FLA-3 (FR) Hinkley point 3 (UK) Shin Kori (KO) Leningard II (RU)
Fig. 3 Increase in the delays of construction times for five typical cases world-wide
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6 Lessons learned from the developments of 
Flamanville and Olkiluoto 
Another major question is what caused the increase in construction duration of 
the NPPs in Finland, France and the US still under the construction. In addition, 
there was an increase in construction times in China and Russia for China from 
2011 onwards and for Russia with the latest design. For instance, the construction 
of the first European pressurized reactor (EPR) in FLA3 in France revealed that 
even when this reactor was initially thought as no more costly than its predecessor 
(the N4) this would not be the case. 
At the beginning of 2005 the estimated cost of this project were €3.2 billion. 
However this figure was revised in 2011, when the state-owned French company 
Electricite-de–France (EdF) announced that the costs had reached €6 billion. This 
situation even worsened with the latest press releases stating €8.5 billion in 2012 
and 9.5 billion in 2016. The latest estimate is €10.9bn (Platts, 2018).
For the Westinghouse latest design (AP1000) the situation for the two pairs of 
reactors (Summer and Vogtle) that started construction in the US is very similar. 
The first cost estimates done both in 2003 were around USD 2400/kW. These costs 
were later revised stating ONC in USD 2010 of 5100/kW. The pattern is that all three 
Gen III+ designs that have started construction – EPR, AP1000 and AES2006 – 
have overruns of time much longer than their predecessors. In Russia and China, 
contemporary projects using earlier designs were much less delayed. Because Gen 
III+ has higher design safety, if this leads to greater complexity and makes them 
more difficult to build, contrary to the claims made for Gen III+, this will increase 
their costs and increase lead times which, if it reflects construction problems will 
also increase interest costs.
7 Summarizing the major reasons for investment costs 
increases of NPP 
In the following we summarize the major reasons for investment costs increases 
of NPP. As stated, so far there is no precise and comprehensive analytical evidence 
that explains the skyrocketing of the real costs of NPP that have occurred since 
the beginning of nuclear power use. Our explanations for the major reasons for 
the cost increases are:
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• The intuitive assumption is that these extra costs arise from the additional safety 
requirements resulting from accidents at Browns Ferry, Three Miles Island and 
Chernobyl (and of the 9/11 attack). Indeed, as Rangel (2013) and Leveque (2015) 
have proven for France increases in safety equipment have contributed to about 
half of the construction cost increases in France between 1970 and 1990;
• There might also be a need for better quality materials, for example Westing-
house steam generators of the 70s used a material that corroded too quickly. 
If raw materials like steel and concrete have gone up faster in real terms than 
inflation, that would also have increased real costs (Cohn 1997, Grübler 2010, 
Thomas (2005)). Increases in labour and material costs is also argued as a major 
cost driver by Leveque (2015) for France;
• A systematic underestimation of the construction costs as well as the construction 
duration: One factor is that reactors seem to have become more prone to cost 
escalation from the pre-construction forecast. Another reason for present day 
construction costs increases is that the pre-construction costs have become more 
realistic thereby appearing to raise the real cost. Certainly, the prices quoted in 
the 1960s were dramatic underestimates.
• Finally, costs could have gone up because things simply have gone wrong with-
out the intrinsic cost going up, e.g. how far is the higher than estimated cost of 
OLK3 due to the forecast being an underestimate and how far because things 
have gone wrong, raising costs. In this context also the question is of interest 
whether Western companies simply do not have the skills anymore to complete 
huge projects on time. The next obstacle concerns on-site construction and short 
production runs. Much like other civil engineering projects – bridges, airports 
e.g in Berlin – NPP are mainly built on-site. 
• However, increases in interest rates for financing has not been identified as a 
driver by any study.
Other possible reasons for the cost increases are:
• the removal of public and industry subsidies;
• increase in construction times: Western companies have lost skills due to the 
lack of new orders, and are no longer able to construct plants on time, with huge 
delays leading to construction times two or three times longer than planned; 
• changes in generation, e.g from GEN II to GEN III and changes in the engineering 
design (reduces possible Learning effects);
• The ending of dumping by construction companies;
• The fact that scaling-up appears to have increased, not decreased costs as illus-
trated in France (Leveque, 2015).
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8 Conclusions
Looking back to the years of the nuclear dream in the 1950s and 1960s one of the 
major historical arguments by the promoters for generating electricity from nucle-
ar power was its low costs compared to other electricity generation technologies. 
However, from the first wave of nuclear reactors construction costs have been on 
an escalation course. To date no systematic analysis on the reasons why the costs 
– especially the investment costs – of NPP have skyrocketed, has been conducted. 
This work is the first that presents the major reasons for investment costs increases 
in a systematic structured way.
The major conclusions of this analysis are: There is one core perception re-
garding the costs of nuclear power plants in recent years: actual costs have always 
been higher than stated prior to construction and construction times have always 
exceeded those promised, in most cases considerably. In addition, Western com-
panies have lost skills, and are even less able to construct plants on time, with huge 
delays leading to construction times two or even three times longer than planned. 
For nuclear power plants in Western Europe and the U.S. in the last 40 years it 
can be stated that (i) forecasts of construction times have never been reliable; (ii) 
forecasts of investment costs have seldom if ever been fulfilled, actual investment 
costs were always higher than costs announced; (iii) currently there are no signs 
anywhere of a cost decrease. 
What can be stated today is that the economic performance of new nuclear 
power plants, particularly in the Western countries, has declined substantially 
compared to their predecessors and to competing power generation technologies. 
The costs of nuclear power have increased dramatically while on the other hand 
the costs of wind and photovoltaics – now the major competitors – have fallen the 
economic performance of nuclear in comparison to these renewable technologies 
is getting worse. 
It will be become much harder for nuclear to recover money in renewable-based 
electricity markets – much less base load needed – even the pure operation & 
maintenance costs are difficult to recover in today’s electricity markets leading to 
more and more unfavourable future prospects of nuclear from an economic point-
of-view (MIT 2003). In addition, the introduction of competition to electricity 
markets means the financial risks that were previously borne by the customer 
must now increasingly be borne by the investors. Because of these risks faced in 
competitive electricity markets, interest rates have risen and “investors tend to 
favour less capital intensive and more flexible technologies”. Or as an influential 
interdisciplinary study conducted at the MIT as long ago as 2003 stated “Today, 
nuclear power is not an economically competitive choice”. In addition, as Leveque 
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(2015) states: “unless nuclear industry moves away from the present model of large, 
non-modular plants and gigantic construction projects, the investment costs of 
NPP are likely continue to rise.” 
Given the identified reasons for the cost increases – and their irreversibility – we 
state that the time of “cheap” electricity from nuclear power is undoubtedly over 
– regardless, whether it has ever existed – and for the next years there are no signs 
of a reversal of current upward going cost trends. 
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Renewable Energies versus Nuclear Power
Comparison of Financial Support Exemplified  
at the Case of Hinkley Point C
Gustav Resch, and Demet Suna1
Abstract
The energy policy debate in Europe has set (industrial) competitiveness high 
on the agenda. Support for renewable energies (RE) was in debate and partly 
suspended. The recent discussion on supporting nuclear power in the UK has, 
however, demonstrated that renewables are not the only low-carbon option that 
requires financial incentives under the current framework conditions. The aim 
of this paper is to compare the costs of state aids necessary for constructing new 
nuclear power plants for the example of the planned plant at Hinkley Point C 
in the UK with support incentives for RE. 
For doing so, a static and a dynamic approach are followed: The static approach 
compares today’s support incentives for renewable energy with the state aid for 
Hinkley Point C, whereas for the dynamic approach a model-based assessment 
of future RE deployment up to 2050 in the EU is undertaken. This is done by 
use of the Green-X-model (www.green-x.at) and incorporates the impact of 
technological learning (future cost reductions) as well as aspects of market 
integration of variable renewables like solar and wind.
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The assessment is conducted at EU level and for selected EU countries where 
nuclear power plays a role at present or is considered as a viable future option. 
From an analytical point of view we undertake an evaluation of effectiveness 
(i.e. amount of electricity generation stipulated) and economic efficiency of RE 
and nuclear power support for today and for the future.
1 Introduction
The European Union is divided on the issue of electricity production. While there is 
consensus that generation technologies need to be low on greenhouse gas- emissions, 
the question of whether to use renewables or nuclear to meet this power demand 
is highly controversial. Both options still require financial support and this is not 
going to change in the near future. This raises the question of where our money 
should be invested in order to achieve greater economic efficiency: into support for 
renewable energies (RE) or support for nuclear power plants?
This paper sets out to answer this question. The recent state aid case for the con-
struction of the nuclear power plant Hinkley Point in United Kingdom serves as the 
model for the nuclear option. After discussing the costs for the nuclear model, we 
undertake an overview on existing support schemes for renewables in the European 
Union. Next to that, we conduct the prospective comparative assessment. Here a 
detailed model-based scenario assessment serves as basis for estimating future 
cost developments concerning renewable energies. This is then again contrasted 
with the nuclear model derived from the Hinkley Point case. Finally, conclusions 
end up this paper.
2 Background – existing and planned support for 
nuclear power and renewable energies
This section is dedicated to shed light on support schemes for low-carbon energy 
technologies, specifically nuclear power and renewable energies in the electricity 
sector. Here the planned support scheme for the new nuclear power plant at Hin-
kley Point in United Kingdom serves as the model for the nuclear option. After 
a brief recap on the planned support scheme, classified as state aid, we lay down 
the resulting costs for the nuclear model case. Next to that we take a closer look 
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at renewable energies, undertaking an overview on existing support schemes for 
renewables in the European Union.
2.1 New milestone in nuclear state aid: Hinkley Point 
The launch of a state aid scheme for a new nuclear power plant at Hinkley Point C 
in the United Kingdom has been heavily debated across Europe since it has repre-
sented a change in paradigm concerning nuclear power. While in the early years of 
the nuclear built-up there have been arguments for very cheap nuclear electricity 
in future, new cost figures and specifically the requested support for Hinkley Point 
C have set an end to that myth. Below we recap some key figures and facts that 
could be extracted from official documents and public statements on that subject.
The NNB Generation Company Limited (NNBG), part of EDF Energy, plans 
to construct and operate a new NPP, consisting of two units with an electrical 
cumulative capacity of 3,260 MW, and an estimated electricity production of 26 
TWh per year at the Hinkley Point NPP site (Hinkley Point C 1&2). If constructed, 
Hinkley Point C would be the UK’s first new reactor since 1988. 
The construction costs of Hinkley Point C were first estimated to be ca. € 19 billion 
(EDF, 2013), but were corrected by the EC to € 31.2 billion, and overall capital costs 
are assumed to be € 43 billion (EC, 2014a). To cover such enormous investments, 
EDF has undergone lengthy negotiations with the UK government. The start of 
the operation is supposed to be in 20232 with expected operational lifetime of 60 
years. The key terms of the final agreement between EDF and the UK government 
contain the following provisions:
Financial support based on “contract for difference” model
The agreement took the form of a so-called “Contract for Difference” (CfD): if the 
wholesale prices for electricity fall below an agreed strike price, then the Secretary 
of State will pay the difference between the strike price and the wholesale price, 
ensuring that NNBG will ultimately receive a fixed level of revenues. When the 
wholesale price is higher than the strike price, NNBG will be obliged to pay the 
difference to the Secretary of State. The duration of the contract is 35 years for each 
of the two reactors. 
2 Our analyses are based on the initial operation start time of 2023, and any update on 
this issue could not be taken into consideration. Nevertheless, the readers should keep 
in mind that as of September 2013, a delay of start date is expected (Gosden 2015). 
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The strike price is set at € 108 per MWh (expressed in real terms, as of 2012). If 
EDF constructs a second nuclear power plant at another site (i.e. Sizewell C) using 
the same design, the strike price would become €104 per MWh. The strike price 
will be fully indexed to the Consumer Price Index, meaning that based on current 
assumptions concerning inflation, this would translate into a nominal strike price 
of € 329 per MWh in 2058 (as the last year in which the CfD scheme applies).
After the modifications urged by the European Commission, a gain-share-mech-
anism for the overall profits will be in place for the entire project’s lifetime, namely 
60 years. If the construction costs are lower than expected, these gains will also 
be shared (EC, 2014a).
Credit guarantee
The NNBG will also benefit from a credit guarantee issued by the UK Treasury. This 
guarantee would significantly reduce EDF’s risk exposure and therefore the cost of 
capital. After the modification in 2013, the guaranteed fee that the operator must 
pay the UK Treasury was significantly raised, resulting in an effective reduction of 
the subsidy by more than € 1.3 billion. (EC, 2014a). Table 1 summarises the main 
characteristics of the planned NPP at Hinkley Point C.
Tab. 1 Main characteristics of Hinkley Point C
Capacity per unit MWe 1,630
Number of units 2
Total capacity (two units) MWe 3,260
Electricity generation TWh/a 26
Estimated start of operation Year 2023
Financial support  
(Contract for Difference / Feed-in Tariff)
GBP2012/MWh 92.5 
(89.5)
Duration of support Years 35
European regulations allow Member States to determine their energy mix within 
their national competence. However, when public money is spent to support com-
panies, the European Commission must verify that this is done in accordance EU 
rules on state aid. Therefore the UK’s support scheme was investigated in 2013. 
During this investigation, the UK was required to modify the terms of the project 
financing. In October 2014, the European Commission concluded that “the mod-
ified UK measures for Hinkley Point nuclear power plant are compatible with EU 
rules” (EC, 2014a).
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The October 2014 decision of the European Commission has led to massive 
protests. The protesters include the Republic of Austria. Based on a legal study, 
Austria regards subsidies for nuclear power reactors as inacceptable according to 
EU legislation (BMWFW, 2014).
2.2 EU support for renewable energies 
As outlined in detail in the RE-Shaping study (see Ragwitz et al., 2012), the first 
decade of the new millennium was characterized by the successful deployment of 
RE across EU Member States – total RE deployment increased by more than 40%. 
More precisely: 
• Electricity generation from RE grew by approximately 40%, RE heating and 
cooling supply by 30% and biofuels in transport by a factor of 27 during the 
period 2001 to 2010,
• New renewables in the electricity sector (all technologies except hydropower) 
increased fivefold during the same period,
• Total investments in RE technologies increased to about € 40 billion annually in 
2009 and more than 80% of all RES investments in 2009 were in wind and PV.
• With respect to PV an ongoing trend of achieving impressive cost reductions 
from year to year has started in the final period close to 2010. . 
These impressive structural changes in Europe’s energy supply are the result of a 
combination of strong national policies and the general focus on RES created by the 
EU Renewable Energy Directives in the electricity and transport sectors towards 
2010 (2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC). 
Despite the challenges posed by the financial and economic crisis, RE investments 
were generally less affected than other energy technologies and partly increased even 
further over the last couple of years. The European Energy and Climate Package is 
one of the key factors that contributed to this development. The EU ETS (Emissions 
Trading System) Directive has introduced full auctioning post 2012, thus exposing 
fossil power generation to the full cost of carbon allowances, at least in theory. In 
practice, an oversupply of allowances has however led to a deterioration of prices 
on the carbon market. 
The pathway for renewables towards 2020 was set and accepted by the European 
Council, the European Commission and the European Parliament in April 2009. 
The related policy package, in particular the EU Directive on the support of energy 
from renewable sources (2009/28/EC), subsequently named RE Directive, comprises 
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the establishment of binding 2020 RE targets for each Member State – in line with 
overall EU target of increasing the RE share to 20% by 2030. 
Later on, the EU Energy Roadmap 2050 gave first signals of renewable energy 
development pathways beyond the year 2020 and identified renewables as a “no-re-
grets” option. In a next step, Europe’s way forward towards 2030 has been discussed 
intensively. Thus, at the Council meeting of this October (2014) the next step was 
taken: A binding EU-wide RES target of achieving at least 27% as RES share in 
gross final energy demand was adopted. This has to be seen as an important first 
step in defining the framework for RES post 2020. Other steps, like a clear concept 
for, and an agreement on the effort sharing across Member States have to follow.
Concerning financial support for RE, various policy instruments have been 
implemented across EU Member States to promote the use of RE (cf. Box 1). Al-
though there are already substantial experiences with the use of support schemes, 
the dynamic framework conditions have led to a continuous need for reforming 
the applied policies. Also policy priorities have changed in most Member States. 
Whilst the policy effectiveness or the ability of support instruments to trigger new 
investments was a main policy target while the RE-share was still negligible, eco-
nomic efficiency has become increasingly important in the light of higher shares of 
RE, rising support costs and the financial crisis. In particular the strong growth of 
photovoltaics in some Member States has enhanced this change of policy priorities. 
The stronger focus on cost control mechanisms has led to a revival of tender or 
auction mechanisms to control the additional RE-capacity eligible for support and 
to determine support levels in a competitive bidding procedure. Another highly 
relevant issue regarding renewables support is related to the increasing share of 
intermittent RE leading to evolving requirements for effective electricity market 
design. While initially fair remuneration of RE power in the market should be a 
priority for market design, a more systemic focus on system flexibility should be 
adopted with a rising share of RE. This is reflected in several market design param-
eters, e.g. how the system matches temporal profiles of different generation and load 
types and how it accommodates the spatial profile of intermittent RE generation.
Box 1 Support schemes for electricity from renewable sources
Globally as well as within the European Union, a feed-in tariff (FIT) system is the 
most common policy instrument for promoting electricity generation from renew-
able energy sources (RES-E).A quota obligation with tradable green certificates 
(TGCs) is another widely implemented support scheme. These main instruments 
for RES-E are often accompanied by complementary instruments like grants
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offering investment support, fiscal incentives (e.g. tax reductions) or (cheap) loans.
The two main support instruments can be characterised as follows:
1. Feed-in tariffs offer financial support per kWh generated, paid in the form 
of guaranteed (premium) prices and combined with a purchase obligation by 
the utilities. The most relevant distinction is between fixed FIT and feed-in 
premium systems. The former provides total payments per kWh of electricity 
of renewable origin while the latter provides a payment per kWh on top of the 
electricity wholesale-market price (Sijm 2002). In recent years, feed-in tariff 
systems are also combined with auctions for price determination as well as 
for having a cost/quantity control on the market. Note that the planned CfD 
scheme in the UK falls also under the category of a FIT scheme.
2. In a quota obligation with Tradable Green Certificates the government 
defines targets for RES-E deployment and obliges a particular party of the 
electricity supply-chain (e. g. generator, wholesaler or consumer) with their 
fulfilment. Once defined, a parallel market for renewable energy certificates 
is established and their price is set following demand and supply conditions 
(forced by the obligation). Hence, for RES-E producers, financial support 
may arise from selling certificates in addition to the revenues from selling 
electricity on the power market.
3 Method of approach
Renewable energies were compared with the nuclear option by looking at the 
quantities of power they can both generate and the level of financial support this 
requires. This mirrors the extra costs which must be borne by the end consumer 
or society. Five different renewable technologies were analysed: biomass, onshore 
and offshore wind, small-scale hydropower plants and photovoltaics.
In brief, the static approach compares the current (as of 2013) level of incentives 
for renewables with the state support mechanism for Hinkley Point. The dynamic 
approach, in contrast, also considers additional factors including future cost reduc-
tions achieved through increasing technological experience and aspects of market 
integration of variable renewables like solar and wind power. The dynamic approach 
has been calculated up to 2050; the nuclear option is added from 2023 onwards 
(planned start-up for Hinkley Point C). The dynamic calculation applies a detailed 
model-based analysis using the Green-X-model (www.green-x.at). This model takes 
into account a multitude of factors including costs, potentials, regulatory frameworks, 
diffusion constraints like non-cost barriers, electricity prices and energy demand, 
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all of which have a strong impact on the economics of power generation. Below we 
provide for the interested reader further insights on both approaches taken.
3.1 Static approach: comparison of planned support  
for nuclear with existing RE support
The level of financial support paid to the supplier of nuclear as well as of electricity 
from the renewable energy sources (RES-E) is a core characteristic of a support 
policy. Actual support levels are, however, often not directly comparable, and de-
tails of the support policy applied, including main instrument like Feed-in-Tarifs 
(FIT) or quotas as well as complementary incentives, need to be taken into account. 
For a comparative assessment of support incentives, the available remuneration 
level during the whole lifetime of a (RE) power plant has to be taken into account. 
This is also stated in a detailed assessment report of the performance of RE support 
policies in EU Member States (Steinhilber et al. 2011). To make the remuneration 
levels comparable, following the methodology applied in (Steinhilber et al. 2011), 
time series of the expected support payments per unit of electricity generated are 
created for each of the assessed options (i.e. biomass, small hydro, photovoltaic 
(PV) and wind (on- and offshore) as well as nuclear power by country) and the net 
present value (NPV), representing the current value of overall support payments, 
is calculated. After that the annualised remuneration level is calculated from the 
NPV using a discount rate of 6.5% and following under each type of instrument a 
normalisation to a common duration of 20 years. Below Formula (1) and (2) show 
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NPV:  Net present value;
SLt: Support level available in year t;
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In addition, expected future wholesale electricity prices are normalised over the 
same time period. In the case of a quota scheme with tradable green certificates 
(TGCs), it is assumed that the total remuneration level is composed of the conven-
tional electricity price (wholesale electricity prices) and the average value of TGCs. 
The results on remuneration levels, wholesale electricity prices or net support 
expenditures are expressed subsequently in real terms, using €2013.
3.2 Dynamic approach: a prospective model-based 
assessment of planned support for nuclear with 
expected future RE support
The dynamic assessment follows the principles sketched above, assessing effec-
tiveness and economic efficiency (i.e. cost effectiveness) of RE and nuclear power 
support from a future perspective. The approach taken builds on a model-based 
assessment of future RE deployment in the European Union and at country level 
for the UK up to 2050. 
A scenario of dedicated RE support is assessed that follows the policy decisions 
taken, i.e. the binding 2020 RE target (of reaching a share of 20% RE in gross final 
energy demand), and that reflects the European policy agenda for tomorrow where 
mitigation of climate change and the built-up of a sustainable energy system are 
expected to remain as top priorities in the period post 2020. The scenario proclaims 
the prolongation of establishing enhancing framework conditions at EU level 
while national (or in future European) RE support instruments aim for setting 
the corresponding incentives to assure the achievement of European RE targets 
by 2030 and beyond. Complementary to fine-tuned financial incentives for RE this 
requires enabling framework conditions and a mitigation of currently prevailing 
non-economic barriers (i.e. administrative barriers and grid constraints that hinder 
the upscaling of RE deployment across Europe at present).
To derive the scenario, the Green-X model is used. Green-X is a dynamic sim-
ulation model for assessing the impact of energy policy instruments on future RE 
deployment and related costs, expenditures and benefits at technology-, sector- and 
country-level, that has been widely used in various studies at a national and European 
level, e.g. for the European Commission to assess the feasibility and impacts of “20% 
RE by 2020”, and to explore policy options post 2020 – for a detailed description 
of this model we refer to (Green-X, 2015).
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Future requirements concerning support schemes for RE
Generally, the need to incentivise the deployment decreases for RE technologies 
thanks to technological learning. Technological progress and related cost reductions 
go hand in hand with the ongoing market deployment of a certain technology. This 
has been impressively demonstrated for example by the uptake of PV in Germany 
and other countries and the achieved significant decline of capital cost. But what 
has been observed for PV is by far not an exceptional case, it is rather an affirmation 
of a general empirical observation – i.e. the technological learning theory. 
On the contrary, with ongoing market deployment of variable renewables like 
solar and wind we see however also an opposing tendency that ultimately may cause 
an increase in the need for financial support. This concerns the market value of the 
produced electricity that is fed into the grid. For these technologies it is becoming 
apparent that in future years (with ongoing deployment) a unit of electricity produced 
is less valuable than of a dispatchable RE technology like biomass where the plant 
may interrupt operation during periods of oversupply (because of massive wind 
and solar power inflow) and correspondingly may low the wholesale power prices. 
Accordingly this may increase the required net support, determined by difference 
between total remuneration and market value.
Whether the cost decrease due to technological learning or the increase in sup-
port requirements due to a decreasing market value will be of dominance depends 
on the country- and technology-specific circumstances. This will be analysed in 
further detail for all assessed energy technologies for the UK and EU 28 within 
the dynamic assessment. 
Overview on key parameters
In order to ensure maximum consistency with existing EU scenarios and projections 
the key input parameters of the scenarios presented in this work are derived from 
PRIMES modelling (EC, 2013) and from the Green-X database with respect to the 
potentials and cost of RE technologies. Table 2 shows which parameters are based on 
PRIMES, on the Green-X database and which have been defined for this assessment. 
More precisely, the PRIMES scenario used is the reference scenario as of 2013 
(EC, 2013). However for this assessment, demand projections have been contrasted 
with recent statistics (from Eurostat) and corrected where adequate (in order to 
assure an appropriate incorporation of impacts related to the recent financial and 
economic crisis). Moreover, mid- to long-term trends have been further modified 
to reflect an adequate representation of energy efficiency, assuming a proactive 
implementation of energy efficiency measures in order to reduce overall demand 
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growth. Here we base our demand trends on a detailed study led by Fraunhofer ISI, 
done on behalf of the European Commission (Braungardt et al. 2014).
Tab. 2 Main input sources for scenario parameters
Based on PRIMES Based on Green-X database Defined for this assessment
• Primary energy prices
• Conventional supply 
portfolio and
• conversion efficiencies
• CO2 intensity of 
sectors
• RE cost (investment, fuel, 
O&M)
• RE potential 
• Biomass trade specification
• Technology diffusion / 
Non-economic barriers 
• Learning rates 
• Market values for variable 
RES-E
• RE policy framework 
• Reference electricity 
prices 
• Energy demand by 
sector*
4 Results
The static approach undertaken at country level provides a comparison of planned 
support for nuclear power at Hinkley Point C in the UK with existing RE support, that 
is, as implemented in 2013. Key outcomes of that are summarised in Fig. 1, indicating 
by RE technology the possible annual electricity generation that could be supported 
with currently implemented RE policies in analysed countries. For doing so, average 
remuneration and net support levels are taken as given. Note that generally a range of 
feasible generation volumes is depicted for the assessed RE technologies by country: 
• The lower boundary of possible volumes answers the question how much renew-
able electricity (from different technologies) could be supported in the assessed 
country, if annual net support expenditures as expected for Hinkley Point C 
under UK circumstances are taken as given. 
• If a new nuclear power plant like the one planned for Hinkley Point C is constructed 
in another country under similar support conditions as planned for the UK (i.e. 
same FIT level as set in the UK), the net support level would differ because of dif-
ferent electricity wholesale prices. Thus, the upper range in Fig. 1 is consequently 
taking into account this difference, using country-specific wholesale prices and 
corresponding annual net support expenditures, and showing how much elec-
tricity generation could be achieved with that for the assessed RE technologies. 
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In accordance with Fig. 1, key results of the static assessment can be summarised 
as follows: 
Under similar budgetary constraints, a higher amount of electricity generation 
appears feasible with wind onshore and small-scale hydropower plants compared 
to nuclear in all analysed 
• countries (with the exception of hydro in the Czech Republic). This means, in 
turn, that small hydro and wind onshore represent “least cost” options from 
today’s perspective across all assessed countries. In those countries where sup-
port is offered to that option, i.e. the UK and Poland, co-firing of biomass in 
fossil-fuel based power plants represents another cost-effective generation option. 
• A cross-country comparison indicates a comparatively small benefit for wind 
onshore in the UK. While in all other countries remuneration levels and net 
support are significantly lower and, in turn, feasible generation volumes are 
higher for wind onshore compared to nuclear power. This is the result of an 
unequal risk perception of two distinct policy instruments that come into play 
for the UK: Today’s support for wind onshore in the UK via a certificate trading 
regime can be classified as significantly more risky than safe revenues stemming 
from a “Contract for Difference” scheme as planned for Hinkley Point C. 
• Both PV and wind offshore represent the most costly options from today’s 






















Fig. 1 Comparison of expected annual electricity generation of Hinkley Point C with 
feasible volumes from assessed RE technologies by assessed country (Source: 
Own calculations)
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The static assessment as discussed above compares today’s incentives for RE with a 
planned aid scheme for nuclear power that may become effective ten years ahead. 
Since partly significant cost reductions have been achieved throughout the last 
decade for several RE technologies it can be expected that ongoing technological 
learning will trigger additional cost decreases and, consequently, reduce the need 
for RES-E support in forthcoming years. Thus, complementary to the above, a dy-
namic approach is followed within this study: Building on the Green-X scenario 
of dedicated RE support and the therein sketched deployment of renewables in the 
EU28, a comparative assessment of future RE support with the planned subsidy for 
Hinkley Point C is undertaken for all assessed countries. More precisely, the years 
from 2023 to 2050 form the assessment period whereby 2023 is chosen since this 
is the year when Hinkley Point C is expected to start full operation. Within that 
assessment support expenditures for RES-E and nuclear power are contrasted and, 
finally, the cost-effectiveness of the two distinct pathways is derived. 
Fig. 2 Future development of remuneration levels and corresponding market values 
of the assessed RE technologies (as aggregate) and of nuclear power across 
assessed countries and at EU28 level according to the Green-X scenario of 
dedicated RE support (Source: Own assessment (Green-X))
Fig. 2 shows the development over time of remuneration levels and the corresponding 
reference price for the assessed technology options, using weighted average figures 
to determine market value and the remuneration level for the aggregated RE tech-
nology cluster that comprises the basket of assessed individual RE technologies. 
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while shaded areas indicate the ranges of expressed items occurring across assessed 
countries. Generally, the need for net support for a new installation in a given year 
can then be derived by subtracting the market value from overall remuneration. 
Thus, this allows for a first interpretation of cost efficiency: 
• For nuclear power it can be observed that during early years of operation a sig-
nificant gap between remuneration and market value, in this case determined 
by the yearly average wholesale electricity price, occurs. This is however getting 
smaller in later years thanks to the expected increase in wholesale electricity 
prices (that goes hand in hand with an increase of fossil fuel and carbon prices 
over time). 
• For renewables an interpretation appears more difficult since outcomes reflect 
the over shading impacts of a basket of technologies that come into play: In early 
years a strong decline of remuneration levels is apparent, reflecting expected 
technological progress across all considered RE technologies but, thanks to their 
dominance driven by cost trends for on- and offshore wind as well as photovol-
taics. In later years, with increasing deployment the merit-order-effect and the 
related decrease in market values of variable renewables is applicable. Offshore 
wind is then mainly responsible for the small gap remaining, where average RE 
remuneration is higher than the market value at EU28 level as well as in some 
of the assessed countries. In general, similar to nuclear the need for net support 
shows a decreasing tendency in the final years up to 2050.
Comparing cumulative electricity generation and corresponding support expendi-
tures that would arise throughout the assessment period (2023 to 2050) an overall 
conclusion related to the cost effectiveness of the two distinct pathways (i.e. nuclear 
versus RE) can be drawn next. Results on specific net support as derived by dividing 
cumulative support expenditures by cumulative electricity generation are shown 
in Fig. 3. Complementary to that, resulting cost savings at country as well as at 
EU28 level that would arise if the preferred option is followed are shown in Fig. 4. 
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Fig. 3 Comparison of overall cost-effectiveness: Specific net support for assessed 
RE technologies and nuclear power by assessed countries and at EU28 level 









































Cost savings due to RE
Fig. 4 Comparison of overall cost-effectiveness: Cost savings due to RE compared to 
nuclear power by assessed country and at EU28 level according to the Green-X 
scenario of dedicated RE support (Source: Own assessment (Green-X))
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We would like to highlight the following As discussed above, net support is generally 
defined as the difference between total remuneration and the market value of the 
fed in electricity. If a new nuclear power plant like the one planned for Hinkley 
Point C is built in another country under similar support conditions as planned 
for the UK (i.e. same FIT level as set in the UK), the net support level would differ 
because of different electricity wholesale prices that in the case of nuclear power 
serve as determinant for its market value. In future years lower electricity prices 
than in the UK are expected for countries like France, Poland, the Czech Republic 
and the whole EU28 on average. Thus, a new nuclear power would consequently 
require significantly higher net support in these countries than in the UK. This 
would strongly increase the burden for consumer and/or the society, respectively.
Results on specific net support as shown in Fig. 4 point out that supporting a 
basket of RE technologies as analyzed in this assessment leads to a higher cost-ef-
fectiveness than the planned support for the nuclear power plant at Hinkley Point 
C that served as nuclear comparator throughout this exercise. This statement is 
valid for all assessed countries as well as for the EU28: 
• Highest cost savings due to RE can be observed for Poland where following a 
RE pathway instead of nuclear would lead to savings in support expenditures 
of 74.5%. 
• On second place follows the Czech Republic where savings due to RE are in 
size of 51.6%. 
• Germany ranks as third among the assessed countries with respect to feasible 
cost savings that come along with following the renewable pathway. Support 
expenditures can be reduced by 39.1% through targeting support to RE tech-
nologies compared to the nuclear alternative. 
• At EU28 level on average savings in support expenditures are in range of 37.1%. 
• A slightly lower figure can be observed for France where savings are in magni-
tude of about 25%.
• Last on the list of assessed countries is the UK. However also in that country 
following a RE pathway instead of a nuclear appears beneficial – i.e. cost savings 
of 8.4% are identified for the UK.
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5 Conclusions 
The level of financial support paid to a nuclear or a RE power plant is a core charac-
teristic of the related policy intervention. Support instruments need to be effective in 
order to increase the penetration of energy sources (in this case RE and/or nuclear) 
and efficient with respect to minimising the resulting public cost, i.e. the transfer 
cost for consumers (society) over time. 
This study assesses the effectiveness and efficiency of support schemes in selected 
European countries for nuclear and specific renewables (wind, hydro, PV and bio-
mass) using two distinct approaches; a static and a dynamic comparative assessment.
The static comparative assessment of the envisaged state aid scheme for the UK’s 
planned nuclear power plant at Hinkley Point C contrasted with today’s support 
incentives for renewables leads to the following conclusions:
Onshore wind and small hydropower plants (with the exception of the Czech 
Republic) represent the “least cost” option from today’s perspective in all the countries 
analyzed. Consequently, if the planned annual support expenditures for Hinkley 
Point C were channeled into these RE options, then more carbon-free electricity 
could be generated. In contrast to above, PV and offshore wind can be classified as 
the most costly options from today’s perspective (with the exception of Poland). 
If Hinkley Point C were to be built in the assessed countries and under similar 
support conditions as those planned for the UK (i.e. same feed-in tariff level), then 
the net level of support would differ from country to country because of varying 
electricity wholesale prices. Wholesale electricity prices in the UK are currently 
among the highest in Europe. Prices in the Czech Republic and Poland are lower. 
Consequently, under the same feed-in tariff level as set in the UK, a new nuclear 
power plant would require significantly more net support (i.e. defined as the differ-
ence between remuneration and wholesale electricity prices for nuclear) in Poland 
or the Czech Republic than in the UK. In turn, this would strongly increase the 
burden for consumer and/or society.
The static assessment, as discussed above, compares today’s incentives for RE 
with a planned aid scheme for nuclear power that may become effective in ten 
years. As some significant cost reductions in RE technologies have been achieved 
over the past decade, we can expect that growing technological experience in this 
field will trigger more cost reductions and, consequently, will reduce the need for 
RES-E support in coming years. Therefore this study also takes a dynamic ap-
proach: building on the Green-X scenario of dedicated RE support and its outline 
for the deployment of renewables in the EU28, future RE support has been com-
pared with the planned subsidy for Hinkley Point C for all the assessed countries. 
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This analysis leads us to the following conclusions: 
• A constant level of remuneration, as guaranteed for nuclear power at Hinkley 
Point C in the UK, may lead to a high consumer burden in the early years, but 
thanks to expected increases in fossil fuel and carbon prices, net support will 
decrease over time.
 During the early years of operation at Hinkley Point there will be a significant 
gap between remuneration level and market value, in this case determined by 
the yearly average wholesale electricity price. However, this gap will reduce with 
time thanks to the expected increase in wholesale electricity prices (which goes 
hand in hand with an increase in fossil fuel and carbon prices over time).
• Two opposing trends determine the need to support renewables: cost reductions 
resulting from technological progress lead to decreasing remuneration, whilst in-
creasing deployment of variable RE technologies cause reductions in their market 
value. The need for net support depends on the country and technology-specific 
circumstances. 
• Generally, the need to incentivise deployment of renewables falls thanks to 
technological learning. Technological progress and related cost reductions go 
hand-in-hand with ongoing market deployment of a technology. This has been 
impressively demonstrated, for example, by the uptake of PV in Germany and 
other countries, and the corresponding, significant decline in capital costs. But 
the massive cost decline for PV is certainly not exceptional; it affirms a general 
empirical observation, i.e. technological learning theory. 
 In contrast, the ongoing market deployment of various renewables including 
solar and wind demonstrates an opposing tendency that may ultimately cause 
an increase in the need for financial support: the market value of the generated 
electricity that is fed into the grid. For these technologies it is becoming apparent 
that in future years (with ongoing deployment) a unit of electricity will be less 
valuable than that produced by a dispatchable renewable energy technology 
such as biomass where the plant may interrupt operation during periods of 
oversupply and wholesale power prices are correspondingly low. 
 Thus the net level of required support is determined by the difference between 
remuneration and market value. Whether the cost decreases resulting from 
technological learning outweigh the need for increased support as a result of 
the decreasing market value, or vice versa, depends on the country and tech-
nology-specific circumstances.
• The assessment at country and at EU levels confirms that remuneration for 
renewables is expected to decline over time. This decrease is strong in the early 
years, followed by a slowdown and stagnation in later years. Contrarily, market 
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values for variable renewables are expected to more strongly decouple from average 
wholesale electricity prices.
 The analysis, which considers selected EU Member States as well as the EU28 
as a whole, indicates a strong decline in remuneration levels for renewables in 
the early years as a result of expected technological progress across all the RE 
technologies considered. Thanks to their dominance, this positive trend is driven 
by cost trends for onshore and offshore wind and photovoltaics. With increasing 
deployment in later years, the merit order effect and the related decrease in market 
value of variable renewables applies. Offshore wind is then mainly responsible 
for the small remaining gap, where average RE remuneration is higher than the 
market value, both at EU-28 level as well as in some of the assessed countries. 
• If we compare cumulative electricity generation and corresponding support 
expenditures we can draw an overall conclusion regarding the cost effectiveness 
of the two distinct pathways (i.e. nuclear vs. RE). Results for specific net support 
clearly indicate that supporting a basket of RE technologies is more cost-effective 
than the planned support for the nuclear power plant at Hinkley Point C that has 
served as the nuclear comparator throughout this exercise. This statement is valid 
for all the assessed countries as well as for the EU28. 
 The highest cost savings achieved through RE can be observed in Poland where 
following a RE pathway instead of nuclear would lead to savings in support 
expenditures of 74.5% whereas average savings in support expenditures for 
the EU28 as a whole are in the range of 37.1%. Finally, the UK comes last in the 
potential savings ranking, yet even in the UK it is economically beneficial to 
follow a RE pathway rather than the nuclear option, with cost savings of 8.4%.
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While more and more nuclear installations facing the end of their lifetime, 
decommissioning financing issues gain importance in political discussions. 
The financing needs are huge along the Uranium value chain. Following the 
polluter pays principle the operator of a nuclear installation is expected to 
accumulate all the necessary decommissioning funds during the operating 
life of its facility. However, since decommissioning experience is still limited, 
since the decommissioning process can take several decades and since the time 
period between the shutdown of a nuclear installation and the final disposal 
of radioactive waste can be very long, there are substantial risks that costs will 
be underestimated and that the liable party and the funds accumulated might 
not be available anymore when decommissioning activities have to be paid. 
Nevertheless, these financing risks can be reduced by the implementation of 
transparent, restricted, well-governed decommissioning financing schemes, 
with a system of checks and balances that aims at avoiding negative effects 
stemming from conflicts of interests.
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1 Introduction
By the end of 2017, 166 nuclear power reactors had been permanently shut down, of 
which 144 were in the process of dismantling or had already been fully demolished 
(IAEA 2018). Moreover, 64% of the operational nuclear power reactors in the world 
at this time were 30 years old or older, and are thus candidates for being shut down 
in the near future (cf. Fig. 1).
Fig. 1 Number of operational nuclear power reactors by age (as of 31 Dec. 2017) 
(Based on IAEA, 2018, 78)
This will result into the need to dismantle, decontaminate and demolish these 
nuclear facilities as well as to undertake processing, conditioning and disposal 
of nuclear waste and spent fuel (‘decommissioning’)(Irrek et al., 2007). It is of 
paramount importance that the funding of these decommissioning activities will 
be adequate and available when needed in order to avoid negatively affecting the 
safety of citizens and natural environment. Although this has been principally 
known since early days of NPP operation (cf., e. g., Lukes et al., 1978), the political 
pressure to identify and implement respective solutions has only increased within 
recent years due to changes in the electricity markets in the course of liberalisation 
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and transformation towards a sustainable energy system and the respective impacts 
on the economic situation of NPP operators and their mother companies, and due 
to more and more NPPs facing their end of operation.
In general, decommissioning financing needs are huge along the Uranium value 
chain. Underground uranium mines and mills, open pits, uranium and thorium 
processing, conversion, enrichment and fuel fabrication facilities, nuclear reactors, 
nuclear fuel reprocessing plants, interim storages and further nuclear installations 
have to be decommissioned in a way that human beings, flora and fauna, air, soil, 
open and ground water sources will be protected against radiation exposure and 
radioactive contamination. Decommissioning and rehabilitation of the nuclear sites 
represents a challenge in ecological and economic terms for the former operators. 
The amount of radioactive waste from all steps of the Uranium value chain adds 
to the complexity of task (Hagen et al., 2005).
Operators of nuclear installations are expected to accumulate all the necessary 
decommissioning funds during the operating life of facilities. However:
• The decommissioning process can take several decades;
• In particular, the time period between the shutdown of a nuclear installation 
and the final disposal of radioactive waste can be very long;
• Therefore, the liable party and the funds accumulated might not be available 
anymore when decommissioning activities have to be paid;
• Moreover, expected decommissioning costs are only partly assessable since 
nuclear decommissioning experience is still limited, and technical concepts 
for important decommissioning steps, particularly for final disposal of higher 
activity waste (HAW), often do not yet exist;
• Finally, unexpected radiation and contamination problems might lead to addi-
tional financing needs even after decades, hundreds or thousands of years after 
final disposal of radioactive waste.
Therefore, this chapter will analyse
• to which extent the Polluter Pays Principle can be implemented in order to 
ensure the complete financing of a safe decommissioning by the operators of 
nuclear installations;
• the different decommissioning financing steps needed;
• who will benefit from the amounts of finance accumulated;
• and compare selected decommissioning financing concepts realised in different 
countries.
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Based on this analysis, conclusions will be drawn and recommendations given for 
the design of safe decommissioning financing concepts. The chapter will thereby 
focus on decommissioning financing of commercial nuclear power plants (NPP). 
However, the general findings can also be transferred to other private or public-
ly-owned nuclear installations.
2 Basic liability principles
Nuclear liabilities of a NPP operator include liabilities for the dismantling, de-
contamination, demolition and site clearance of the nuclear facilities at the end 
of their lifetime as well as for the storage, processing, conditioning and disposal 
of nuclear waste and spent fuel. They arise with the start of operation of a nuclear 
facility, i. e. as the first activation or contamination takes place, and usually increase 
with operation.
A main principle with regard to the distribution of liabilities is the ‘Polluter Pays 
Principle’. In general, the Polluter Pays Principle is broadly accepted in environ-
mental and economic policy. In theory, in a world of perfect information, perfect 
competition and full rationality of market actors, allocative efficiency will be gained 
if all external costs are internalised into the market. In order to maximise the net 
benefit to the society, in principle, the NPP operators should be fully responsible for 
covering the full costs of decommissioning a NPP. This requires a clearly defined 
obligation to plan, implement and finance all decommissioning activities including 
nuclear waste management and final disposal operations. Since the NPP operator 
does not earn money with the NPP after its shutdown, all necessary financial 
means have to be collected during operation of the plant via the electricity prices 
to cover associated decommissioning costs. If decommissioning is not paid by 
those who have benefited from its operation inter- and intra-generational justice 
will not be ensured.
However, in contrast to theory, the Polluter Pays Principle is not fully imple-
mented in every country. In some countries like Finland and Sweden, the ‘Pol-
luter Pays Principle’ is a legal requirement, and there has been made substantial 
progress during the last ten years in several European countries with respect to 
better ensuring its implementation (Irrek et al., 2007; European Commission 2013; 
European Commission 2013a). But still in several countries, the liability of NPP 
operators ends with transfer of radioactive waste to a state-governed organisation. 
According to international law, the state has the responsibility for final disposal 
of radioactive waste. Therefore, financial liabilities for final disposal (and partly 
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waste management, too) are not always fully with the ‘polluters’ but in some cases 
at least partly transferred to the state. For example (Irrek et al., 2007; European 
Commission 2013; European Commission 2013a):
• In Slovenia, the fees the operator pays for dealing with radioactive waste include 
the cost of final disposal. They discharge the operator from any waste manage-
ment and disposal liability. However, the levy is periodically reassessed based 
on available technical data and other inputs.
• In the case of Bulgaria, Lithuania and Slovak Republic, there are agreements 
between the state governments, the European Union and some Member States 
about European contributions to finance decommissioning of the nuclear power 
plants in the context of the countries’ accession to the European Union in order 
to ease an early shutdown of these NPPs for safety reasons (cf. Schmidt et al. 
,2013, and Ustohalova/Schmidt, 2014, for recent discussion on this support and 
its effectiveness). 
• In Germany, in mid 2017, NPP operators transferred all liabilities for interim 
storage and final disposal of radioactive materials to the state against a lump 
sum of Euro 24.1 bn, with financing regarding these activities managed by a 
state-governed fund. Any costs exceeding this amount will not have to be borne 
by the NPP operators. This severely violates the Polluter Pays Principle. The 
argument behind this was fed by a substantial decrease in electricity wholesale 
prices which has caused severe losses of the large energy companies. It was 
argued that it would be better to secure a lump sum paid by the NPP operators 
now instead of not knowing if the companies will be able to finance radioac-
tive waste management activities in the future. It should be noted that the cost 
estimate behind this amount is just a rough one, partly based on an extremely 
rough estimate of 1997 by a German authority (Bundesamt für Strahlenschutz 
– BfS) for a final disposal site which is not a technically feasible one (Gorleben). 
Moreover, it does not take into account various problems with interim storages 
which have already been foreseen by nuclear experts (cf., e. g., Neumann, 2016). 
In parallel to the transfer of liabilities and money in 2017, the state took over two 
central interim storages. From 2019 onwards, the state will also be responsible 
for the decentral interim storages at the NPP sites, which have been in operation 
by the NPP operators. From 2020 onwards, the German state will be responsible 
for all interim storage sites as well as for any final disposal activities.
Even in those countries, in which the Polluter Pays Principle is a legal requirement, 
a NPP operator will not be made financially liable for 
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• any radiation exposure and radioactive contamination in the Uranium value 
chain before the fuel arrives at the NPP. While it theory, for this part of the 
nuclear fuel chain, the respective owners of the Uranium mill or the Uranium 
processing, conversion, enrichment and fuel fabrication plants should be made 
financially liable, ethical considerations could lead to the argument, that the 
NPP operator has to bear some social responsibility also for these parts of the 
value chain.
• any problems arising after the final closure of the final disposal facility. The re-
sponsibility usually ends as soon as all waste has been finally disposed of and the 
safety authorities have accepted that the final closure of the final disposal facility 
has been concluded fulfilling the pertinent safety requirements for final closure. 
However, the example of the German Asse II mine shows that unforeseen problems 
can arise after closure of such a final disposal. From 1967 to 1978, 125,787 drums 
and waste packages containing low-level and intermediate-level radioactive waste 
were emplaced in this test repository. The legal basis for this was mining law, not 
nuclear law, and there was no proof of long-term safety before the waste was disposed. 
Today, the large total volume of open drifts and chambers and the closeness of the 
chambers to the adjoining rock cause severe problems in the Asse mine. The salt 
rock and adjoining rock loosen, and clefts have formed through which groundwater 
flows into the mine. The severeness of this disposal problem has been increased by 
the fact that the inventory of radioactive waste in this mine is not exactly known, 
particularly with regard to the amount of plutonium disposed. It is now planned 
to retrieve the radioactive waste and to dispose it elsewhere (www.asse.bund.de; 
status: 08 May 2016). The fees collected for the final disposal of radioactive waste 
during operation of the mine summed up to about Euro 8.25m, while current 
estimates for retrieval costs are between Euro 4–6bn (Kirbach 2009; N.N. 2013; 
www.atommuellreport.de; status: 08 May 2016). There has been some discussion 
in Germany on who should be made financially liable for these extra costs. In 2010, 
some German politicians (e.g., Kelber et al., 2010) argued that the introduction 
of the nuclear fuel tax could be justified, among others, by the fact that the NPP 
operators have benefited from disposal sites like Asse II and thus should contribute 
to the additional costs that will occur.
Anyway, if such problems arise decades or hundreds of years after the closure of 
the final disposal facility, the NPP operators might not exist anymore. This could 
also happen if problems arise during the final disposal activities decades after the 
NPP shutdown. Therefore, full implementation of the Polluter Pays Principle cannot 
be 100% secured in any decommissioning financing scheme. Nevertheless, it should 
become a legal requirement and should be implemented as far as possible in every 
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country with nuclear facilities in order to increase allocative efficiency. Nevertheless, 
the implementation of the Polluter Pays Principle will only function well if there 
is a sufficient amount of transparency to the public in the interest of current and 
future generations of electricity customers and taxpayers. Therefore a requirement 
to ensure transparency should be added, which should include transparency of the 
following steps of decommissioning financing (Irrek et al., 2007):
• Determination of decommissioning strategies and time schedules;
• Identification and estimation of decommissioning costs including cost break-
downs by cost items and details of cost estimation methodology, 
• Collection of decommissioning funds; 
• Management and investment of funds until the money is used for payment of 
decommissioning activities;
• Use of funds for the original purpose, i. e. for payment of decommissioning 
activities. 
These steps are analysed in more detail in the following chapters.
3 Technical decommissioning strategies and  
time schedules
In principle, there are three technical decommissioning (decontamination and 
dismantling) strategies for NPPs (Irrek et al., 2007; OECD/NEA, 2012; OECD/
NEA, 2016):
• Immediate dismantling:  
Decontamination and dismantling immediately after operation period. All 
contaminated material is removed or decontaminated to a level at which no 
more regulatory control is required. In this case, dismantling starts shortly 
after the permanent shutdown of the NPP and might take between 15–20 years, 
with no unforeseen incidents happening. In case of unavailability of routes for 
the spent nuclear fuel, this is kept in an interim storage on-site, which might be 
decommissioned decades after the demolition of the NPP has been completed.
• Deferred dismantling (safe enclosure / safe storage):  
First, spent fuel is removed from the facility. The plant is then kept intact and in 
a safe and stable state to enable the radionuclides activity to decay until it reaches 
levels that reduce difficulties of handling. Decontamination and dismantling 
146 Wolfgang Irrek
then starts several decades after the permanent shutdown of the NPP. Deferral 
periods range between 20 and around 100 years, e. g. 25 years in Spain, 60 years 
in the United States, and a century or more in the United Kingdom.
• Entombment  
This option involves encasing radioactive structures, systems and components in 
a long-lived substance, such as concrete. The encased plant would be appropriately 
maintained, and surveillance would continue until the radioactivity decays to 
a level that permits termination of the plant’s license and end any regulatory 
control. Most nuclear plants will have radionuclide concentrations exceeding 
the limits for unrestricted use even after 100 years. Therefore, special provisions 
would be needed for the extended monitoring period this option requires. To 
date, no facility owners have proposed the entombment option for any nuclear 
power plants undergoing decommissioning. In fact, this is more an emergency 
option than a strategy option, so far used only in the case of Chernobyl. 
The choice of strategy depends on several parameters and framework conditions, 
the decontamination, dismantling and demolition stage aimed at, and the plan-
ning for the future use of the site. Operators of nuclear facilities usually take into 
account the following criteria when deciding on a dismantling strategy (Irrek et 
al., 2007; OECD/NEA 2016, 46):
• Radiation protection  
There is one major argument for deferred dismantling which is radioactivity 
decay, as it will ensure the reduction of radiation hazard during dismantling 
and a reduction of volume of radioactive waste. Moreover, new techniques 
(e. g., robotics) might be invented that could further reduce radiation harzards. 
Finally, deferred dismantling might ease disposal routes for radioactive waste if 
a final disposal site is available by this time. On the other hand, with immediate 
dismantling, radiological characterisation is much easier and less costly. More-
over, there will be reduced effects of deterioration and ageing like corrosion.
• Know-how of employees  
Immediate dismantling ensures the availability of qualified and experienced 
workforce with internal knowledge on the design and history of the facility 
from its operation. On the one hand, immediate dismantling might ease a 
socially acceptable reduction in employed and contracted staff at the site of 
the nuclear facility after the installation has been shut down (cf. Irrek, 2005). 
On the other hand, workers might not be motivated to demolish a plant where 
they had been working. Moreover, deferred decontamination and dismantling 
might make it easier to outsource dismantling activities at cheap labour costs 
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because of existing wage differentials between employees in the nuclear sector 
and employees of contractors.
• Reuse of site  
Immediate dismantling allows an earlier reuse of the site, with respective eco-
nomic effects for the region.
• Costs  
A thorough evaluation and comparison of different strategies is needed in order 
to assess which strategy will be the least-cost while fulfilling all the nuclear safety 
obligations. For example, for the deferred decontamination and dismantling 
strategy, it has to be taken into account in how far existing ancillary equipment 
can be used for decommissioning activities decades after the end of operation 
as well as the costs for maintenance and surveillance. Moreover, economies of 
scale could be achieved if several similar plants are dismantled in co-ordinated 
manner. A general question is how much cheaper is it to outsource decontam-
ination and dismantling activities or to carry them out in-house with existing 
know-how. Furthermore, total costs also depend on the availability of waste 
management, storage and disposal options, and on the decision about the use 
of the site for other purposes after its release from radiological restrictions. 
However, such cost estimation is not an easy task. Different assumptions on 
the underlying decontamination and dismantling processes, on the technical 
feasibility of possible technical solutions and technical developments, on per-
son-years needed, on labour, material/equipment and capital costs, on time 
horizons, and on developments of the labour market and the general economic 
environment can lead to different strategic choices.
• Financial risks  
Risks and uncertainties of changes in benefits and costs have to be adequately 
taken into account because of all these possible influences, time horizons of 
several decades are considered. For example, a long period of deferment not only 
gives the chance to yield interest over a longer period of time, but includes also 
a higher risk that the funds will be lost or will significantly lose value.
The preferred decommissioning strategy can differ from case to case, even within the 
same country. In most cases, economic arguments with respect to expected financial 
benefits and costs as well as perceived financial risks are the decisive arguments 
for the operators to choose a specific decommissioning strategy, particularly for 
privately owned facilities. However, there are also strategic or tactical arguments 
for particular decommissioning strategies of the NPP operators in the course of 
political discussions on the distribution of liabilities (cf., e. g., discussion in Germany 
on the possible final repository site). Nuclear safety authorities are mostly in favour 
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of immediate dismantling, particularly in recent years in the European Union. The 
reasons given for this include the consideration that the risk of the loss of memory 
on the conception and operation of a facility will be significant.
4 Identification and estimation of decommissioning 
costs
Based on the decommissioning strategy and time schedule determined, cost plan-
ning starts with an identification and estimation of costs. The direct comparison 
of decommissioning cost estimates generated for different plants by different cost 
estimate providers is limited due to different cost structures, different combina-
tions of individual cost items, different methodologies applied and different ways 
of dealing with uncertainties. This holds true, even if the results are presented in 
a similar manner, e. g., by using the International Structure for Decommissioning 
Costing (ISDC). Following the ISDC, costs can be split up for principal activities 
as follows (OECD/NEA, 2012):
01 – Pre-decommissioning actions.
02 – Facility shutdown activities.
03 – Additional activities for safe enclosure and entombment.
04 – Dismantling activities within the controlled area.
05 – Waste processing, storage and disposal.
06 – Site infrastructure and operation.
07 – Conventional dismantling, demolition and site restoration.
08 – Project management, engineering and support.
09 – Research and development.
10 – Fuel and nuclear material.
11 – Miscellaneous expenditures.
For each of these principal activities, on a second level, several activity groups can 
be distinguished. For example, according to ISDC (OECD/NEA 2012), pre-decom-
missioning actions consist of decommissioning planning, facility characterisation, 
waste management planning and further activity groups, each differentiated on 
a third level into single activities (e. g., strategic planning, preliminary planning 
and final decommissioning planning). For each activity, labour costs, investment 
costs (capital, equipment, material costs), expenses (consumables, taxes, etc.) and 
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contingencies (a specific provision for unforeseeable elements of costs within the 
defined projects scope) should be identified.
In many cases, cost estimates are bottom-up ones taken into account the spe-
cific decommissioning activities required. However, there are also cost estimates 
by specific analogy to similar past projects, by parametric estimating based on 
historical databases on similar systems and subsystems, by cost reviews that just 
look at those cost items to be updated or by rough expert opinion when other 
techniques or data are not available (OECD/NEA, 2015). As with other complex 
construction or deconstruction or other engineering projects, cost estimates are 
based on a number of technical and economic assumptions, and on assumptions 
influenced by the political-administrative framework conditions. Therefore, there 
are financial risks to be taken into account in any ex ante-evaluation of decom-
missioning project costs. In practice, there are different methodologies how to take 
into account uncertainties and risks, for example (Irrek et al., 2007; Däuper et al., 
2014; OECD/NEA, 2016):
• Risks and uncertainties ignored  
In Switzerland, in 2014, the Swiss Federal Audit Office claimed that cost es-
timates were based on an ideal scenario leading to too low contributions to 
the decommissioning funds and a high degree of risk borne by the Federal 
Government. However, in the future, following a new ordinance implemented 
in 2014, a 30% contingency for unexpected costs should be included according 
to a new ordinance.
• Conservative estimates  
In France, national regulation demands dismantling cost estimates to be ‘con-
servative’ ones;
• Cost estimates with flat or specific contingency factors  
In the Slovak Republic, based on risk analysis and risk assessment, contingency 
factors between 0.2 and 16.5% are considered;
• Scenario calculation with sensitivity analysis of major cost drivers  
In Lithuania, scenario calculations take into account different wage levels;
• Probabilistic and deterministic cost estimates  
In Sweden, probabilistic cost estimates performed in Sweden in addition to 
deterministic ones;
• Complex modeling  
Monte Carlo analysis and other quantitative modeling approaches can be used 
to simulate possible deviations from assumptions taken, if there are many 
independent variables with significant uncertainties. In the United Kingdom 
a combination of computational modeling with Monte Carlo simulation and 
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management judgement based on experience of previous projects leads to con-
tingencies in the range between 1–24%.
In general, optimism bias can cause a NPP operator to believe that the respective 
NPP is less at risk of experiencing a future cost increase compared to others. There-
fore, regulation has to ensure that adequate cost estimation methodologies are 
applied that properly take into account possible risks of cost increases. Moreover, 
international organisations and national authorities should ensure that information 
on costs of past decommissioning activities are widely spread and could be used 
for calculation of future costs. Information on past decommissioning activities 
and improved methodologies have led to substantial increases in cost estimates in 
various countries during the past 15 years (cf. OECD/NEA, 2016).
5 Collection of decommissioning funds 
After the costs have been properly estimated, it has to be determined, if, when and 
how funds should be set aside at the beginning of and/or during plant operation. 
In general, any financing scheme should ensure and be managed and periodically 
reviewed in a way that sufficient funds will be collected during the lifetime of a 
nuclear facility and will be available at the time decommissioning and waste man-
agement expenses occur. Basically, the funding schemes can be differentiated into 
(cf. also Irrek et al., 2007; OECD/NEA, 2016):
• Payment of decommissioning activities from the current budget of public au-
thorities (e. g., for decommissioning of Uranium mines in Germany): Provisions 
might be collected during lifetime of a plant via a levy or taxes, but very often 
there is no collection of funds during lifetime of the plant.
• Internal unrestricted fund of a private company (e. g., for dismantling and 
demolition and waste processing of NPPs in Germany): On the liabilities side 
of the balance sheet, the liable company discloses the amount of provisions ac-
cumulated by the respective year. However, it is not required that any assets are 
separated and reserved or earmarked for decommissioning purposes. Therefore, 
if decommissioning activities have to be paid it might happen that there will 
not be any financial means available. In case of insolvency of the company, the 
state has to step into the breach.
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• Internal restricted fund of a private liable company with public regulation (e. 
g., for NPPs in France): In contrast to the internal unrestricted fund, there is an 
enhanced insolvency protection because assets are separated and earmarked for 
decommissioning purposes and restrictions on investment of funds are imposed.
• External restricted fund (in most of the European countries, e. g., in Switzerland, 
Finland and Sweden): The funds are managed externally, i. e. not within the 
liable company, but by a dedicated body that may be a private or state-owned 
entity, and with respective transparency. This dedicated body has to follow 
specific restrictions with regard to the investment of financial means in order 
to enhance insolvency protection. In most cases, although there is an external 
fund installed the liabilities remain with the NPP operators. Thus the Polluter 
Pays Principle will be followed. For example, if there is an increase in costs, NPP 
operators will have to make additional payments to the funds. However, this is 
not the case with the new external fund for radioactive waste management and 
final disposal installed in Germany recently, where NPP operators have just 
paid a lump sum to the fund.
• External unrestricted fund (e. g., the ‘Cassia conjugation per ill set tore electric 
– CCSE’ in Italy, which allows surcharges on the electricity price for several 
purposes, among others, for nuclear decommissioning).
Accruals to an internal fund or contributions to an external fund are usually set 
up in regular installments or according to the electrical energy produced. For this, 
costs are usually inflated up to the year they will incur, and then discounted to 
its current value to determine the size of the accrual. Since discounting rates are 
usually higher than inflation rates, this leads to the sum of accruals or contributions 
being lower than the cost estimates. This, in turn, demands to yearly provide funds 
not only for the regular installment, but also for the difference between the present 
values of the actual year and the past year. The determination of the inflation and 
discounting rates is of central importance in any of these funding regimes. Only 
in few countries, provisions are based on undiscounted costs.
However, there are also funding regimes, where the full amount of costs has 
to be provided for from start of operation (Irrek et al., 2007; Däuper et al., 2014; 
OECD/NEA, 2016): For example, in France, since 2006, with a transition period 
until 2010, provisions for dismantling and decontamination of a NPP have to be fully 
collected already with start of operation. In Finland, a special requirement exists 
which, in principle, demands to cover the full nuclear liability already at the start 
of operation by special financial securities. In Sweden and in the Netherlands, with 
start of operation, NPP operators have to provide a guarantee for early shutdown. 
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Fig. 2 Guarantees covering fi nancial risks related to decommissioning costs occurring 
in case of early shutdown (Guarantee I) or aft er fi nal shutdown of the plant 
(Guarantee II) (Irrek et al., 2007, 152)
Such schemes substantially reduce the risk that the state will have to pay for early 
shutdown of plants and contribute to implementing the Polluter Pays Principle. In 
addition to such guarantees for early shut down (Guarantee I in Fig. 2), in some fi -
nancing schemes, NPP operators have to provide additional guarantees for additional 
costs exceeding the cost estimates that might occur aft er fi nal shutdown (Guarantee 
II in Fig. 2). For example, in Finland, the state has the possibility to demand such 
guarantees up to 10% of the sum of liabilities. In Sweden, such guarantees amount 
to 16–17% of estimated costs. And in Switzerland, there partly is a joint liability of 
all operators in case one of the NPP operators cannot pay its contributions.
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6 Management and investment of funds
A well-designed governance regime of the fund and a high level of quality of fund 
management is crucial for maintaining or even increasing the value of the funds so 
that sufficient funds will be available at the time decommissioning activities have 
to be paid. Funds can be managed by public or private fund managers. Specific 
restrictions beyond general accounting principles and general accounting law can 
be imposed on managers of internal or external funds, e. g., with regard to (Irrek 
et al., 2007):
• the way funds have to be accumulated;
• the investment of the financial means collected until they are used to pay for 
decommissioning activities;
• the payment for decommissioning costs;
• the regular reporting on funds and fund management;
• the control by the public (e.g., government, parliament, special boards, infor-
mation rights of the public).
Typical examples of investment restrictions and guarantees required for internal 
or external funds in practice are (Irrek et al., 2007; Däuper et al., 2014; OECD/
NEA, 2016):
• Restrictions regarding the degree of risk allowed to be taken, e. g. by limiting 
the share of asset classes with higher risks. For example, in France, assets of 
the internal restricted funds have to present a sufficient degree of security and 
liquidity. However, since 2010, diversification into real assets has been increased. 
In Slovenia, it has to be invested not less than 30% in state bonds, not more than 
5% in stock, not more than 15% in other bonds, not more than 5% in stocks of 
one issuer, and approximately 10% in securities on foreign financial markets. 
In the US, there are just simple guidelines such as using a “prudent investor” 
standard, with restrictions on self-investing and on foreign investment.
• Restrictions that do not allow investment in companies associated with the 
legally obliged parties or that have invested the majority of their assets in nu-
clear facilities.
• In Finland, there is the special situation that the lincensee can borrow back up 
to 75% of the capital of the fund against securities and at current interest rates.
Actual performance of the funds differs depending on the investment restrictions 
imposed, i. e. on the degree of risk taken, and on the general economic situation. 
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Tab. 1 Yield on investment of the Swiss decommissioning and waste management 
funds (quarterly reports) 
Nominal Yield on 
Investment per 
Quarter
Real Yield on 
Investment per 
Year
Nominal Yield on 
Investment per 
Quarter
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** not including KKM
* Since 1 April  2017, there is a separated investment strategy for the NPP Mühleberg (KKM) compared to the 
investment strategy for the NPPs Beznau (KKB), Gösgen (KKG), Leibstadt (KKL) and for the interim storage 
Würenlingen AG (Zwilag); therefore the first number is relevant for KKM, the second fo KKB, KKG, KKL, Zwilag. 
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While the European Commission (2013a) recommends that a secure risk profile 
should be sought in the investment of the assets, ensuring that a positive return is 
achieved, a 100% security of a positive return over any given period of time cannot 
be guaranteed over the many decades of lifetime of such a fund. Moreover, there is 
a general tradeoff between security and the yield on investment.
The Swiss example in Table 1 shows that an investment strategy with up to 50% 
of funds invested into shares at the stock market can lead to comparatively high 
returns in some quarters of a year, but also to a decrease in funds value in others. 
If the liable company feeds the fund with discounted contributions, the fund will 
have to yield positive returns to make up for the difference between the cost estimate 
and the discounted value, or additional contributions by the liable company will 
be needed. This will be also required with a secure investment strategy, if there 
are negative real interest rates on safe investment into bonds of solvent states as it 
could be observed in some states recently.
The internal unrestricted fund differs from the restricted solutions in one impor-
tant aspect: The provisions accumulated on the liabilities side of the balance sheet do 
not guarantee that there will be financial means available when decommissioning 
activities have to be paid. The cash flow from the financial equivalent of the set-aside 
provisions can be freely used by the companies as a portion of corporate revenue. 
In Europe, Germany is the only country where such an internal, completely 
unrestricted fund still exists for the dismantling and demolition of reactors and 
for the conditioning of radioactive waste. Here, no information is available on how 
nuclear power plant operators or their parent groups have invested the unrestricted 
funds from the nuclear provisions. A direct link cannot be drawn between individual 
liability items and individual asset items on a group’s balance sheet. Just because 
provisions are set up does not necessarily mean that the funds are being invested to 
finance dismantling and disposal. Groups can employ any type of financing what-
soever to provide future funding for dismantling and disposal activities (cf., e. g., 
Perridon et al., 2012, for the general financing options). Using the German groups 
E.ON and RWE as examples, the financing options can be investigated as follows:
• With regard to financing from current cash flow, one needs to consider that 
operating margins have fallen sharply in recent years and have been negative 
at times, while revenue and EBITDA have also fallen year-over-year in most of 
E.ON’s and RWE’s business divisions. There is no guarantee that the cash flow 
generated during the next years will be adequate to finance higher provisions 
or pay for activities related to nuclear dismantling and the long-term storage 
of radioactive material.
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• The options that E.ON and RWE have for using debt to finance activities related 
to nuclear dismantling and disposal are becoming more limited in light of their 
declining credit ratings and relatively high debt-to-equity ratios.
• For financing through asset restructuring, one needs to take a closer look at the 
groups’ assets, especially tangible assets, shareholdings, financial assets and – to 
the extent that they are not required to cover current liabilities – liquid assets. 
Assets available in the short-term are not sufficient to cover net nuclear provi-
sions. The sum of the values of E.ON’s and RWE’s plant and machinery assets 
and shareholdings declined significantly from 2013 to 2016. There is a risk that 
this trend will continue.
While observing the availability of the groups’ current financial resources to cover 
their obligations in the nuclear sector, one must also bear in mind that the groups 
must use their assets and cash flow not only for their nuclear provisions, but also 
to cover other obligations. Therefore, it is necessary to compare the groups’ total 
financial resources with all of their assumed obligations. For example, for RWE, 
based on annual reports it can be calculated that the long-term financial resources 
at RWE’s disposal at the end of 2016 were hardly sufficient to cover all of RWE’s 
long-term obligations (own calculation based on annual company reports and 
Irrek / Vorfeld 2015). 
7 Use of nuclear decommissioning funds
In general, decommissioning funds should be used only for the purpose for which 
they have been established and managed, i. e. to pay for decommissioning and 
radioactive waste management activities. Therefore, the degree of independence 
between the operator of a nuclear installation as the liable polluter and contributor 
to the funds, the company carrying out decommissioning activities and thus using 
decommissioning funds, the funds management and the position disposing of the 
power of authorising payments is a key issue in any decommissioning financing 
system. 
In general, market actors in nuclear decommissioning business making use of 
nuclear decommissioning funds are the following:
• Operators of nuclear facilities, who benefit already during operation as well as 
after shut-down, depending on the degree they are involved in the decommis-
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sioning activities. During dismantling it is important to make use of existing 
know-how of the personnel of the NPP operator;
• National or international fi rms specialised in nuclear decommissioning;
• Local fi rms without any specialisation in nuclear decommissioning, e. g. craft s-
men, scaff olders, unqualifi ed staff  that can be trained for decontamination 
activities, etc.
Fig. 3 Past and expected future yearly payment for decommissioning activities in 
Germany, following groups’ balanced sheets and cost estimates by the NPP 
operators of 31 December 2014 including cost estimates for fi nal disposal of 
HAW although there is no technical concept or site available yet (balanced 
sheets of E.on, RWE, EnBW and Vattenfall, 2003–2015; own calculation based 
on Warth & Klein Grant Th ornton, 2015)
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Tab. 2 Profits and losses of selected companies active in the German decommissioning 
market (companies’ income statements of 2014, 2015 and 2016 as far as 
available)
Company Year Profit / Loss 
[1,000 Euro]
Year Profit / Loss 
[1,000 Euro]
Nukem Technologies GmbH  
[Russian Rosatom group]
2014 -26,960 2015
Siempelkamp Ingenieur und Service 
GmbH [Siempelkamp Nukleartechnik 
GmbH]
2014 -2,683 2015 2,176
Celten Service GmbH 2015 105 2016 141
Eckert & Ziegler UmweltdiensteGmbH 2014 -1,367 2015 -4,266
SAT Kerntechnik GmbH 2014 32 2015
EWN Entsorgungswerk für  
Nuklearanlagen GmbH  
[Energiewerke Nord GmbH;  
German state-owned company]





Safetec Entsorgungs- und  
Sicherheitstechnik GmbH
2014 791 2015 793
EnBW Kernkraft GmbH [NPP operator] 2015 0 (per defini-
tion)
2016 0 (per defini-
tion)
Vattenfall Europe Nuclear Energy 
GmbH [NPP operator]
2014 -173,100 2015 -459,4000
GNS Gesellschaft  
für Nuklear-Service mbH
2015 27,400 2016 30,000
AREVA GmbH [incl. losses from NPP 
construction and modernisation]
2014 -764,164 2015 -632,392
In Germany, following the shutdown of NPPs after the Fukushima accident, decom-
missioning activities have increased during recent years (Fig. 3). It can be expected 
that the level of expenses will continue in the coming years when further NPPs 
will be shut down. With regard to the age of NPPs in the world (Fig. 1), a growth 
in international decommissioning expenses can be expected, too. In 2013, Nukem 
Technologies GmbH estimated, that the international market volume until 2030 could 
sum up to more than Euro 250bn. However, in general, as stated in AREVA’s financial 
report of 2014, the international decommissioning market is only slowly developing 
yet. The available income statements of selected companies active in the German 
decommissioning market show that several of them are still facing losses (Table 2). 
Nevertheless, there are several attempts to reduce costs and thus losses. For 
example, Nukem Technologies expects that a 15–20% decrease in costs of decontam-
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ination and dismantling might be possible (Kutscher 2015). Possible optimisation 
includes the following:
• Portfolio planning: co-ordination of and synergy effects from parallel activities 
at different sites including specialisation and centralisation of specific disman-
tling activities;
• Standardisation and modularisation of decontamination and dismantling 
activities;
• Mobilisation: Mobile equipment for conditioning of nuclear waste;
• Increase in decontamination and in the share of radioactive waste that does not 
have to be stored in a final disposal site but can be used with or without any 
restriction for other purposes if remaining radiation does not exceed specific 
levels, which can be a problem from the nuclear safety perspective if concerns 
and new medical knowledge with regard to risks from low-dose level radiation 
are ignored; 
• Lean management and professional logistics, project management, process 
management, risk management and cost management: reduction in overhead 
costs by concentration of administrative activities, mergers and acquisitions; 
optimised planning and control.
It can be expected that international companies specialising in back-end activities 
like companies of the Russian Rosatom group like Nukem Technologies GmbH 
will be the first benefiting from such developments. This might lead to market con-
centration processes, which will be a challenge for governments aiming at getting 
insight and control of activities with respect to nuclear safety.
8 Comparison of selected decommissioning financing 
concepts
Existing European and international analyses of decommissioning financing 
schemes (Irrek et al., 2007; European Commission 2013; European Commission 
2013a; OECD/NEA, 2016) show that financing schemes in practice substantially 
differ with regard to 
• Cost estimates and accounting procedures;
• Collection and investment of funds;
• How risks and uncertainties have been addressed;
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• Implementation of Polluter Pays Principle;
• Use of funds: Incentives for reducing costs;
• Different degree and ways of public control – differing public information rights.
Table 3 compares the financing schemes in Switzerland, Sweden and Finland from 
which can be particularly learned for future design of decommissioning financing 
concepts. In order to implement the polluter pays principle as far as possible and 
to ensure that governments will be able to control decommissioning activities 
with regard to nuclear safety, the following central questions have to be addressed 
when designing the governance scheme for nuclear decommissioning financing 
(Irrek et al., 2007):
• Who defines or regulates decommissioning (financing)?   
In most cases, this task is assigned to public licensing authorities (government 
level). A key issue thereby is the independence of the authority, which has to 
align different objectives from different stakeholders. Employees of the authority 
should dispose of sufficient personal independence from the operators and, if 
the operators are public entities, from the government.
• Who is liable or who has to pay the decommissioning activities?   
Due to the polluter pays principle assumption, the operators of nuclear installa-
tions should have to carry all decommissioning costs. They should pay through 
a decommissioning funding system, which urges them to financially contribute 
to a designated decommissioning fund. Guarantee schemes like the ones in 
Sweden and Finland aim at ensuring the implementation of the polluter pays 
principle even in case of an early shutdown of the nuclear installation or in case 
of increasing decommissioning costs after the end of operation.
Tab. 3 Comparison of decommissioning financing schemes in Switzerland, Sweden 
and Finland (Däuper at al., 2014; Kaberger/Swahn, 2015; Irrek/Vorfeld, 2015; 
OECD/NEA, 2016; quarterly reports of Swiss funds)
Country Switzerland Finland Sweden
Legal form Two separate public 
law foundations for 
decommissioning 
and radioactive waste 
management.
One single public law 
foundation.





All 5 NPPs and an 
interim storage.
All NPPs with their 
on-site interim storages.
All NPPs.
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Country Switzerland Finland Sweden
Obliged 
party





nagement by an agency 
at an industrial orga-
nization. Board with a 
cost committee and an 
investment committee: 
4 of 9 members of the 
board and 4 of 7 (2 of 7) 
members of the invest-
ment (cost) committee 
are representatives from 
NPP operators. Revisi-
on by certified auditor.
Fund governed by the 
Ministry for Labour 
and Economy.
Operational fund 
management by a state-
owned agency.
Board of Governors and 
Administration, with 









over 50 years of ope-
ration.
Regular installments 
over 25 years of opera-
tion or depending on 
the amount of waste 
produced via a ca. 10% 
surcharge on the elec-
tricity price
Regular installments 
over 40 years of opera-









75% of the fund can be 
borrowed back by the 
NPP operator who has 
to invest it in a produc-
tive way.
25% state bonds.











Operators of nuclear installations hand in bills for decommissioning activi-




External restricted funds (public law foundation) with a specific degree of 
public transparency and control in order to ensure a safe decommissioning.
Economic risk remains with NPP operator, who has additional payment 




Cost estimates probably too low and thus the funds. More realistic cost 
estimates are partly planned but controversially discussed.
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Country Switzerland Finland Sweden
Special di-
sadvantages
Strong influence of NPP 
operators on funds.




tion of NPP operators 




Reform of 2014 foresees 
a 30% surcharge on 
estimated costs to cover 
possible uncertainties.
Joint liability of NPP 
operators in case one of 
them cannot pay.
100% funding gua-
ranteed from start of 
operation.
NPP operators are allo-
wed to borrow back up 
to 75% of funds against 
guarantees.
Up to 10% additional 
guarantee covering cost 
uncertainties can be 





short-fall of funds: 
Guarantee I covering 
the case of early shut 
down and plant-specific 
Guarantee II covering 
cost uncertainties (16-
17% on average).
• Who is the entity, which holds the fund in its general accounts?  
In practice, various solutions are implemented from internal unrestricted to 
external restricted. However, only a restricted fund has the objective to ensure 
that assets will be available when needed to pay for decommissioning activities.
• Who outlines the investment policy and the investment guidelines?  
In general, the prudence principle should be followed in order to ensure that 
sufficient financial means will be available for a safe decommissioning. For this, 
the independence and competence of all involved stakeholders is important. The 
example of Switzerland shows that the strong influence of the NPP operators on 
the fund management can lead to a more risky investment strategy, which, in turn, 
can lead to substantial returns in some years, but also to a substantial decrease 
in asset value in others. The incentive to finance part of future decommissioning 
costs through a high investment performance is evident. A high performance 
on its part can conflict with the prudence principle. However, the professional 
application of asset and liability management allows managing a slightly high-
er risk. Special attention has to be paid to lending practices to related parties 
like in the example of Finland. In particular, lending can be beneficial for the 
NPP operator, but should be backed up by respective guarantees. Furthermore, 
means of finance should be invested in such a way that correlations between 
the investment and the development of the nuclear industry are avoided. It is 
recommended to develop guidelines, which describe the required qualifications 
of investment managers and which give a basic investment policy frame also 
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defining the acceptable risk levels. A kind of oversight board or decommissioning 
financing committee could provide such guidance.
• Who manages the fund?  
A sufficient degree of independence between the operators of nuclear instal-
lations (as polluters and thus contributors to the funds) and the investment 
managers is a key issue.
• Who disposes of the power of authorising payments for decommissioning?  
As mentioned already before, the degree of independence between the operator 
of a nuclear installation as the liable polluter and contributor to the funds, the 
company carrying out decommissioning activities and thus using decommis-
sioning funds, the funds management and the position disposing of the power of 
authorising payments is a key issue in any decommissioning financing system. 
The conflict potential always remains with the entity that has access to the de-
commissioning funds (power of authority). If the NPP operator solely disposes of 
the power of authority (e. g., in internal unrestricted funds), he could be tempted 
to defer payments in periods, where he wishes to use the financial resources for 
other purposes, or where he has general liquidity problems. If the government 
solely disposes of the power of authority and the liable NPP operator has to 
contribute to the fund for any additional costs occurring, the government could 
be tempted to use the financial resources in an inefficient way or for additional 
activities not really needed. 
• Who monitors or controls decommissioning (financing) and who 
has the authority for sanctions in the case of non-compliance?    
Like the definition and regulation of decommissioning financing, this task 
usually is assigned to public licensing authorities on the government level. The 
independence of the authority from the interests of the various stakeholders is 
of vital importance here, too.
9 Conclusions and recommendations
In conclusion, with regard to the financial consequences and risks involved in the 
different nuclear decommissioning financing schemes, existing schemes could be 
improved by (Irrek et al., 2007; OECD/NEA, 2016):
• Measures that establish a system of checks and balances in the governance chain 
in order to avoid negative effects stemming from conflicts of interests;
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• Measures that increase transparency including regularly reviewed, realistic, 
well-founded, published cost estimates. Within this context, a much better 
understanding of the uncertainties affecting decommissioning activities and 
how to best take them into account in cost estimations should be aimed at;
• Measures that set incentives to cost reduction while at the same time maintaining 
the level of radiation protection needed;
• A system of rules for regular contributions to the fund and to cover cases of 
short-falls like the guarantees in the Swedish system in order to ensure the full 
implementation of the polluter pays principle from the first until the last day of 
operation of a nuclear installation and beyond;
• Measures that ensure that fund assets will be separated from other assets and 
liabilities and invested according to the prudence principle so that they are 
available at the appropriate time and used only for their original purpose.
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The regulation of nuclear issues dates back as far as the foundation of the 
European Community. The Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy 
Community (EURATOM) was one of the founding treaties of the European 
Communities next to the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Com-
munity (ECSC) and entered into force on January 1, 1958. Since then and unlike 
the other founding treaties, the EURATOM Treaty has never been significantly 
amended or reformed. Why?
To be able to answer this question, one must look at the legal conditions and 
political key messages for the setting up of the EURATOM Community. The 
latter not only from within Europe but also from abroad. Due to the Members 
States’ original compromise and the limits between what is controlled and 
regulated under the treaty and what remains in the discretion of the Member 
States, the EURATOM Treaty is clearly limited in its scope. 
The EU has no competences in regulatory fields such as operational safety 
of nuclear power plants, management and safe disposal of radioactive waste, 
storage or disposal facilities and decommissioning of installations. All these 
1 Dörte Fouquet, BBH, Brussels, Belgium, doerte.fouquet@bbh-online.be
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crucial objectives remain the sole responsibility of national authorities and are 
co-guided by standards adopted at the international level, especially under the 
framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The EURATOM 
Treaty then remains as the only sectoral energy policy impeding the integration 
of policy towards a democratic energy Union. This is reflected by the European 
Parliament’s role being rather that of an opinion-giving onlooker than a co-de-
cision maker in matters related to nuclear regulation.
1 Introduction: EURATOM – a treaty without harmony 
The EURATOM Community and its Treaty establishing the European Atomic 
Energy Community (EURATOM) are marked by their inherent failure to achieve 
a joint common nuclear policy and establish a common interest of the European 
Communities, and later the European Union, in the development of nuclear energy. 
Instead, the EURATOM treaty has set the European energy landscape on a distortive 
pathway, which was foreshadowed by its limitations and conflicts back in 1945. 
In October 1945, the provisional French government under President Charles 
de Gaulle issued ordinance N° 45–2563 establishing the French “Commissariat à 
l’énergie atomique” in order for France to keep its place in the field of nuclear re-
search.2 The Commissariat and its Committee were, at that time, directly attached 
to the Government and under direct tutelage of the French President.3 De Gaulle 
established this Committee weeks after the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki in August 1945. France was the only founding member of EURATOM 
that, alongside the civil use of nuclear energy, sought hegemony in military nuclear 
power and competed against the dominant position of the United States of America. 
Article 1 of the ordinance clarifies : “Le Commissariat à l’Energie Atomique poursuit 
les recherches scientifiques et techniques en vue de l’utilisation de l’Energie Atomique 
dans les divers domaines de la science, de l’industrie et de la défense nationale”.
2 See « Ordonnance N° 45–2563du 18 Octobre 1 945 (J.O. du 31 .10.45) et rectificatif du 
J.0. du 3.11 .45) modifiée par la loi n° 47–1497 du 13 Août 1947(J.O. du 14.8. 47) et par 
le décret n° 51 -7. du 3 Janvier 1951 (J.O. du 4. 1 . 51) ; copy online in 
3 See exposé des motifs : « …L’autorité de l’Etat sur la marche du Commissariat est d’ail-
leurs la contrepartie nécessaire de la liberté, tout à fait exceptionnelle dans notre droit 
public, qui’ lui est donnée dans sa gestion. Pour assurer une consécration indiscutable 
à cette autorité, il est prévu que le Comité est présidé par le Président du Gouvernement 
Provisoire…. ».
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France’s continued research in the military use of nuclear energy resulted in 
its first bomb tests in 1960, eight years after the United Kingdom’s test in 1952. 
The peaceful use of nuclear energy in France was as important as its wish to 
remain and grow as an independent nuclear military force in the World. Today, 
France, together with the United Kingdom, the United States of America, Russia 
and China, is one of the five nuclear weapon states (NWS) under the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).4, with four undeclared or unrecognized states, 
with possibly more on their way.
When it came to purchase and choice of nuclear energy technology, none of 
the other founding states even showed strong interest in purchasing French civil 
nuclear technology. From the beginning of EURATOM, and even ahead of its rat-
ification, these other founding Member States- Belgium, the Federal Republic of 
Germany, Italy, Luxemburg and the Netherlands- were more interested in ordering 
US technology for new nuclear power plants. A specific agreement with the United 
States – the EURATOM Cooperation Act followed in 19585, immediately after the 
establishment of EURATOM. 
Jean Monnet and others in Europe together with eminent non-EU politicians 
such as US President Eisenhower “hoped that EURATOM would foster European 
integration”.6 As was outlined by the European Parliament’s research unit in 2002: 
“Sectoral integration of nuclear energy was chosen by Spaak and Monnet because 
it was viewed as less ambitious than a general common market or customs union, 
and therefore less likely to fail. Nuclear energy was an appealing prestige technology, 
especially after the liberalisation of US nuclear policy. The Euratom proposal was 
4 The Principle of the NPT is that other states which were signatories eschewed the 
nuclear weapons option and in return were promised assistance in civil nuclear power 
development by the weapons states.
5 EURATOM Cooperation Act of 1958 is a United States statute enabling a cooperative 
program between the European Atomic Energy Community and the United States. 
Following the US Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the cooperative program was designed 
to be an international agreement cleared the way for the United States to build nuclear 
power plants within the European Atomic Energy Community territory.
6 In fact, Monnet after the first failures for more European institutions tried to push for a 
EURATOM treaty as integrating force and peace enforcing similar to the ECSC approach. 
Only, especially countries such as Germany did not want any EURATOM treaty without 
a Common market: “To Monnet’s great surprise the German government was not in-
terested in the new (EURATOM) Community, while Erhard, already credited with the 
German Wirtschaftswunder, was openly opposed to it. A meeting with German officials 
established the basic fact of the coming negotiations, namely that Germany would not 
swallow EURATOM without a general common market…” Werner Kamppeter: Lessons 
of European Integration, April 2000, http://www.fes.de/analysen/kamppeter1_1.html 
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expected to appeal to the French, since France had a strong interest in the develop-
ment of […] nuclear energy”7
On the other hand, the United States was a keen competitor of France in view 
of the supply of nuclear power plants, having a competitive advantage at the time 
of the EURATOM negotiations.8 In addition, relations between France and the US 
were quite frail after the Suez crisis in 1956. 
This made France turn to its European neighbors rather than towards the United 
States9 for cooperation in nuclear issues but without wanting to give up dominion 
on its own nuclear policy. 
France wanted to close the widening gap between itself and the United States’ 
prolific construction and sale of nuclear power plants. For France, EURATOM was 
the vehicle to stop American dominance in the supply of nuclear energy in Europe.
As was distinctly pointed out by Louis Armand, President of the French CEA 
(Comité de l´équipement industriel au Commissariat à l’énergie atomique (CEA)), 
during the EURATOM debate in the French National Assembly on 5 July 1956: “Il 
est inutile d’attendre pour se demander si telle solution (EURATOM, d.Verf.) serait 
la meilleure. Je ne sais comment vous faire partager mon angoisse quant à l’urgence. 
Le temps presse et, si nous voulions faire de l’effet, je vous dirais que, pendant que 
7 O’ Driscoll, Mervyn, European Parliament, Directorate-General for Research, Working 
paper, The European Parliament and the Euratom Treaty: past, present and future, 2002,( 
ENER 114 EN), p. 36.
8 Sebastian Wolf; EURATOM, the European Court of Justice, and the Limits of Nuclear 
Integration in Europe, German Law Journal; 12 (2011), 8. – S. 1637–1657, p. 1653; Dwight 
D. Eisenhower: “ I am especially pleased to approve the EURATOM Cooperation Act of 
1958, which enables the United States Government to begin active preparation for the 
Joint United States-EURATOM Program to develop nuclear power in Europe. EURATOM 
(The European Atomic Energy Community), which came into being on January 1, 1958, 
was formed by six of our European friends--Belgium, Germany, France, Luxembourg, 
Italy and the Netherlands--in order to combine their efforts in developing the peaceful 
uses of atomic energy. It holds great promise, not only as a means to this end, but also as 
a means of furthering European unity. Our Joint Program, which is EURATOM’s first 
major program, is designed to achieve the construction in Europe of about six nuclear 
power reactors with a total installed capacity of about one million kilowatts of electricity 
and to improve power reactor technology through a research program of great scope. 
This Joint Program should prove highly beneficial both to Europe and to the United 
States.”-The EURATOM Cooperation Act of 1958 is Public Law 85–846 (72 Stat. 1084). 
Dwight D. Eisenhower: “Statement by the President upon Signing the EURATOM Co-
operation Act.” August 29, 1958. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The 
American Presidency Project http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=11203 .
9 Grégoire Mallard, Crafting the Nuclear Regime Complex (1950-1957): Dynamics of 
harmonization of opaque treaty rules; EJIL (2014) , Vol. 25 No. 2, 445–472, p. 455.
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nous parlons, un ensemble d’alternateurs équivalent à ceux, réunis, de Génissiat, 
de Donzère, d’Eguzon, de Gennevilliers, soit tout l’ensemble des alternateurs fran-
çais, travaillent en Amérique à alimenter les usines de séparation isotopiques, donc 
à augmenter la distance qui nous sépare de l’industrie américaine. Tout cela va 
tellement vite que, si nous ne nous dépêchons pas, nous ne rattraperons plus. Sans 
EURATOM, c’est bien simple, tous les pays européens iront s’adresser aux colosses. 
L’Italie, nous le savons, achète dès maintenant une installation américaine de 75.000 
kilowatts, du même type que celle que les Belges ont acquise et qu’on inaugurera 
l’année prochaine à Bruxelles. Et voilà le commencement de ces accords bilatéraux, 
le commencement de cet achat de matériel. ...Aussi, ce que je puis vous dire, c’est 
que le travail des experts à Bruxelles a été un travail fonctionnel. On l’a dit et c’est 
vrai. Ce n’est pas institutionnellement que le problème a été étudié. Il a été défini en 
fonction des besoins, et comme M. Perrin l’a dit, en faisant juste le nécessaire, mais 
en le faisant bien, car on n’a pas besoin de tout associer. Mais ce qu’on associe, il faut 
l’associer avec des règles telles que l’ensemble travaille mieux que ne le feraient les 
mêmes éléments, mais séparés. C’est ainsi que nous n’avons pas pensé à la création 
d’un commissariat européen de l’énergie atomique.… Nous avons respecté tous les 
programmes nationaux, comme le demandait M. Perrin, et limité l’association à un 
minimum, mais au minimum vital, c’est le cas de le dire, au minimum nécessaire 
pour une large irradiation. Les experts de Bruxelles ont envisagé que l’association ne 
porterait que sur 20 p. 100 des équipements. C’est ainsi que les recherches resteront 
indépendantes”.10
And, on the other hand, France insisted during the negotiations for the EUR-
ATOM Treaty that “equality of rights of the Members”, as was claimed by the other 
founding Member States to EURATOM, was not in any way pursued in order to 
hinder its own nuclear weapon programme. 
During the months before final consent on the EURATOM treaty text was 
reached, conflict and discussion continued. Disagreement was rife over Article 77 
on the balance to be drawn when it came to defining the single jurisdiction that 
would have control over fissile material on the EURATOM territory.
At the London Conference of nine powers on 28th of September to 3rd of 
October 1954, German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer declared that his country 
would not produce nuclear weapons in Germany and thus enabling his country for 
10 ARMAND, Louis; PERRIN, Francis. L’EURATOM : Exposés faits à la tribune de 
l’Assemblée nationale le 5 juillet 1956 par Francis Perrin et Louis Armand. Paris: 1956. 




re-armament.11 Nonetheless, in January 1957 in Algeria, France and Germany, the 
latter being a deliberate opponent so that France would not alone have a military 
use for nuclear fissile material12, signed a secret military cooperation agreement in 
a meeting between their defense ministers (Maurice Bourgès-Maunoury and Franz 
Josef Strauss). This agreement was later extended to Italy in 1957. These secret agree-
ments laid the ground for a biased application of the control articles of EURATOM. 
In consequence of these agreements, EURATOM never clearly governed material 
destined for military use. Only in that way did France accept that the EURATOM 
inspectors would “control the conformity between the ’real’ and ‘declared’ uses of 
nuclear fuels (be they civil or military uses)”13 
Therefore, the inspectors could only verify that the material in France was for 
military use but could not prevent this use. This weakened EURATOM’s role as a 
backbone of the international Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and its objectives and 
immediately hamstrung its status as the governing supranational body. Moreover, it 
created a situation from the beginning where there was a split vision between France 
and the other EURATOM founding members. This in effect weakened any hope for 
unity under EURATOM. One can thus conclude that divergence was an integral 
part of EURATOM from its beginning. Also, to the outside world and especially 
to the United States, this biased approach prevailed. Monnet briefed his assistant 
Max Kohnstamm14 before they went to negotiate details for the EURATOM-US 
11 For the extent of this policy in order to ensure France’s acceptance of Germany having 
an own army (die Bundeswehr) again, see Soutou Georges-Henri. Les accords de 1957 
et 1958 : vers une communauté stratégique nucléaire entre la France, l’Allemagne et 
l’Italie? In: Matériaux pour l’histoire de notre temps, n°31, 1993. Penser et repenser 
les défenses (suite). pp. 1-12;doi : 10.3406/mat.1993.404096 http://www.persee.fr/doc/
mat_0769-3206_1993_num_31_1_404096 
12 See for background of a quite lively s dispute between the ministers of foreign affairs of 
France and Germany, Grégoire Mallards, a.a.O.
13 Grégoire Mallard, a.a.o.
14 Max Kohnstamm: From 1948 to 1952 Max Kohnstamm was appointed to the Dutch 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as Diplomat under the direction of Minister Hirschfeld, 
where he was responsible for German affairs and in particular the Ruhr Authority and 
later under Minister Stikker, he was responsible for European concerns. He helped 
negotiating for the Schuman Plan where he met Monnet. After this, he participated 
in the negotiations for EURATOM and in the negotiations for the US-EURATOM 
Agreement of 1958, where he was Secretary to the three “Wise Men”. He later became 
Vice-President of the Action Committee for the United States of Europe, 1956–1975. He 
was a close supporter of Monnet in his endeavor for creating an integrated Europe. A 
fascinating wealth of information are his archives at the European University Institute 
(http://archives.eui.eu/en/fonds/155415?item=JMDS.A-09.06 ).
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treaties on Nuclear to “avoid explaining how the system of EURATOM control would 
work” and to maintain “the appearance“ of equivalence between the American and 
the EURATOM control and thus of strictly non-military civic use of fissionable 
material belonging to and controlled under EURATOM.15 
2 EURATOM ltd.
The problematic start thus led to a future where no real Atomic Energy Union was 
ever established in Europe. Instead, EURATOM has served as a basis for gigantic 
and continuing benefits for nuclear research over the last decades in comparison 
to other energy research. Additionally, there never was a unified movement to 
promote a European policy framework for nuclear. 
The EURATOM treaty remains a treaty with limited liability.
There seems to have been a recent move to attach an aspect of exclusive suprem-
acy to EURATOM over the European Union treaties, at least when it applies to the 
internal energy market and to the observance of procurement and competition rules. 
Under the current Commission and its predecessor, EURATOM was re-invented as 
a way of underlining a common European interest to support the creation of new 
nuclear power plants with public money and guarantees, as will further be shown.
National preferences or antipathies concerning a powerful EURATOM Com-
munity prevail until today. 
The above, almost fascinating, national obstinacy of Member States to not create 
a true Atomic Energy Union when agreeing to the EURATOM Treaty in the past is 
well documented by numerous examples, the first of which being the unwillingness 
of France in the years after EURATOM entered into force to sign the NPT. The 
NPT, as joint initiative of the Soviet Union, the United States of America and the 
United Kingdom has been open for signature since 1968.
The signature of the Community did not lead to an automatic assent of France 
to the NPT since the EURATOM treaty is only binding internally, with its own 
safe guard clause under Art. 77, on the regional Member State level. 
In 1973, the seven non-nuclear weapon States within EURATOM formally 
signed, together with the European Community, an agreement with IAEA for the 
implementation of NPT safeguards. 
Concerning non-military nuclear installations, a similar agreement was con-
cluded in 1976 among the IAEA, the Community and the United Kingdom. The 
15 Grégoire Mallard, a.a.O.
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United Kingdom deliberately had offered to accept the IAEA safeguards for the 
UK non-military nuclear plants.16
France only acceded to the NPT in 1992, in the same year as China did. Before 
that and after the NPT entered into force, France not being a party to the NPT, 
signed a similar three party agreement with the EURATOM Community and the 
IAEA which foresaw the application of IAEA safeguards in a manner similar to the 
above agreements but, “limited, however, to those materials which France wants to 
put under such safeguards. (…)Thus we now find in Western Europe a unique situ-
ation in the field of safeguards due to the fact that there exists a regional safeguards 
authority invested with supranational rights which at the same time not only fulfils, 
within the framework of the IAEA system, the tasks normally assigned to a national 
system of accounting and control, but also collaborates with the IAEA in inspections 
in a way which permits the latter to draw its own independent conclusions.”17
3 Activities and sectors governed by EURATOM
When screening EURATOM following modern, scientific and established rules on 
circular economy legislation, EURATOM again fails to deliver further underlining 
its status as a “ failed community”.18 An example is its limited provisions on plan-
ning and permitting procedures which fail to include operation, safe operation, 
ore supply, dismantling and safe final storage of radioactive waste.
Existing secondary legislation under EURATOM, which covers issues such as 
waste, were in some cases helped by a progressive interpretation of the European 
Court rather than by the EURATOM treaty itself with the limited scope of its 
concerned Chapter (Chapter 3 on Health and safety), as will be reflected on below. 
In consequence, EURATOM, following its beginnings and its undercurrent 
of opposing interests, particularly those of the one Nuclear Weapon State (NWS) 
(France) and the other EURATOM founding members, emerges as a ‘skeleton treaty’ 
unable of consequently regulating the diverse elements of nuclear power including 
16 Schleicher, H.W. (1980), (former Director of the EURATOM Safeguards Directorate, 
Commission of the European Communities). Nuclear Safeguards in the European 
Community – a Regional Approach, IAEA Bulletin 22 (3/$) p 45. 
17 Schleicher, H.W., ibid. page 45.
18 See Wolf, Sebastian, EURATOM, the European Court of Justice, and the limits of Nu-
clear integration in Europe, German Law Journal 12 (2011), 8, p. 1638 and referring to 
Weilemann, Peter, die Anfänge der Europäischen Atomgemeinschaft, p. 157.
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uranium mining, supply, shipment, use and processing and final dismantling of 
nuclear installations. 
EURATOM’s objective is prominently established in the EURATOM treaty: 
“Article 1
By this Treaty the HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES establish among themselves a 
EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY (EURATOM). It shall be the task of 
the Community to contribute to the raising of the standard of living in the Member 
States and to the development of relations with the other countries by creating the 
conditions necessary for the speedy establishment and growth of nuclear industries.”
Art. 2 lists the responsibilities and tasks for the EURATOM Community:
Major objectives are to promote research and ensure the dissemination of tech-
nical information and to establish uniform safety standards to protect the health 
of workers and of the general public and ensure that they are applied; facilitate 
and ensure investment, particularly by encouraging ventures on the part of un-
dertakings; Chapter 3 EURATOM, entitled, ‘Health and Safety’, outlines content 
and limitation of the power of the Community with its Art. 30:
According to EURATOM, basic standards shall be laid down within the Com-
munity for the protection of the health of workers and the general public against the 
dangers arising from ionizing radiations. However, this provision does not give any 
right to the Community to directly safeguard Nuclear Power stations: “It essentially 
provides for the Community to establish a series of dose limits for exposure of human 
beings to radiation. (This has been done, usually following the line established by the 
International Commission for Radiological Protection (ICRP)). But it does not provide 
any competence to EURATOM either with respect to possible damage to the natural 
environment caused by radiation, and perhaps even more remarkably, it provides no 
EURATOM Community competence with respect to the safety of nuclear reactors”.19
The main European objectives under EURATOM outlined in Art. 2 and detailed 
for safety and health aspects in Chapter 2, are:
• the establishment of the basic installations necessary for the development of 
nuclear energy in the Community;
• to ensure that all users in the Community receive a regular and equitable supply 
of ores and nuclear fuels;
• to make certain, by appropriate supervision, that nuclear materials are not 
diverted to purposes other than those for which they are intended;
19 O’ Driscoll, Mervyn, The European Parliament and the EURATOM Treaty: past, present 
and future, p. 17.
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• to exercise the right of ownership conferred upon it with respect to special fissile 
materials; details of the property ownership in this sense are further laid down 
in Chapter VII of the EURATOM treaty. However, while the Community has 
the property rights, Art. 87 makes it clear that Member States, persons and 
undertakings shall have the unlimited right of use and consumption of fissile 
materials in lawful possession. 
In reality, these fissile material property rights of the Community have proved 
of little practical consequence within the European Community, as will again be 
outlined below.
EURATOM should, under Art. 2, ensure wide commercial outlets and access to 
the best technical facilities through the creation of a common market in specialised 
materials and equipment, through the free movement of capital for investment 
in the field of nuclear energy and through freedom of employment for specialists 
within the Community.
Another point which was to be a future point of contention as to its scope was 
the provision under Art. 2 that EURATOM should establish with other countries 
and international organizations similar relations as it will further progress on the 
peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 
4 The EURATOM Supply Agency
Chapter 6 of Title II EURATOM establishes the EURATOM Supply Agency (ESA) 
and confers upon it an exclusive right to conclude contracts relating to the supply 
of ores, source materials and special fissile materials coming from inside or from 
outside of the Community. Chapter 8 established the property ownership rules 
where -as laid down in Art. 86 Para 1 EURATOM- the special fissile materials shall 
be the property of the Community. 
The ESA conceived would own and control the supply of all fissile materials in 
the Community. Art. 86 and 87 EURATOM are perfect examples of a bizarre and 
redundant legal position of the Community: the provisions under Art. 86 EUR-
ATOM declare the Community as being holder of the property right on special 
fissile materials, and defines a “right of ownership” to “all special fissile materials 
which are produced or imported by a Member State, a person or an undertaking” and 
which are subject to the safeguard clauses under Chapter 7 EURATOM. Despite 
this principle, the Community has no real right of ownership since use is clearly 
curtailed via the provisions under Art. 87 EURATOM, according to which Member 
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States, persons or undertakings have unlimited rights over use and consumption of 
this material. The European Supply agency reflects the ambiguous and incomplete 
community framework of EURATOM. 
It is the EURATOM Community / the Commission that controls the distribu-
tion of patent rights and production licenses for a series of reactor designs and fuel 
cycle technologies to be developed by the Joint Nuclear Research Centre (JNRC). 
Important conditions are set for research (Art. 7) and international agreements 
(Art. 101), e.g. on ensuring access to fissile materials. 
These tasks and responsibilities by the Community are, to a large extent, kept 
away from serious control by the European Parliament in the sense of modern 
legislative power and supervision over the executive or, as was put pointedly: 
“Control by democratically elected Parliaments was not exactly a significant feature 
of the nuclear sector in the 1950s”.20 And this democracy-excluding oversight was 
never reformed by a modernisation of EURATOM as has been the case in other 
areas via the various reform treaties leading to the Lisbon treaty. 
When it comes to uranium supply, the reality of nuclear supply substantially 
mirrors the existing situation on gas import dependence in Europe. All sourcing 
is done outside the EU and mostly from former Soviet Union countries, e.g. from 
Russia. One might question the sustainability of this supply route, a worrying fact 
also outlined by the European Commission itself.21 Another point of unease is the 
fact that Russia is nowadays pushing to supply new nuclear power stations to Europe, 
such as the one just recently constructed in Hungary named Paks II – a new instal-
lation with procurement and state aid authorised by the European Commission.
20 O’ Driscoll, Mervyn, The European Parliament and the EURATOM Treaty: past, present 
and future, p. 6.
21 The EU Commission outlined in its Communication COM (2014) 330 final “Euro-
pean Energy Security Strategy” of 28th of May 2014, p. 16: “ The worldwide uranium 
supply market is stable and well diversified but the EU is nonetheless completely 
dependent on external supplies. There are only a few entities in the world that are 
able to transform of uranium into fuel for the nuclear reactors, but EU industry has 
technological leadership on the whole chain, including enrichment and reprocessing. 
“…However, Russia is a key competitor in nuclear fuel production, and offers integrated 
packages for investments in the whole nuclear chain. Therefore, particular attention 
should be paid to investments in new nuclear power plants to be built in the EU using 
non-EU technology, to ensure that these plants are not dependent only on Russia for 
the supply of the nuclear fuel: the possibility of fuel supply diversification needs to be 
a condition for any new investment, to be ensured by the EURATOM Supply Agency.
 Furthermore, an overall diversified portfolio of fuel supply is needed for all plant oper-
ators.”
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4.1 The reality of supply channels and long term supply 
contracts
Chapter 6 of Title II EURATOM opens with mention to, and a request for, a common 
supply policy concerning the sourcing of source and special fissile materials and 
conveys to the supply agency an exclusive right to conclude contracts relating to 
the supply of ores, source materials and special fissile materials coming from inside 
or outside the Community. Strangely enough, Chapter 6 seems to be respected or 
applied very little and “many articles have apparently either not been implemented 
at all, or only partially implemented or applied.”22 
The same is valid for the Special Fissile Materials Financial Account as a trans-
action balancing and auditing tool: Art. 89, para. 4 under Chapter 8 of EURATOM 
foresees that the Agency could undertake transactions for its own account and shall 
in this context “be deemed to be an undertaking”. This provision for a European 
nuclear undertaking has never been implemented. 
The Supplies Agency exists, but rather worked as an observer than as an active 
buyer and supplier of fissile material. Until at least 2005 the Agency never itself 
used its purchase power and there is no publicly documented evidence for direct 
activities in purchasing, supplying and stockpiling of material. 
In 2005, a report on Security of supply, published by an advisory task force to 
the EURATOM Supply Agency, parted from this past experience, that security of 
supply concerns in the nuclear fuel cycle result from the fact that primary production 
of natural uranium covers only some 60% of world demand while the remaining 
part comes from historical production (inventories and weapons dismantling) and 
from the re-enrichment of tails of depleted uranium resulting from the enrichment 
process.23 This task force of the major Western nuclear operators at that time and the 
nuclear energy and fuels company, British Nuclear Fuels plc (BNFL), several times 
outlined the question of stocks but always clearly and self-evidently defined and 
described the stocks as those kept by the nuclear operators. The report mentioned 
the possibility that the Agency could act under Art. 72 EURATOM and establish a 
stockpile, but in no way referred to this as an option near to reality. This is clearly 
illustrated in the following analysis in the report, underlining that there “is a decrease 
of stocks in many countries as part of this reduction of operational costs for utilities. 
22 O’ Driscoll, Mervyn, The European Parliament and the EURATOM Treaty: past, present 
and future, p. 13
23 See Analysis of the Nuclear Fuel Availability at EU Level from a Security of Supply 
Perspective, EURATOM Supply Agency – Advisory Committee Task Force on Security 
of Supply Final Report of the Task Force, June 2005, page 5.
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The appropriate level of stocks and the entire fuel procurement policy depends on the 
size and electricity generation pattern of each utility”.24 Also, the recommendation 
in case of shortages does not mention in any way a role for the Agency to execute 
its right and even objective under EURATOM in stockpiling capability.25
The European Court of Auditors has apparently regularly asked what the Supplies 
Agency could actually be doing. France, over many years, has displayed an attitude 
of not caring at all about the Agency.26
When it comes to national policies and contracts with third countries, an in-
ternational organisation or a national of a third State (e.g. an energy company or 
supplier), the line between competencies of the State and of EURATOM remained 
unclear and was several times subject to European Court decisions. The Member 
States clearly remain sovereign to bilaterally conclude those international agree-
ments. EURATOM steps in when “matters within the purview” of EURATOM are 
concerned, as laid down under Art. 103 EURATOM.27 This wording creates ground 
for uncertainty and thus underlines the reality that there is no unique EURAT-
OM competence, even in matters where the ownership of the fissile material is 
explicitly given to the EURATOM community under the treaty but where use and 
24 See, Analysis, ibid. page 5.
25 See, Analysis, ibid, page 16: “Against long term risks (not susceptible to happen in less 
than a year or two) remedies are more mixed, e.g. exploration and investments in new 
production facilities, diversification, long term contracting, and partnerships. In any 
case, an effective monitoring of the supply and demand situation at EU and world levels 
and its likely evolution would be a very important tool for the Commission’s analysis 
in view of the EURATOM Community’s responsibilities in the EU energy security of 
supply, as well as for the nuclear industry. The ESA which already has a unique insight 
into the market through its concurrence privilege, could be this monitoring tool, but 
would benefit from accurate information from all nuclear industries operating in the EU, 
on their sources and commitments as well as their stocks of nuclear material (including 
their quantity, form and location).”
26 O’ Driscoll, Mervyn, The European Parliament and the EURATOM Treaty: past, present 
and future, European Parliament, Directorate-General for Research, Working paper, 
2002,( ENER 114 EN), page 17: “The Court of Auditors has regularly asked what the 
Supplies Agency actually does. France appears in the past to have sometimes largely 
ignored the very existence of the Agency, considering that France is exempt from most 
of the provisions of Chapter 6 (which it has also challenged the legitimacy of in the 
European Court of Justice – so far unsuccessfully).”
27 See for example: European Court, Ruling 1/78 of 14. 11. 1978 following an application of 
the Kingdom of Belgium pursuant to Art. 103 EURATOM, asking as to whether in the 
absence of the concurrent participation of the Community, Belgium may adhere to the 
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, Facilities and Transport 
under the IAEA regime.
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management is kept with the Member States. This limitation is also important in 
questions around who can sign which kinds of agreements at international level.
In 2016, a recommendation by the Commission was needed on the interpretation 
of Art. 103 EURATOM. The recommendation tries to establish more clarity around 
fuel supply contracts but outlines a dilemma: “In the event that a draft agreement 
or contract concerned by the present Recommendation includes also provisions on 
supply matters, its assessment by the Commission pursuant to Article 103 should be 
without prejudice to the exclusive right of the Agency to conclude supply contracts; 
co-signature of supply contracts by the Agency on the other hand is without prejudice to 
the assessment by the Commission of the compatibility of Member States’ draft agree-
ments or contracts with the provisions of the Treaty and its secondary legislation.”28
The EURATOM Supply Agency is hesitant, when it comes to agreeing to long-
term supply contracts with nuclear fuel. 
In a recent decision, the Commission acting as the EURATOM Supply Agency 
refused to co-sign a Nuclear Fuel Supply (NFS) Contract on nuclear fuel supply 
and spent fuel storage and treatment for future Units 5 and 6 to be built at the site 
of the existing Paks nuclear power plant in Hungary. The Hungarian company 
Paks II and the Russian company Nizhny Novgorod Engineering Company «Ato-
menergoproekt» had signed the NFS Contract on 9 December 2014. Following its 
signature, the NFS Contract was submitted to the “Agency” on 23 December 2014 
pursuant to Art. 52 of the EURATOM Treaty and screened under the procedure 
of Art. 103. By letter of 13 January 2015, after extensive discussions with the Paks 
II consortium and Hungary, the “Agency” notified its refusal to co-sign the NFS 
Contract, reasoning that the clauses of the contract “de facto prevent diversification 
of fuel supply”.29 Under this contract, Rosatom, the Russian State Atomic Energy 
Corporation, is mandated to provide the technology and the supply of nuclear fuel 
(and assemblies) and offered the option of managing the spent nuclear fuel for at 
least 20 years through its subsidiary “NIAEP”. The financing of the project is aimed 
to be ensured mainly via a loan granted by the Russian Federation to the Hungarian 
State for which the state gives various guarantees. The state aid part of the deal was 
recently authorised by the European Commission in view of Art. 2 (c) EURATOM30 
28 See C(2016) 1168 final COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION of 4.4.2016 on the appli-
cation of Article 103 of the EURATOM Treaty, para 13.
29 See (declassified part of) COMMISSION DECISION of 2.3.2015 (CÇ2015) 1398 final ) 
relating to a procedure in application of the second paragraph of Art. 53 of the EURA-
TOM Treaty, Para 4.
30 Art. 2 c) EURATOM: (In order to perform its tasks, the Community shall, as provided in 
this Treaty:..) “( c) facilitate investment and ensure, particularly by encouraging ventures 
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and its view that there is a common European interest in promoting the creation 
of new nuclear power stations.31 On the fuel supply and waste management con-
tract, the Agency was more wary. A problematic reality has appeared: Hungary is 
to complete a new state aid-supported construction of the Paks II nuclear power 
plant, with supply and management provided by Rosatom where the Commission 
itself has acknowledged an almost full import of fissile material from Russia.
Concluding, it is obvious that major executive provisions for the Agency under 
Chapter 6 and 8 of EURATOM are not mirrored in reality even though they were 
designed to represent its pillars. They seem to never have really been destined to 
have a dominant role enshrined to the EURATOM Community and its control 
agencies: France and Western Germany at the time of the Spaak Committee32 and 
the preparation of a Treaty gave a green light for a somewhat inventive definition, 
concerning “property” and “control” . 
To recall: In view of France’s insistence as sovereign NWS, the Spaak Committee 
explained that “control” for the Community when it comes to fissile material means 
a “control of conformity”. “The EURATOM Community would be granted “property” 
of all nuclear fuels used for peaceful ends within the EURATOM territory (therefore 
leaving the property of fuels used for French military ends to the French government); 
but this notion of property was defined “as a “property sui generis,” an old notion 
which differed from the common notion in Roman Law, since the property of fuels by 
the EURATOM Community granted no rights to its owner during normal times”.33
And in line with the above task force’s report, not only France but none of the 
nuclear operators in any Member State attributed any real power of property and 
supreme control to the Community. 
This mismatch once again underlines the already drawn conclusion from the 
late 1990s that “EURATOM never got off the ground”.34 
on the part of undertakings, the establishment of the basic installations necessary for 
the development of nuclear energy in the Community; “. 
31 SA.38454 – 2015/C (ex 2015/N) Commission decision of 6.3.2017 on state aid which 
Hungary is planning to implement for supporting the development of two new nuclear 
reactors at Paks II nuclear power station. 
32 The Spaak Committee was an Intergovernmental Committee set up by the Foreign 
Ministers of the six Member States of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) 
as a result of the Messina Conference of 1955.
33 Mallard, Grégoire, The European Nuclear Force, An Obscure Object of Desire, Princeton 
University and Université Paris-Est (LATTS) (2009), page 19.
34 Trachtenberg, Marc, 1999. A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. Page 205.
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5 The relationship of the European treaties towards 
each other 
The Merger Treaty, or “Brussels Treaty”, which entered into force on 1 July, 1967 
created a Single Commission and a Single Council of and for the three European 
Communities, meaning the executive bodies of the European Coal and Steel Com-
munity (ECSC), the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and the 
European Economic Community (EEC). The institutions of the EEC would manage 
all institutional responsibilities under EEC, ECSC and EURATOM. All three were, 
after the Brussels treaty, denominated as the European Communities but from a 
legal point of view all three continued to exist separately under their respective 
treaties. As a consequence, since 1967, the Council and the Commission of the EEC 
replaced the Commission and Council of EURATOM and the High Authority and 
Council of the ECSC. Although each Community remained legally independent, 
they shared common institutions. 
In 1993, the Maastricht Treaty created the European Union, which absorbed 
the three Communities, yet EURATOM and the ECSC kept their legal personality.
The Maastricht treaty was repealed by the Amsterdam Treaty, which was signed 
in 1997. With the Lisbon Treaty of 2009, the European Union replaced the original 
European Communities but the structures and legal conditions at the communities’ 
bases as specific treaties remained unchanged. This was due to lack of support in 
many EU Member States to create a European Constitution as had previously been 
conceived by the Maastricht treaty. Therefore, the European law is still established 
by the two international Treaties, minus the ECSC, which had a deadline and 
expired after 50 years in 2002. The Treaty establishing the European Community 
was renamed the “Treaty on the Functioning of the EU” (TFEU).
During the finalised 1995 enlargement of the European Union, Austria, Finland 
and Sweden acceded to the European Union (EU). All these States had already 
established links to the Union with the European Free Trade Association (EFTA).
6 The role of the European Parliament and of the 
European Court of Justice 
A major headache for the European Parliament and the democratic community 
in the EU in general is its very limited role in all EURATOM based legal projects 
since its position is restricted to that of an advisory institution under Art. 31 EUR-
ATOM rather than as a legislator. Back in 1988, and two years after the Chernobyl 
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disaster, the European Parliament contested in an annulment procedure before the 
European Court that Council Regulation (EURATOM) No. 3954/87 of 22 Decem-
ber 1987 laying down maximum permitted levels of radioactive contamination of 
foodstuffs and of feeding stuffs following a nuclear accident or any other case of a 
radiological emergency was wrongly based on Art. 31 EURATOM, which provides 
that the Parliament is to only be consulted, whereas it should have been based on 
Art. 100a of the EEC Treaty which requires cooperation with the Parliament im-
plementation of the procedure.35
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) declared the case as admissible despite an 
opinion of the Council asserting that the European parliament did not have the 
legal personality under (former) Art. 173 EEC treaty or Art. 146 EURATOM since 
it is not included among the institutions which, like the Member States, bring an 
action for annulment against any measure of another institution before the Court.36
The Court accepted the fact that the Parliament is not mentioned in both arti-
cles and thus the Court could not include the Parliament among the institutions, 
which may bring an action per se as institution but “being required to demonstrate 
an interest in bringing an action”.37
But the Court saw its “duty to ensure that the provisions of the Treaties concern-
ing the institutional balance are fully applied and to see to it that the Parliament’s 
prerogatives, like those of the other institutions, cannot be breached without it hav-
ing available a legal remedy, among those laid down in the Treaties, which may be 
exercised in a certain and effective manner”.38
According to the Court, such a procedural gap cannot prevail over the funda-
mental interest in the maintenance and observance of the institutional balance 
laid down in the Treaties establishing the European Communities, thus referring 
to all Treaties. Therefore and insofar as the Parliament disagrees with the Coun-
cil’s choice of legal basis for the contested Council regulation, this led to a breach 
of Parliament’s prerogatives by denying it the possibility of participating in the 
drafting more actively than it could under the EURATOM consultation procedure.
In consequence, the Court dismissed the Council’s objection of inadmissibility 
and allowed the proceedings to be continued with regard to the substance of the case.
On the substance, though, the Parliament lost the case. The Court did not follow 
the arguments of the European Parliament that the regulation was also a harmon-
isation measure within the meaning of Art. 100a of the EEC Treaty. For the Court 
35 ECJ Case C-70/88, (interlocutory judgment of 22.05.1990), Para 39.
36 Case C-70/88,( Interlocutory judgment) Para 13.
37 Case C-70/88, (Interlocutory judgment) Para 24.
38 Case C- 70/88, (Interlocutory judgment) Para 25.
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the prohibition of marketing provided for in Art. 6(1) of that Regulation was “only 
one condition for the effectiveness of the application of the maximum permitted levels. 
The regulation therefore has only the incidental effect of harmonising the conditions 
for the free movement of goods within the Community inasmuch as, by means of the 
adoption of uniform protective measures, it avoids the need for trade in foodstuffs 
and feedingstuffs which have undergone radioactive contamination to be made the 
subject of unilateral national measures.”39
Over the ensuing years, the European Parliament has had some success none-
theless in this respect, but it is restricted to very few decisions.40
An interesting case in this context may also be the ECJ judgment in C-490/10 of 
06.02.2012 concerning an Action for annulment in view of Regulation (EU, EUR-
ATOM) No. 617/2010, especially concerning the notification to the Commission 
of investment projects in energy infrastructure within the European Union and 
the choice of the legal basis of this Regulation, meaning Article 187 EURATOM 
versus Article 337 TFEU, in view of Article 194 TFEU. 
The case concerned an action introduced in October 2010 by the European Par-
liament against the Council, where France and the Commission intervened on the 
side of the Council. The Parliament demanded the ECJ to annul Council Regulation 
(EU, EURATOM) No 617/2010 of 24 June 2010 concerning the notification to the 
Commission of investment projects in energy infrastructure within the European 
Union and repealing Regulation (EC) No 736/96.41 In 2009, the Commission had 
39 CASE C-70/88, JUDGMENT OF 4. 10. 1991 Para 17.
40 Recently, the European Parliament voted a resolution of 13 September 2017 on the 
draft Commission Implementing Regulation amending Commission Implementing 
Regulation (EU) 2016/6 as regards feed and food subjected to special conditions gov-
erning the import of feed and food originating in or consigned from Japan following 
the accident at the Fukushima nuclear power station (D051561/01 – 2017/2837(RSP)) 
urging the Commission not to loosen restrictions on imports. The Parliament argues 
that it is very difficult to verify whether the measures proposed are sufficient to protect 
the health of Union citizen, especially in view that the responsible Japanese utility Tokyo 
Electric Power Company (TEPCO) has officially requested permission from the Japa-
nese Government to dump into the Pacific Ocean almost one million tonnes of highly 
radioactive water related to the clean-up of the nuclear accident. The Parliament sees 
the draft Commission implementing regulation inconsistent with Union law in that 
it is not compatible with the aim and general principles laid down in Regulation (EC) 
No 178/2002 of providing the basis for ensuring a high level of protection of human 
life and health, animal health and welfare, the environment and consumer interests; 
the Parliament calls on the Commission to go back to the drawing board and present 
together with a new proposal.
41 Council Regulation (EU, EURATOM) No 617/2010 of 24 June 2010 concerning the 
notification to the Commission of investment projects in energy infrastructure within 
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submitted a proposal for this Regulation to the Council. The proposal was based on 
Art. 284 EC and Art. 187 EURATOM.42 These provisions did not provide for any 
involvement by the Parliament in the decision–making process, but the Council 
decided to consult it as it had done when adopting previous Regulation No 736/96. 
Since the entering into force of the Lisbon treaty in December 2009, the European 
Parliament asked for a review of the legal basis for the draft Council Regulation so 
that it would henceforward be based on Art. 194 TFEU43, instead of Art. 284 EC 
(which became Art. 337 TFEU) and Art. 187 EURATOM.
The Parliament argued that Art. 337 TFEU and Art. 187 EURATOM were now 
substituted with Art. 194 (1) and (2) TFEU as legal basis to be observed for this draft 
Regulation. The Regulation focused on data collection in the energy market and the 
newly introduced shared responsibility for energy under the Lisbon treaty would 
make Art. 194 TFEU the relevant bases thus ensuring the Parliament’s legislative 
role as defined in the new co-decision procedure. The Court’s judgment not only 
agreed with the view of the European Parliament, that Art. 187 EURATOM would 
in this case not take precedence over Art. 194, but that the latter remained the sole 
basis for the envisaged Regulation, underlining that the contested Regulation con-
the European Union and repealing Regulation (EC) No 736/96 (OJ L 180, 15.7.2010, p. 7).
42 Art. 187 EURATOM: “The Commission may, within the limits and under the condi-
tions laid down by the Council in accordance with the provision of this Treaty, collect 
any information and carry out any checks required for the performance of the tasks 
entrusted to it.”
43 Art. 194 TFEU: 
 “1. In the context of the establishment and functioning of the internal market and with 
regard for the need to preserve and improve the environment, Union policy on energy 
shall aim, in a spirit of solidarity between Member States, to:
 (a) ensure the functioning of the energy market;
 (b) ensure security of energy supply in the Union;
 (c) promote energy efficiency and energy saving and the development of new and re-
newable forms of energy; and (d) promote the interconnection of energy networks.
 2. Without prejudice to the application of other provisions of the Treaties, the European 
Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, 
shall establish the measures necessary to achieve the objectives in paragraph 1. Such 
measures shall be adopted after consultation of the Economic and Social Committee 
and the Committee of the Regions.
 Such measures shall not affect a Member State’s right to determine the conditions for 
exploiting its energy resources, its choice between different energy sources and the 
general structure of its energy supply, without prejudice to Art. 192(2)(c).
 3. By way of derogation from paragraph 2, the Council, acting in accordance with a special 
legislative procedure, shall unanimously and after consulting the European Parliament, 
establish the measures referred to therein when they are primarily of a fiscal nature.”
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cerns the notification by all Member States of the aggregated data and information 
relating to all investment projects in energy infrastructure.44
The Court came to the conclusion, that it is “appropriate to find that the contested 
[R]egulation, in so far as it was based on Art. 187 EURATOM, was adopted on an 
incorrect legal basis and it should have been based solely on Art. 194(2) TFEU”.45 
The Court annulled the contested Regulation on this ground.
This leads to the conclusion that EURATOM is “lex specialis” only for those 
objectives which are explicitly and specially regulated by it and only if clear re-
strictions respectively excluding nuclear matters from general energy policy or 
other policy fields in the Union with consequence to the energy sector are outlined. 
The European Parliament has the right for co-decision in areas that touch upon 
EURATOM issues when the legal basis is predominately the general TFEU. But the 
conflict often arises about the legal bases for energy legislation which affects nuclear 
matters in the energy market. In a recent decision by the ECJ it did not follow a 
similar annulment request by the European Parliament concerning the legal basis 
in view of Council Directive 2013/51/EURATOM46 on the protection of the health 
of the general public with regard to radioactive substances in water intended for 
human consumption, underlining EURATOM’s specific sphere of application.47 The 
choice of legal basis in this case excluded application of the co-decision procedure 
and thus any substantial involvement of the Parliament.
As has been outlined, the main provisions of the EURATOM Treaty have never 
been amended since it entered into force on 1 January 1958, which is a sign of a 
monolithic or static situation, strangely detached from national energy reality and 
the European objective of a single European Energy market, which was defined in 
the mid-eighties of last century. 
Clear sign of this stagnation is the limited number of judgments of the European 
Court of Justice on cases with respect to the EURATOM Treaty, most concerning 
violation of the safeguard provisions under Art. 77. EURATOM. Based on specific 
research by Wolf, there seem to be no more than 31 cases until 2009 before the 
European Court of Justice which have secondary legislation based on EURATOM 
as its object.48 Most of these cases refer to infringement problems in view of the 
44 ECJ, C-490/10, European Parliament v. Council, para 84.
45 Ibid, Para 86.
46 O.J. L296/12/2013.
47 Case C 48/14, action for annulment under Art. 263 TFEU and Art. 106a(1) EA brought 
on 30 January 2014, European Parliament v. Council.
48 See Wolf, Sebastian (2011): EURATOM Before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal 
Non-Integration, European Integration online Papers (EIoP), Vol. 15, Art. 10 http://
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possibilities for sanctions foreseen under Art. 83 EURATOM. Nonetheless, in 
contrast to the above, the European Court of Justice has intervened several times 
to deny a broad range of applications of EURATOM’s basic articles. 
7 Secondary legislation as timid opening towards  
a broader scope 
The inability of the European Member States to produce a common European ap-
proach rather than individual national mandates can also be seen in the difficulties 
of the European Commission when proposing legislation under the EURATOM 
Treaty, especially concerning nuclear safety. Countries with a plan to phase out 
nuclear, such as Germany, are reluctant to cede too much control to the Commu-
nity because they fear a dilution of their safety standards following a European 
compromise and therefore remain adamant that the key authority in respect to 
nuclear power is the nation and not the Community. On the other side are Mem-
ber States seeming reluctant to any interference when calling a different security 
standard than their own. Jointly, this situation creates a very hesitant European 
policy approach to EURATOM-based secondary legislation. 
Major secondary legislative work is carried out on the basis of Art. 30 EUR-
ATOM. Art. 30 and Art. 31 provide for the establishment in the Community of 
basic standards for the protection of the health of workers and the general public 
against the dangers arising from ionising radiations. Art. 30 provides a definition 
of the basic standards and Art. 31 describes the procedure for the adoption and 
enforcement of those standards.
Art. 33 EURATOM particularly states:
“Each Member State shall lay down the appropriate provisions, whether by legislation, 
regulation or administrative action, to ensure compliance with the basic standards 
which have been established and shall take the necessary measures with regard to 
teaching, education and vocational training.
The Commission shall make appropriate recommendations for harmonising the 
provisions applicable in this field in the Member States.
eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2011-010a.htm, page 9: “The result of this research for data is a 
compilation of only 30 cases which mainly concern EAEC primary and/or secondary 
law (see Table 2 for the full list). Given the sheer mass of ECJ cases, this small number 
already can be interpreted as another indicator of the rather meagre legal development 
of the EAEC.”
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To this end, the Member States shall communicate to the Commission the provisions 
applicable at the date of entry into force of this Treaty and any subsequent draft 
provisions of the same kind.”
The following examples suggest a move towards a more European approach to 
regulation under EURATOM:
7.1 Directive 2009/71/EURATOM establishing a Community 
framework for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations 
and its amendment, Directive 2014/87/EURATOM 
It should be underlined that the European Commission over the years has worked 
intensively to reach a high safety standard within EURATOM to improve safety in 
the respective Member States. This initiative is once again limited by the EURATOM 
provisions which state that the responsibility for the safety of nuclear installations is 
solely attributed to the Member States and the nuclear utilities and other respective 
license holders on their territory. 
Subparagraph (b) of Art. 2 EURATOM provides for the establishment of uniform 
safety standards to protect the health of workers and of the general public. Art. 30 
EURATOM defines “basic standards” for the protection of the health of workers 
and the general public against the dangers arising from ionising radiations.
Pursuant to Art. 30, Art. 31 and Art. 218 EURATOM, the Community initially, 
in 1959, issued basic safety standards with Council Directive of 2 February 1959 
laying down rules and standards for the protection of the health of workers and the 
general public against the dangers arising from ionising radiations.49 
These standard rules were revised fairly regularly: in 1962 by Directive of 5 
March 1962, in 1966 by Council Directive 66/45/EURATOM, in 1976 by Council 
Directive 76/579/EURATOM, in 1979 by Council Directive 79/343/EURATOM, 
in 1980 by Council Directive 80/836/EURATOM and in 1984 by Council Directive 
84/467/EURATOM. 
In 1996 the basic standards Directives as revised were replaced by Council Di-
rective 96/29/EURATOM of 13 May 1996 laying down basic safety standards for 
the protection of the health of workers and the general public against the dangers 
arising from ionising radiation (‘the Basic Standards Directive’)50 which repealed 
the previously applicable rules as of 1 of May 2000. 
49 OJ, English Special Edition, 1959–1962, (I), p. 7.
50 OJ 1996, L 158, p. 1.
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Nuclear Safety Directive 2009/71/EC regulates that the Member States are 
required to submit certain practices involving a hazard from ionising radiation 
to a system of reporting and prior authorisation and to ensure protection from 
radiation for the population in normal circumstances.
The Directive comprises provisions for the establishment of a national legisla-
tive and regulatory framework for nuclear safety of nuclear installations, for the 
organisation, duties and responsibilities of the competent regulatory authorities, for 
the obligations of the licence-holders, for the education and training of all parties’ 
staff and for the provision of information to the public. In terms of the organisation 
of the competent regulatory authorities, it constitutes the separation principle, 
which indicates that the competent regulatory authorities must be functionally 
separate from any other body or organisation concerned with the promotion or 
utilisation of nuclear energy. In addition, Member States shall arrange at least every 
ten years for periodic self-assessments of their national framework and competent 
regulatory authorities and invite an international peer review of relevant segments 
of their national framework and/or authorities. Outcomes of any peer review shall 
be reported to the Member States and the Commission. 
Recital 9 of the Directive underlined that each Member State may decide on its 
energy mix in strict accordance with its relevant national policies and Recital 8 
again put forward the principle of national responsibility as well as the principle of 
the prime responsibility of the respective license holder under national supervision.
7.2 A long and winding road towards the 2009/71/EURATOM 
Directive of the Council 
Again, the road towards Council Directive 2009/71/EURATOM was littered with 
conflicts between the Commission and the Council, with Member States not wishing 
to lose any sovereignty over their nuclear energy and their power of oversight there 
over beyond what could not be denied under EURATOM. 
The Commission started to work on a proposal for a joint Nuclear Safety regime 
in 200351 which it finally withdrew in 2010, having given up on finding a compro-
mise with the Council.52 
Council Directive 2009/71/EURATOM transfers major provisions from the 
International Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS) of July 1994 and further safety 
51 COM (2003) 32 – 1: Proposal for a Council (EURATOM) Directive Setting out basic 
obligations and general principles on the safety of nuclear installations.
52 Withdrawal of obsolete Commission Proposals (2010/C 252/04), O.J. C 252/7, 18.9.2010.
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principles into European EURATOM legislation. Its basic structur mirrors the 
Convention’s.53The CNS entered into force the year of and as result of the Chernobyl 
nuclear disaster and is designed to protect individuals, society and the environment 
from harm by establishing and maintaining effective defences against radiological 
hazards in nuclear installations. As sharply outlined by Dehousse, the CNS, despite 
the catastrophe in the middle of the European continent, does not contain any 
mandatory provisions for safety control.54 
Directive 2009/71/EC could not have seen the light of day, especially as unanimous 
as it was actually voted in the Council, without a preceding permissive decision by 
the European Court of Justice in 2002. It was the ECJ that laid the ground for the 
Commission’s legal initiatives in this field. 
In the background of the specific conflict between the Commission and the 
Council before the ECJ was Council action of December 1998 that declared the 
accession of EURATOM to the CNS but also a reservation of the applicability of 
some provisions of the CNS for EURATOM. The Commission had proposed the 
original text of such restricting declaration but with far fewer reservations. 
The possibility for the Community to derogate from certain provisions of the 
CNS follows from Art. 30,para. 4 CNS. Para. 4 regulates accession to the treaty for 
inter alia regional organisations. These organisations, reflecting their mandate, shall 
under Art. 30, para. 4 (iii) CNS “communicate to the Depositary (…) a declaration 
indicating which States are members thereof, which articles of this Convention apply 
to it, and the extent of its competence in the field covered by those articles”.
The Commission requested annulment of that specific part of the Council 
declaration detailing the reservation to the IAEA “on the ground that, by limiting 
the scope of that paragraph, the Council sought to establish that the Community’s 
competence in the fields covered by the Convention is limited to Articles 15 and 16(2) 
thereof and does not extend to the fields covered by Articles 1 to 5, 7, 14, 16(1) and 
(3) and 17 to 19 of the Convention.”55
The Commission argued that the third paragraph of the declaration infringes 
Community law in that it does not refer to all the competences of the EURATOM 
Community in the fields covered by the Convention and that that provision, and not 
53 Dehousse Franklin, The Nuclear Safety Framework in the European Union after 
Fukushima, Egmont Paper 73 (2014), p. 17; Dehousse saw the following reason for the 
similarity of structure: “This was meant to distinguish clearly between the objectives 
and the obligations of the Member States. This, however, has not been fully achieved 
since there is an ‘essential overlap between the scope of application, the definitions and 
the operational articles.”
54 Dehousse, Franklin, ibid. p. 15.
55 ECJ Case C-29/99, para 2 ( I-11283).
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the whole decision of accession to the CNS, should therefore be annulled based on 
Art. 146 EURATOM. The European Commission accepted the limited competence 
of EURATOM but maintained that even if EURATOM would not have a specific 
right for regulation on the opening and operation of nuclear installations, it is 
competent concerning the risk resulting from the operation of such installations. 
The Council kept its positions of national sovereignty as principle where no specific 
rules were established in the EURATOM treaty and underlined its view that “no 
article of the EURATOM Treaty bestows on the Community the competence to regulate 
the opening and operation of nuclear facilities. That competence was retained by the 
Member States. The Community would have competence only when it concerns the 
protection of the general public, and in consequence all the articles of the Convention 
which concern that protection were explicitly referred to in the above declaration”.56
Council and Commission were in agreement that the Community possesses 
shared competences to take, subject to Art. 15 CNS, the appropriate steps to ensure 
that in all operational states that the exposure of the workers and the public to 
radiation caused by a nuclear installation be kept as low as reasonably achievable 
and that no individual be exposed to radiation doses which exceeds prescribed 
national dose limits. The same agreement concerned Art. 16(2) of the Convention 
and its details on the appropriate steps to ensure that in an emergency where ra-
diation could endanger the population, the competent authorities of the States in 
the vicinity of the nuclear installation are provided with appropriate information 
for emergency planning and response.
In essence, the Court had to judge whether the Community possesses other 
competences in the fields covered by the Convention on Nuclear Safety.
The Court underlined that “the EURATOM Treaty does not contain a title relating 
to installations for the production of nuclear energy”, and needed to review if an 
interpretation of the provisions in Title II, Chapter 3 (Health and Safety) EURAT-
OM could lead to a broader competence for the Community then authorised by 
the Council in its limiting decision.57 
Interestingly, the Court upheld this definition and exercised of a broad inter-
pretation of EURATOM.58 The Court referred to its previous judgements under 
EURATOM. According to the Court, such interpretation had to be carried out in 
the light of the objective set out in the preamble to the EURATOM Treaty to “create 
the conditions of safety necessary to eliminate hazards to the life and health of the 
public”. The Court took into account the fact that Title II, Chapter 3 of the EUR-
56 Case C 29/99, para 65 ( I-11305).
57 Case C 29/99, para 74 (I-11221).
58 Case C 29/99, para 78 (I-11308).
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ATOM Treaty implements Art. 2(b), which instructs the Community to establish 
uniform safety standards to protect the health of workers and of the general public 
and ensure that they are applied. The Court deduced from this that the objective for 
protection cannot be achieved without controlling the sources of harmful radiation. 
But it also outlined that on “the other hand, the Community’s activities in the field of 
health protection must observe the competences of the Member States defined, inter 
alia, in Title II, Chapter 3, of the EURATOM Treaty itself ”.59
In the end, the Council correctly introduced a new reservation to the IAEA, 
reflecting the Court’s judgment.60
In the end of 2008, the Commission started to rekindle a legislative process 
for a nuclear safety Directive.61 For the Commission, this revised proposal aimed 
to build on: “a) the technical work of the Western European Nuclear Regulators 
Association (WENRA) completed in 2006 for existing nuclear installations, with 
the participation of all European nuclear safety regulators; b) the principle that 
only strong and independent regulators can ensure the continued safe operation of 
the nuclear power plants in the EU; c) enshrining in the Community legislation the 
principles of the main international instruments available, namely the Convention 
on Nuclear Safety (CNS), concluded under the auspices of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA), and the safety work carried out by the IAEA”.62 
59 Case C-29/99, para 75 (I-11307).
60 See IAEA, “Declaration by the European Atomic Energy Community according to the 
provisions of Art. 30 (4)(iii) of the Convention on Nuclear Safety:
 “The Community declares that Articles 15 and 16 (2) of the Convention apply to it. 
Articles 1 to 5,
 Art. 7 (1), Art. 14 (ii) and Articles 20 to 35 also apply to it only in so far as the fields 
covered by
 Articles 15 and 16 (2) are concerned. The Community possesses competence, shared 
with the above-mentioned Member States, in the fields covered by Articles 15 and 16 
(2) of the Convention as provided for by the Treaty establishing the European Atomic 
Energy Community in Art. 2 (b) and the relevant Articles of Title II, Chapter 3 entitled 
“Health and Safety”.” 
61 COM(2008) 790 final Proposal for a COUNCIL DIRECTIVE (EURATOM) setting up 
a Community framework for nuclear safety: “The present draft Directive setting up a 
Community framework on Nuclear Safety aims at restarting the process of establishing 
a common EU framework on nuclear safety, by updatingand replacing the Commission 
proposal for a Council (EURATOM) Directive setting out basicobligations and general 
principles on the safety of nuclear installations, included in the initialNuclear Safety 
Package.”(of 2003).
62 See EU Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive (Euratom) setting up a Community 
framework for nuclear safety, Brussels, 26.11.2008, COM(2008) 790 final, Explanatory 
memorandum, page 2
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The final text of Directive 2009/71/EC ultimately adopted by the Council echoed 
the fact that Europe, with this Directive and despite following the structure of the 
CNS, remained below the rules on nuclear safety under the IAEA’s Nuclear Safety 
Convention. The ball remained strictly in national courts. 
The Directive entered into force on 22 July 2009 and all EU Member States had 
till 22 July 2011 to implement its contents in to their national laws. Member States’ 
first reports on the implementation of the Directive were to be submitted to the 
Commission by 22 July 2014. 
The Fukushima nuclear accident in March 2011 strengthened the initiatives of 
the European Commission to increase security and safety standards in the Union, 
but, again there was no change towards a unified European stance or interest on 
nuclear. The amending of Directive 2014/87/EURATOM reviewed the EU framework 
on nuclear safety in the light of the Fukushima accident in 2011 and the findings 
of the Commission triggered EU stress test exercises. 
The amended Directive, which came into force in August 2014 and which had 
to be transposed into Member States’ legislation by 2017, reinforces the provisions 
of the existing Directive.63
Five years after the Fukushima disaster, during a scientific workshop at Cam-
bridge, Ludo Veuchelen, who had worked during his career at the Belgian Nuclear 
Research Centre and was Chairman of the Working Group on Safety and Regu-
lation of the International Nuclear Law Association, criticised the entanglement 
of EURATOM with industry and underlined that the organisation had too much 
power for a single body. He added that a self-fulfilling interest of the civil servants 
working under EURATOM was propping up the system. He deplored e.g. a lack of 
democracy (control) and a lack of decisive power and control by the EU Parliament.64
63 The main objectives envisaged were :a stronger role and clearer independence of the 
national regulatory authority; the introduction of an EU-wide nuclear safety objective, 
focusing on accident prevention and risks of significant radioactive releases; a European 
system of regular topical peer reviews and regular safety reassessments of nuclear in-
stallations; more transparency on nuclear safety matters (information and cooperation 
obligations and involvement of the public) enhancing accident management and on-site 
emergency preparedness and response arrangements and procedures; promoting nuclear 
safety culture in the workplace.
64 Report (J. WEITZDÖRFER, Fukushima Five Years On – Legal Fallout in Japan, Lessons 




8 Accessing to the Union without access to EURATOM- 
Leaving EURATOM without leaving the EU Treaty- 
BREXIT as game changer?
On 1 January 1973 the United Kingdom (UK) became member of the EURATOM, 
and of the European Community. 
As has been outlined above, EURATOM and the Communities shared some 
institutions since 1958. In 1967, the so-called Merger Treaty65 brought together the 
separate Councils’ and Commissions’ institutions which the three Communities 
(the EEC, EURATOM and the European Coal and Steel Community) had kept 
separated until then.
Since that point, the provisions on the institutions in the EURATOM Treaty 
have been updated every time the corresponding rules in the EEC Treaty were 
amended. Those institutional rules are now split between the TFEU and the TEU. 
The constitutional link is now established in Art. 106a of the EURATOM Treaty, 
which was inserted by the Treaty of Lisbon.
Subparagraph 1 of this Article reads as follows: 
“1. Article 7, Articles 13 to 19, Article 48(2) to (5), and Articles 49 and 50 of the Treaty 
on European Union, and Article 15, Articles 223 to 236, Articles 237 to 244, Article 
245, Articles 246 to 270, Article 272, 273 and 274, Articles 277 to 281, Articles 285 
to 304, Articles 310 to 320, Articles 322 to 325 and Articles 336, 342 and 344 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and the Protocol on Transitional 
Provisions, shall apply to this Treaty.”
8.1 Exit à la carte- the process before Lisbon
Over the last decades, the European Commission clearly denied the possibility that 
any nation in Europe could access full membership of the Union if they do not also 
accede to the EURATOM Treaty. 
In a request for a written answer, MEP Franz Obermayr (NI) in 2010 had asked 
the EU Commission inter alia as follows: 
“1. According to an Austrian report commissioned by the Austrian Greens before the 
1994 referendum on membership of the EU, it would not be necessary for Austria to 
65 Treaty establishing a Single Council and a Single Commission of the European Com-
munities (8 April 1965), signed in Brussels on 8 April 1965 entered into force on 1 July 
1967.
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join EURATOM if it acceded to the European Union. Can the Commission endorse 
this report from the point of view of European law?(...)
3. Since the Lisbon Treaty entered into force, a new legal situation has arisen as regards 
the possibility of withdrawing from EURATOM: as Article 49a of the Lisbon Treaty66 
also applies to the EURATOM Treaty, it must be possible de jure for an EU Member 
State to withdraw unilaterally from it. Does the Commission anticipate that one or 
more Member States will withdraw de facto? What are the practical arrangements 
for implementing this clause?”67
In his answer, Commissioner Oettinger outlined on behalf of the Commission that 
no path would have been open for Austria e.g. to access the EU without acceding 
EURATOM in answering just with “No.” to the above question of the MEP. On 
selective withdrawal from EURATOM the Commission was a bit more detailed 
in its answer. Overall, the EU Commission is of the opinion that a Member State 
cannot withdraw just from the EURATOM Treaty under the new provisions of 
Art. 50 Lisbon Treaty.68
66 He seems to refer to Art. 50 Lisbon Treaty: 
 “1. Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its 
own constitutional requirements.
 2. A Member State which decides to withdraw shall notify the European Council of its 
intention. In the light of the guidelines provided by the European Council, the Union 
shall negotiate and conclude an agreement with that State, setting out the arrangements 
for its withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its future relationship with the 
Union. That agreement shall be negotiated in accordance with Art. 218(3) of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union. It shall be concluded on behalf of the Union by 
the Council, acting by a qualified majority, after obtaining the consent of the European 
Parliament.
 3. The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date of entry into 
force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the notification referred 
to in paragraph 2, unless the European Council, in agreement with the Member State 
concerned, unanimously decides to extend this period.
 4. For the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 3, the member of the European Council or of 
the Council representing the withdrawing Member State shall not participate in the 
discussions of the European Council or Council or in decisions concerning it.
 A qualified majority shall be defined in accordance with Art. 238(3)(b) of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union.
 5. If a State which has withdrawn from the Union asks to rejoin, its request shall be 
subject to the procedure referred to in Art. 49.”
67 E-8740/2010, Parliamentary questions 26 October 2010 – Question for written answer 
to the Commission/Rule 117,Franz Obermayr (NI)
68 E-8740/2010 6 December 201; Answer given by Mr Oettinger on behalf of the Commis-
sion: “1. No…. 3. According to Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union, any Member 
State may decide to withdraw from the European Union in accordance with its own 
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It seems safe to say that the Union is of the opinion that one can only accede 
to all treaties, meaning that a departure from the Union membership invokes a 
dissolution from all treaties including the EURATOM treaty. A ‘half divorce’ does 
not appear to be an option.
In September 2002, the Secretariat of the Convention sent a discussion paper to 
its Praesidium (under former French President Giscard d’Estaing) for information 
concerning the beginning of the “simplification procedure”. Some Member States 
did not want to see the occasion used to reopen discussion on matters that were 
firmly established: EURATOM was in this respect a particularly sensitive point.
In March 2003, the Praesidium published a paper ‘Suggested approach for the 
EURATOM Treaty’. This approach explicitly did not think it “appropriate” to be-
come involved in an operation “to amend the EURATOM Treaty substantially”.69The 
Praesidium instead favored amendment of the EURATOM Treaty allowing it to 
continue to exist independently.
8.2 The European Parliament calling for sunset 
In 2002, the European Parliament passed a resolution that included a call for the 
EURATOM Treaty to be abandoned by 2007. If this proposal were adopted, it would 
have enabled the Convention and its subsequent Intergovernmental Conference to 
acknowledge that a fundamental reform of EURATOM was necessary but allowing 
more time for the process of assessing which parts of the Treaty should remain and 
in what framework.70
In 2003, several Convention Members called for more reform:
constitutional requirements. This Article also applies to the European Atomic Energy 
Community (Article 106a EURATOM Treaty). The EU and EURATOM share the same 
institutions, the same budget and staff, and are designed to function together with the 
same number of Member States. Hence, there appears to be no ‘à la carte’ withdrawal 
only from the EURATOM Treaty…”.
69 See: Fouquet, Doerte, Froggatt, Antony” Options for the EURATOM Treaty in the 
framework of a New European Constitution” May 2003.
70 See: Barnes, Pamela, Going forward into the past: the resurrection of the EURATOM 
Treaty, EUSA 0507 EURATOM Treaty, Tenth Biennial International Conference, Mon-
treal, Canada, May 17th-19th 2007
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“We wish to make the following recommendations to the Convention in relation to 
the EURATOM Treaty:
The Convention has already achieved consensus on the following points: There should 
be a single constitution treaty. The Union should have a single legal personality and 
a single institutional structure.
Therefore it is necessary to repeal the EURATOM Treaty. We argue here that it is now 
appropriate -to abolish the ‘special economic zone’ that the EURATOM created, and 
to respect the principles of fair competition and the creation of a level playing field 
for different energy sources, thereby ceasing to give nuclear energy undue advantages 
over its rivals. We offer an analysis of the present functions of EURATOM and make 
proposals concerning their transposition into the Part Two of the Constitution (see 
Praesidium preliminary draft Constitutional Treaty (CONV 369/02)), while proposing 
that others be simply repealed.“71
8.3 The declaration of reform-minded Member States
The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe as signed in Rome on 29 October 
2004 and published in the Official Journal of the European Union on 16 December 
2004 contained an important formal declaration which unfortunately subsequently 
fell into oblivion, until today. Declaration No. 54 made by the Federal Republic of 
Germany, Ireland, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Austria and the King-
dom of Sweden and annexed to the Final Act of the Intergovernmental Conference 
which adopted the Treaty of Lisbon, signed on 13 December 2007; reads as follows:
“Germany, Ireland, Hungary, Austria and Sweden note that the core provisions of 
the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community have not been sub-
stantially amended since its entry into force and need to be brought up to date. They 
therefore support the idea of a Conference of the Representatives of the Governments 
of the Member States, which should be convened as soon as possible”.72
Brexit may be the right moment to rekindle this initiative. 
71 Official statement by Convention Members: Marie Nagy, Renee Wagner, Neil Mac-
Cormick Contribution to the Convention; THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION –THE 
SECRETARIAT -Brussels, 18 February 2003-, CONV 563/03 – Contribution 250.
72 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 26.10.2012, 
Official Journal of the European Union, C 326/47.
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8.4 The Reform of EURATOM debate- to be rekindled in the 
light of BREXIT 
Art. 208 EURATOM stipulates that the treaty is concluded for an unlimited period.
The questions of whether EURATOM is an “eternal treaty” or if it can be phased 
out in view of a changed energy system, or if it should at least be adapted to the 
current reality of the energy market and be stripped of a certain allegiance to and 
promotion of nuclear technology may be rekindled by the current BREXIT debate. 
For such a move, Member States would finally need to commit to a new, specific 
EURATOM reform convention process.
As the Nuclear Monitor described in 2007: “Obviously, EURATOM was meant 
to be for eternity. And its fathers were not even aware of nuclear’s eternity problem 
since there are no explicit provisions for nuclear waste in the EURATOM Treaty!”73
8.5 The Withdrawal option since Lisbon
Art. 50 of the Treaty on European Union sets out the procedure for a Member 
State to withdraw from the European Union should it wish to do so. It was first 
introduced by the Lisbon Treaty in 2007.
The corresponding Article, integrating e.g. Art. 50 TEU as also applicable for 
EURATOM, is Art. 106a EURATOM, introduced under Title III (Institutional 
and financial provisions) 
In general, a Member State must notify the European Council of its intention 
to leave. The withdrawal agreement must be negotiated in accordance with Art. 
218 (3) TFEU.
The UK government in its White Paper on BREXIT in February 2017 outlined 
very briefly that for the government, invoking Art. 50 TEU would also mean in-
voking the exit from EURATOM: 
“When we invoke Article 50, we will be leaving EURATOM as well as the EU. Although 
EURATOM was established in a treaty separate to EU agreements and treaties, it uses 
the same institutions as the EU including the Commission, Council of Ministers and 
the Court of Justice. The European Union (Amendment) Act 2008 makes clear that, 
in UK law, references to the EU include EURATOM. The EURATOM Treaty imports 
Article 50 into its provisions….As the Prime Minister has said, we want to collaborate 
with our EU partners on matters relating to science and research, and nuclear energy 
is a key part of this. So our precise relationship with EURATOM, and the means by 
73 See EURATOM: Countries free to step out, Nuclear Monitor Issue: #658, 13/07/2007.
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which we cooperate on nuclear matters, will be a matter for the negotiations – but it 
is an important priority for us – the nuclear industry remains of key strategic impor-
tance to the UK and leaving EURATOM does not affect our clear aim of seeking to 
maintain close and effective arrangements for civil nuclear cooperation, safeguards, 
safety and trade with Europe and our international partners. Furthermore, the UK 
is a world leader in nuclear research and development and there is no intention to 
reduce our ambition in this important area. The UK fully recognises the importance 
of international collaboration in nuclear research and development and we will ensure 
this continues by seeking alternative arrangements.”74
The United Kingdom’s White Paper on the exit from and new partnership with the 
EU says that the European Union (Amendment) Act 2008 “makes clear” that, in 
UK law, references to the EU include EURATOM. The EURATOM Treaty “imports 
Article 50 into its provisions”. 
The tasks for the UK when leaving the Union and EURATOM are enormous: 
Falling out of all European funded or co-funded research is one issue. UK needs to 
set up a new national regulatory system and re-negotiate contracts to ensure supply 
of nuclear fuel, ores and fissile materials, not only for nuclear energy and indirectly 
military use,75 but also for disrupting time-sensitive supply chains, which transit 
radioisotopes used in the diagnosis and treatment of cancer. Around 500,000 scans 
are performed in the UK every year using imported radioisotopes. 
The UK does not have any reactors capable of producing these isotopes and at 
present must rely on a continuous supply from reactors in France, Belgium and 
the Netherlands.
This situation may force Member States to decide to use the task of separation 
from the UK in order to straighten out issues in EURATOM by e.g. increased 
democratisation of EURATOM, the need of a level playing field in the internal 
energy market, clarity on responsibility over the entire life cycle of an installation, 
full responsibility of the nuclear industry in case of accidents, phase out of old 
nuclear power plants in a coordinated and secure fashion, waste management and 
overall the urgent recognition that there is no common interest in promoting new 
nuclear energy in the Union.
74 HM Government, The United Kingdom’s exit from and new partnership with the Eu-
ropean Union, February 2017, page 44
75 At present, UK maintains a fleet of four nuclear-armed submarines in Scotland, each 
carrying 16 Trident missiles. The UK parliament voted in 2016 to overhaul its nuclear 
forces and for building four new nuclear-powered submarines to carry US Trident 
missiles armed with modernized nuclear warheads for the next decades. At present UK 
has approx. 215 warheads; see
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9 The subsidy question – or how to shelter any public 
nuclear investment in a liberalised market?
9.1 The Hinkley Point C State Aid case
At present, Austria, supported by Luxemburg, pleaded to the European Court76 to 
annul a positive state aid decision of the European Commission authorising sub-
stantial state aid for a new nuclear power plant at Hinkley Point in Somerset.77 The 
case is now in appeal before the European Court of Justice (ECJ). There are several 
grounds on which Austria is fighting the decision of the European Commission. I 
will concentrate on Austria’s argument on the notion that the promotion of nuclear 
power is an objective of Common Interest under EURATOM.
After the preliminary examination of the state aid package, the Commission 
had doubts as to the legality of the aid and opened a formal investigation.78 But 
in October 2014, almost a year later, after intense back and forth between many 
stakeholders and the Commission (e.g. from EU independent power producers 
many using renewable energy as well as traders79) the, exiting, Commission under 
President Barroso gave a positive decision.80 
The most pertinent argument of the European Commission to allow the UK 
subsidy regime, its Feed-in Tariff option via the so-called Contract for Difference 
for Nuclear, combined with state guarantees, was in its view due to the fact that, 
EURATOM with its technology promotion approach in Article 2, describes a com-
mon European interest in the promotion of building new nuclear power stations. 
76 Austria v Commission Case T-356/15
77 State Aid procedure SA. 34947 (2013/C) (ex 2013/N) – United Kingdom- Investment 
Contract (early Contract for Difference) for the Hinkley Point C New Nuclear Power 
Station
78 Commission Decisions State aid SA. 34947 to initiate the formal investigation procedure, 
Brussels, 18.12.2013 C(2013) 9073 final
79 In view of EURATOM, their main arguments are summarised by the Commission as 
follows: “Several parties commented that the aid measures are incompatible with the 
Altmark criteria, whereby electricity generation would be a standard economic activity 
and thus nuclear energy should compete with other electricity sources in a liberalised 
internal electricity market; the measure lacks an objective of common interest; there 
appears to be no objective criterion for justifying the duration of 35 years; it treats differ-
ently nuclear power and renewable energy sources; it is based on unknown parameters 
and there is a lack of a cost-benefit analysis.” See Decision Brussels, 08.10.2014C(2014) 
7142 final cor
80 Press Release IP/14/1093, full text of decision published in 2015:O.J. L 109/44 of 28.04.2015 
.
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In view of the above analysis and in view of the arguments put forward by 
Austria and supported by Luxembourg before the Court, this Commission’s view 
does not reflect the reality of the development under the EURATOM treaty and 
its limitations versus the development of an internal energy market. The Europe-
an Commission takes the position that the EURATOM Treaty establishes in Art. 
2(c) that the Community shall “ facilitate investment and ensure, particularly by 
encouraging ventures on the part of undertakings, the establishment of the basic 
installations necessary for the development of nuclear energy in the Community” 
and points out to Art. 40 EURATOM which envisages the Community publishing 
of illustrative programs “to stimulate investment, indicating production targets”.
The Commission correctly describes its obligation under Art.107 TFEU to 
investigate aid granted by Member States that distorts competition or threatens to 
do so. In addition, especially “in the context of liberalised and increasingly compet-
itive markets, the role of State aid control is increasingly important in EU electricity 
markets. The commitment of the European Union to promote investment into nuclear 
must be carried out in ways which do not distort competition.”
In the case of the UK aid mechanisms for Hinkley Point C, the Commission 
concluded that no distortion exists.81 The Commission seems to see itself bound by 
the objectives of EURATOM: “The Commission however accepted that the measure 
was in line with the EURATOM Treaty. As recognised in past Commission decisions, 
the EURATOM Treaty aims at creating the “conditions necessary for the development 
of a powerful nuclear industry, which will provide extensive energy sources.” This 
objective is further reiterated in Art 1 of the EURATOM Treaty, which establishes that 
“it shall be the task of the Community to contribute to the raising of the standard of 
living in the Member States (…) by creating the conditions necessary for the speedy 
establishment and growth of nuclear industries.” On this basis, the EURATOM 
Treaty establishes the EURATOM Community, foreseeing the necessary instruments 
and attribution of responsibilities to achieve these objectives. The Commission must 
ensure that the provisions of this Treaty are applied”.82 
The European General Court recently decided on the annulment plea by Austria. 
and with its judgment in effect underlying that there exists a compelling case to 
reform the EURATOM treaty and to clarify that there is no common interest to 
promote further nuclear power projects in the Union.
It was not only Austria and Luxembourg that addressed the Court over a de-
cision by the EU Commission. Several German communal energy utilities as well 
as an Austrian and a German Green electricity producer and trader introduced an 
81 See Decision Brussels, 08.10.2014C(2014) 7142 final cor 
82 See Decision, Brussels, 08.10.2014C(2014) 7142 final cor, Rn 394 cons. 
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annulment procedure before the European General Court.83 The Court declared 
their case as inadmissible, in line with its (in the majority of cases) restrictive view 
on access to justice for applicants concerning Commission decisions on state aid 
directed to a Member State granting aid to a competitor in the internal energy 
market. This adds to the effect of nuclear being a sheltered species within an in-
ternal EU energy market.
The General Court in its judgment gave full support to the Commission for 
its decision), especially on its points concerning EURATOM Treaty provisions as 
legal bases for the justification of a common European interest under Art. 107 (3) 
(c) TFEU. The General Court supported the assessment of the Commission that 
the state aid measure contributes to the long-term security of supply in particular 
“based on capacity forecasts and the role which Hinkley Point C’s supply of elec-
tricity will play when it is expected to start operating”.
The General Court decided that the Euratom Treaty would underline the pro-
motion of building and operating new nuclear power plants in the general interest, 
and that the authorisation of State aid within this argumentation would also be 
applicable by a Member State even if that public interest of one Member State is 
not shared by all the Member States.84
The General Court followed and supported the views of the Commission and 
the United Kingdom that the Euratom Treaty gives the legal basis for state support 
for the construction and operation of nuclear power stations and this specific UK 
aid package considering that a specific nuclear market failure would allow for aid 
mechanisms in the common interest. 
It remains unclear whether the General Court is trying to enlarge the current 
established definition of “common” or European Union interest under Art. 107 
(3) (c) TFEU in suggesting that the Euratom Treaty, via a quite lenient interpreta-
tion of Art. 2 (c) in Recital 97, equates the building of nuclear power plants as in 
the common interest. This view of the General Court following the Commission 
seems a quite novel interpretation of Art. 2 (c) which from its wording does not at 
all tackle the promotion of investment into nuclear power plants but rather seeks 
to define the performance of the Euratom community as to “facilitate investment 
and ensure, particularly by encouraging ventures on the part of undertakings, the 
83 See Ordinance/Beschluss, Rechtssache T-382/15 Greenpeace Energy eG mit Sitz in Ham-
burg (Deutschland) und die weiteren im Anhang namentlich aufgeführten Klägerinnen 
Prozessbevollmächtigte: Rechtsanwältinnen D. Fouquet und J. Nysten
84 For the following and an analysis in detail see: D. Fouquet, The Hinkley Point C Judgment 
of the General Court in view of a changing internal electricity market RELP Volume 9 
Issue 1 2018, p. 35 cons..
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establishment of the basic installations necessary for the development of nuclear 
energy in the Community”. The Euratom Treaty itself then clarifies what is meant 
with the concrete execution of this investment policy under Art. 40. Specific instru-
ments such as the illustrative programmes under Article 40 and the publication of 
projects under Article 44 are examples but there is no mention to the promotion of 
investment of nuclear power plants. The building of nuclear power plants remained, 
from the first day of the Euratom Treaty, solely in the competence of a sovereign 
national State. The Euratom Treaty, one might say, facilitates the groundwork for 
nuclear research and safety policies but certainly does not establish a Community 
project of investment facilitation into nuclear power plant builds. 
9.2 The European Commission and the Hungarian Nuclear 
Build Case
In the same line as the Hinkley Point case, the Commission has also given a green 
light and recently accepted a state aid package by Hungary for a new Russian-built 
nuclear power reactor in Paks, Hungary. This is all the more astonishing as Russian 
involvement in a large part of European electricity could see, in principle, the same 
security concern arise that the Union has in the field of gas supply from Russia. A 
situation which has led to the adoption of serious safety regulations in the gas field 
in the Union. Moreover, the situation around Rosatom and waste export issues 
from Hungary to a country which seems set to not allow open and access to its 
waste processing and storage facilities adds significantly to security considerations. 
Concerns on security of supply lead the European Union to introduce a specific 
energy security strategy and one of the major reasons for such was its on Russia.85
The Russian Federation and Hungary signed in January 2014 a specific inter-
governmental agreement (IGA) on a nuclear programme.86 Based on the IGA, 
85 The Commission underlines the security issues and needs for a strategy in view of “ 
geopolitical events, i.e. the crisis in Ukraine. Temporary disruptions of gas supplies in 
the winters of 2006 and 2009 already provided a wake-up call for the EU, underlining the 
need of infrastructure development, increased cooperation and of a common European 
energy policy. Since then, the EU has done a lot to strengthen its energy security in terms 
of gas supply. However, the work is not completed yet and further steps are needed. “, 
see European Commission, Memo, Questions and answers on security of energy supply 
in the EU, 28 May 2014
86 Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government 
of Hungary on cooperation on peaceful use of nuclear energy, concluded on 14 January 
2014 and ratified in Hungary by Act II of 2014 of the Hungarian Parliament (2014. évi 
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both countries shall cooperate in the maintenance and further development of the 
current Paks nuclear power plant (Paks NPP). This includes the design, construc-
tion, commissioning and decommissioning of two new power units 5 and 6 with 
VVER (water-cooled water moderated) type reactors with a combined capacity of 
at least 1 000 MW in addition to the existing power units 1–4. The operation of 
units 5 and 6 is intended to compensate for the loss in capacity when units 1–4 (2 
000 MW altogether) retire. Hungary submitted that units 1–4 will be in operation 
until the end of 2032, 2034, 2036 and 2037 respectively, without envisaged prospect 
of further lifetime extension.
However, the Commission seems doomed to repeat the Hinkley Point reasoning 
for the Paks State aid package:
The Commission again underlined that under the EU Treaties, Member States 
are free to determine their energy mix and have the choice to invest in nuclear 
technology. The Commission’s role would only be to ensure that when public funds 
are used to support companies, this is done in line with EU state aid rules which 
aim to preserve competition in the Single Market.
The Commission’s state aid investigation defined and concluded that in view 
of a waver by the Hungarian state to ask for a higher return of its investment than 
a private investor would ask for, the mechanisms constitutes State aid within the 
meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU. These rules require state aid to be limited and 
proportionate to the objectives pursued in order to be approved.
According to the Commission, Hungary had proven that the measure avoids 
undue distortions of the Hungarian energy market. In particular, it has made a 
number of substantial commitments to limit potential distortions of competition87:
II. törvény a Magyarország Kormánya és az Oroszországi Föderáció Kormánya közötti 
nukleáris energia békés célú felhasználása terén folytatandó együttműködésről szóló 
Egyezmény kihirdetéséről), quoted in EU Commission decision COMMISSION DE-
CISION (EU) 2017/2112 of 6 March 2017, published in Official Journal L 317/45 on 1st of 
December 2017 on the measure/aid scheme/State aid SA.38454 — 2015/C (ex 2015/N) 
which Hungary is planning to implement for supporting the development of two new 
nuclear reactors at Paks II nuclear power station
87 The main observations and arguments for the decision of the Commission when it comes 
to proportionality were as follows: 
 To avoid overcompensation of the operator of Paks II, any potential profits earned by 
Paks II will either be used to pay back Hungary for its investment or to cover normal 
costs for the operation of Paks II. Profits cannot be used to reinvest in the construction 
or acquisition of additional generation capacity. To avoid market concentration, Paks II 
will be functionally and legally separated from the operator of the Paks nuclear power 
plant (the incumbent MVM Group) and any of its successors or other state-owned energy 
companies. To ensure market liquidity, Paks II will sell at least 30% of its total electricity 
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In its argumentation during the investigation procedure, Hungary even compared 
the EURATOM Treaty with the former European Coal and Steel (ECSC) Treaty on 
the basis that they both are of a sectoral nature and that the ECSC Treaty contains a 
far-reaching prohibition against State aid which was, in practice, aligned with Art. 
107 TFEU by virtue of Art. 67 and Art.95 of the ECSC Treaty. Hungary stated that 
in applying the rules on State aid laid down in the TFEU the Commission would 
misconstrue the regulatory goal pursued by the drafters of the EURATOM Treaty, 
which lacks any specific State aid provisions.88
Many who gave comments during the full investigation procedure (Austria, IG 
Windkraft, Oekostrom AG, Greenpeace Energy and others) outlined once again, in 
this spectacular state aid case for nuclear power, that subsidising the construction 
and operation of new nuclear power plants is not provided for under the principles 
laid down in Article 107(3) TFEU as being compatible with the internal market. 
Nuclear power was clearly defined as not being a new, innovative or sustainable 
technology for electricity generation capable of contributing to achieving the EU 
goal: increasing the proportion of energy generated by renewable technologies. 
Moreover and once again, as especially underlined by Austria, neither Article 2(c) 
nor Article 40 EURATOM would allow for the promotion of new nuclear invest-
ments to be considered as an objective of common interest due to the fact that no 
common interest within the meaning of Article 107(3) TFEU could be derived or 
integrated from the EURATOM Treaty. In addition, it was stressed by Austria 
and others, also once again, that such an objective would be in conflict with other 
principles of the Union under TFEU, namely the precautionary principle under 
Article 191 TFEU and the sustainability principle of the Union. 
Again, the Commission upheld the applicability of State aid rules in support of 
nuclear power; but remained somewhat true to its view that “in fact, whilst Article 
2(c) of the EURATOM Treaty creates an obligation on the Union to facilitate invest-
ments in the field of nuclear energy and Article 40 of the EURATOM Treaty obliges 
the Union to publish illustrative programmes in order to facilitate the development 
of nuclear investments, the EURATOM Treaty does not foresee any specific rules to 
control the financing, by a Member State, of such investments. According to Article 
106a (3) of the EURATOM Treaty, the provisions of the TFEU shall not derogate from 
the provisions of the EURATOM Treaty”.89
output on the open power exchange. The rest of Paks II’s total electricity output will 
be sold by Paks II on objective, transparent and non-discriminatory terms by way of 
auctions, see. European Commission, press release of 6 March 2017- IP/17/464
88 See published EU Commission decision, in Official Journal L 317/45, para 122.
89 See published EU Commission decision, in Official Journal L 317/45 para 277.
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It seems that (and in case the European Court does not accept Austria’s plea) 
the need to reform EURATOM remains a pressing necessity. Without a reform 
of EURATOM, there cannot be a level playing field in the Union for other energy 
technologies and modern energy services with renewable energy producers being 
especially concerned.
10 Conclusion
From the above, it is clear that EURATOM never was a harmonising treaty for a 
joint common approach and objective. It was, from the beginning hampered, by 
interferences from the nuclear weapon state France and later the UK, when joining 
EURATOM, in order not to hinder their own national interests in nuclear weapon 
planning and development.
The EURATOM Treaty and its original objective of promoting and guaranteeing 
nuclear energy development no longer corresponds to modern reality and is now 
completely outdated. 
The EURATOM Treaty does not fit in the actual internal energy market driven 
by consumers’ interests. The technology it was established to support is no longer 
economically competitive in electricity generation. There is now a multitude of 
players to guarantee security of supply without the risks and internalised burdens 
associated with nuclear energy production, storage and radioactive waste.
Without heavy state aid and guarantees, new nuclear power has no leg to stand on. 
After more than 60 years of industrial production of nuclear power plants, 
now is the time to say goodbye and to ensure the safe dismantling of all obsolete 
nuclear power stations as well as safe final storage of all waste in and within the 
European Union. 
European Nuclear policy will, in the coming years, have to manage nuclear 
risks, decommissioning of reactors and nuclear waste management. This is not 
covered by the treaty. 
As it does not appear legally feasible for EU Member States to exit EURATOM 
without leaving the EU, there is an urgent need to revise the treaty in accordance with 
the modern environmental, social and economic objectives of the European Union.
A paramount task for Europe!
In an EU with a nuclear legacy of hundreds of old nuclear power plants, an un-
derstanding between those Member States that still want nuclear energy as part of 
their energy mix and those who are phasing out or never had nuclear energy as a 
source may be appropriate. This agreement, in light of a reform of the EURATOM 
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treaty, should see the creation of a European dismantling and safe storage support 
mechanism which integrates the whole life cycle approach and full responsibility 
of the nuclear power producers. It should establish a progressive European liability 
regime and the reform needs to remove any mention from the archaic preamble 
of the EURATOM treaty of a promotional objective while fully opening the treaty 
to democratic scrutiny and a legislative process that are totally commonplace in 
a parliamentary democracy. After such reform of EURATOM, any new nuclear 
power will need to face the full market conditions and would not be able to hide 
behind its ancient subterfuge. After more than 60 years, there is no time better 
than the present.
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Nuclear core melts with large emissions of radioactive substances are not paid for 
by nuclear power companies but by the victims and by taxpayers. This subsidy 
is often the result of legislation with that purpose.
Experience shows that the relative frequency of such accidents is several 
orders of magnitude larger that the risk estimates publicised by the nuclear 
industry and nuclear proponents.
This chapter describes the how the problem was created in order to make the 
nuclear development economically possible. In the end, it is described how a 
market may be created based on compulsory paying capacity, possibly provided 
via catastrophe bonds that would internalise many costs of accidents. At the 
same time, such regulations would provide a market evaluation, by responsible 
actors, of the nuclear risk costs.
1 Tomas Kåberger, Chalmers University of Technology, Göteborg, Sweden, tomas.kaberger@ 
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1 Creating the problem
As private cars were introduced and became more powerful during the 20th century 
they created a social problem: People who could readily afford to buy a car, were 
sometimes unable to pay the costs of the damages they caused when crashing into 
other cars, people or houses.
The frequency and cost of car accidents, however, were small enough for car 
drivers to manage the costs by sharing them. Legislation was introduced making 
traffic insurance compulsory, ensuring that compensation could and would be paid 
even for very unlikely large accidents. Today, this compulsory payment capacity 
may be in the order of 1 000–100 000 times the price of a car in many countries.
Regarding nuclear reactors, accidents pose a similar problem: Companies may 
well afford to pay for the construction of a nuclear reactor. Still, they are not able 
to pay for the damages after a nuclear core has melted and radioactive materials 
escaped from a broken containment. 
This was understood already in the mid 20th century, after the US report on 
consequences of a major reactor accident was published in 1957. [Beck et al 1957]
In retrospect, this report appears naive as the understanding of the risks of 
ionising radiation was not well developed. Still, the economic impact of an accident 
was understood as a so large liability that no private investor would be interested in 
investing in a nuclear power plant. At the same time there was a common notion 
that nuclear power was desirable. Therefore, according to dominant actors, economic 
market conditions should be created to make nuclear investments appear profitable.
Jasper [1989] describes how the nuclear industry asked a group of legal experts 
to provide a proposal for a legislation that would make nuclear power profitable 
by socialising the costs of potential accidents. 
For car accidents a solution was to share the costs among all car users via man-
dated insurance. In the nuclear case, a tiny part of the liabilities were shared, but 
it was necessary to relocate most of the costs outside the nuclear industry.
The report by Murphy et. al [1957] and the resulting Price-Anderson Act have 
served as blueprints for nuclear accident legislation in most countries with privately 
owned nuclear power reactors, as well as for international conventions2. The key 
elements are: 
1. In case of a nuclear reactor accident the operator of the plant is the only one 
actor that can be held liable. 
2 Most notably the Paris convention on third party liability in the field of nuclear energy. 
See IEA 1989.
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 This reduces the cost of building a reactor, as all suppliers are relieved of the risk 
that faulty equipment or mistakes during construction may imply economic costs 
to them, were they to cause a reactor accident. Without this component in the 
legislation, large companies would refuse to deliver because they either would 
have to accept high insurance costs, or they would run the risk of bankruptcy 
if they had delivered something that later was declared the cause of an accident. 
2. The economic liability of the operator is strictly limited to an amount far below 
the potential costs of a major accident. 
This component in the legislation has two important aspects. Without a limited 
accident liability the operator would face bankruptcy in case of a major accident. 
To banks and others, considering lending money to an operating company, that 
risk for bankruptcy would be a reason to increase interest rates to compensate for 
their risk of losing their money in case of an accident. Increased interest rates would 
lead to higher costs of nuclear power. 
An important consequence of this legislation is that the victims of large accidents 
are without the right to compensation. It is sometimes assumed that the govern-
ments, i.e. all people paying taxes in the country where the reactor is operating, 
take over the full liability. However, this is rarely explicitly stated, as the size of 
potential accidents is large also in relation to government budgets. It follows that 
the actual victims of nuclear accidents will carry a large part of the burdens, for 
example as loss of their habitat.
Deliberately externalising environmental costs is an extraordinary measure 
in economic policy. Arguments in support of this kind of legislation sometimes 
illustrate why. In Sweden, the law was based on a government commission that 
justified this subsidy by arguing “As seen from the statements above, it is neces-
sary to utilise nuclear power – at any cost – if we do not want to accept a lowered 
standard of living”. [SOU 1959:34 p.25].  (In Swedish: “Såsom framgår av det ovan 
sagda blir vi nödgade att ta atomkraften i anspråk – kosta vad det kosta vill – om vi 
inte vill acceptera en standardsänkning.”) 
We may speculate if this blunt expression of illogical economics is a result of the 
commission secretary intentionally leaving a clear signal to coming generations, or 
an expression of enthusiastic nuclear zeitgeist beyond rational economic thinking.
Many would claim that this was a decision driven by nuclear weapon ambitions 
and therefore outside the realm of economic logic.
Regardless of the motives, legislation limiting the liabilities of nuclear actors 
appears as decisive energy policy. The law had immediate and significant economic 
implications for the competitiveness of this particular energy technology. It was 
designed to, and served as, a substantial subsidy.
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In the half century since this legislation was spreading over the world, evidence 
has accumulated regarding both the frequency of large accidents and the health 
impact of ionising radiation.
2 Experience
The frequency of core melts and of accidents with emissions far exceeds earlier 
expectations. We now count around3 10 nuclear power reactors whose operations 
were closed after full or partial core melts4. Out of these core melt events, Chernobyl 
and three Fukushima reactors have resulted in significant emissions of radioactive 
materials. 
This experience has come during a period where IAEA estimate the accumu-
lated number of reactor operation years is around 17 000. [IAEA 2017]. So far, the 
relative frequency of core melts has been one in a couple of thousand reactor-years, 
while core melts with significant radioactive contamination has been in the order 
of one in 5 000 reactor-years.
Regarding ionising radiation, the series summary reports provided by the 
International Commission on Radiation Protection, ICRP, now expects roughly 
10 times as many cancer cases from a certain collective dose of ionising radiation 
compared to the estimate in the 1950s.
The scientific issue of health effects of ionising radiation is one of the most 
intensive scientific controversies as the economic stakes involved are high. One 
reason is the industrial interests to defend the privilege of legally limited liability. 
Another, the potential liabilities and political implications of the exposure of 
people to radiation from nuclear weapons testing5. The latter became an issue in 
3 The words ”around” is used as there are other reactors closed after core damages, while 
not immediately after, and there are reactors whose status as commercial power reactors 
are unclear.
4 While definition of core melts as well as which reactors to include among power reactors 
may be challenged, a rough list may include St Lucens GHHWR in 1966, Bohunice A1 
in 1977, TMI 2 in 1979, Chernobyl 4 in 1986, Greifswald 5, and finally three reactors at 
Fukushima Dai-ichi in 2011. [World Nuclear Association, 2016]. Cochran [2011] also 
include The Sodium Reactor Experiment, Sankt Laurent A-1 and A-2 as well as Chapel-
cross-2, but not the Bohunice A1, and ends up with 11 power reactor core melts. There 
are also non-power producing reactors where core melting has occurred.
5 This is the same kind of scientific controversy as those previously experienced with 
tobacco smoking and asbestosis.
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1981 when a UN committee estimated nuclear weapon testing being responsible 
for 150 000 premature deaths6.
The costs of severe reactor accidents may be in the order of several hundred or 
even several thousand billions EUR or USD. Costs resulting from such accidents 
include evacuation of people, health effects among people despite evacuations, 
costs of limiting emissions of radioactivity, decontamination as well as some sort 
of decommissioning of the remains of reactors and waste management.
Chernobyl and Fukushima experiences show these costs are not within the 
capacity of even the largest nuclear operators in the world. 
In the Chernobyl case, most of the consequences occurred in Belarus and the 
Ukraine. As the costs were initially paid out of the Soviet Union budget, most of 
the resources came from the Soviet republic of Russia. When Russia withdraw from 
the Soviet Union, they could stop paying, which provided an economic incentive 
for Russia to dissolve the union. A compilation of incomplete cost assessments 
are provided by Samets & Seo 2016. Health effect due to low-level exposure is not 
included in the cited studies.
Ukraine had difficulties managing the costs of safeguarding the Chernobyl site. 
Hence, taxpayers in other European countries have been forced to assist in financing 
the construction of a shelter over the damaged reactor, which would reduce the 
distribution of radioactivity over the coming 100 years. In order to protect their 
own interests, the potential victims have been made to pay for prevention. 
Fukushima is still in a state where it is impossible to estimate a limit to the costs 
as the long term strategies to control the radioactivity are not yet fixed. Suzuki et 
al (2016) estimate costs excluding health effects at almost 100 trillion yen, or 1 
trillion US dollar.
Using experience to get a possible order of magnitude of the real risk cost of 
nuclear reactors, we may combine 100 billion -1 trillion US dollar per accident 
with a relative frequency of one in 5 000 reactor-years which would give an average 
risk cost of 20–200 million dollar per reactor-year. With reactors producing 5–10 
TWh/year this would provide a range from 0.2-4 cent/kWh. Despite enormous 
uncertainties the accumulated experience suffices to dismiss the idea that the risk 
costs are “clearly negligible”.
The argument that externalising the costs of accident risks is acceptable because 
the risk costs are negligible is not consistent with experience.
The question is instead how to manage this risk costs in a rational way.
6 United Nations Comprehensive Study on Nuclear Weapons 1981, p 86, § 260
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3 Managing nuclear risk
Often, a risk of lost property that is large for the actor exposed, is managed by an 
insurance system. When there is a large economic risk for third parties, such as 
with car accidents, the insurance system is made compulsory7. 
In an insurance market, voluntary actors use experience and other relevant 
information to reach a price for the risk, and the actors offering to share the risk, 
normally insurance companies, become economically liable for the outcome. 
For nuclear accident risks, the analogy with the compulsory car insurance system 
is, however, not immediately applicable. The reason is that insurance companies 
are not able to cover damages of the magnitude of nuclear accidents. With less than 
500 nuclear power reactors in the world, the owners of reactors cannot finance 
an insurance system by themselves. This argument has been used to claim that a 
compulsory insurance is not possible. 
However, it is possible to find insurance systems that do not rely on traditional 
insurance companies. Such systems have been developed to manage natural disasters 
and other rare catastrophes. Radetzki & Radetzki [2000] describe how catastrophe 
bonds8 could be used for nuclear accident liabilities. 
Operators could be forced to pay for catastrophe bonds to collect capital enough 
to compensate victims of large accidents. Such bonds would be normal interest 
bearing bonds, were those who provide capital are offered an extra premium on 
the condition that the bond value is used to cover the cost of the catastrophe in 
question if realised. Using the catastrophe bond market opens access to relevant 
magnitude of capital to cover also large nuclear accidents, and the premium paid 
by the reactor operators would provide a measure of the accident risk. 
Creating the market would include specifying the kind of costs to be covered 
caused by an accident. Property costs, compensations for evacuations are directly 
payable to the victims. What may be significant costs for health effects will not 
be individually identifiable but may occur as large economic burdens on health, 
or medicare, insurance systems. This liability may then be payable to the health 
insurance systems rather than to individuals, even when individual suffering may 
be a significant part of the economic impact.
7 The reason for a compulsory insurance is that the responsible actor may lack paying 
capacity. Electric Power Companies may be very large, but no EPC is large enough 
to manage a large reactor accident. Even more important is that EPCs often organise 
nuclear power plants in separate limited liability companies to avoid liability for other 
risks including future waste and decommissioning costs.
8 For a definition of catastrophe bond, see Investopedia 2017.
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Another relevant issue in the regulation is how large the required paying capacity 
shall be. This may prove an important issue if the paying affects every provider of 
capital for any accident. As described by Radetzki & Radetzki I have also earlier 
suggested that a solution that reduces the importance of this capacity decision I have 
presented is to make the catastrophe bonds consecutive rather than exchangeable. 
Consecutive bonds would be specified so that one bond may be used to cover cost 
between 1 000 M USD and 1 001 M USD, while another bond would only be used 
if the accident cost more than 1 001 M USD to cover the next million. The former 
may be expected to cost more than the latter, as the probability of the larger accident 
is lower than the probability of the smaller. 
Under such a regime of consecutive bonds the importance of the level of re-
quired capacity may be reduced as the cost of marginal bonds would be small when 
reaching trillions of USD.
By introducing compulsory arrangements of this kind, a market value would 
be created for nuclear accident risks. Political debates on probabilities and effects 
would be replaced by professional assessments made by parties who would have 
to assume economic responsibility for their assessments. This is likely to result in 
more scientific assessments of risks and their economic value.
4 Possible consequences, and imperfections
The obvious consequence of a compulsory insured paying capacity for third party 
liabilities, is that the operators would pay a market price of the risk costs. This would 
reduce their competitiveness in relation to other energy technologies. 
Still, this proposal is embraced by many pro-nuclear spokespersons as they expect 
the assessment in the market will be that most nuclear reactors are so safe that the 
risk costs are small. Paying a small amount to cover the full accident liability would 
be a low price to do away with the political arguments of accident risks.
At the same time nuclear critics find the proposed market solution palatable as 
they are convinced the price for nuclear catastrophe bonds would be so high reactors 
would be out-competed by modern renewable energy alternatives.
There have been some critical arguments. Swedish nuclear opponent Eija Lil-
jegren-Palmær has argued that the nuclear industry has such an advantage regarding 
access to information that they would be able to mislead representatives of financial 
institutions, such as pension funds, to accept theoretical calculations with too small 
premiums. Instead of misleading politicians representing tax payers, they would 
mislead those managing the same tax-payers pension funds.
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Such a risk cannot be disregarded. When Compulsory, government controlled 
pension funds are involved the risk is similar. 
However, often pension funds are managed without pro-nuclear policy objec-
tives. Further, markets would allow individuals or groups to withdraw their money 
from funds they see exposing them to risks. Thus there would at least be more of 
voluntary risk taking then after parliamentary majority decisions.
However, there are proponents who would say that the hysteria around radi-
ation is making the assessments biased so as to over-estimate risk costs. Here, 
the response is that the nuclear industry only has to find a sufficient number of 
financial actors who see the realistic risks to buy the required paying capacity via 
the bond market. The required capacity is likely to be small compared to potential 
global capital markets.
There is a risk in both directions that lack of information or ignorance may result 
in decisions resulting in misleading pricing of the accident risks. However, some 
may lose a small potential income as they over estimate risks. To others entering 
the marked via misinformed decisions may lose their assets. Still, the victims and 
taxpayers are not affected, as those who voluntarily took on the risks will carry 
both the economic liability and guarantied paying capacity. 
For electricity consumers a demand on full paying capacity would not have a 
significant effect on electricity prices. In the short term this is true as nuclear power 
rarely provide the marginal, price setting generation. In the longer term, the set of 
different generation technologies now available at similar costs is providing many 
alternatives, and in most parts of the world nuclear is clearly not an option when 
considering new capacity. 
If the market evaluation of the risk turns out low enough, reactors would con-
tinue to operate and the insurance would not affect short term marginal cost and 
therefore not the electricity price. 
If, however, the risk cost was high and reactors forced out of the market, the cost 
of renewable energy has lately proven so low that the price effect would also be small.
As described elsewhere, [Kåberger 2001], this reform may come together with the 
internalisation of fossil fuel externalities. Making fossil fuelled generators pay for 
local air-pollution and greenhouse gas emissions would initially have a greater effect 
on electricity prices as fossil fuelled power often constitute price-setting marginal 
generation. An important reason to do both is that nuclear power under a carbon 
pricing regime may be ably to continue operating with higher risk costs than in a 
situation without pricing emissions from fossil fuelled generators in the short term.
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5 Conclusion
Experience shows that currently prevailing regulation of nuclear accident liabilities 
is a significant subsidy to nuclear power. As new, renewable energy supply is eco-
nomically competing with existing nuclear power, re-regulating accident liability 
will have importance for the rate of decommissioning nuclear reactors and therefore 
also for the number of reactor accidents in the future.
Experience of large reactor accidents with significant emission of radioactivity 
has shown that even the most endowed reactor owners are unable to compensate 
the victims. Governments concerned also have had great difficulties in meeting the 
need for compensation. In the Chernobyl case tax payers of other countries have 
even stepped in to subsidise the mitigation of the consequences.
The experience of reactor owners creating significant costs they are unable to 
compensate, has proved to be a problem similar to when the owners of cars caused 
damages beyond their paying capacity.
In the current era of competitive electricity markets this opportunity appears 
all the more urgent for markets to find the efficient rate of change of power supply.
As the catastrophe bond concept and market was developed by the end of the 21st 
century it has become possible to address the problem of large nuclear accidents by 
making it compulsory for anyone operating a nuclear reactor to be able to pay for 
the consequences of large accidents. As with cars, the required paying capacity may 
be orders of magnitude higher then the cost of building a reactor, but the societal 
problem of rolling-off external costs on citizens and communities around nuclear 
accident sites can be addressed to some degree. 
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Corporate Policies of the Nuclear Vendors
Stephen D. Thomas1
Abstract
The nuclear reactor supply industry, once seen as an essential component of 
diversified companies with an electrical engineering capability, is now seen 
in Europe, USA and Japan as a risky niche business for specialist companies. 
Vendors from Russia and China now appear likely to win the vast majority of 
new reactor orders although in both cases, their technologies have not been 
reviewed by experienced Western regulators. Russia may not have the financial 
strength to back up its large order book while China has yet to win orders in 
open export markets.
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1 Introduction
When nuclear power began to be commercially exploited in the 1950s, it was seen by 
the major ‘national champion’ diversified engineering companies as the technology 
of the future and therefore a key capability to acquire. In the USA, such companies 
included Westinghouse and GE, in Germany Siemens and AEG, in Japan Hitachi, 
Mitsubishi and Toshiba and in France Compagnie General d’Electricité (CGE) 
and Empain Schneider. Russia also developed its own technologies but it had little 
impact outside the Soviet Republics and the Comecon countries until the collapse 
of the Soviet Union in 1990. China has only become a force in nuclear markets since 
2008, while, for various reasons, India, despite pursuing nuclear power since the 
1960s has not built a competitive nuclear reactor supply industry.
By 2018, the picture was very different to that of the 1950s. Nuclear power had 
consistently failed to meet expectations and was increasingly seen as a technology 
that was not central to corporate ambitions. Westinghouse had sold its nuclear 
division to the British government in 1999 who sold it on to Toshiba in 2006; GE 
effectively exited the business in 2006 leaving it largely in the hands of its Japanese 
collaborator, Hitachi; Siemens exited the sector in 2009; AEG collapsed in the mid-
70s; Mitsubishi had made little impact outside Japan; the French companies had 
been reorganised several times. The sector has generally not been profitable and by 
2016, Areva, the latest incarnation of the French nuclear industry was effectively 
bankrupt after six consecutive years of losses and was split up with a majority stake 
in its reactor division being bought by the French utility, EDF, reverting to its previ-
ous name, Framatome. Westinghouse declared bankruptcy in March 2017 and was 
sold by Toshiba to a Canadian company, Brookfield Business Partners. However, 
there were major players both integrally connected to their national government. 
Russia’s champion was the massive Rosatom group which, through a huge number 
of subsidiaries, contained the whole range of nuclear activities including fuel cycle, 
reactor sales, and reactor ownership and operation. China had three vendors all 
with a wide range of nuclear activities, attempting to make an impression on the 
international market: China General Nuclear (CGN), China National Nuclear 
Power Corporation (CNNC) and the SNPTC division of State Power Investment 
Corporation (SPI). Korea emerged as a potential reactor exporter in 2010 through 
Korea Hydro Nuclear Power Co (KHNPC) winning an order for four reactors to the 
United Arab Emirates. By 2018, it had not won further export orders and it remains 
to be seen whether it can compete with the stronger, better established vendors.
Other vendors include, Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL), Mitsubishi 
and The Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd (NPCIL). However, their prospects 
for exports appear limited and they are not examined further
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In this chapter, we examine the strategies of the seven established reactor vendors: 
Framatome, Rosatom, Hitachi-GE, Toshiba/Westinghouse, CGN, CNNC and SPI. 
We look at their strengths and weaknesses including:
• Experience with their current technologies;
• Their home market;
• Their target export markets;
• Their ability to offer financing to their prospective customers.
2 The historical structure
The main pioneers of the technology were two US companies, Westinghouse and 
GE offering light water cooled and moderated reactors developed from submarine 
propulsion reactors. Westinghouse developed the Pressurised Water Reactor (PWR) 
while GE developed the Boiling Water Reactor (BWR). Japan and Germany tried to 
develop their own technologies but with limited success and their main effort went 
into licensing and indigenising these US technologies. The companies took licenses 
with their long-term partners in the heavy electrical industry, Mitsubishi and Sie-
mens with Westinghouse and Hitachi, Toshiba and AEG with GE. France followed 
its own technological route until 1969 when it too adopted US technology, Empain 
Schneider licensing the PWR from Westinghouse and CGE, the BWR from GE.
The exceptions to this pattern of licensing US were the UK and Canada. The 
UK tried to develop its own technologies (gas-cooled, graphite moderated reactors) 
until 1977 when it adopted the Westinghouse PWR. Unlike the other countries, the 
major companies in the UK, like GEC never put their weight behind the nuclear 
programme preferring to take stakes in weak consortia that frequently failed. By 
the time the PWR was adopted, it was too late for UK companies to develop a dis-
tinctive capability. Canada developed heavy water cooled and moderated reactors, 
Candu, for its home market and it has exported these to Argentina, China, Korea, 
Romania, India and Pakistan. A particular attraction for some buyers was that 
unlike PWRs and BWRs, this design did not need enriched Uranium. Enrichment 
is a technology with military sensitivity and is controlled mainly by USA, Russia, 
UK and France and using PWRs or BWRs inevitably involves some degree of 
dependence on these countries. However, the technology AECL is offering is old 
and appears to have very few prospects of new orders.
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3 The vendors 
Toshiba 
Toshiba’s roots in the nuclear business go back to the 1960s and its participation 
in Japan’s Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) programme. Japan’s electricity system 
is split into two parts with all equipment for the northern half, including Tokyo 
Electric, supplied by Toshiba and Hitachi using designs licensed from GE. This 
pattern continued with nuclear power. Japan’s first BWRs were imported, then 
orders were split reasonably evenly between Hitachi and Toshiba with, typically, 
one of the companies the primary contractor for the nuclear steam supply system 
(NSSS) and the other supplying the other high value item, the turbine generator. The 
US market collapsed in the mid-70s and Hitachi and Toshiba took a more central 
role in new reactor design development, notably with the Advance Boiling Water 
Reactor (ABWR) announced in 1980 and with its first order in 1986. An important 
exception was the development of the Economic Simplified Boiling Water Reactor 
(ESBWR) announced in 2000, which was very much a product for the US market 
and has not been seriously considered for Japan.
Toshiba and Hitachi never played a lead role in exports of the BWR with, for 
example, the most recent BWR export, for Taiwan, going to GE. Whether this was 
a conscious decision by the Japanese companies not to pursue exports or due to 
restrictions imposed by their licensor, GE, is not easy to determine. However, other 
technology licensees such as Siemens and Framatome chose to end their license 
agreements, in 1975 and 1982 respectively, when they felt they did not need the 
support of their licensor. 
This arrangement between Hitachi, Toshiba and GE ended in 2006 when Toshiba 
chose to buy the Westinghouse reactor division, outbidding its rivals Mitsubishi and 
Hitachi. The Westinghouse nuclear division had been bought by the UK government 
in 1999 via its fuel cycle company, British Nuclear Fuels Limited (BNFL) for $1.1bn. 
BNFL subsequently bought ABB’s and Combustion Engineering’s nuclear business 
for $485m2. The government planned to privatise BNFL and presumably create 
a reactor vendor business. These plans were destroyed by the effective financial 
collapse of BNFL in 2002 and the subsequent break-up of BNFL’s assets including 
the sale of a 77 per cent stake in the Westinghouse/ABB/Combustion Engineering 
group to Toshiba in 2006 for $4.16bn3. Inevitably, this led to the breaking of the 
2 The Times ‘BNFL makes Pounds 300m US acquisition’ December 30, 1999
3 The Shaw Group took a 20 per cent stake and Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries 
Co. purchased the remaining 3 per cent stake. Associated Press ‘Toshiba completes 
acquisition of Westinghouse, U.S. atomic power plant company’ October 17, 2006
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relationship between Toshiba and GE and Hitachi. Toshiba chose to continue to 
offer the ABWR design independently. This design had received generic regulatory 
approval from the US safety regulator, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 
for 15 years from 19974. Toshiba applied to renew this approval in 2010, but in July 
2016, the application was withdrawn because of the lack of potential US customers5. 
One utility, NRG, had said it would buy two ABWRs in 2009 for its South Texas 
prospect, but this project made little progress and is unlikely to go ahead.
Toshiba’s main option is the Westinghouse AP1000 PWR, which in 2006 ap-
peared close to completing regulatory review by the NRC, although this was only 
finally achieved in 2011. Four AP1000s were ordered for the US market, two each 
for the Summer and Vogtle sites and construction started on these in 2013/14 but 
a combination of serious cost overruns and delays, and the bankruptcy of West-
inghouse led to the abandonment of the Summer project in 2017 with the Vogtle 
project also at risk of abandonment
The AP1000 was submitted to the UK safety regulator, Office of Nuclear Reg-
ulation (ONR), in 2007 in the Generic Design Assessment (GDA) process but the 
process was suspended in December 2011 due to the lack of UK customers. At that 
time, there were still 51 design issues to be resolved6. Subsequently, Toshiba bought 
a 60 per cent stake in a UK-based consortium, NuGen, which plans to build three 
AP1000s. The GDA process was re-opened in 2014 and was completed in 20177. 
Toshiba sold its bankrupt Westinghouse nuclear division in 2018 and it is not clear 
whether it expects to continue to try to sell reactors. The NuGen project seems 
unlikely to proceed, at least using AP1000 technology. The Combustion Engi-
neering capability gave Toshiba System 80+ PWR technology, which had received 
regulatory approval from the NRC in 1997, while the ABB stake gave them a 50 
per cent stake in a company, HTR, offering high temperature gas-cooled reactor 
technology, HTR-Modul. The System 80+ and HTR-Modul capabilities were not 
directly marketed but these technologies had already been licensed, the System 
80+ to Korea and HTR-Modul to South Africa and China.
4 For details of NRC reactor design reviews, see http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/
design-cert.html (Accessed March 1, 2016)
5 https://www.mynewsdesk.com/toshiba-global/pressreleases/toshiba-withdraws-applica-
tion-to-u-s-nuclear-regulatory-commission-to-renew-abwr-design-certification-1462359 
(Accessed July 15, 2016)
6 http://www.onr.org.uk/new-reactors/ap1000/index.htm (Accessed July 15, 2016)
7 http://www.onr.org.uk/new-reactors/ap1000/index.htm (Accessed September 2, 2018)
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Hitachi 
The history of Hitachi in the nuclear business was intimately connected with that 
of GE and Toshiba until 2006. Under the reorganisation resulting from Toshiba’s 
acquisition of the Westinghouse nuclear division, two new joint ventures were 
set up: GE-Hitachi, 80 per cent owned by GE which was to operate primarily in 
the USA and Hitachi-GE, 80 per cent owned by Hitachi, which was to operate in 
all other markets8. GE-Hitachi applied to renew the license for their version of 
the ABWR in 2010 despite it having no immediate US customer, but by February 
2016, little progress appeared to have been made on this. The ESBWR did receive 
US regulatory approval in 2015. However, the prospects for sales of reactors in the 
USA, either of the ABWR or ESBWR designs, appear poor and GE-Hitachi is not 
considered further. Hitachi-GE purchased a UK-based consortium set up to build 
and operate nuclear power plants in Britain, Horizon, in 2012 for $1.2bn9. Horizon 
owns two sites at each of which it plans to build two ABWRs. The ABWR design was 
submitted to the UK safety regulator, ONR, for Generic Design Assessment in 2014 
with expected completion of the review in 201810. The Horizon projects can only 
proceed if Hitachi-GE finds a strong investor, either a utility or the UK government.
Framatome
Framatome achieved a dominant position in reactor supply for France in 1975 when 
its version of the PWR, licensed from Westinghouse, was chosen for the large pro-
gramme of reactors that followed. By 1990, 58 PWRs had been sold to the French 
market. Framatome was initially privately owned but in 1975, the Commisariat 
Energie Atomique, the French national nuclear R&D organisation took a 30 per 
cent stake, expanding to 34 per cent in 1982 and in 1984, when the parent of the 
other shareholder, Creusot Loire went bankrupt, the government re-organised the 
shareholding with CEA taking 35 per cent, the large diversified French engineering 
company, CGE, taking 40 per cent and EDF with 10 per cent taking most of the rest.
Framatome had progressively moved away from the Westinghouse licensed design 
terminating its technology license with them in 1981 and the last four of the 58 
reactors ordered were for a design designated N4, the first design that was claimed 
to be wholly French. However, the Chernobyl disaster led to a perceived need for 
greater safety and in 1992, a new design, the European Pressurised Water Reactor 
8 An exception to this is GE-Hitachi’s PRISM fast reactor design which is being marketed 
in export markets, for example, the UK. See http://gehitachiprism.com/ (Accessed July 
22, 2016)
9 Associated Press ‘Japan’s Hitachi to buy Horizon Nuclear’ October 30, 2012
10 http://www.onr.org.uk/new-reactors/uk-abwr/index.htm (Accessed March 1, 2016)
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(EPR) was announced developed by a joint venture of Framatome and Siemens, 
Nuclear Power International11. The aim was that the design would be licensable in 
both France and Germany. In 2000, Framatome (66 per cent) and Siemens (34 per 
cent) merged their nuclear businesses as the Areva NP part of the Areva group12. 
In January 2009, Siemens announced it would exercise its right to withdraw from 
the joint venture and this was completed in 2011.
The EPR was submitted to the UK’s GDA process in 2007 and was given a design 
acceptance certificate, valid for 10 years in December 201213. In 2008, Areva NP 
also submitted its EPR design to the US NRC for generic appraisal. However, in 
2015, with no US orders likely, it froze the process14. 
The financial collapse of Areva led to it being split into its component parts, a 
reactor vendor division and a fuel cycle company. A majority stake in the reactor 
divisions was bought by the French utility, EDF, in 2018 and the company was re-
named Framatome. By mid-2018, it was not clear what plans EDF had for Framatome.
Rosatom
Rosatom, the Russian national nuclear company, is a vast diversified company 
involved in every aspect of nuclear technology including fuel cycle activities, 
ownership and operation of reactors as well as reactor sales.
Russia was the first country in the world to operate a power reactor with the 
6MW Obninsk reactor opened in 1954. Russia commercialised two types of reactor, 
the VVER, the Russian version of the PWR, and the RBMK, the design used at 
the Chernobyl site. The VVER has been built in two sizes, 440MW and 1000MW. 
For this analysis, we focus on the period after the 1986 Chernobyl disaster and we 
do not look at the RBMK which ceased to be an option for new orders after 1986. 
We focus particularly on the period from 2007 onwards when Russia began again 
for the first time since 1986 to market reactors in large numbers for Russia and for 
export. For an overview of Russia’s nuclear history up to the Chernobyl disaster, 
see Schmid (2015) and IAEA (1997).
At the time of the Chernobyl disaster, Russia was building reactors in Russia, 
Ukraine, Lithuania Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic (GDR), 
Poland, Bulgaria, Cuba and Hungary. Some of these were completed without in-
terruption, such as Hungary and Lithuania, for some construction was halted for 
11 Nuclear News ‘Joint Franco-German design partly unveiled’ August 1992
12 Nuclear Engineering International ‘Framatome and Siemens to merge’ February 2000
13 http://www.onr.org.uk/new-reactors/uk-epr/design-acceptance.htm (Accessed July 15 
2016)
14 Nuclear News ‘Areva suspends work on U.S. EPR certification’ April 2015
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a significant period but later restarted, such as Russia, Ukraine, Czech Republic, 
Slovak Republic while other programmes were abandoned, such as the GDR, 
Cuba and Poland. By that time, for the VVERs, Russia was concentrating on the 
1000MW design, the V-320.
The first new activity of the Russian nuclear industry after Chernobyl was with 
the order in 1997 of two reactors using the AES-91 design for the Tianwan site in 
China15. This was followed by the order in 2002, after several years of negotiation, 
of two reactors using the AES-92 design for the Kudankulam site in India16. These 
reactors were essentially the V-320 design with additional safety systems, greater 
‘passive’ safety and a core-catcher for the AES-91. The AES-91 was developed by the 
St Petersburg design studio of Rosatom, Saint-Petersburg Atomenergoproekt, while 
the AES-92 was developed by the Moscow Office, Moscow Atomenergoproekt17. 
However, it was the announcement of a new design, AES-2006, in 2006 along 
with ambitious targets for new reactor orders for the Russian home market that saw 
a sudden change of gear for the Russian nuclear industry (Mukhatzhanova, 2007). 
Although this time there was a single designation, AES-2006, as with AES-91 and 
AES-92, there was a Moscow (V-392M) and a Saint-Petersburg (V-491) version with 
the first four orders, all for Russia, split between the two versions18. Forecasts of a 
steady flow of three orders a year for the home market were quickly proved wrong. 
Only one further order beyond the first four, on which construction started in 
2008–10, was placed (in Kaliningrad in 2012) and this was effectively abandoned 
within a year of construction start. The focus switched to exports with an order 
for four reactors won with Turkey in 2010 and by 2017, Rosatom was claiming an 
export order book of about 30 reactors, although construction had started on only 
one project, in Belarus. 
Some of these markets are for countries with no experience of commercial nuclear 
power plants, including Vietnam, Jordan, Bangladesh and Egypt and, historically, 
attempts to build nuclear plants in such countries often come to nothing. The 
potential orders for Finland and Hungary are most strategically important. The 
perception will be that safety regulation in EU countries is rigorous and if Russia 
15 Xinhua News Agency ‘Work on nuclear power station begins’ October 20, 1999
16 Nuclear Engineering International ‘Koodankulam deal signed’ January 2002
17 For details of the history of the VVER design, see http://www.rosatom.ru/en/resources/
b6724a80447c36958cfface920d36ab1/brochure_the_vver_today.pdf (Accessed March 2, 
2016)
18 For a detailed specification of the differences, see http://www.rosatom.ru/en/resources/
b6724a80447c36958cfface920d36ab1/brochure_the_vver_today.pdf (Accessed March 2, 
2016).
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can satisfy the safety regulators in these countries, this will be seen as a strong 
endorsement of the design. In 2018, construction on the first reactors for orders to 
Turkey and Bangladesh belatedly started
In 2010, a new design, VVER-TOI (V-510), developed by the Moscow office was 
announced. It was claimed it would have lower design, construction, operation, 
maintenance and decommissioning costs, would be up to 38 per cent more efficient 
than the AES-2006 VVER design and would have a slightly higher rated capacity 
of 1300MW19. When it was announced, it was expected to be available for ordering 
in 2012, but it was not till 2018 that construction on the first unit began.
China
China has three nuclear reactor vendors but with very different backgrounds. China 
National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) was the original company set up in the 
1960s, China General Nuclear (CGN)20 set up in 1994 and State Power Investment 
Corporation (SPI) set up in 200721. 
CNNC and CGN
Because of their common technology roots with technology licensed from Fram-
atome, it is logical to deal with CNNC and CGN together. CNNC has its roots 
in the Second Ministry of Machine Building, from which the China Ministry 
of Nuclear Industry was created and was renamed CNNC in 1988. It makes no 
secret of its military roots and its continued military connections and its web-site 
states22: ‘Historically, CNNC successfully developed the atomic bomb, hydrogen 
bomb and nuclear submarines and built the first nuclear plant in the main land of 
China. CNNC is the main body of the national nuclear technology industry, the 
core of the national strategic nuclear deterrence and the main force of the national 
nuclear power development and nuclear power construction and shoulders the 
duel historical responsibilities for building of national defence force, increasing 
the value of state assets and developing the society.’
19 Nuclear Engineering International ‘Atomenergoproekt on track to market VVER-TOI 
in 2013’ February 2012
20 Until 2013, CGN was China Guangdong Nuclear (CGN).
21 The State Nuclear Power Technology Company was created in 2007 and merged with 
the smallest of the big four Chinese generation companies, China Power Investment 
Corporation (CPIC) to form the SPI
22 http://www.cnnc.com.cn/tabid/643/Default.aspx (Accessed December 18, 2015)
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It was in 1985 that construction work began on the first reactor for the Chinese 
market, a small (300MW) indigenous design of Pressurised Water Reactor (PWR)23 
designed by the Shanghai Nuclear Engineering Research and Design Institute 
(SNERDI), established in 1970 and supplied by CNNC. Four reactors of this design 
were exported to Pakistan between 1985 and 2011, China’s only export market 
to date. In 1987, construction started on the first large reactors (Daya Bay), two 
1000MW units imported from the French vendor Framatome. However, despite 
it being the only Chinese reactor vendor, CNNC was not a major player in this 
project. The Chinese partners in Daya Bay, primarily Guangdong Electric Power 
Company were consolidated into a new state-owned company, China Guangdong 
Nuclear (CGN)24 in 1994. In 1992, CNNC signed a technology transfer agreement 
with Framatome for the technology ordered at Daya Bay, the M310. In 1995, CGN 
signed a similar agreement with Framatome25. In 2008, construction work in China 
took off with six reactors beginning construction (four from CGN and two from 
CNNC) all based on the imported M310 design, CNP-1000. In 2009 and 2010, ten 
more reactors of this design started construction.
The M310 design dates back to the 1960s, having been licensed by Framatome 
in the early 1970s from Westinghouse. The Chinese authorities had already ac-
knowledged more modern designs were needed. Its plan was to select one of the 
advanced designs on offer from foreign vendors importing a few reactors initially 
but progressively transferring the technology to Chinese companies. Two designs 
were considered, the French EPR supplied by Framatome’s successor company 
Areva and the AP1000 supplied by Westinghouse, which, by then was owned by 
Toshiba. The AP1000 was chosen in 2006 with four reactors ordered, reportedly 
because of greater willingness of Westinghouse to transfer technology. However, 
a year later, an order for two EPRs was placed with CGN partnering Areva and 
EDF for this project.
It became clear that the AP1000 and the EPR were too expensive in their existing 
form and all three vendors began work to develop advanced reactor designs, using 
the designs of their licensee as the basis. These designs would meet the requirements 
of European and US regulators and would be Chinese Intellectual Property. CNNC 
and CGN developed smaller reactor designs (1000MW) than the EPR (1600MW) 
based on the M310, ACPR-1000 and ACP-1000 respectively. Four reactors in China 
using the CGN ACPR-1000 design and two reactor exports to Pakistan using the 
23 The PWR is the most widely used type of reactor worldwide accounting for about two 
thirds of the world’s operating reactors
24 http://www.cgnpc.com.cn/n1500/index.html (Accessed December 15, 2015)
25 Nuclear Engineering International ‘Growth in China’ November 2001
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CNNC ACP-1000 design had started construction by 2018. However, in 2013, the 
Chinese government required CGN and CNNC to ‘merge’ these designs to create 
the Hualong One or HPR-1000 design. It appears that CGN and CNNC have their 
own versions of the HPR-1000 which may have more in common with ACPR-1000 
and ACP-1000 than with each other. By 2016, CNNC had started construction of 
two reactors in China using their version of the HPR-1000 and CGN had started 
construction of one.
Following the Fukushima disaster in March 2011, there was a sharp reduction 
in ordering and from 2011–14, construction started on only six reactors, two using 
the old design based on M310, two imported from Russia and two ACPR-1000s. 
In 2015 six construction starts took place, three for the HPR-1000, two for the 
ACPR-1000 and one for the CNP-1000. However, by September 2018, there had 
been only one construction start in China since the beginning of 2016. It is not 
clear what has led to this new pause in construction starts. Possible factors include 
the slowdown of electricity demand growth, which has led to serious overcapacity 
in some regions, concerns about the new technologies and shortage of skills and 
technological capacities.
By 2013, CGN and CNNC were beginning to look to export markets and an 
order with CNNC was agreed with Pakistan for two ACPR-1000s26 (construction 
on the first unit started in August 2015 and the second in May 2016). The export 
markets are coordinated by the Chinese Atomic Energy Authority (CAEA) and the 
National Development and Reform Commission and the three Chinese vendors do 
not appear to compete in the same market. In December 2015, a CNNC/CGN joint 
venture company, the Hualong International, was announced to export Hualong 
One technology27. In May 2016, CGN and CNNC signed an agreement that they 
would not compete with each other in export markets28. 
CNNC would focus outside Europe with South America, including Argentina 
(building one Canadian design reactor then an HPR-1000) and Africa, including 
Sudan, its most likely markets. CGN would focus on Europe where its best oppor-
tunities appear to be in UK and Romania (building a Canadian supplied reactor). 
The UK would be a particular prize for CGN bringing prestige that would enhance 
CGN’s prospects in other markets.
26 Most reports now state the design is the HPR-1000.
27 Nucleonics Week ‘CNNC and CGN set up joint venture to export Hualong One reactors’ 
January 7, 2016
28 Nuclear Engineering International ‘China’s CGN and CNNC agree not to compete’ July 
2016, p 5
232 Stephen D. Thomas
SPI
The AP1000 was chosen in 2007 over the EPR with four reactors ordered and a 
new company created, State Nuclear Power Technology Company29 (SNPTC), 
which merged with a utility to form State Power Investment Corporation (SPI) 
in 2015, to indigenise the technology. SNERDI was made a subsidiary of SNPTC 
giving it experience and substance. SNPTC’s advanced design was the CAP1400, 
a scaled up version of the AP1000. By September 2018, construction on the two 
CAP1400 units firmly planned had not begun despite press reports forecasting an 
imminent start. In May 2016, it was reported that the design was only complete 
enough for one year of construction work to be carried out and there was said to 
be discussion whether the CAP1400 should be for export only30. Whether China 
can credibly offer a design for export that has not been built for the home market 
is questionable. There are reports that China is delaying start of construction on 
a CAP1400 until the first AP1000 is operating successfully and the first units only 
went critical in mid-201831. 
In November 2014, Turkey announced it was in exclusive talks with SPI and 
Toshiba/Westinghouse to buy four reactors, two using the Toshiba AP1000 design 
and two using the CAP1400 with construction start forecast for 2018/19. Howev-
er, by 2016, it was reported that the talks were not going well and were no longer 
exclusive32. At best, the timetable is likely to slip and at worst, not to go ahead. SPI 
is one of five vendors competing in South Africa for an order for 6–8 reactors but 
it did not appear to be a front-runner and in August 2018, South Africa effectively 
abandoned its nuclear programme.
4 A comparison of the competitive positions  
of the vendors 
For this analysis (see Table 1), we look at the current design being offered by each 
of the vendors: for Westinghouse, this is the AP1000, for Framatome, the EPR, 
for Hitachi-GE the ABWR, for Rosatom the AES-2006, for CNNC and CGN the 
HPR-1000 and for SPI CAP1400.
29 http://www.snptc.com.cn/en/ (Accessed December 18, 2015)
30 Nuclear Intelligence Weekly ‘Weekly Round-up’ May 20, 2016, p 1
31 Nuclear Intelligence Weekly ‘Nine Projects Top Priority List’ May 6, 2016, p 5
32 Nuclear Intelligence Weekly ‘Akkuyu’s Prospects Pull Past Sinop’ July 22, 2016, p 3–4.
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Home market
A strong home market provides a vendor with a market that may be less cost sen-
sitive and competitive than export markets giving it a more assured flow of orders 
and a profitable base. An assured flow of orders will allow the build-up of a strong, 
efficient supply chain and reactor importers will see regulatory approval in the home 
market as a demonstration of the licensability of the design, especially where the 
home market has a long history of building and operating reactors and where the 
regulatory body is open and accountable.
On this criterion, the Chinese vendors appear strongest with the likelihood that 
all three vendors will receive at least two orders per year, although doubts about 
the role of the CAP1400 may weaken the position of SPI. Ten years ago, Russia and 
France were forecasting a strong market to replace existing reactors and to meet 
electricity demand growth. For France, the economics of life-extension appear far 
more attractive than new-build and there is little prospect of many orders being 
placed. Russia is still talking about new projects but these have been constantly 
delayed. Prospects for the Japanese home market appear for Hitachi and Toshiba 
appear poor with the priority likely to be getting existing plants back on line rather 
than trying to build new ones. Westinghouse is often seen as a US company because 
of its US base, but the prospects in the USA for new orders, particularly following 
the problems at the Summer and Vogtle projects also appear equally bleak there.
Regulatory approval
The USA and the UK are both carrying out rigorous generic reviews of designs to 
establish for all sites the licensability of the design, a process that has taken 5–10 
years. Design approval means that for a period of 10 (UK) or 15 (USA) years the 
design is approved leaving only site-specific issues to be reviewed in any applica-
tion to construct or operate a plant. The AP1000 has completed the US and the UK 
process. EPR has completed the UK process but the US process was abandoned in 
2015 largely because there were no immediate prospects of reactor sales to the USA. 
The GE/Toshiba/Hitachi ABWR was licensed in the US in 1997 but this expired 
in 2012. Renewal was applied for independently by both GE-Hitachi and Toshiba 
but by 2016, little progress appeared to have been made and Toshiba effectively 
abandoned its renewal application. Hitachi-GE submitted their updated version 
of the ABWR to the UK authorities in 2014 and was completed in December 2017. 
The Russian regulatory process is opaque and documentation is not available so 
buyers would have to trust in the rigour of the Russian process. Equally, the Chinese 
process is not transparent. The reviews that do take place seem to take about a year, 
suggesting they are not in the same depth as the US/UK equivalent.
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Experience with their current designs
Only the ABWR has actual operating experience with four reactors completed in 
Japan, the first in 1992. These have not operated very little since the Fukushima 
disaster but up to that point, their lifetime load factor was poor, only about 60 per 
cent. Four further ABWRs have started construction, two in Japan and two in 
Taiwan but none of them were actively being built in 2016 and they are unlikely 
to be completed. The EPR has four reactors under construction (two in China and 
one each in Finland and France) and by 2016 these were 4–10 years late and well 
over-budget. The two reactors under construction in China were started last but 
the first reactor in China went critical in June 2018. The eight AP1000s that started 
construction are also very late and over-budget. The Summer project was about 4 
years late when it was abandoned and the Vogtle project is also at least 4 years late. 
The AP1000s nearest to completion are the four reactors under construction in 
China, the first two of which went critical in mid-2018. Six AES-2006s have started 
construction with the four in Russia are all at least four years late. The first two 
reactors were completed in 2017 and 2018. In July 2016, one of the reactor vessels 
for the Belarus project was dropped while it was being manoeuvred into position. 
Belarus has demanded that the vessel be replaced and Rosatom has agreed. It is 
not clear how far this will delay the project33. Two each of the CNNC and the CGN 
versions of HPR-1000 were under construction by September 2018. There is no 
construction experience yet with CAP1400.
Government support
The support of the vendor’s national government is increasingly key for winning 
orders, particularly providing finance and coordinating other companies to par-
ticipate. China appears to have particular advantages in this respect because of 
the strength of China’s economy and its ownership of the vendors. These advan-
tages remain unproven in export markets and if economic growth in China is not 
sustained, there may be less scope for China to support its vendors. The Russian 
government is also intimately connected with its vendor, Rosatom, and most of 
the export orders it claims are reliant on Russia providing the finance. However, 
international sanctions resulting from the Ukraine issues, the collapse of the oil 
price and the money spent by the Kremlin trying to defend the rouble mean the 
capacity of Russia to provide finance for exports must be in doubt. One of the main 
33 TASS ‘Rosatom to observe Minsk’s demand for replacement of Belarus NPP reactor 
vessel – company’ August 12, 2016
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reasons given for delays completing nuclear power plants in Russia is lack of funds 
(Thomas, 2015).
Ironically, the Japanese government was in the process of setting up government 
mechanisms to support Japanese vendors Hitachi and Toshiba, including provision 
of loan guarantees in 2010 at the time of the Fukushima disaster. The Japanese 
government still seems determined to support nuclear power but it remains to 
be seen whether it can get the political support to do this and by 2018, Japanese 
vendors had won no orders with this government support and Toshiba’s future as 
a reactor vendor was in doubt.
Areva claimed that it could supply sovereign loan guarantees for reactor exports34 
for example to China and South Africa. It did provide €610m in loan guarantees for 
the Finnish Olkiluoto project in 200335, but this project has gone badly and it may 
be that the guarantees will have to be paid. However, this sum, 20 per cent of the 
expected construction cost, would appear not to be adequate coverage for a project 
now and the expected cost of nuclear has increased markedly. For example, the 
expected cost of the two reactor Hinkley Point project is about £30bn and this is 
expected to require 70 per cent coverage by loan guarantees for the deal to be viable. 
This would result in guarantees worth about £21bn. Whether the French government 
is willing to guarantee such sums must be in doubt. Whether Framatome, under 
the control of EDF, would continue to try to sell reactors was not clear by mid-2018.
Vendor’s financial position
The decline of markets for reactors has left several of the vendors in financial 
difficulties. Most serious of these are the collapses of Areva and Westinghouse. In 
March 2015, Areva announced annual losses of €4.8bn, the fifth consecutive year 
of losses36. The public stake in Areva had continued to increase to around 87 per 
cent by then. It became clear that the company could not continue in its existing 
state and the French government launched a rescue attempt. The company was 
split into two main parts, the fuel cycle business, Areva NC, renamed Orano, and 
the reactor vendor and servicing business, Areva NP, renamed Framatome. EDF, 
itself 83 per cent state-owned, was required to take over up to 80 per cent of Areva 
NP for about €2bn. The plan is that EDF would sell up to a 29 per cent stake to a 
34 Nucleonics Week ‘French export credit agency to insure loans for Cgnpc, Eskom’ August 
21, 2008
35 Nucleonics Week ‘European ‘green power’ generators challenge EPR’s competitiveness’ 
December 16, 2004
36 http://www.areva.com/finance/liblocal/docs/doc-ref-2014/DDR_EN_310315.pdf (Ac-
cessed March 1, 2016)
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third party leaving it with a 51 per cent stake. In July 2016, Mitsubishi and EDF 
signed a deal increasing cooperation and in 2017, Mitsubishi took a 19.5 per cent 
stake in Framatome37. 
The French government had to recapitalise Areva with about €4bn of public 
money38 and it also had to assume liabilities for failings with existing orders, for 
example, the cost overrun at Olkiluoto. 
In July 2015, a report by an independent panel of accountants and lawyers from 
within the company showed that Toshiba had been overstating its profits for seven 
years. This led to mass resignations at board level including the CEO39. This resulted 
in all the credit rating agencies reducing Toshiba’s credit rating and in December 
2015 both Standard & Poors and Moody’s reduced the rating to ‘junk’ (non-invest-
ment grade)40. In May 2016, Toshiba wrote down the value of the Westinghouse 
nuclear business, which it had acquired in 2006 for $5.4bn by $2.4bn41. In May 
2016, Toshiba announced its largest ever loss of Yen460bn ($4.2bn) for FY 201542 
and in March 2017, Westinghouse declared bankruptcy. Toshiba effectively cut the 
Westinghouse division adrift and it was sold to the Canadian company, Brookfield 
Business Partners. By mid-2018, it was not clear whether Westinghouse’s new 
owners would pursue new reactor orders or whether it would concentrate on the 
less risky and more lucrative reactor servicing and maintenance market. By mid-
2018, it was not clear whether Toshiba would attempt to rebuild a reactor vendor 
division based on its BWR capability.
The Hitachi group does not appear to be in serious difficulties although its nu-
clear division has not sold a reactor for nearly 20 years. The three Chinese vendors 
appear profitable. It is difficult to determine the strength of the Rosatom group 
but the weakness of the Russian economy in general is likely to restrict its scope. 
37 Nuclear Intelligence Weekly ‘EDF’s Balancing Act Between MHI and CGN’ July 8, 2016, 
p 4
38 Nucleonics Week ‘EDF taking over Areva reactor business: government’ June 4, 2015
39 Japan Times ‘Heads roll at Toshiba as scandal claims top brass’ July 22, 2015
40 Agence France Presse ‘Moody’s, S&P cut scandal-hit Toshiba’s credit rating to junk’ 
December 22, 2015
41 Nuclear Intelligence Weekly ‘Toshiba Warns of $2.4 Billion Westinghouse Impairment’ 
April 29, 2016
42 http://www.toshiba.co.jp/about/ir/en/pr/pdf/tpr2015q4e_ca.pdf (Accessed July 20, 2016)
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5 Conclusions 
The nuclear reactor supply industry, once seen as an essential component of diver-
sified companies with an electrical engineering capability, is now seen in Europe 
and USA as a risky niche business for specialist companies. In Japan, the capability 
is still in the hands of national champion companies but their commitment to the 
sector must be in doubt following the Fukushima disaster.
If the nuclear reactor vendor business is to have a future, it appears increasingly 
likely that it will be driven by Russia and China. For both countries, their nuclear 
industry appears to be part of national policy to expand their political and eco-
nomic influence. However, neither of these has significant experience in developed 
countries with well-resourced critical customers, with experienced, independent 
safety regulators and with well-developed public participation channels. For some 
developing country markets that have less capability to be critical customers, this 
may not be a restriction, but such markets are usually of limited scale, require sig-
nificant financial support and, historically, nuclear programmes in such countries 
often do not materialise.
The volume of nuclear orders being placed for China are often seen as China 
‘going nuclear’ but the reality is that nuclear only makes up about 3 per cent of its 
electricity supplies and because of its rapid electricity demand growth, even if its 
most ambitious plans are realised, it will still get less than 10 per cent of its electric-
ity from nuclear power. If these plans are to be realised, China needs to get over a 
major hurdle of siting plants inland rather than on the coast where all the existing 
plants are. There is considerable resistance to inland siting (King and Ramana, 
2015) and if this is not overcome, the scope for further nuclear capacity will be 
heavily restricted. So while the world nuclear industry may well need China for its 
survival, China does not necessarily need nuclear power. So if exports of nuclear 
plants are not bringing it the political influence and economic influence it is hoping 
for, it may not pursue the export market, even if it does continue to build in China.
For Russia, the dynamics are rather different. Electricity demand in Russia is 
falling, and, in the short-term, it probably lacks the financial resources and the supply 
chain to build many reactors either for export or the home market. Its economy is 
nowhere near as flexible and competitive as China’s so it cannot as easily as China 
switch the focus of its export efforts to other sectors.
It is hard to see the vendors from Japan and Europe – Hitachi-GE, Toshiba and 
Framatome – being competitive in nuclear export markets. Their technologies are 
problematic, they lack the comprehensive government backing that Russia and 
China give, and their home markets are minimal. The question then becomes do 
they need to sell new reactors to survive and perhaps profit. From 1991, when it 
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started building the last completed reactor in France, Framatome/Areva has started 
building only four reactors, two in China, and one each in France and Finland. These 
orders have been highly problematic are unlikely to be profitable and have seriously 
damaged their reputation. The flow of work servicing and providing replacement 
parts for operating plants is much more predictable and probably more profitable. 
With utilities under more financial pressure than in the past, this work is perhaps 
less profitable than it was in the past and the original vendor is no longer so sure 
of getting the servicing work, but it still appears a better route than very risky new 
reactor projects. With about 160 reactors in USA and France beginning to reach 
the end of their design life and with their owners generally anxious to run them 
a further 20 years or more, this appears a market that would provide a continued 
flow of work for Hitachi-GE, Toshiba and Framatome. It would also give them the 
opportunity to think afresh on new reactor designs, taking into account the lessons 
from Fukushima, which are only now beginning to emerge.
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Abstract
This chapter documents the technical development of different generations of 
nuclear power plants and provides an outlook for possible future concepts and 
their market prospects. The objective is to assess whether there is really signif-
icant technological progress on the horizon and whether these “new” concepts 
have prospects to become cost-effective. A major conclusion is that most of the 
so-called Generation IV concepts have already been discussed in the 1950s. At 
that time, they have not been pursued further due to problems such as costs, 
limiting factors in material properties and problems in appropriately controlling 
the fission processes. Yet, since about 2000 a modest revival of the discussion on 
these concepts is observed, obviously mainly motivated by securing the flow of 
public money for nuclear research and the broad recognition that with present 
reactor concepts the nuclear industry will not succeed.
1 Reinhard Haas, Technische Universität Wien, Austria, haas@eeg.tuwien.ac.at; Amela 
Ajanovic, Technische Universität Wien, Austria, ajanovic@eeg.tuwien.ac.at; David 
Reinberger, Magistrat Stadt Wien, Austria, david.reinberger@wien.gv.at
© The Author(s) 2019
of Nuclear Power, Energiepolitik und Klimaschutz. Energy Policy
and Climate Protection, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-25987-7_11
R. Haas et al. (Eds.), The Technological and Economic Future 
244 David Reinberger, Amela Ajanovic, and Reinhard Haas 
1 Introduction
Since the first nuclear power plants (NPP) were built in the 1950s, several technical 
developments have taken place. This chapter documents the changes in various 
generations of nuclear power plant designs, their major features and differences 
and to analyze technological problems arising mainly with respect to safety. In 
addition, we focus on the prospects of so-called Generation IV (GEN IV) reactors. 
According to the WNISR (2018), as of mid-2018, world-wide 413 nuclear power 
reactors were operating in 31 countries. The design, size and age of these reactors 
vary widely. Some of them are from the 1960’s, directly derived from designs for 
military purposes. Over two thirds (69 %) of the reactors in operation are Pressur-
ized Water Reactors (PWR), 13 % Boiling Water Reactors (BWR), 11 % Pressurized 
Heavy Water Reactor (PHWR). The majority of them is older than 30 years. 
Apart from the basic features (i.e. type of coolant, moderator material, working 
temperature, thermal/fast neutrons), the designs are categorized by “generations” 
(GEN); i.e. Generation I, II, III, III+, and IV. For GEN III and GEN III+, there are 
no clear definitions of which reactor design fits to which generation. It can be seen 
as an indicative classification. The major motivation for the nuclear industry for 
developing new reactor concepts are: (i) high current costs; (ii) low current fuel use 
efficiency; (iii) limited available uranium-resources; (iv) problems with refueling 
schedule; (v) problems concerning safety and waste management.
2 Historical development of reactor concepts
This sub-chapter provides a concise overview and critical review of the history of 
reactor concepts from GEN-I to GEN-III+, their advantages and their weaknesses. 
In addition, an outlook on GEN-IV reactor types is given. It is claimed that they 
are radically different designs compared to those in use today. If ever, they are 
expected to enter markets in 20 to 40 years.
Today three generations of nuclear reactors are operating worldwide. (Goldberg et. 
al (2011)). Figure 1 shows when specific concepts entered the market or are expected 
to do so. Today, both GEN II and GEN III plants are still being planned, built and 
used. Even GEN I plants are still in operation despite their lack of safety features.
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Generation I
GEN I plants are the early prototypes and power reactors from the 1950s and 1960s 
that were launched to generate nuclear power for commercial (civilian) purposes. 
They were deployed directly from military applications for commercial purposes 
without any additional safety devices. At least some of them were clearly built for 
dual-use (civil and military) purpose. GEN-I plants did not have any (active or 
passive) dedicated safety devices. 
Examples of GEN I are the Soviet AMB in Belojarsk or the AM-1 in Obninsk 
(both are graphite moderated types which have advantageous properties for the 
plutonium production) , the UK’s “Magnox” gas-cooled reactor – e.g. Calder Hall-1 
(1956–2003), Wylfa (1959-2012) (also Graphite moderated) – and the US reactors of 
the first generation such as Shippingport (1957–1982) in Pennsylvania (PWR) and 
Dresden-1 (BWR) (1960–1978) in Illinois. Most of them have already been shut down.
The last European remaining commercial Gen I plant, the Wylfa Nuclear Pow-
er Station in Wales, has been scheduled for closure in 2012, and finally was shut 
down in December 2015. In Pakistan the last GEN-I plant – a CANDU-137 – is 
still operational at Karachi. 
Generation II
GEN II systems began operation in the late 1960s and comprise the vast majority of 
today’s operating reactors ordered from the mid-60s to the 2010s. They are designed 
for a typical average operational lifetime of 40 years. The major difference to the 
GEN-I reactors are dedicated active safety designs and that they were in principle 
designed for civil use only. 
GEN-II reactors are typically light water reactors (LWRs) even though there are 
heavy water designs too. They use safety features involving electrical or mechanical 
operations that are initiated automatically and, in many cases, can be initiated by 
the operators. 
Figure 1 depicts the evolution of different generations of nuclear power reactors: 
GEN I, II and III in operation, GEN III+ as near-term deployment, and finally the 
GEN IV expected to be deployed not before 2030.
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Fig. 1 Th e evolution of diff erent generations of nuclear power reactors
Most of the GEN II plants still in operation in the Western countries were manu-
factured by Westinghouse, Framatome, and General Electric (GE). In the following 
section, the most important GEN-II systems are described in more detail. 
Pressurized water reactors 
Th e pressurized water reactor (PWR) was developed from the reactors used to propel 
submarines. In contrast to submarine reactors, which use high-enriched uranium, 
PWRs employ low-enriched uranium. Th ey are water cooled and moderated. Th e 
power density of PWRs can be relatively high (100 MW/m3) due to the eff ectiveness 
of the heat removal. 
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Fig. 2 Description of a pressurized water reactor (based on Greenpeace (2005))
Th eir primary circuit is characterized by high pressure (~15M Pa) and high tem-
perature (~600°F/ ~300 °C). Safety shall be guaranteed by diff erent systems to 
control the power output and to cool the core and the barrier system, consisting 
subsequently of the material structure of the uranium-pellets, the cladding of the 
fuel rods, the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) itself, the concrete structure around 
the RPV and the containment, which encloses the primary circuit. 
Th e steam generators, the link between the primary and secondary circuits, are 
a potential source for radioactivity leaking to the outside. Due to the high power 
density and the correspondingly high decay heat generated aft er shutdown, PWRs 
depend heavily on the availability of the cooling system. Th e active systems depend 
on a continuous electricity supply. Even when emergency diesels, redundant grid 
connection and batteries are installed, station blackouts represent a serious risk, 
which i. e. in Fukushima led to the destruction of all safety barriers. 
Safety systems are usually redundant (i.e. more components are provided for a 
task than needed). However, redundancy becomes useless if a so-called ‘common 
cause-failure’ like fl ooding or fi re disables all parallel trains of a safety system. In 
principle, there is a continuous trend worldwide towards increasing automation in 
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nuclear power plants’ safety, which potentially can reduce the hazards of human 
error. Th ere is also a trend to replace original analog I&C with digital systems. Th e 
implications on safety of this shift  are discussed still controversial. 
Boiling Water Reactors 
Th e boiling water reactor (BWR) was developed from the PWR, in an attempt to 
achieve greater simplicity of design and higher thermal effi  ciency by using a single 
circuit and by generating steam within the reactor core. As for PWRs, water acts 
as moderator and coolant. Th e result is a reactor that still exhibits most of the 
hazardous features of the PWR, while introducing a number of new problems. 
Fig. 3 Description of a boiling water reactor (based on Greenpeace (2005))
BWRs have lower power density (~50 MW/m3) in the core as well as lower pressure 
and lower temperature in their cooling circuit than a PWR. Th e uranium inventory 
in the core is higher than in PWRs. 
Th e primary circuit of a BWR passes outside the reactor containment. Th e 
radioactive steam is directly used to power the turbine(s). Neutron fl uxes are 
considerably lower (by a factor of 10) than in a PWR, leading to signifi cantly less 
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neutron induced aging of the reactor materials. On the other hand, the vessel is much 
larger; longitudinal welds may be required, whereas there are only circumferential 
welds in a PWR vessel. There is also a much more complicated inner structure, as 
well as many penetrations at the bottom. Like a PWR, a BWR depends heavily on 
fast and reliable active safety systems, while the plumbing of the BWR’s emergen-
cy core cooling system is much more complex. Control rod injection is – against 
gravity – from underneath the pressure vessel, Regulating the operation of a BWR 
is generally more complex than in a PWR. Under certain circumstances, the col-
lapse of so-called steam voids in the core can lead to increasing reactivity and thus 
increasing power during an accident. 
3 Generation III and Generation III + 
GEN III designs began to emerge in the mid-1980s onwards, based on learning from 
the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl accidents. A number of ‘evolutionary’ GEN 
III designs were developed from GEN II reactor types without any drastic changes. 
According to the World Nuclear Association (WNA), GEN III reactors are 
characterized by improvements in the following areas (WNA 2004):
• a more standardised design for each type to expedite licensing, reduce capital 
cost and reduce construction time,
• simpler and more rugged design, making them easier to operate and less vul-
nerable to operational upsets,
• longer operating life – typically 60 years,
• reduced possibility of core melt accidents,
• better fuel technology, higher thermal efficiency, higher burn-up to reduce fuel 
use and amount of waste,
• modularized construction.
The most significant improvement of GEN III systems is the incorporation of passive 
safety features in some designs, which do not require active controls or operator 
intervention but instead rely on gravity or natural convection to mitigate the impact 
of abnormal events. Passive systems do not work under any circumstances. They 
may not relay on functioning of some technical systems but they relay on certain 
external (uncontrollable) parameters under which the desired physical/chemical 
process works. 
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Different concepts bearing the labels GEN III and GEN III+ are in various stages 
of development and implementation today. In the following, the most important 
examples as mentioned by WNA (2004) and the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA, 2004) are provided. Usually, the concepts are classified into two 
categories: Large designs >700 MWe and medium designs <700 MWe.
1. Pressurized Water Reactors
The principal large designs are APWR (Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI)/
Westinghouse), APWR+ (MHI), EPR (AREVA), AP-1000 (Westinghouse), KSNP+ 
and APR-1400 (Korean Industry) and the CNP-1000 (China National Nuclear 
Corporation). Regarding the Russian VVERs, an advanced VVER-1000 has been 
developed by Atomenergoproject and Gidropress. 
The main small- and medium-size advanced PWR designs are the AP-600 
(Westinghouse) and the VVER-640 (Atomenergoproject and Gidropress).
2. Boiling Water Reactors
The main large concepts are the ABWR, (Hitachi, Toshiba, GE), the BWR 90+ 
(Westinghouse Atom of Sweden), the SWR-1000 (Framatome ANP) and the 
ESBWR (GE). The HSBWR and HABWR (Hitachi) are small- and medium-sized 
advanced BWR concepts.
Three ABWRs were already operating in Japan: Two at Kashiwazaki-Kariwa 
since 1996, a third started operating in 2004. As of the end of 2018, none of them is 
operational due to shutdown following earthquakes in July 2007 and March 2011. 
Generation III+
Generation III+ reactors are slightly modified GEN III designs initiated in the late 
1990s, when the nuclear industry began to promote a ‘nuclear renaissance’. These 
should solve three key problems: safety, cost and buildability. The central claim 
was based on the premise that the existing designs have become too complex and 
expensive due to new safety systems. 
Construction costs of US$1,000/kW were forecast, a level that would make 
nuclear competitive with gas, and construction times of four years or less were 
expected (see previous WNISRs). The promise that nuclear power could be the 
cheapest option reignited interest in nuclear power in a number of key markets. 
What are the lessons learned today? Regarding the claim that designs would be 
easier to build, 20 years since a ‘nuclear renaissance’ has been announced, only a 
handful of GEN III+ reactors – four AP-1000, one EPR – have started operating, in 
2018, in China. Standardization did not take place, and the introduction of mod-
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ularized design seems to have simply shifted the quality issues from construction 
sites to module factories. 
By end of 2018, an additional 11 reactors claiming to meet GEN III+ criteria – 
whatever they are – were under construction: six AES-2006, three EPRs and two 
AP-1000, all of them years behind schedule and significantly over budget. The 
construction of two AP-1000s in the U.S., at the VC Summer site in South Carolina, 
was abandoned in 2017 after builder Westinghouse went bankrupt.
4 Small Modular Reactors (SMRs)
As nuclear power generation has been established in the 1950s, the capacity of re-
actor units has grown from 60 MWe to more than 1400 MWe, with corresponding 
economies of scale in operation. However, these large plants operating today set a 
high and expensive standard for safety. 
Several firms are working on designs that are smaller in scale than the current 
GEN III designs. A basic feature of these plants is that they would make use of 
modular construction techniques. Small components shall be assembled in a fac-
tory environment (offsite or onsite) into structural modules weighing up to 1,000 
tonnes. The idea is that these new reactors—at a 300 MW scalable, smaller than a 
rail car and one-tenth the cost of a big plant—could be built quickly. 
The driving forces for SMRs are the reduction of investment per unit and the 
need for integration into smaller grids in developing countries. However, there 
are serious doubts concerning these prospects. Furthermore, the opinion that the 
only way to make nuclear power cost competitive is the use of small modules is 
not shared by all nuclear industry experts. The reason is – see above – the achieved 
economies-of-scale with respect to LWR. Capital construction costs (price per 
unit of electric capacity, or $/kWe) of a nuclear reactor decrease with size, but 
the economy of scale applies only if reactors are of a very similar design, as has 
historically been the case. 
The design characteristics of SMRs, however, are significantly different from 
those of large reactors. SMRs approach the economies of scale problem by achieving 
significant cost savings elsewhere leading to significant learning-by-doing efficiencies. 
For example, SMR designs seek to streamline safety and safeguard requirements 
by replacing (at least some) security guards with concrete security barriers and/
or by building underground, streamlining the requirements for operators and the 
emergency planning zone requirements. 
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The new designs do stretch out refuelling schedules, from 18 months to possibly 
3–5 years and potentially to as long as 10 years. 
5 Generation IV
The above-mentioned problems of the industry have led to the development of a 
so-called GEN IV reactors. They are described as radically different designs to 
reactors operating today, some involving a closed fuel cycle. Moreover, GEN IV 
reactors are said to be highly economical, to incorporate enhanced safety and 
reliability features and embed physical protection. They should produce minimal 
amounts of waste and be proliferation resistant, as these designs include advanced 
actinide management.
In addition, GEN IV reactors should have all of the features of Gen III+ units, as 
well as the ability, when operating at high temperature, to support economical hy-
drogen production, thermal energy off-taking, and perhaps even water desalination.
Yet, today, in 2018, GEN IV reactors are considered to be decades away from 
commercialization, as they have been when the discussion on these concepts 
started again in the early 2000s. The few attempts in the past based on concepts 
like fast neutron reactors nowadays called GEN IV ended with severe technical 
issues (e.g. Phénix and Superphénix in France) or accidents (e.g. Monju in Japan), 
which forced a closure of the respective project. Only two are currently in operation 
(Beloyarsk-3 and -4).
The start of the GEN IV initiative can be pointed to the year 2000, when the 
U.S. DOE launched the “Generation IV International Forum” (GIF) with the aim of 
developing a technically new generation of reactors. Today, ten member-countries 
participate in this initiative (Argentina, Brazil, Canada, France, Japan, Republic 
of Korea, South Africa, Switzerland, U.K. and the USA), as does EURATOM. The 
initial goal was to develop innovative nuclear systems (reactors and fuel cycles) 
likely to enter markets by as early of 2020. 
The concepts selected for Generation IV were discussed within the GIF groups 
of international experts from industry, universities and national laboratories. They 
were organized to undertake the identification and evaluation of candidate systems, 
and to define research and development (R&D) activities to support them. Initially, 
some 100 different designs were identified as candidates and evaluated. 
These designs ranged from concepts that rather belonged to Generation III+ to 
a few that were radically different from all known technologies. At the end of the 
process, six concepts were recommended for further development in the framework 
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of GIF. A roadmap describes the R&D required to develop each of the six systems 
as well as the approximate time and cost for completion. Many of the technological 
gaps were common to more than one system and the roadmap identifies several 
areas where crosscutting R&D would be required. The necessary R&D would be 
very expensive, and no single country had the necessary facilities and expertise to 
carry it out alone (DOE, 2002).
5.1 Sodium-Cooled Fast Reactor System (SFR)
The SFR system consists of a fast-neutron reactor and a closed fuel cycle system. 
There are two major options: One is a medium size (150 to 500 MWe) reactor with 
metal alloy fuel, supported by a fuel cycle based on pyrometallurgical reprocess-
ing in collocated facilities. The second is a medium to large (500 to 1,500 MWe) 
reactor with MOX fuel, supported by a fuel cycle based upon advanced aqueous 
reprocessing at a centralized location serving a number of reactors. The primary 
coolant system can either be arranged in a pool layout or in a compact loop layout. 
(DOE, 2002; Lineberry, 2002).
According to GIF, the SFR has the broadest development base of all the GEN IV 
concepts. The existing know-how, however, is based mainly on old reactors, which 
have already been shut down for various reasons (safety, economics, resistance from 
the population), e.g Superphenix in France (1988) and Kalkar in Germany (1989). 
Considering its history, as well as the significant hazards of this reactor line it 
is difficult to understand, why the SFR has been selected by GIF. According to GIF, 
research on both, the fuel cycle and the reactor system, is necessary to bring the SFR 
to deployment. Furthermore, there is important work to be done regarding safety. 
It has been argued that the SFR system is top ranked in sustainability because of 
its closed fuel cycle and potential for actinide management. It has been rated good 
in safety, economics, proliferation resistance and physical protection. In 2002 the 
SFR system was estimated to be deployable by 2015 (DOE, 2002). It did not happen.
5.2 Very-High-Temperature Reactor System (VHTR)
The VHTR is considered as a next step in the evolutionary development of high-tem-
perature gas-cooled reactors (HTGR). This reactor line has been pursued until the 
late 80s in several countries; however, only prototype and demonstration plants 
were ever operated, all of which were decommissioned after rather short and un-
successful overall operating times about twelve years of operation at most such 
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as the small Dragon reactor experiment (20 MWth, 1966 -1975, U.K.), the THTR 
Hamm-Uentrop, (308 MWe, 1986–1988, Germany) as well as the U.S. plants at 
Peach Bottom (42 MWe, 1967–1974) and Fort St. Vrain (342 MWe, 1976–1989).
The VHTR system uses a thermal neutron spectrum and a once-through urani-
um fuel cycle. The reference reactor concept has a 600-MWth graphite-moderated 
helium-cooled core based on either the prismatic block fuel of the GT-MHR or the 
pebble bed of the PBMR. It is regarded as the most promising and efficient system 
for hydrogen production, either using the thermochemical iodine-sulphur process, 
or from heat, water, and natural gas by applying the steam reformer technology 
at core outlet temperatures greater than 1,000°C. The VHTR is also intended to 
generate electricity with high efficiency (over 50%). 
Furthermore, it is hoped that the concept could benefit from the experience 
gained with the Japanese HTTR research reactor and the Chinese HTR-PM still 
under construction, as well as from the GT-MHR and the PBMR projects at present 
in the planning phase. 
5.3 Supercritical-Water-Cooled Reactor System (SCWR)
The SCWRs are high-temperature, high-pressure water-cooled reactors that operate 
above the thermo-dynamic critical point of water (T > 374,12 °C and p > 22,06 GPa). 
The reference plant has a 1700 MWe power level, an operating pressure of 25 MPa, 
and a reactor outlet temperature of 550°C. Fuel is uranium oxide. SCWRs could 
be designed as thermal or as fast-spectrum reactors, but current worldwide efforts 
focus on the thermal design.
The thermal efficiency of a SCWR can approach 44%, compared to 33–35% for 
LWRs. Because no change of phase occurs in the core and the system utilizes a direct 
cycle (like the BWR), steam separators, dryers, pressurizes and recirculation pumps 
are not required, resulting in a considerably simpler and more compact system than 
traditional LWRs. SCWRs are hoped to be more economical than LWRs, due to 
plant simplification and high thermal efficiency. The Governments of Japan, the U.S. 
and Canada are developing the SCWR. There have been no prototypes built so far.
The technology for the SCWR is based on the existing LWRs and supercriti-
cal-water-cooled fossil-fired power plants. However, there are important SCWR 
technology gaps in the areas of materials and structures, including corrosion 
and stress corrosion cracking (SCC), safety and plant design. The main feasibility 
issues are the development of suitable in-core materials and the demonstration of 
adequate safety and stability.
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5.4 Lead-Cooled Fast Reactor System (LFR)
LFR systems are reactors cooled by liquid metal (lead or lead/bismuth) with a 
fast-neutron spectrum and closed fuel cycle system. A full actinide-recycle fuel 
cycle with central or regional facilities is envisaged. A wide range of unit sizes is 
planned, from ´batteries̀  of 50–150 MWe, and modular units of 300–400 MWe 
to large single plants of 1200 MWe. The LFR battery option is a small factory-built 
turnkey plant with very long core life (10 to 30 years). It is designed for small grids, 
and for developing countries that may not wish to deploy a fuel cycle infrastructure.
Among the LFR concepts, this battery option is regarded as the most promis-
ing, concerning fulfilment of Generation IV goals. However, it also has the largest 
research needs and longest development time.
Experience with the technology is restricted to seven Russian Alpha class sub-
marines, which stopped operation in 1995, and on the advanced liquid-metal fast 
breeder reactor (ALMR), the design of which was withdrawn from the U.S. NRC 
review at an early stage (WANO, 2004).
The LFR system is top-ranked in sustainability because a closed fuel cycle is 
aimed at, and in proliferation resistance and physical protection because it employs 
a long-life core. It is rated good in safety and economics. The LFR system was es-
timated in 2002 to be deployable by 2025 (DOE, 2002). That is out of reach today.
5.5 Gas-Cooled Fast Reactor System (GFR)
The GFR system is a helium-cooled reactor with fast-neutron spectrum and closed 
fuel cycle. It is primarily envisioned for electricity production and actinide man-
agement. The GFR reference assumes an integrated, on-site spent fuel treatment 
and re-fabrication plant, but the viability of the planned technology has yet to be 
demonstrated. Fuel cycle technology is the most comprehensive technology gap 
of the GFR.
In spite of large technology gaps, according to GIF, the GFR system is top-
ranked in sustainability because of its closed fuel cycle and excellent theoretical 
performance in actinide management. It is rated good in safety, economics, as well 
as proliferation resistance and physical protection. The GFR was estimated in 2002 
to be deployable by 2025 (DOE, 2002). That will not happen.
Several GIF members have a specific interest for a sequenced development of 
gas-cooled system: The first step of the ´Gas Technology Path` aims to develop a 
modular HTGR, the second step would be the VHTR, and the third step the GFR 
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(Carré, 2004). The gas-cooled systems VHTR and GFR are seen as the top priorities 
of GIF members in Europe and the USA.
5.6 Molten Salt Reactor System (MSR)
During the 1960s the USA developed the molten salt breeder reactor as the primary 
back-up option for the conventional fast breeder reactor (cooled by liquid metal). 
A small prototype (8 MWth), the Molten Salt Reactor Experiment (MSRE), was 
operated for only four years. The next project planned, the Molten Salt Breeder 
Reactor (MSBR), was never built. The present work rests only on these projects. 
Detailed designs of an MSR have not been produced since the 1970s (Forsberg, 2002).
The MSR system is based on a thermal neutron spectrum and a closed fuel cycle. 
The uranium fuel is dissolved in the sodium fluoride salt coolant that circulates 
through graphite core channels. The heat, directly generated in the molten salt, 
is transferred to a secondary coolant system, and then through a tertiary heat 
exchanger to the power conversion system. 
5.7 Discussion of GEN IV concepts
GIF considers a closed fuel cycle as a major advantage of Generation IV concepts. 
A system with a closed fuel cycle is regarded as more effective, and sustainable. 
However, not all of the six concepts selected for development employ a closed 
fuel cycle. The VHTR, most favoured, relies on an open cycle; and for the SCWR, 
once-through constitutes the nearer-term option. Furthermore, it is questionable, 
whether it will actually be possible to successfully develop and implement a closed 
fuel cycle. In addition, the costs of such closed fuel cycle concepts would be very 
high. According to the study “The Future of Nuclear” of the U.S. Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology (MIT, 2003), a convincing case has not yet been made that 
the long-term waste management benefits of advanced closed fuel cycles involving 
reprocessing of spent fuel are not indeed outweighed by the short-term risks and 
costs, including proliferation risks. The waste problem of nuclear industry can 
only be reduced even in an optimistic closed cycle scenario but remains far from 
being solved. (e.g. Gutachten Transmutation, Gerald Kirchner et al., 2015) Also, 
the MIT study found that the fuel cost with a closed cycle, including waste stor-
age and disposal charges, to be about 4.5 times the cost of a once-through cycle. 
Therefore, it is not realistic to expect that there will be new reactor and fuel cycle 
technologies that simultaneously overcome the problems of cost, safe waste disposal 
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and proliferation. As a result, the MIT study concludes that the once-through fuel 
cycle best meets the criteria of low costs and proliferation-resistance (NEI, 2003).
The basic concepts of the “new generation” have been around as long as nuclear 
power, but they were forced out of the market in the early years by the LWR – not 
without reason, considering the experiences so far, which are dominated by tech-
nical and economic problems, and safety deficits.
In order to overcome these problems, materials, processes and operating regimes 
that are significantly different from those of currently operating systems or previous 
systems would have to be developed. So far, none of the six reactor concepts selected 
for development fulfils all GEN IV aims.
6 Conclusions 
Practically all of the 413 world-wide operating reactors (as of mid-2018) are GEN-II 
reactors carrying the well-known risks with respect to safety issues and prolifer-
ation. By the end of 2018, only a hand full of GEN III+ reactors – attributed with 
higher safety levels – are in operation (all in China). There are only 11 are under 
construction world-wide. They should be safer due to additional passive safety 
features. The lessons learned so far are that these generations’ plants are much more 
expensive and can experience huge delays in construction times.
Different international, government sponsored organisations such as GIF are 
selling the idea of so-called GEN IV reactors. They pretend that under that umbrella 
term a completely new generation of reactors is being developed. The envisaged 
concepts are surely different from the light water concepts used so far. The message 
for the media, politicians and the public is: GEN IV is a safe, economical com-
petitive, proliferation-resistant power source without the problem of increasing 
greenhouse gas emissions. 
However, these expectations are very high, and their realization is at least 20 years 
away. In addition, the underlying basic concepts of “GEN IV” are decades old and 
encompass a range of ideas, which were already discussed in the 1950s. They were 
not pursued further due to severe problems such as high costs, limiting factors in 
material properties and difficulties in controlling the fission processes. They were 
forced out of the market already in the early years by the LWR.
It is of core interest to understand what the real motivation behind the GEN 
IV initiative is. To some extent it seems the revival of the discussion on GEN IV is 
mainly driven by the wish to secure the flow of public money for nuclear research. 
Whether it will really lead to the development of new reactors remains highly 
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doubtful. The sobering final conclusion is that substantial amounts of money are 
invested in efforts which are not likely to solve any of the problems of nuclear power, 
climate change and energy supply security. 
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Decommissioning of Nuclear Power Plants 
and Storage of Nuclear Waste
Experiences from Germany, France, and the U.K.
Ben Wealer, Jan Paul Seidel, and Christian von Hirschhausen1
Abstract
The decommissioning of nuclear power plants and the storage of nuclear waste are 
major challenges for all nuclear countries. Both processes are technologically and 
financially challenging. We provide an analysis of the status quo of both processes 
in three major nuclear countries: Germany, France, and the U.K. Germany was 
able to gain some decommissioning experiences but not one large-scale reactor 
has been released from regulatory control. EDF was forced to cancel its target to 
immediately dismantle all GCRs by 2036 due to underestimated technological 
challenges, while in the U.K., decommissioning of the legacy fleet lasts well into 
the 22nd century. Until now, no scale effects could be observed, if EDF can reap 
scale effects due to the standardization of its fleet remains to be seen. The search 
for a deep geological disposal facility is the most advanced in France, where the 
start date is fixed by law to 2025. There are many uncertainties related to estimated 
future costs. In the three countries, three different funding schemes are imple-
mented: Germany switched from internal non-segregated funds to an external 
segregated fund for waste management. In the U.K. the decommissioning of the 
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legacy fleet will be paid by the taxpayer for the next 100 years while an external 
segregated fund was established for the current operational fleet. In France, an 
internal segregated fund finances the future liabilities of EDF.
1 Introduction
The decommissioning of nuclear power plants (NPP) and the long-term storage 
of nuclear waste are important elements of the life cycle of nuclear power plants, 
but both processes have been underestimated for a long time, both in terms of the 
technological challenges as well as the financial implications. Traditional economic 
analysis has discounted the future costs for decommissioning and storage so that 
these never appeared in the financial calculations. Furthermore, the little available 
experience leads to a high uncertainty about future pathways. In addition, technical 
and financial data are difficult to compare between countries.
In this chapter we provide an in-depth analysis of decommissioning and waste 
storage processes in three major European nuclear countries: Germany, France, 
and the United Kingdom. To do so, we are going to compare the different national 
strategies of organizing and financing the decommissioning of NPPs and the storing 
of high-level nuclear waste. We distinguish between the two main elements of the 
strategy: production and financing. First, someone has to manage and organize 
the decommissioning and storage process (the production): this can either be pri-
vate or public companies, or a mixture of both. Second, both processes need to be 
financed: This can be done by the federal budget, an external segregated fund, or 
in-house financing by the companies, usually done in internal funds—segregated 
or non-segregated (OECD/NEA 2016a).2
The shutdown reactors in the three observed countries France, Germany, and 
the U.K. account for more than 77% of the reactors in shutdown state in the Eu-
ropean Union (European Parliament 2013). In addition, these countries represent 
interesting features that reveal the different experiences and challenges. Germany 
is just exploring ways for large-scale decommissioning, having decided to phase out 
2 External segregated fund: The operators pay their financial obligation in a publicly con-
trolled fund managed by private or state owned external independent bodies. Internal 
non-segregated fund: The operator of a facility is obliged to form and manage funds 
autonomous, which are held within their accounts as reserves. Internal segregated 
fund: The operator feeds a self-administrated fund, which is separated from the other 
businesses.
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nuclear power by 2022. Both, France and the U.K., are facing specific technological 
challenges with the graphite-moderated reactors of the 1960s. There are concerns in 
France that the financial challenges of the future decommissioning process—with 
58 still operational reactors France will face the largest decommissioning project 
in Europe—are not yet well understood and underestimated. The case study of the 
U.K. reveals organizational and financial challenges of having to clean up after a few 
decades of operating the nuclear sector, and the long time frames to be expected.
The focus of this chapter is on the decommissioning of large-scale NPPs that 
were operated commercially for electricity production and the management of 
high-level radioactive waste (HLW). The two light water reactor (LWR) concepts—
the pressurized water reactor (PWR) and the boiling water reactor (BWR)—are 
the most widely installed reactor designs in the world. However, in this case study, 
the only BWRs are located in Germany while France only operates PWRs. The 









Operational Shutdown Operational Shutdown Operational Shutdown
Germany U.K. France
PWR BWR GCR Other
Fig. 1 Operational and shutdown reactors by reactor type in the observed countries, 
own depiction based on IAEA (2017).3
3 The cluster “other” comprises for France: two fast breeding reactors (FBR) and one 
heavy-water moderated gas-cooled reactor (HWGCR); for Germany: one high-tem-
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and installed in France and the U.K. While France ceased operations of its entire 
GCR fleet, they are still operational in the U.K. The number of shutdown reactors 
in the United Kingdom and Germany outweigh the operational reactors by a large 
amount, as can be seen in Fig. 1. 
The decommissioning and clean-up of the global civil nuclear legacy and the long-
term storage of nuclear waste represents technological, safety and environmental 
challenges for all nuclear countries. During the period when nuclear energy was 
established, the focus of planners and operators was predominantly on designing, 
building and operating a safe plant and only limited on the eventual decommission-
ing of the facility and the management of resulting radioactive wastes (McIntyre 
2012). In general, the decommissioning process of an NPP moves from the outer 
to the inner area of the reactor. Simultaneously, the degree of contamination of the 
handled parts increases. The eventual process of decommissioning of the nuclear 
power plant can be divided into five main stages.4 A geological disposal facility for 
high-level waste is still missing worldwide. As spent nuclear fuel (SNF) has to be 
stored for 40–50 years in order to cool down, before it can be permanently stored 
in an underground disposal repository, the time was not that pressing to tackle 
this problem for the responsible actors, which led to the construction of interim 
storage facilities for high-level wastes.
As the goal of this chapter is an analysis of the technical, organizational and 
financial status quo of both processes in Germany, France, and the U.K., the dif-
ferent national strategies and approaches of organizing the production and the 
financing of the decommissioning process, and storing the nuclear waste will firstly 
be analysed and then compared; the final section concludes. 
perature gas-cooled reactor (HTGR), one FBR, two pressurized heavy-water reactors, 
one HWGCR, and one FBR; for the U.K.: two FBRs and one SGHWR
4 Stage 1: Dismantling of systems that are not needed for the decommissioning process 
and installation of the logistic in the hot zone. Stage 2: Dismantling of higher contam-
inated larger system parts. Stage 3: Dismantling in the hot zone, e.g. deconstruction of 
the activated reactor pressure vessel (RPV) and its internals (RVI) and of the biological 
shield. Stage 4: Deconstruction of contaminated system parts, removal of operating 
systems and decontamination of buildings. Stage 5: Demolition of the building or further 
nuclear or non-nuclear use (Wealer et al. 2015).
Decommissioning of Nuclear Power Plants and Storage of Nuclear Waste 265
265
2 France
With a nuclear share in the net electricity production of 72.28% in 2016 (IAEA 
2017) France still relies heavily on nuclear power. The Energy Transition for Green 
Growth bill, approved by the National Assembly in 2015, foresees a reduction of 
this share to 50% by 2025. In 2017, Electricité de France (EDF) operates 58 NPPs 
on 19 sites across the country with a total installed capacity of 63.2 GW. The oldest 
running reactors are the two Fessenheim units which became critical in 1978, and 
the most recently installed NPPs are the two Civeaux units, commissioned in 2002. 
The French nuclear fleet has an average age of around 30 years and has with its three 
PWR designs5 the highest degree of standardization in the world (World Nuclear 
Association 2017). All the nuclear steam supply systems of the operational NPPs 
were designed by Framatome (IAEA 2017). In 2010, EDF announced that it was 
assessing the prospect of raising the 40-year lifetimes to 60 years for all its existing 
reactors. This strategy would involve replacement of all steam generators in the 900 
and 1,300 MW reactors and other refurbishments costing 400–600 million EUR per 
unit.6 As the focus of this chapter lies on the decommissioning and waste manage-
ment of commercial NPPs, the activities of EDF will be the focus in the following.
2.1 Production
2.1.1 Decommissioning of nuclear power plants
Currently, there are 13 NPPs in a stage of permanent shutdown; of which nine NPPs 
are from the first-generation GCRs, similar to the U.K. Magnox reactors. Chooz-A 
is the only PWR currently being decommissioned by EDF. The decommissioning 
of the former military installations in Marcoule G-1, G-2, and G-3 is taken over by 
the public nuclear research agency Commissariat à l’énergie atomique et aux éner-
gies alternatives (CEA). French regulation states that NPPs have to be immediately 
dismantled and the process has to be carried out as fast as possible; depending on 
the complexity of the plant this could mean several years up to several decades 
(Autorité de sûreté nucléaire 2016b). Initially EDF planned to decommission its 
shutdown NPPs in two waves within 25 years with an estimated end in 2036 (Au-
5 The three-loop 900 MW reactors (CP0, CP1, CP2), the four-loop 1,300 MW reactors 
(P4), and the four-loop 1,450 MW reactors (N4).
6 So far EDF has replaced the three steam generators in 22 of their 900 MW reactors, 
ordered 44 steam generators for eleven of the 1,300 MW class and will proceed with 
the other nine (World Nuclear Association 2017).
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torité de sûreté nucléaire 2016a). The first wave consisted of the FBR Super-Phénix, 
the HWGCR Brennilis, the PWR Chooz-A and the GCR Bugey-1; in the second 
wave the last five GCRs Chinon A 1–3 and Saint Laurent A 1–2 were planned to be 
decommissioned. This ambitious plan was changed in 2016.
Chooz-A (operational from 1967 to 1991) was the first European commercial 
PWR and built under a Westinghouse license. By December 1995 the reactor was 
defueled and the SNF dispatched to the reprocessing centre in La Hague. The 
policy change in the French decommissioning strategy in 2011 from Long-Term 
Enclosure to Immediate Dismantling accelerated the decommissioning plans and 
reduced the enclosure period from 50 to only a few years (European Parliament 
2013). Since 2014, the reactor pressure vessel of Chooz-A is being decommissioned 
under water. The work was contracted to a Westinghouse-Nuvia France consortium 
(Hitchin 2010). The experiences with the PWR dismantling are seen as an important 
feedback source for the further dismantling of the still operational PWR fleet, but 
this is questionable (Seidel and Wealer 2016) as Chooz-A is an early reactor design 
and quite unique with its embedment inside a bedrock of a hill in the Ardennes. 
Chooz-A is therefore not really comparable to the other PWRs. EDF missed the 
ambitious target of completing the decommissioning process by 2016, the process 
is now expected to be completed by 2020–2025 (Martelet 2016).
As disposal routes for irradiated graphite waste are still missing, the Long-Term 
Enclosure of a GCR is the worldwide preferred decommissioning strategy. Nonethe-
less the change of EDF’s strategy also affected its GCR decommissioning strategy, 
which was considered to be more global and interconnected as it had to cope with 
a considerable amount of irradiated graphite. To cope with this waste, EDF initially 
started with the construction of an interim storage facility on the Bugey site, but 
the construction was stopped in 2012. In 2016, EDF announced a change of its GCR 
strategy to the regulatory authority ASN (Autorité de sûreté nucléaire): the focus 
for the next 15 years would lie on dismantling nuclear installations except for the 
reactors and its buildings. The plans foresee that the first reactor (Chinon A-1) will 
start the dry dismantling in 2031; during the estimated dismantling duration of 
25 years, the five remaining reactors will be enclosed. This new strategy will lead 
to a possible release of the GCRs from regulatory control in the beginning of the 
22nd century. The major motivations for a switch to a dry dismantling strategy were 
constrains due to the long immersion times of the reactors, i.e. corrosion and leak 
tightness (Martelet 2016). The initial plan with the continuous flow of graphite waste 
and the very tight focus on the reactor core could not be implemented because the 
actual dismantling is technologically complex and needs more preliminary tests 
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than expected.7 ASN recognized the proposal and expects by the end of 2017 a 
detailed decommissioning plan for the next 15 years and EDF to take a position 
regarding this sudden change in strategy. In France, EDF officially uses the term 
“Safe Configuration” instead of Long-Term Enclosure (or Safe Storage), while in the 
U.K., where EDF Energy is responsible for the decommissioning of the operational 
GCR fleet, the company opts officially for the Long-Term Enclosure strategy. It is 
also unsure, if the new strategy is compatible with the implication of the French 
regulatory authority to carry out the decommissioning as fast as possible (Seidel 
and Wealer 2016).
2.1.2 Storage of high-level wastes
As France operates a closed fuel cycle, SNF is not declared as waste but as a resource 
and is reprocessed in La Hague by Areva. The glass canisters containing vitrified 
HLW are stored at the production sites Marcoule, Cadarache, and La Hague (Le-
htonen 2015). The final forecasts for the generated waste of the operational nuclear 
fleet—assuming an average life of 50 years—is expected to be around 10,000 m³ 
(OECD/NEA 2016b). The Waste Management Act established the way to treat radio-
active waste and set the direction of research undertaken by the government agency 
ANDRA. Research for a final storage is mainly undertaken at the 500-metre deep 
underground rock laboratory Cigéo in Bure situated in clays. ANDRA expects to 
present its master plan to the government for operation and disposal at Cigéo site in 
2017 and expects a construction permit in 2018. Construction should start in 2020 
and the start of the pilot phase is set by law to 2025. Contrary to other countries, 
research is also undertaken in the field of partitioning and transmutation, and 
long-term surface storage of wastes following conditioning. A major part of the 
low-level long-lived waste is the graphite from the GCRs, which is probably going 
to be stored 200 meters underground in a layer of clay as (“Intact Cove Disposal”) 
or going to be stored with the HLW in the Cigéo disposal (Ministry for Ecology, 
Sustainable Development and Energy 2014).
7 According to EDF’s previous time schedule, the critical path of the former GCR initial 
decommissioning project consisted of the graphite removal from the reactor core and the 
decommissioning of the reactors was already well behind in schedule in 2011 (Laurent 
2011).
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2.2 Financing
Applying the polluter-pays-principle, the operators of nuclear power plants are 
responsible to bear all costs related to decommissioning and waste management. 
The financing scheme is based on two different kinds of funds. The first is char-
acterized by a segregated internal fund set up by EDF and Areva8 and managed 
under separate accountability. Besides that, there are two more internal restricted 
funds related to ANDRA: one for research for future storage facilities and one for 
the construction and operation of a future storage facility for medium and long 
lived high-level waste. The majority of future costs is related to the facilities of EDF. 
Table 1 provides this cost estimation and the provisions set aside by EDF.
Tab. 1 Estimated costs of EDF end of 2016 in million EUR (EDF 2017).
Purpose Estimated costs end of 
2016 (Mio. EUR)
Provisions set aside end 
of 2016 (Mio. EUR)
Spent Fuel Management 18,460 10,658
Long-term Radioactive waste 
management
29,631 8,966
Nuclear plant decommissioning 26,616 14,122
Last cores 4,344 2,287
Total 79,051 36,033
In total, the estimated costs are more than 79 billion EUR, with the main parts being 
for the geological disposal facility Cigéo (~ 30 billion EUR) and decommissioning (~ 
27 billion EUR). Critical reports about the cost estimations mention that, especially 
the decommissioning costs of 27 billion EUR for 58 reactors are underestimated. 
Extrapolations of costs estimations of other countries show that EDF is expecting 
comparatively low costs per unit (Cour des Comptes 2014). EDF argues that the 
costs will be lower due to the high standardization degree of their fleet and because 
multiple reactors are situated on the same site (Assemblée Nationale 2017). None-
theless, the cost estimations are increasing continuously every year. In only three 
years, since the end of 2012, the estimated costs increased by nearly 10 billion EUR. 
The current provisions are discounted with an interest rate of 4.2% and an assumed 
inflation rate of 1.5%. As always, little changes of the estimated interest or inflation 
8 Areva has no NPPs and operates nuclear facilities like the reprocessing center in La 
Hague.
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rate for provisions and cost can have large influences on the calculations resulting 
in an underestimation of the needed financial resources. In its assessment of the 
EDF decommissioning and waste strategy, the French National Assembly could not 
the share “the excessive optimism” of EDF for its future decommissioning projects. 
The report concluded that the decommissioning and the clean-up will take more 
time, the technical feasibility is not fully assured, and will cost more money than 
EDF currently anticipates (Assemblée Nationale 2017).
The two funds set up by the waste management agency ANDRA are fed by 
payments from the operator’s internal funds at the time they are needed. The only 
fund fed right now is the research fund, receiving payments through a tax paid by 
the operators. As there is not yet a construction license, the construction fund is 
currently not fed but the operators make payments from their internal funds to 
ANDRA’s general budget to finance operations related to the storage facilities for 
short-lived, medium-level wastes. AREVA and EDF were forced to advance their 
back-end provisions and accountancy practice because of partial privatizations. 
Both have now set up restricted internal segregated funds for the financing of the 
nuclear back-end. EDF feeds its fund by a charge of 0.14 Eurocent/kWh included in 
the price of electricity. Due to the Waste Law of 2006, the assets in the funds of EDF 
and Areva have to be accounted separately and the market value has to be at least 
as high as the provisions to be covered. In cases of insolvency or bankruptcy of an 
operator, the state can claim right over the assets. The internal funds are supervised 
by an administrative authority, who is authorized to impose corrective measures. 
This also includes the right to impose payments to ANDRA’s budget. A detailed 
report about the estimated costs, the timing and the value of the provisions has to 
be presented at least every three years (European Commission 2013).
2.3 Conclusion for France
The operators EDF and CEA are responsible for the decommissioning of their 
power plants. While the latter is clearly a public agency, this classification is not 
so clear for EDF. The major shareholder of the private company is the French state 
(over 85%), making EDF de facto a public enterprise. The gained decommissioning 
experiences are not sufficient and the strategic impact of Chooz-A for the future 
decommissioning of the operational PWRs is questionable. If Chooz-A finishes in 
2025, the process will have taken 34 years to complete. The decommissioning process 
of the GCRs has not really started yet and an end is not in sight. A long time frame 
is to be expected, reaching well into the 22nd century. The management of high-level 
radioactive waste is in the hands of the public agency ANDRA. The anticipated 
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start of operations of the HLW disposal facility to begin in 2025 is ambitious. The 
financial aspects of the nuclear back-end in France are dominated by questionable 
cost estimations and hence set aside financial resources which are likely to be too 
low. The internal segregated funds are managed by the operators and subject to an 
administrative control and oversight by national authorities. If this control will be 
able to prevent a shortfall of financial resources in the future is uncertain.
3 United Kingdom
The U.K. currently operates 15 NPPs on 8 sites—all operated by EDF Energy, a 
subsidiary of EDF—and has an installed nuclear capacity of 8.8 GW representing 
a nuclear share of 20.4% of the British electricity production in 2016 (IAEA 2017). 
The latest shutdown was Wylfa-1 in 2015. A particularity of the British nuclear 
feet is that, with the exception of Sizewell B (PWR) only GCRs are operational. 
At the moment, EDF Energy is considering lifetime extensions for its nuclear fleet 
until 20239, and is therefore investing about 600 Mio. GBP in plant upgrades (EDF 
2017). Currently, there is a controversial discussion about plans to commission 
new reactors with a total capacity of 16 GW starting in 2030, including the well 
discussed NPP Hinkley Point C.
3.1 Production
3.1.1 Decommissioning of nuclear power plants
The first generation of British NPPs—the so-called Magnox line—was operated 
by the publically owned British Nuclear Fuels Limited and U.K. Atomic Energy 
Authority (UKAE) and is in a state of shutdown now. The public body Nuclear 
Decommissioning Authority (NDA) is responsible for the decommissioning of 
this legacy fleet. The NDA estate comprises besides the Magnox NPPs, research 
centres, fuel-related facilities, and Sellafield, the most hazardous site in Europe. 
Here the site operations include fuel reprocessing, fuel fabrication, and storage of 
nuclear materials and radioactive wastes. With the exception of the latter, all sites 
are managed through private-sector consortia, while Sellafield is managed by the 
NDA itself. The NDA has employed more than 3,500 contractors all over the U.K. 
9 Sizewell B will probably be extended until 2055.
Decommissioning of Nuclear Power Plants and Storage of Nuclear Waste 271
271
and already spent around 12 billion GBP; contracting is critical to the NDA, as 95% 
of the NDA’s funding is spent externally (NDA 2016c).
The 17 sites of the estate are grouped into 6 Site Licence Companies (SLC). The 
NDA owns these sites and takes the role as the supervising and contracting authority 
and is turning the management over to the contractors, the so-called SLCs under 
European public procurement law. The latter are the long-term shareholders of 
the sites but the management is periodically open to competition. The winner of 
these contracts acts as the Parent Body Organization (PBO). The PBO receives the 
shares of the SLC and organizes the strategic management for the duration of the 
contract. This mechanism was introduced with the idea to increase the efficiency 
of the procedure by opening the work to private contractors (MacKerron 2015). The 
NDA is responsible for defining both the target and the timing of decommissioning 
and remediation, allowing the SLCs to determine how best to deliver this outcome. 
The current plans of the NDA indicate that it will take around 110 years to complete 
the core-mission of nuclear clean-up and waste management (NDA 2016c).
With the exception of Calder Hall 1–4, part of the Sellafield complex, all the sites 
with Magnox reactors are operated by Magnox Limited. Since 2014 Cavendish Fluor 
Partnership10 is the current PBO and hence the long-term owner of Magnox Ltd. 
and supplier of the strategic management and additional resources. The Sellafield 
complex is operated by the SLC Sellafield Limited. The organization of this site 
was changed in April 2016 and Sellafield Ltd is now a wholly owned subsidiary of 
the NDA. A detailed review concluded that the complex, technical uncertainties 
at the Sellafield site were less suited to the PBO model (NDA 2016a). Its mission 
to retrieve nuclear waste from some of the world’s oldest nuclear facilities extends 
well into the 22nd century and the sums of money involved are much greater than 
on other NDA sites.
Since 1977, 30 reactors were shut down and 26 of these are currently in the 
dismantling process. The current strategy for the Magnox fleet is the Long-Term 
Enclosure approach. With the exception of the Wylfa reactors, the reactors are 
defueled and most of the systems external to the biological shield have been re-
moved. According to NDA’s strategy, the biological shield, the reactor pressure 
vessel, the external pressure circuit, and steam generators would be sealed and 
stored. The dismantling of the reactors will begin 85 years after the shutdown 
of the plant. However, the NDA and Magnox Ltd are currently reviewing their 
strategy as there have been advances in remote decommissioning techniques and 
considerable experience gained in remote handling, packaging, and storage of 
highly activated waste at Magnox sites. In addition, an improved understanding of 
10 A consortium of Cavendish Nuclear—a subsidiary of Babcock International—and Fluor.
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the implications of radioactive decay has shown that after the long period of Long-
Term Enclosure, the larger amount of the reactor waste will still not be suitable 
for management as low-level waste. A last development is the realization that the 
reduction in decommissioning costs with the increase in deferral time is largely 
offset by the increased cost of preparing and managing the Long-Term Enclosure 
of the reactor. The waste has been conditioned on-site and interim storages have 
been built to store the waste until the final disposal route is available. Some site 
decommissioning and remediation work has been undertaken at most sites with 
a major focus on the preparation of the ponds for the Long-Term Enclosure state. 
Since 2011 the focus has been on the plants in Bradwell and Trawsfynydd. Magnox 
is working towards a target of placing all the reactors into the Long-Term Enclosure 
state by 2028. The ultimate goal for NDA’s mission is to achieve the end state of all 
sites by 2125 (NDA 2016c).
3.1.2 Storage of high-level wastes
The NDA advocates an approach where wastes are managed according to the radi-
ological, physical, and chemical properties and divides its strategy of radioactive 
waste management in two topics: Higher Activity Waste (HAW) and Lower Activity 
Waste (LAW).11 According to the NDA (2015), the radioactive waste stocks and future 
arising sum up to around 4,720,000 m3 in terms of final packaged volume. About 
90% of this volume can be attributed to LAW and about 10% consists of HAW. 75% 
of the NDA-owned HAW is from the Sellafield Site and about 22% from Magnox 
sites (NDA 2015). Within the U.K., there are large quantities of graphite present 
with approximately 60,000 tonnes on the Magnox sites alone (NDA 2016b). As the 
dismantling of the reactors is deferred, the biggest amount of graphite will arise 
from 2070 onwards. High-level vitrified waste stemming from reprocessing SNF 
is stored in stainless steel canisters in silos at Sellafield. In 2016, a dry cask storage 
facility for SNF was commissioned at the Sizewell B station. U.K. policy states that 
SNF management is a matter for the commercial judgement of its owners, subject 
to meeting the necessary regulatory requirements. SNF is not considered as waste 
and the U.K. has a closed fuel cycle in place, i.e. used fuel was reprocessed. If the 
U.K. government gives up reprocessing and declares SNF as a waste, SNF would be 
11 The term HAW refers to all radioactive material that has no further use and is either 
LLW, ILW or HLW and deemed not suitable for the disposal at the LLW repository 
in Cumbria or the LLW repository in Dounreay. The strategy of the NDA consists in 
converting HAW into a form that can be safely stored and managed for many decades 
awaiting the opening of the geological disposal facility (NDA 2016b).
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consigned to a geological disposal facility. The aim of the NDA is to reprocess at least 
all of the Magnox fuel, which should be achieved by the year 2020 (NDA 2016c). 
The long-term management policy for HAW is to package and store wastes in 
interim storages until they can be transferred to a geological disposal facility. The 
inventory to be disposed of is currently being stored by the waste owners.12 In 2014, 
the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) published a White Paper 
on implementing a geological facility and the Radioactive Waste Management 
Limited (RMW) was established as an NDA subsidiary. As a legal entity, RWM will 
be able to apply for and hold the regulatory permits and licenses required for the 
siting, construction and operation of a geological disposal facility (DECC 2014). A 
public agency is therefore responsible for the preparatory work to plan the geolog-
ical disposal of HAW and delivering the disposal facility. Until today no possible 
suitable sites have been identified. The detailed layout and design of the facility will 
depend on the waste inventory and the specific geological characteristics of the 
site. The underground facilities are expected to comprise a system of vaults for the 
disposal of ILW, and an array of engineered tunnels, for the disposal of HLW and 
SNF (DECC 2014). During the construction and operational stage, which will last 
around 100 years, wastes that have been placed in the facility could be retrieved, 
which is not an option after the closing of the facility. The siting is still based on a 
voluntarist approach, i.e. the willingness of local communities to participate in the 
process, although this approach has already failed once. Current plans predict the 
deep geological facility being available around 2060 (NDA 2016c). 
3.2 Financing
Following the reorganization of the nuclear sector in the United Kingdom there, 
are three different financing systems for the nuclear back-end in place: one for the 
NDA facilities, one for the reactors owned by EDF Energy, and one for possible 
newbuild power plants—the decommissioning costs for the nuclear facilities in 
the U.K. have to be considered separately for the NDA and the EDF Energy sites. 
The NDA expects in their annual report for 2016/17 discounted costs of 116 billion 
GBP for more than 120 years; the majority (around 75%) of the costs are attributed 
to the Sellafield site alone (NDA 2017).13 
12 NDA and its SLCs, EDF Energy, Urenco U.K. Ltd, Ministry of Defence, GE Healthcare 
and other non-nuclear users of radioactive material.
13 The uncertainty of this estimation was mentioned in the NDA annual of 2012/13 report 
as follows: “Given the very long timescale involved and the complexity of the plants and 
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The decommissioning process is managed by the NDA and undertaken by con-
tractors, which are primarily financed through public funds. The annual budget for 
the NDA is set by the U.K. Department for Energy and Climate and HM Treasury 
(OECD/NEA 2016a). In addition to the governmental funding, the NDA gener-
ates income with commercial activities. In the commercial year 2016/17, the NDA 
earned around 1 billion GBP, with 612 million GBP coming from reprocessing and 
waste management activities (NDA 2017). With the shutdown of Wylfa, income 
through selling of electricity production, which used to decrease the payments 
from the taxpayers, came to an end. So the funding of the NDA will become even 
more dependent on the British taxpayers in the future.
The decommissioning of the EDF Energy NPPs will be primarily payed by the 
Nuclear Liabilities Fund (NLF), an external segregated fund established by the 
U.K. government in 1996. The only function of the fund is to provide funding to 
meet specific waste management costs and the decommissioning liabilities for the 
NPPs originally owned by public utility British Energy (OECD/NEA 2016a). The 
NLF had assets with a market value of around 8,935 million GBP at the end of the 
financial year 2015 (NLF 2015). In 2005, when British Energy was restructured 
and became EDF Energy, the U.K. government announced that it would fund the 
qualifying liabilities for the case that they exceed all the assets of the fund (OECD/
NEA 2016a). The owner of the NLF is the Nuclear Trust, a public trust established 
under Scottish law.14 When the NLF was established it received an initial endow-
ment of 228 million GBP from the U.K. government. Today, the fund is fed by two 
sources: one source is a small quarterly payment by EDF Energy, the second and 
predominant sources are the revenues of the investments of the fund (OECD/NEA 
2016a). In the financial year 2014/15, EDF Energy made contributions of around 
26.5 million GBP to the fund and the operating profit before tax was around 155 
million GBP (NLF 2015). If EDF Energy wants to receive payments from the fund 
to meet liabilities, it has to apply to the NDA, which acts as an agent of the U.K. 
government. The NDA as the administrator of the Liabilities Management Agree-
ments approves the NLF payments for decommissioning and waste management. 
Table 2 provides the cost estimations and the provisions set aside by EDF Energy. 
The provisions for the eight operational NPPs of EDF Energy are calculated with 
a discount rate of 2.7% and an implicit inflation rate based on long-term forecast 
of adjusted retail prices.
material being handled, considerable uncertainty remains in the cost estimate particularly 
in later years.” 
14 The five trustees—three are appointed by the U.K. government and two by EDF Ener-
gy—also act as the directors of the NLF.
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Tab. 2 Estimated costs and related provisions for EDF Energy nuclear backend in 
million GBP (EDF 2017).
Purpose Costs based on year-end 
economic conditions of 
2016 (Mio. GBP)
Amounts in provisions  
at present value in 2016  
(Mio. GBP)









According to EDF’s financial statement, the provisions for decommissioning and 
waste management are reported in the assets as “receivables” (EDF 2017, 93). The 
current value of the fund exceeds the discounted cost estimates of EDF Energy. 
But already in 2012, the NLF expressed the view, that the fund may not be large 
enough in the end. In addition, the U.K. government insists that the fund is depos-
ited almost entirely in the National Loans Fund to earn an annual rate of interest 
used to reduce the overall U.K.’s public debt (MacKerron 2015). EDF Energy is 
responsible for all operational aspects of the decommissioning of the existing NPPs, 
but the U.K. government has the power to decide to transfer the decommissioning 
responsibility to the NDA at any point after the electricity generation at the power 
stations ended (OECD/NEA 2016a).
According to the Energy Act of 2008 operators that want to construct new 
nuclear power plants have to establish secure financing arrangements and exact 
plans for decommissioning and disposal before they get the application to build a 
new plant. The financing has to be realized by an independent external fund that 
will be fed during the operational time of the plant with levy of a certain amount 
per generated kWh.
3.3 Conclusion for the U.K.
The public agency NDA is responsible for the decommissioning of the legacy fleet. 
The licenses remain with the NDA, but the work is tendered to a PBO, a consortium 
of private enterprises. This was a changed in 2016 for the Sellafield site, where a 
public organizational model is seen as more suitable for the complex and long-lasting 
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clean-up of the site. Nearly all the shutdown reactors have been defueled and are 
currently being prepared for the Long-Term Enclosure. A long time frame is to be 
expected, reaching well into the 22nd century. For the current operational NPPs the 
operator EDF Energy—a private enterprise and subsidiary of EDF—is responsible 
for the decommissioning. Concerning the high-level waste management, the con-
struction of a disposal facility is the scope of a NDA subsidiary and thus a public 
matter. Up to now all site selection activities failed and have to restart again. The 
financing of decommissioning and waste management will be challenging too, 
especially for Sellafield. The costly decommissioning and site remediation of the 
legacy fleet have to be financed by the taxpayers over more than 100 years. The 
lessons learned from the shortfall of former provisions led to the establishment of 
an external segregated fund for the operational NPP fleet, which should prevent 
public payments in the future but it remains questionable if the financial resources 
set aside in the fund will cover these costs.
4 Germany
With a nuclear share of 13.1 percent (80.07 TWh) in 2016 (IAEA 2017), Germany 
has the smallest share of nuclear energy among the observed countries, but the 28 
shutdown NPPs (in 2017) constitute the most diverse NPP fleet to dismantle of the 
observed countries (see Fig. 1). The 13th amendment of the Atomic Energy Act in 
August 2011 withdrew the operating licenses of the seven oldest NPPs and Krümmel. 
The remaining eight operational plants will be gradually shutdown by the year 2022. 
The current fleet is operated by the German utilities EnBW, PreussenElektra (E.ON 
subsidiary) and RWE as well as the Swedish utility Vattenfall Europe Nuclear Energy. 
Siemens Kraftwerke Union AG (KWU), later to be dissolved with the French firm 
Framatome into Areva NP, built all the nuclear steam supply systems—the reactor 
and the reactor coolant pumps and associated piping in an NPP—in the operational 
power plants. The operational Pre-Convoi PWRs (Vor-Konvois) will be shut down 
in 2021. The Convoi reactors (Konvoi)—the latest PWR-design commissioned in 
the late 1980s—are the last NPPs to be shut down in 2022.
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4.1 Production
4.1.1 Decommissioning of nuclear power plants
The different shutdown reactors are in different stages of their decommissioning 
process: two are in a stage of Long-Term Enclosure (LTE), three plants have been 
successfully dismantled and released from regulatory control, two plants have been 
dismantled but await regulatory release, while the remaining NPPs are currently 
in different phases of the decommissioning process.
The BWR Lingen was put into Long-Term Enclosure15 in 1998, the request for 
decommissioning was submitted to the regulatory authority by RWE in 2008 and 
approved in 2016. The three NPPs—two BWRs and one HWGCR—that have been 
successfully decommissioned and released from regulatory control were rather small 
prototype reactors. Of the three, VAK Kahl (BWR, 25 MW), was the only reactor 
that operated for a longer period of time (24 years) and was after its shutdown im-
mediately dismantled and released as a greenfield in 1998.16 The BWR Würgassen 
was the first larger commercial NPP to be dismantled. The reactor was of the first 
generation BWRs and had a capacity of 640 MW. After 19 years of operating time, 
the NPP was shut down in 1994 and de facto decommissioned by 2014. During the 
dismantling in the hot zone (stage three) PreussenElektra tendered the dismantling 
and conditioning of the reactor vessel internals to Areva NP GmbH. The site has 
not yet been released as a greenfield as parts of the buildings are used as an interim 
storage for low and medium level wastes awaiting the opening of the disposal site 
Konrad. Decommissioning of Gundremmingen-A, another first generation BWR 
(237 MW), started in 1983 and in 2016 the majority shareholder RWE finished the 
actual decommissioning process with the decontamination of the buildings (Bredberg 
et al. 2017), but as it is the case with Würgassen the site cannot be released from 
regulatory control as parts of the building are used for future decommissioning 
works for the still operational units B and C.
There are currently 12 power plants in the process of being dismantled, the major 
part of them are PWRs.17 The NPP Stade has nearly finished decommissioning, here 
PreussenElektra again tendered the removal and conditioning of the reactor vessel 
15 The other NPP in Long-term Enclosure is the pebble bed HTGR THTR-300.
16 HDR Großwelzheim (Superheated BWR, 25 MW, 1969–1971) was decommissioned from 
1988 until 1998. Niederaichbach (HWGCR, 100 MW, 1973–1974) was decommissioned 
from 1987 until 1995.
17 Other NPPs being decommissioned are AVR Jülich (HTGR, 15 MW), KNK II (FBR, 17 
MW), and MZFR Karlsruhe (PHWR, 1,219 MW); all three reactors are decommissioned 
by the public company EWN respectively EWN subsidiaries.
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internals to Areva. The legacy fleet of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) 
Rheinsberg and the five units of Greifswald are being decommissioned by EWN 
Entsorgungswerk für Nuklearanlagen (EWN), a public company under control of 
the Federal Ministry of Finances. For both sites, the deferred dismantling strategy 
was chosen. The Rheinsberg reactor pressure vessel was transported to the central-
ized on-site interim storage facility (Zwischenlager Nord), also operated by EWN. 
In Greifswald the reactor vessel internals of reactor one and two were immediately 
dismantled and conditioned. For the internals of reactor three and four as well as 
all the reactor pressure vessels of the five reactors deferred dismantling was the 
strategic choice; also in storage and planned to be dismantled later on are the 17 
steam generators and parts of the primary cooling system. Decommissioning of 
Obrigheim, operated by EnBW, should be completed sometime between 2020 and 
2025. Mülheim-Kärlich, the only RWE power plant and the only Konvoi reactor 
currently being dismantled, is entering the reactor decommissioning phase and is 
planned to be released from regulatory control in 2021. 
All NPPs shut down in 2011 and Grafenrheinfeld shut down in 2015 have sub-
mitted their decommissioning proposal at the regulatory authority; the proposal 
was also submitted for Gundremmingen B, which shut down in December 2017. 
Of these, Brunsbüttel, Isar 1, Biblis A and B as well as Neckarwestheim 1 have been 
granted their decommissioning requests in 2017. The major part of the NPPs are 
still in the post-operational phase or are just starting with the decommissioning 
process. The German operators currently face several obstacles in order to be able 
to conclude the decommissioning process in a timely manner without escalating 
costs. At the moment there is still not a sufficient number of transport and storage 
casks being produced in order to defuel the reactors. The quick shutdown of the 
NPPs after the Fukushima incident caused a high number of special fuel rods—not 
completely burnt-down fuel—in the reactor cores. For these fuel rods no casks 
for the safe storage have been approved by the regulatory authority at this point. 
The defueling of the reactors cores and subsequently storing in an interim storage 
cannot be achieved until the required casks are available.
4.1.2 Storage of high-level wastes
The high-level radioactive waste consists of SNF and vitrified structures from 
the reprocessing process. The political decision to stop German reprocessing was 
final in 1989, after this the German operators invested in the French reprocessing 
facility in La Hague. Until 2005, nearly half of all the SNF was sent to France and 
the U.K. for reprocessing. From 2005 on, the policy was direct geological dispos-
al—which meant interim storage of SNF and no more reprocessing (Hocke and 
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Kallenbach-Herbert 2015). For this, the utilities operated through Gesellschaft 
für Nuklearservice (GNS) two centralized interim storage facilities in Gorleben 
and Ahaus; a third facility is Zwischenlager Nord operated by the public company 
EWN. But the major part of the SNF is currently still stored in the storage pools 
or in one of the twelve de-centralized on-site storage facilities.
In 2016, the institutional framework of the waste management process was 
changed with the introduction of the law aimed to restructure the responsibilities in 
the nuclear waste management process.18 The ownership of the centralized interim 
storage facilities was transferred to the newly created public company Gesellschaft 
für Zwischenlagerung (BGZ, “company for interim storage”), which will also take 
over the decentralized interim-storage facilities and the low-level waste repositories. 
According to the final report19 of the high-level waste management commission set 
up by the Repository Site Selection Act in July 2013 –the site for the deep geological 
facility with “the best safety” for the 30,000 m3 of high-level waste20 is to be found 
in a three-phase process, accompanied by extensive public participation. For the up 
200,000 m3 of low- and intermediate waste and salt mixture to be retrieved from 
the Asse II geological facility currently no disposal solution exists. The goal of the 
Repository Site Selection act is a “deep geological repository with reversibility” in 
either clay, salt or granite. The plans foresee a start of operation of the disposal site 
after 2050, but more realistic estimates expect the start after 2080 (Thomauske 2015). 
After 50 years of operation time the disposal facility is planned to be sealed off. 
4.2 Financing
The funding system in Germany differs between purely public-owned facilities, 
facilities with mixed-ownership and the facilities in private ownership. The costs 
for the decommissioning of the former owned nuclear facilities are financed from 
the current public budget; the Federal Government covers the majority of the costs, 
while some are covered by State Governments. The most common examples for 
public funding are the former GDR NPPs Greifswald and Rheinsberg, the decom-
missioning of which is totally funded by the Ministry of Finance. For the facilities 
in mixed-ownership, there is a proportional split of the costs between the public 
and the private utilities clarified by special arrangements (European Commission 
18 Gesetz zur Neuordnung der Verantwortung in der kerntechnischen Entsorgung (BT 
768/16).
19 See Kommission Lagerung hoch radioaktiver Abfallstoffe (2016).
20 This includes the high-level waste until the shut-down of the last power plant on 31.12.2022.
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2013). However, the majority of the costs are related to the nuclear back-end of 
the privately-owned NPPs. In 2015, the auditing company Warth & Klein Grant 
Thornton AG provided on behalf of the German government an estimation of the 
whole costs for the nuclear back-end of 23 commercial NPPs: 47.5 billion in 2014 
Euros. The several undiscounted cost categories are presented in Table 3.
Tab. 3 Estimated Nuclear Back-End Costs in Germany (Warth & Klein Grant 
Thornton AG Wirtschaftsprüfungsgesellschaft 2015).
Cost categories Undiscounted costs 
2015–99 in prizes 
of 2014 (Mio. EUR)
Discounted costs 2015–99 with 








Interim Storage 5,823 26,770
Low and Medium Waste 
Disposal (Schacht Konrad)
3,750 9,016
High Level Waste Disposal 8,321 50,966
Total costs 47,527 169,808
In addition, there are costs the for the public funded decommissioning of Gre-
ifswald and Rheinsberg and for research facilities: The initial decommissioning 
costs for Greifswald were estimated to be about 4 billion EUR and for Rheinsberg 
600 million EUR; the latest cost estimate in 2016 was around 6.5 billion for both 
facilities. As always, all cost estimations are subject to many uncertainties related 
to expectations about future inflation rates, cost increases, and time delays. The 
estimation of Warth & Klein Grant Thornton AG considered this by a computation 
of the estimated costs with a nuclear specific inflation rate of 1.97% until 2099, 
which resulted in total discounted costs of around 169.8 billion EUR. The audit 
concluded that the effect of changing the estimated nuclear-specific inflation rate 
on future costs is strong and causes the most uncertainties. 
In the old financing system, the financial resources to cover decommissioning 
and waste disposal were managed by the private companies in internal non-segre-
gated funds with no public authority controlling them. The companies set up the 
provisions according to international accounting standards and were free to choose 
where to invest it. The OECD/NEA (2016a) highlighted the unregulated and un-
controlled system of internal non-segregated funds itself as the most critical aspect 
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of the German system. In the case of a bankruptcy of the operator, the financial 
resources to cover future costs would probably have been lost. The financial situ-
ation of the utilities was and still is not secured to exclude the risk of bankruptcy 
in the future. In the case of the loss of the funded provisions, the public budget 
would have been obliged to cover the costs. Table 4 presents the provisions of the 
companies as mentioned in their annual financial statements at the end of 2014. 
The calculations of the private companies were based on an average interest rate of 
4.58% and the before mentioned nuclear specific inflation rate of 1.97%; both are 
highly uncertain. A lower real interest rate on the provisions set aside would have 
had a crucial effect. With an average interest rate of 2.03 %, the present value of the 
set provisions would have to be today around 77 billion EUR to cover the future 
costs (Warth & Klein Grant Thornton AG Wirtschaftsprüfungsgesellschaft 2015).
Tab. 4 Provisions of German Operators end of 2014 (Warth & Klein Grant Thornton 
AG Wirtschaftsprüfungsgesellschaft 2015) 
Company Provisions end of 2014  
(Mio. EUR)









Total 38,288 Average 4.58
On behalf of the government, an expert commission reviewed the financing system 
and provided reform proposals to meet the actual risk related to the system of in-
ternal non-segregated funds.21 Their recommendations and the new law published 
in December 2016 (BT 768/16) led to a fundamental change of the German funding 
system. This change was also motivated by concerns that the private utilities would 
not be able to cover all future liabilities with their internal non-segregated financial 
resources due to the experiences with high cost increases in former decommission-
ing and waste disposal projects. There were annually cost increases between 2.9 
and 6 percent, which is much higher than the general inflation rate or the assumed 
21 See KFK – Kommission zur Überprüfung der Finanzierung des Kernenergieausstiegs 
(2016).
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nuclear-specific inflation rate (Warth & Klein Grant Thornton AG Wirtschaftsprü-
fungsgesellschaft 2015). Based on the reform proposals, an external segregated fund 
was implemented in 2016, which will have to finance all aspects related to waste 
disposal, i.e. interim and final storage. The fund was fed by the former provisions 
for these tasks totalling 23 billion EUR, including a risk premium. The utilities 
are still responsible for decommissioning and for the conditioning of the wastes, 
but all tasks as well as the operation of the interim storage facilities will be done 
by public companies and paid from the fund. The responsibility as well as risks, 
including the financial ones in the case of insufficient set-aside money, will have to 
borne by the public, which infringes the polluter-pays-principle (Jänsch et al. 2017).
4.3 Conclusions for Germany
Germany was able to gain some experience in the decommissioning of NPPs. The 
four private utilities have chosen the Immediate Dismantling strategy in nearly all 
cases. The public enterprise EWN chose the deferred dismantling strategy for the 
reactor pressure vessels. The private operators carry out themselves the dismantling 
process, although specialized private companies carry out some part of the work; 
this is especially true for the technologically challenging dismantling of the reactor 
pressure vessel and its internals. All NPPs currently in the post-operational stage still 
face several obstacles in order to be able to conclude the decommissioning process 
in a timely manner without escalating costs, e.g., still not a sufficient number of 
transport and storage casks being produced in order to defuel the reactors. The future 
disposal path for HLW is still highly uncertain—this also applies for the disposal of 
low- and medium-level wastes—and has retroactive effects on the timing, progress, 
and costs of the decommissioning process. Additionally, all estimated future costs 
are underlying many uncertainties due to cost increases and interest rates. This 
is especially true for all future costs related to the management for both low-and 
intermediate, and high-level waste. It is questionable if the financial resources set 
aside in the fund will cover these costs.
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5 Conclusions
Overall, the three case studies show that the biggest challenges concerning the de-
commissioning and storing still wait for solutions. Decommissioning was in most 
cases neglected, only Germany has gained some experiences in decommissioning 
NPPs but no large-scale reactor (over 1 GW) has successfully been decommissioned. 
It can be stated that overall the experience is still lacking, considering the high need 
for decommissioning in the coming years in all of the observed countries. Until 
now, no scale effects could be observed, if EDF can reap scale effects due to the 
standardization of its fleet remains to be seen. The preferred strategy for light water 
reactors is Immediate Dismantling, while in some cases the radiological decay was 
used and the deferred dismantling strategy was applied to highly activated com-
ponents. In contrast, the worldwide preferred strategy for GCRs is the Long-Term 
Enclosure. EDF is now also considering this strategy for its French GCR fleet due 
to underestimated technological challenges and missing graphite disposal routes. 
This postpones the end of the decommissioning of the legacy fleets in the U.K. and 
France well into the 22nd century. In all three cases, the decommissioning of the 
NPPs is critical due to the missing disposal facilities, which led to the construction 
of interim storage facilities. 
Considering the production of the decommissioning process in the observed 
countries, we have two public companies EWN and Magnox Ltd. organizing the 
decommissioning of the legacy fleets, while the latter tenders the work to a private 
consortium. In Germany and France, the operators are responsible for the decom-
missioning of their NPPs. Some part of the work, especially the most challenging 
work—the dismantling of the reactor pressure vessel and its internals—has been 
tendered to specialized nuclear companies. In the U.K., the decommissioning of 
the operational NPPs has to be done by the operator, but the NDA has a “take-over” 
option and can decide to transfer the decommissioning responsibility to the public 
body. On the other hand, the high-level disposal facility is in the three countries the 
scope of the government. If the construction permit for Cigéo is granted, France 
will have the most advanced process of implementing a deep geological disposal 
facility while Germany and the U.K. are still in the site selection process.
The financing of decommissioning and radioactive waste management will be 
a long-term challenge in all three countries. All cost estimations are underlying 
uncertainties due to long time-scales, cost increases, and estimated interest and 
inflation rates. This could lead to an underestimation of future costs. Of all the 
observed financial systems, the old German system of internal non segregated 
funds seemed to be the most uncontrolled and unsecured. This led to a change 
in the financial system and the implementation of an external segregated waste 
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fund. In France, the financial resources are held in internal segregated funds 
with administrative control and oversight by national authorities. However, this 
does not prevent comparatively optimistic cost estimations and due to this, likely 
inadequate set aside financial resources. In the U.K., the costliest aim will be the 
decommissioning and site remediation of the legacy fleet and Sellafield payed by the 
taxpayers over the next 100 years. To prevent a repetition of a shortfall of funded 
provisions, a system with an external segregated fund for the operational nuclear 
fleet was introduced. This approach seems to be the most suitable to finance the 
future cost of the nuclear back-end, even if it also could not overcome the problem 
of too low cost estimations.
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Finding safe and publicly acceptable routes for the management of long-lived 
nuclear wastes has been problematic in all countries that have used nuclear 
power. The dominant expectation on the part of Governments and the nuclear 
industry has been that the best option will be deep underground disposal. 
However even in Sweden, where political consensus has emerged over a site for 
a repository, disputes continue about long-term safety. Ethical issues, especially 
inter-generational equity, are relevant given continuing delays in implementing 
long-term management and where countries, like the UK, continue to build 
new reactors, achieving political acceptability is more problematic than where 
new-build is not an option. Failure to resolve nuclear waste issues is a major 
obstacle to public acceptance of nuclear technology. 
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1 Introduction
Radioactive waste is for many people the single most problematic issue surrounding 
nuclear power. For the great majority of countries using nuclear power, there has 
been little or no progress in resolving the waste issue. This chapter provides an 
overview of the main issues, with illustrations from a range of countries.
Generation of nuclear electricity produces radioactive substances, some not 
found in nature that are extremely hazardous. In many cases they remain potentially 
harmful to human health and the environment for thousands of years. Although 
there is now a history of nuclear generation stretching back 60 years – and a military 
legacy that goes back further – there is, as yet, no long-term management facility 
for the most problematic civilian wastes completed anywhere in the world. 
This is not for want of trying. Most nuclear-using countries have official policies 
that endorse the option of deep geological disposal (DGD) as the favoured strategy 
for trying to isolate wastes from the biosphere for very long periods in the future. 
But few countries have made any significant progress towards building such a re-
pository (Finland and Sweden (Swahn and Kaberger 2015) are rare, if still partial, 
exceptions). The failure to establish long-term management routes is a predominantly 
social and political question and can generally be attributed to a lack of trust on the 
part of affected populations, locally and nationally, in the technical solutions that 
have been proposed, reflecting in turn a poor history of nuclear waste governance. 
2 The wastes
Radioactive wastes arise at several points in the nuclear cycle but the main problem 
is about so-called ‘higher activity’ wastes. These have the characteristics that they 
are highly radioactive and remain hazardous for long periods in to the future – 
generally measured in centuries or longer.
These higher activity wastes are of two main types. The first are ‘high level’ 
wastes (HLW), which besides being highly radioactive and long-lasting are also 
heat generating and so need periods of cooling before they can be managed effec-
tively [(MacKerron 2015). These wastes are almost entirely the product of fission 
in reactors and consist either of spent fuel, or some of the separated components 
of spent fuel, including plutonium. Separation of plutonium and unburned ura-
nium from spent fuel is known as ‘reprocessing’. This is a complex chemical and 
mechanical process that creates new waste streams and is now undertaken by few 
countries (including the UK, France and Russia, with Japan expected to open its 
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long-delayed reprocessing plant sometime soon (World Nuclear News 2017)). Plu-
tonium is sometimes combined with uranium to make so-called mixed-oxide fuel 
(MOX) and then used in current commercial reactors. This however only postpones 
the waste issue. The reason is that it is impractical to reprocess MOX fuel, which 
is radioactively hotter and more difficult to manage than conventional spent fuel 
(von Hippel and MacKerron2015). 
However, much of the world’s civilian separated plutonium is currently stored 
(especially in the UK and France), pending decisions on whether to treat it as waste 
or first make it into MOX. The rationale for plutonium separation was originally 
found in the nuclear weapons’ states desire to produce fissile material for bombs 
(Gowing 1974). Later a new rationale developed. This derived from the intention of 
several countries from the 1950s onwards to develop ‘fast breeder’ reactors, which 
would depend on large quantities of plutonium as a start-up fuel, after which reactors 
would generate their own fuel. Fast reactors have now been abandoned by most of 
their original supporting countries (the USA, the UK, France and Germany) though 
ambitions for fast reactors persist in Russia, India, and China (Cochran et al. 2010).
The second waste category consists of ‘intermediate level’ wastes (ILW) which 
are also radioactive and long-lasting but not heat-generating. Most countries ex-
pect to manage HLW and ILW (especially the longest-lasting ILW) together in a 
deep repository (OECD/NEA 2013 chapters 1 and 2). ILW arises from a number of 
sources, including reactor operation and – where reprocessing of spent fuel takes 
place – some of the waste streams that reprocessing creates. Other wastes, mostly 
low level (LLW) are less radioactive and are dangerous for shorter time periods. Such 
wastes are in most cases already managed with little controversy, often in shallow 
burial sites. The rest of this chapter concentrates on the higher activity wastes.
3 Proposed technological solutions
For several decades the overwhelmingly dominant expectation on the part of 
Governments and the nuclear industry has been that higher activity wastes will at 
some point be subject to buried in a deep geological disposal (DGD). This would 
be some distance underground – at least 500 metres or more – and would rely both 
on the host rock as well as engineered safety to contain the wastes safely for what 
is hoped to be more or less indefinite periods in to the future. While other routes 
for long-term management of wastes have been seriously considered – for exam-
ple sub-seabed disposal, shooting wastes into space or beneath ice caps – all have 
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fallen by the wayside in recent years in the face of perceived risks, international 
law obstacles or excessive cost (CoRWM 2006, Chapter 10). 
Several different geologies appear in principle suitable as host environments for 
a DGD repository. This has included granites (Scandinavia), salt (Germany) and 
clay (France). (Brunnengraber et al. 2015, Part 1) While the geology is expected to 
form part of the barrier to the escape of radioactivity, all DGD proposals also expect 
that there will be multiple engineered barriers. Wastes will be sealed in canisters 
or drums which themselves contain internal barriers and then further materials, 
for example bentonite clay, may be used to provide a further barrier between the 
waste-containing structure and the host rock. 
One variant of the DGD idea is the potential use of boreholes for the disposal 
of particularly difficult wastes, such as immobilized plutonium (Gibb et al. 2008). 
Such boreholes might be at a depth of 3 – 5 kilometers, where geological formations 
are in principle especially stable. If such a method became feasible – and at present 
there are concerns about the reliability of drilling technology to such depths – the 
relatively small diameter of boreholes suggests that such an option would probably 
only work for quite small waste volumes. 
While the great bulk of opinion favours a DGD route for long-term management 
of higher activity wastes, there are sharp divisions between those who want a re-
pository closed and sealed as soon as all relevant waste is emplaced, and those who 
favour retrievability or reversibility for some substantial future period (CoRWM 
2006, Chapter 10). The argument in support of prompt closure is that the safety and 
security cases are stronger if a repository is closed and sealed as soon as possible. 
In practice such ‘early’ closure will probably be at least 100 years in the future for 
major nuclear-using countries and there are concerns that leaving a repository 
accessible for longer is risky, given the difficulty of knowing how societies will 
evolve centuries into the future. 
The opposing argument – in favour of retrievability – is that maintaining access 
to waste, proposed in the UK case for up to 300 years (MacKerron 2015), allows for 
flexibility if circumstances change. There are two possible changes in circumstances 
envisaged in this argument. The first is that is that new technology might allow the 
period over which waste is hazardous to be radically reduced. Such ideas already 
have some currency in the notion that so-called partitioning and transmutation 
(P&T) might drastically reduce the half-lives of several isotopes (Schneider and 
Marignac 2008). However P&T would be extremely expensive and in any case 
could not reduce half-lives of some of the isotopes with longest lives. The second 
possible change is that it might be possible to recover the waste and use it as fuel 
for new kinds of nuclear technology. This also has current advocates but runs into 
the problem that further wastes will be created (OECD/NEA 2013 Chapter 4). 
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4 Issues of repository design and long-term safety
Beneath this widespread generic endorsement of DGD there are many technical 
arguments about specific repository design. For example in Sweden the confidence 
that was once widely shared about the so-called KBS design – which has provided 
a starting point for other countries’ efforts, including Finland and the UK – has 
been eroded in recent years by concerns that the corrosion-resistance of the cop-
per that is integral to the design might be compromised. Equally there have been 
long-running disputes in the US scientific community about the long-term safety 
of the design proposed for the (now abandoned) Yucca mountain site in Nevada 
(Macfarlane and Ewing 2006).
While no country has expressed the view that an alternative to DGD is a good 
long-term way forward, some have deliberately postponed any long-term decision. 
The Netherlands for example has a policy of storing wastes for around 100 years 
before expecting to make a long-term decision (Arentsen 2015). A few countries, 
for example Italy and Spain, have been influenced by this approach, but no-one 
seriously argues that continuing storage is an acceptable long-term way forward. 
This raises questions of equity between generations that are explored further below. 
Virtually all other nuclear-using countries are committed to a search for a way to 
move DGD forward as quickly – in practice generally very slowly – as possible. 
In this process of trying to find a way to implement DGD the almost universal 
assumption has been that every country needs to take responsibility for managing 
its domestically generated wastes within its own borders. There have been a few 
exceptions to this. Russia used to take back spent fuel from the reactors it sold 
to its East European client states, and very small quantities of waste have been 
transferred between countries (for example between Georgia and the UK) (Abbott 
1998). But the principle that wastes should be the responsibility of the states that 
generate them is still the norm. 
Nevertheless proposals periodically surface to develop multi-national disposal 
sites – for example within Europe and more improbably in Western Australia. While 
these have superficial attractions, such as possible cost savings and the remoteness 
of some of the potential sites, thy have all floundered on mixed political and ethical 
grounds – the unacceptability that some countries will take on burdens that should 
belong elsewhere. For all practical purposes the issue of waste disposal is one that 
needs to be solved within each individual nuclear-waste-producing country. 
Despite the near-consensus on the desirability of a DGD approach to waste 
management, the very limited progress to date on implementing such projects is 
striking. Only Finland and Sweden have made serious progress in this area. In the 
case of Sweden it is noteworthy that there has been serious engagement with local 
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candidate communities – both of which were very close to pre-existing nuclear sites 
– and they were given the option of withdrawal if the terms offered were regarded 
as unacceptable (CoRWM 2006, Chapter 9). In Finland, with a tradition of consen-
sual decision-making, there has been community consent for the construction of 
a repository and the process of first building an underground laboratory has been 
ongoing since 2011 (Auffermann et al. 2015). Construction of a full-scale repository 
has started and it is possible that an operating licence may be granted by 2020. 
Sweden has also gone through a process of canvassing communities for volunteers 
and two sites proved willing to act as hosts, with one now selected (Swahn and 
Kaberger 2015). Even in these countries, the process of emplacing wastes will take 
many decades, and for other countries the timescale will be substantially longer. 
In all other countries progress has been much more limited. In France a candi-
date site – Bure, in a thinly populated part of eastern France – has been selected in 
a much more top-down process, but it is not clear when (or of) construction will 
begin (Blowers 2017, chapter 4). Elsewhere there is even less progress. In the USA, 
there has been a protracted process in which Yucca Mountain was selected as the 
preferred site for DGD, but there were a long series of legal challenges and much 
public and local political resistance over many years which led to the site being 
effectively abandoned in 2011 (Macfarlane and Ewing 2006). In Germany, where 
there have long been proposals for three sites for different waste categories, there 
have been apparently intractable delays, and a fierce anti-nuclear movement, as 
well as local citizen movements, that have meant that there has been no progress 
towards a solution for many years (Hocke and Kallenbach-Herbert 2015). In Canada 
a stepwise process through its NWMO, involving wide-ranging engagement has 
led to the potential choice of a site in Ontario but recent progress has been slow, 
with no agreement yet reached (NWMO 2018). 
In the UK a new process was initiated in 2003 with the formation of the Com-
mittee on Radioactive Waste Management (CoRWM) charged with formulating 
a new approach to policy. CoRWM reported in 2006, broadly endorsing a DGD 
end-point and recommending that only a voluntarist approach would work (CoR-
WM 2006, Chapter 14)]. This was endorsed by the UK Government (Defra, BERR 
and the devolved administrations for Wales and Northern Ireland 2008) and after 
local authorities in the area around the Sellafield nuclear site provisionally vol-
unteered there followed a three year period of intense negotiation. However this 
was brought to a halt in 2012, when Cumbria County Council refused permission 
to take negotiations any further. This means that the UK, in common with many 
other countries, still has no agreed site for a repository. 
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5 Ethics
The objective of implementing long-term management options for higher activity 
wastes raises important issues in ethics – specifically, equity both within and 
across generations. Intra-generational equity issues surround the location of waste 
management sites, where local communities assume the burden of responsibility 
while distant communities are exempted. This strongly suggests recompense for 
the community willing to take on a national burden.
Inter-generational equity is more problematic. The benefits of nuclear power in 
terms of power production have been experienced in the present and past. But in 
the absence, as seen above, of any satisfactory waste management solution in most 
countries, the costs and risks associated with nuclear waste will affect future gener-
ations, who will experience no compensating advantages (CoRWM 2006, Chapter 
6) In terms of environmental principles this is a clear case of violating the ‘polluter 
pays’ principle. Attempts to avoid this violation by ensuring that funding is put aside 
now to cover future costs are not credible. The existence of such funds may mean 
that future generations have a prior claim on resources to manage waste, but the 
real resources needed – labour and capital equipment – fall to future generations to 
find and are at the expense of other potential uses of those resources in the future 
as well as representing risks to workers and possibly others. 
On ethical grounds it is therefore important to try and find a way to manage 
wastes in a safe and secure way as soon as practically possible because the interests 
of all generations are at stake. If above-ground storage is more hazardous in the 
next few decades than burying waste, then the interests of this generation as well 
as future generations are that burial should be achieved as soon as practical. The 
argument for early action is therefore strong provided there is confidence that early 
commitment to a repository does not jeopardize the safety of future generations 
(CoRWM 2006, Chapter 13). But as argued above, the universal expectation is that 
even in countries where waste management plans are far advanced, the process 
of completing the burial of wastes will take up to a century or more. So even an 
effective waste management programme will cause some burdens to be passed to 
future generations and possibly expose current generations to significant risks in 
the meantime. 
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6 The politics of nuclear waste
Given the scientific consensus, established over decades, that a DGD route is poten-
tially achievable and can in principle be made safe over many future generations, 
the extreme slowness in the process of implementation needs explanation. The most 
commonly observed reason for this universal failure is a chronic lack of public trust 
in the process of nuclear waste governance, and that this lack has made progress at 
potentially favoured DGD sites impossible – or at best exceptionally slow. 
The question behind this observed lack of trust is why it should be so. Until 
around 2000, decision-making processes for nuclear waste management were al-
most universally centralized, opaque, used narrowly scientific criteria, and failed 
to engage with either local communities or publics. This was, especially for nuclear 
weapons states, partly a legacy of the secret and closed nature of all decisions about 
nuclear technology. Characteristically, the process was that a small elite group of 
government officials, nuclear industry leaders and scientists would endorse the idea 
of geological disposal and then announce a chosen site for a repository. This would 
be followed by highly vocal, local campaigns against the choice of the site, often 
involving coalitions of actors of quite different general political views, sometimes 
national and even international. Abandonment of the proposed site followed (the 
UK) or there would be delays lasting decades and becoming indefinite (USA and 
Germany) 
This became known as the ‘decide-announce-defend’ style of decision-making 
(CoRWM 2006, Chapter 1), to which could then be added ‘abandon’ (DADA) when 
local communities and their wider supporters resisted. This exacerbated and to a 
degree helped create the lack of trust on the part of many citizens towards deci-
sion-makers in Government and the nuclear industry. 
Around the turn of the century a combination of repeated failures to establish 
a DGD site and a new more participatory approach to decision-making in several 
countries – an approach which was applied to other ‘difficult’ areas of decision 
involving controversy, such as GM food – led several countries to introduce a 
more deliberative and open style of decision-making (Chilvers and Burgess 2008). 
This so-called ‘deliberative turn’ in decision-making processes has had some pos-
itive results. Where such processes have led to some real progress, as in Sweden, 
there seem to have been two conditions, one pre-existing and the other specific to 
waste management. The first condition seems to have been relatively high levels 
of initial public trust in relevant institutions including the nuclear industry. The 
second, strongly exemplified in Sweden, was a process of deep engagement with 
communities that first volunteered as repository sites, but were also given the op-
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portunity to withdraw from the process if they found the proposals being offered 
were unattractive (CoRWM 2006, Chapter 9) 
Countries like Canada and the UK also followed more participatory and delib-
erative models in trying to formulate more effective waste policies in the 2000s. 
In the UK, CoRWM was given a ‘blank sheet of paper’, with emphasis in its terms 
of reference to consult widely and to ‘inspire public confidence’ (CoRWM 2006, 
Annex 1), a commodity previously in short supply. CoRWM took a consciously 
‘analytic-deliberative’ approach to its work and conducted very wide-ranging 
engagements with both stakeholders and non-aligned members of the public. 
Its 2006 report endorsed DGD as the desirable end-point but its most important 
recommendation[c], endorsed subsequently by Government (Defra, BERR and the 
devolved administrations for Wales and Northern Ireland 2008), was that com-
munities should be invited to volunteer to become potential repository sites, to be 
resourced to do this effectively, and to be given a right to withdraw participation 
if the terms being offered were unattractive. 
This new approach did improve the level of trust in the policy process but was 
no guarantee of success. As outlined below the ongoing revival of Government 
commitment to new nuclear power (HMG 2017) has made it more difficult to 
achieve agreement on a way forward for higher activity wastes. 
While the widespread move towards more participatory forms of decision-mak-
ing has improved trust and made progress more likely, it has not been a panacea. 
Even in its own terms it has had problems in rectifying the power imbalances 
that inevitably exist between local communities and the combined forces on the 
State and the nuclear power industry. A critique of the CoRWM process suggests 
that while its greater openness and engagement were helpful, it was still subject to 
important framing processes within which the influence of powerful incumbent 
actors could not be countered (Chilvers and Burgess 2008). 
The politics of nuclear waste also extend well beyond the issue of local siting. 
Local opposition to siting proposals have often been influenced and bolstered by 
national and international forces. Environmental NGOs like Greenpeace have 
often majored on the waste (and associated reprocessing) issues and in countries 
like Germany a wide range of political forces – not all of them associated with en-
vironmentalism – have joined together to resist proposals for waste management 
solutions at national level. 
This wider than purely local current of resistance to the policy of burying waste 
has at least two strands. One is the idea that it is impossible to demonstrate that any 
underground repository can guarantee that there will be no return of radioactivity 
to the biosphere for hundreds of thousands of years. And while most scientists in 
this field argue that it may be possible to make a DGD adequately safe this often falls 
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short of endorsing a particular site, and/or the precise methods proposed to try and 
contain the waste within the repository. And of course no-one can guarantee the 
integrity of a repository thousands of years in the future (CoRWM 2006, Chapter 13)
A second strand concerns the meaning of emplacing waste deep underground. 
The colloquial version of this argument is ‘out of sight, out of mind’ involving a 
suspicion that the purpose of deep disposal is to make invisible the problem that the 
waste was created in the first place. This argument is used by those who have more 
wide-ranging objections to nuclear power, but is also visible among others who do 
not hold such views. It is often associated with scepticism about the robustness of 
the safety case that can be made for DGD and has been particularly strong where 
reprocessing of spent fuel has added complexity to the management task.
The politics (and ethics) of waste management can also vary sharply depend-
ing on the status of nuclear power within a country. Where a decision is made to 
abandon nuclear power the waste issue becomes purely one of managing a legacy. 
If there is trust that the decision to abandon nuclear power is final, then the issue 
becomes simply one of finding the ‘least worst’ way of managing the waste legacy 
(CoRWM 2006, Chapter 14). In such situations it has sometimes proved possible 
to bring together people of varying opinions about nuclear power – supporters 
and opponents – in the common cause of finding a solution. This was the case in 
2003 in the UK when, on the formation of CoRWM in 2003, it appeared that there 
would be no future role for nuclear power in the UK (DTI 2003).
The problem can become more intractable when there is an ongoing programme 
of building new nuclear power. The politics and ethics here are different. The question 
is no longer how to find the least worst way to manage waste but rather whether 
proceeding with nuclear power is justifiable, given that more waste will ensue, and 
that there are alternative paths for power production that do not impose the same 
potential burdens on future generations. At local level this translates into uncertainty 
for a community in terms of how much waste they may eventually need to receive, 
and is likely therefore to lead to greater resistance than if it knows it will host a fixed 
legacy. Where such commitments to new nuclear construction are strong, as in the 
UK, resistance to an ‘out of sight out of mind’ solution to waste management has 
become stronger – due to a conviction that getting the waste out of the way is being 
used simply as a legitimation device for the advance of new nuclear construction. 
The stance of the UK Government on this – that it has confidence that a long-term 
management route for waste ‘will’ exist (Defra BERR and the devolved administra-
tions for Wales and Northern Ireland 2008)– has had the tendency to reduce public 
trust, especially as it was as long ago as 1976 that an influential report advocated 
that there should be no going ahead with a substantial nuclear programme unless it 
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could be demonstrated that a route existed (Royal Commission on Environmental 
Pollution1976) (not ‘will exist’) to manage waste effectively.
7 Conclusions
Failure across all nuclear-using countries to implement technically convincing and 
publicly acceptable ways of dealing with higher activity wastes has been a feature 
of nuclear power across the world for several decades. There have been some small 
advances since the Fukushima accident in a few countries, primarily Finland and 
Sweden, but even in those cases, no operating repository will open until 2020 at 
best. Further, there seem to be distinct features of Nordic political systems, espe-
cially higher degrees of public trust and consensual decision-making styles that 
are hard to replicate elsewhere. While issues like safety, security and proliferation 
risk remain problematic, it is the inability of all countries yet to find a credible 
long-term way forward to manage the most dangerous categories of waste that is 
the primary stumbling bock to acceptance of the technology. 
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Riding to the Rescue? 
The Changing Picture in China and the Global 
Future of Nuclear Power
M. V. Ramana1
Abstract
China has the most ambitious targets for nuclear power and some expect that 
it would shore up the flagging prospects for a large expansion of nuclear power 
around the world. But in recent years, China’s nuclear program has not grown 
as fast as projected. This chapter explains why there are good reasons to expect 
nuclear power growth to slow down further. Promises that new reactor designs 
will be constructed in large numbers in China or exported from China to other 
countries seem unlikely to materialize. As a result, nuclear power’s salience to 
future global electricity generation will continue to diminish.
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1 Introduction
For long, China was expected to be the engine that would propel a large-scale 
expansion of nuclear power in the 21st century. Starting around 2005, the country 
embarked on constructing a very large number of nuclear plants (see Figure 1). 
After a short pause following the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi accidents, China resumed 
new reactor construction in late 2012 and today has the most number of reactors 
under construction—18 reactors, nearly a third of the global total (IAEA, 2018). 
The dominance of China in nuclear reactor construction testifies not just to 
China’s emergence as an industrial powerhouse but also the decline in nuclear 
growth elsewhere. Indeed, in recent years, both the United States and Western 
Europe have seen many reactors shut down well before their license period expire 
in comparison with new reactor construction. Globally nuclear energy production 
as a share of all electrical energy generated has declined to around 10.5 percent, 
nearly 40 percent below the maximum of over 17 percent in 1996 (Schneider and 
Froggatt, 2017). 
Fig. 1 Annual commencement of nuclear reactor construction
Source: “Global Nuclear Power Database” http://thebulletin.org/global-nuclear-power- 
database
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Targets for nuclear capacity in many countries have also been declining, especially 
in the aftermath of the disaster that started in 2011 at the Fukushima Daichi nuclear 
plant (Ramana, 2016). In contrast, China has continued rolling out impressive tar-
gets for the future. More recently, the country has also started making determined 
attempts to export its reactors (Thomas, 2017), for example, by infusing capital into 
a very expensive nuclear power project in the United Kingdom, as a result of which 
some were even asking if China might be able to rescue Europe’s nuclear energy 
industry (Brown, 2015; Sputnik, 2015). 
Is this a realistic projection of China’s role in the future of nuclear power? Will 
China really be able to compensate for the ongoing decline in nuclear energy? This 
article tries to answer these questions by examining the targets that have been set 
and the plans that were announced, and following these by an examination of 
the actual experience of reactor construction and exports. This is followed by a 
discussion of some drivers of reductions in nuclear plans and a brief conclusion. 
2 Current status
According to the IAEA’s Power Reactor Information System, as of January 2019, 
China had 46 operating reactors with a total net capacity of around 43 GW (gi-
gawatts), and a further 11 reactors with a total capacity nearly 11 GW are under 
construction (IAEA, 2019). In 2017, nuclear power contributed 247.5 TWh, which 
constituted 3.9 percent of all electricity generated in China, up from 3.6 percent 
in 2016. The nuclear fraction has been very gradually increasing since 2010 (see 
Figure 2). Nevertheless, the small magnitude of that fraction implies that the large 
buildup of nuclear power was part of a general strategy that called for building up 
all kinds of electricity generation plants. In particular, China has been ramping up 
construction of modern renewables. In 2017, wind energy contributed 306 TWh, 
up by 26 percent from its contribution in 2016, while solar energy contributed 118 
TWh, up by 75 percent from 2016 (China Energy Portal, 2018).














1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
Nuclear Energy (TWh)
Fraction of all electricity
Fig. 2 Nuclear energy supplied to the grid (blue points) and the fraction of all 
electricity provided by nuclear power
Source: Authors calculations based on figures in BP, 2016, Statistical Review of World 
Energy 2016: BP, accessed October 18, 2016, at http://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/
energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html.
3 Ambitious targets
Although China is a relatively late entrant to nuclear power, with construction of 
nuclear power plants starting only in the 1980s, three decades after the nuclear 
weapons program started, it has periodically laid out impressive targets.2 Some of 
these are listed in Table 1. Perhaps the highest of these was the figure of 114 GW 
by 2020, released by the National Development & Reform Commission in 2010 
(Power Engineering, 2010). These figures have come down and according to the 
latest 13th Five-Year Plan, the targets for 2020 were to have 58 GW of nuclear gen-
erating capacity in operation and a further 30 GW of capacity under construction 
(WNN, 2016c). Even this target will likely not be met and Chinese officials admit 
that it might be only 53 GW by 2020 (Stanway and Chen, 2016). But in the longer 
term, Chinese nuclear advocates continue to posit impressive targets, up to 150 
GW by 2030, nearly thrice what is likely to be the operating capacity in 2020. For 
example, the China General Nuclear Power Corporation foresees a nuclear capacity 
of “120-150 GW by 2030” (Stanway, 2016).
2 One early projection by Professor Lu Yingzhong who was then Director of the Institute 
of Nuclear Energy Technology at Tsinghua University envisioned nuclear power con-
tributing 12.7 percent of all energy (including heat and electricity) in China by 2020 
with that fraction rising to 19.35 percent by 2030 (Lu, 1984).
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Tab. 1 Nuclear Power Targets
Year in which Pro-
jection was Made




1988 2000 6,000 2,168
1996 2010 20,000 10,282
2002 2020 40,000 – 80,000 ?
2008 2020 50,000 ?
2010 2020 114,000 ?
2016 2020 58,000 ?
Sources: (Dazhong and Yingyun, 2002; Meyers and others, 1993; Ran and Li, 1998; Sternfeld, 
2009; WNN, 2016c)
When it comes to exports, too, Chinese nuclear advocates have been making extrav-
agant claims (Thomas, 2017). This trend has become stronger after the Fukushima 
accidents that commenced in 2011. That accident set back nuclear programs around 
the world, leaving China in a comparatively better place. This has been welcomed 
by Chinese officials; according to Zhang Guobao, a former Administrator at China’s 
National Energy Administration “history has given China an opportunity to over-
take the world’s nuclear energy and nuclear technology powers” (Stanway, 2013). 
In 2016, the president of China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) announced 
that “China aims to build 30 nuclear power units… by 2030”; this goal, in turn, 
was based on the assessment that “more than 70 countries” were “planning or are 
already developing their own nuclear power projects, and it is estimated 130 more 
nuclear power units will have been built by 2020” (Xinhua, 2016).
4 Interest in Chinese market
Because of the expectation that China will be building up its nuclear capacity rap-
idly, reactor vendors and national government representatives have been flocking 
to the country since the 1980s in the hope of selling their wares (MacDougall, 1984; 
Lu, 1993; Silver, 1994; Bratt, 1996; Zhou and Zhang, 2010). Foreign government 
officials, sometimes at very high levels, have been involved in advocating for their 
reactor designs (Silver, 1994; Silver, 1996b; Silver, 1996a; Zuercher, 1995; Bodgener, 
2008; Ria, 2008; Cultice and Feng, 2009). 
The nature of the competition is made clear by a 2008 cable from the U.S. embassy 
in Beijing to Washington and is worth quoting at some length:
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“Effective advocacy for U.S. nuclear suppliers is essential to ensuring access to 
China’s rapidly growing civil nuclear power market. With the exception of the bid-
ding process that resulted in a contract for four Westinghouse AP1000 reactors, all 
reactor purchases to date have been largely the result of internal high level political 
decisions absent any open process. Even the Westinghouse decision was arguably a 
political one, which was quickly followed by subsequent non-competitive purchases 
of the competing French and Russian plants. China is currently in the process of 
building as many as 50 to 60 new nuclear plants by 2020; the vast majority will be 
the CPR-1000, a copy of 60’s era Westinghouse technology that can be built cheaply 
and quickly and with the majority of parts sourced from Chinese manufacturers… 
Pressing for open and transparent bidding processes for reactor sales (for complete 
plants or individual major component purchases), as well as advocating for China to 
pursue advanced reactor technology for future sites so that it’s reactor fleet is not so 
reliant on aging technology through the next half century could be a more effective 
approach to bolster U.S. interests in China’s nuclear market. Regardless of how the 
United States decides to advocate, it should be done continuously and from a high 
level in order to keep up with the French and Russians” (U.S. Embassy Beijing, 2008). 
Two claims made in this cable are worth noting. First, all nuclear contracts were 
political decisions. In other words, they may not really be technically or economi-
cally justifiable. Neither the Chinese government nor any of the countries seeking 
to export reactors to the country offered a public cost-benefit analysis in support 
of the decision to import one or the other reactor type. Further, vendors enticed 
Chinese policymakers with varying degrees of technology transfer, attractive 
financing arrangements, and other political benefits (Ramana and Saikawa, 2011). 
Second, all countries that seek to sell nuclear reactors have been engaged in high 
level governmental campaigning, on a continuous basis. As the New York Times 
reported in 2004: “In recent months, a procession of political leaders has pressed 
China to favor power plant designs and equipment from their home countries. 
They have included President Jacques Chirac of France; former Prime Minister 
Jean Chretien of Canada; Viktor Khristenko, who was named fuel and energy 
minister in Russia on Tuesday; and dozens of less-prominent officials. President 
Bush even raised the virtues of American nuclear technology with the Chinese 
prime minister, Wen Jiabao” (Buckley, 2004). The justification for the high level 
political engagement was the poor state of the nuclear reactor market elsewhere 
and the promises of growth in China. 
Riding to the Rescue? 305
305
5 Recent experience with reactor construction
Partly as a result of such high level intervention, China’s nuclear establishment 
did import a number of reactors. China’s entry into nuclear energy began with 
the construction of a series of indigenously designed reactors at the Qinshan site. 
However, in the late 1980s, China imported reactors with the M310 design from 
Framatome in France for the Daya Bay site; the majority of the reactors built in 
China involve the CPR-1000, a modification of the M310 design. The only excep-
tions were two VVER1000s and two Candu-600 reactors imported from Russia and 
Canada, respectively, but there was never any plan to make those the mainstay of 
the Chinese nuclear fleet. It was only after 2005 and the eleventh 5-year plan that 
imported reactors came back into consideration, with the specific aim of introducing 
third-generation reactors from other countries (Xu, 2008).
The relevance of the construction of the reactors was heightened in the after-
math of Fukushima because of the decision made by policy makers that China 
would build only Generation III or III+ reactors. The initial assumption was that 
this stipulation would lead to the adoption of AP1000 technology, in part because 
senior nuclear policy makers promoted the idea that this reactor design would 
have withstood the conditions that led to the events at Fukushima. For example, 
a general manager in the China Power Investment Corporation pointed out that 
the “reactors in the Japanese nuclear power plants, which have been affected by the 
massive quake, are Generation II reactors and have to rely on back-up electricity to 
power their cooling system in times of emergency”, whereas the “AP1000 nuclear 
power reactors, currently under construction in China’s coastal areas and set to 
be promoted in its vast hinterland, are Generation III reactors and have built in 
safety features to overcome such a problem” (Reporter, 2011). This was very much 
the same claim that Westinghouse itself peddled. As the Westinghouse President 
and Chief Executive Officer Aris Candris put it to ABC News: “Everyone has heard 
of what happened at the Fukushima Daiichi plant…Had an AP1000 been on that 
site we would have got no nuclear news post-tsunami” (Sy, 2011).
The other reason to have expected an important role for AP1000s in China’s 
nuclear plans is that a key player in the Chinese nuclear power sector, the State 
Nuclear Power Technology Corporation (SNPTC), held the sole rights “to sign 
contracts with foreign parties to receive… 3rd generation nuclear power technolo-
gy” (SNPTC, 2011). Specifically, the 3rd generation nuclear power technology that 
SNPTC was to contract for was the Westinghouse AP1000, which it was expecting 
would become “the dominant technology for China’s future nuclear industry 
development” (Lawrence and Katz, 2007). The Fukushima accidents and the Chi-
nese government’s decision that future nuclear construction would be limited to 
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Generation III reactors gave SNPTC an opportunity to translate their expectation 
about the AP1000’s dominance into reality. By May 2011, SNPTC had convinced 
officials at Westinghouse Electric Company that the AP1000 was going to dominate 
the Chinese reactor market from then on (Li and Tranum, 2011). But the actual 
experience of the projects involving AP1000s proved more problematic.
Before going on to the AP1000 projects, let us first look briefly at the European 
Pressurized Reactor (EPR) units being built at Taishan. These were originally 
scheduled to “be commissioned at the end of 2013 and in autumn 2014” respectively, 
and France’s Areva had hoped “to have started work on more reactors” by then 
(Thibault, 2010). As of February 2017, China General Nuclear Power maintained 
that the two units will start commercial operations in “the second half of 2017 and 
the first half of 2018, respectively” (AFP, 2017). Despite the serious concerns set off 
in April 2015 when the French nuclear safety regulator, Autorité Sûreté Nucléaire 
(ASN), revealed that the reactor bases and lids Areva had supplied from its Le 
Creusot plant did not meet safety specifications (Chaffee, 2015), the first EPR was 
opened for commercial operations in December 2018 (IAEA, 2019). The delays 
with the EPR were not surprising, at least in retrospect, because by the time con-
struction started in Taishan, the corresponding projects at Olkiluoto in Finland 
and Flamanville in France had already run into trouble and were expected to be 
significantly delayed (Kanter, 2009).
In contrast, the AP1000s at the Sanmen and Haiyang sites were the very first 
constructions of this design anywhere in the world. When construction started at 
Sanmen, the Shaw Group, one of the partners in the consortium building the reac-
tor, proudly proclaimed, “As with the successful, on-time and on-schedule pour of 
the first nuclear concrete for the Reactor Building mat earlier this spring, we have 
again shown that next generation nuclear power plants can be, and are being, built 
in an efficient and timely manner” and looked forward “to bringing this plant on 
line as scheduled in 2013” (Shaw Group, 2009). Unfortunately for Westinghouse 
and Shaw, these promises did not come to pass. 
An important source of problems, although not the only one, has been the reac-
tor coolant pumps (RCPs) that were supplied by US manufacturer Curtiss-Wright 
Corporation. The RCP forces water to circulate through the reactor and transfer 
the heat generated by the fission reactions in the reactor core. In January 2013, 
Curtiss-Wright found that a piece of a “blade within the pump had separated 
from the… casting” and it had to recall the RCPs that had already been shipped 
off (NIW, 2013). The RCP had to undergo design changes and fixes that took two 
years to complete. The problem with the RCPs was symptomatic of a larger problem: 
construction of the Sanmen and Haiyang power plants had began well before the 
engineering of the plant’s design was completed (Spegele, 2016).
Riding to the Rescue? 307
307
Because the design has never been constructed anywhere, new problems keep 
surfacing.3 One such problem was observed during tests that were conducted at the 
first AP1000 unit at Sanmen-1. These tests were conducted without any radioactive 
material being loaded into the reactor, but at high temperatures. The problem in-
volved neutron shield blocks that are supposed to stop neutrons from the nuclear 
core from escaping into the rest of the reactor. During these tests, the material 
that was in the shield blocks had “volumetrically expanded and extruded out of 
the shield blocks into the nozzle gallery” and there was “internal pressurization 
of the shield blocks,” according to a heavily redacted report on the issue presented 
by Westinghouse to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission in February 2017 
(Cooke, 2017, p. 5). Westinghouse was forced to admit that it had “not properly 
considered” the possibility that the shielding material might expand in volume.
Any of these problems could result in serious safety consequences. Chinese 
nuclear officials have expressed concern in the past about these problems. In 2013, 
for example, a former vice-president of CNNC complained to South China Morning 
Post: “Our state leaders have put a high priority on [nuclear safety] but companies 
executing projects do not seem to have the same level of understanding” (Ng, 
2013). The result has been a very long series of delays. All four AP1000s went into 
commercial operation in late 2018 or early 2019 (IAEA, 2019).
Cost estimates have risen too. Early estimates by China’s Nuclear Energy Agen-
cy put the cost of constructing AP1000 reactors at $2300/kW (NEA, 2010, p. 48). 
A newspaper article from 2016 claims implicitly that the cost might be $3000/
kW (Abe, 2016). In its environmental impact assessment for the Sanmen project, 
China’s National Nuclear Safety Administration “projected a total project pricetag 
of 52.5 billion yuan ($8.3 billion) — more than double the original budget for the 
two units of 25 billion yuan”(Yu, 2018).
The problem that this higher cost of construction poses is that of economic 
competitiveness. In 2016, Steve Kidd, who was formerly with the World Nuclear 
Association, suggested that a tariff of 0.50 RMB per kWh has been mentioned for 
AP1000 and EPR nuclear projects, up from 0.43 RMB per kWh for projects that 
constructed more traditional nuclear reactor designs (Kidd, 2016). But the tariff 
available to the project developers was significantly lower. In April 2018, Sanmen 
“cleared the annual power exchange auction in Zhejiang province, making it eli-
3 However, it bears remembering that even with the follow on AP1000 constructions in 
the United States, there have been a number of technical problems with significance 
for safe operations, which raises fundamental questions about the soundness of that 
design. These problems were to cause record losses for Toshiba and drive Westinghouse 
to bankruptcy (Asahi Shimbun, 2017; Cardwell and Soble, 2017; Lewis, 2016).
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gible to sell 766 gigawatt hours of output during 2018 at a price of 0.385 yuan per 
kilowatt hour ($0.061¢/kWh)...roughly 10% less than the standard nuclear tariff of 
0.43 yuan/kWh” (NIW, 2018a).
The poor experience at Sanmen and Haiyang has not stopped Westinghouse 
from making unrealistic claims about the future of the AP1000 in China. In 2016, 
Jose Gutierrez, interim chief executive of Westinghouse, indulged in wishful 
thinking: “We expect to see a fleet of AP1000 reactors in China ... We don’t know 
how many China wants to build, but it could be tens” (De Clercq, 2016). This does 
not appear to have any basis in reality and reflects an attempt to boost its plunging 
fortunes. Indeed, Westinghouse officials themselves may not believe in this. The 
Wikileaks cables reveal that nearly a decade ago, at a meeting convened by the 
DOE China Office, Westinghouse representative in China, Gavin Liu, “noted that 
because China’s technical capacity is increasing, the longer it takes to start the 
next round of AP1000 reactors, the less scope will be available for Westinghouse” 
(DOE China Office, 2008). 
The outlook for Westinghouse in China is bleak. As Lin Boqiang, director at the 
China Center for Energy Economics Research at Xiamen University told Bloomberg 
News, “The only way Westinghouse can win contracts in China is to demonstrate 
they can build reactors quicker and cheaper than anyone else in China’s market 
and win hearts with actions, not words…Westinghouse so far hasn’t demonstrated 
such abilities” (Stapczynski and others, 2015). Li Ning, from Xiamen University, 
told the Wall Street Journal that Chinese officials “are certainly very frustrated” and 
“they feel Westinghouse oversold the system, oversold the technology, promised 
more than they could really deliver” (Yap and Spegele, 2015). Of course, ever since 
Westinghouse filed for bankruptcy in the United States in March 2017 (Cardwell 
and Soble, 2017), the future of the company itself has been highly uncertain. 
6 New reactor designs
China has also been at the center of efforts to rescue nuclear power by adopting new 
reactor designs in place of the now-standard Light Water Reactor design that has 
dominated nuclear power around the world. These newer reactor designs, which 
are mostly paper designs, are held out as solving one or more of the many problems 
that have plagued nuclear power. 
There are at least two reasons offered for the focus on China. The first is the idea 
that if any country is to be capable of supporting the production of, and offering a 
market for, a large number of units, it would be China. Growth of nuclear power 
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in other markets is either slow or non-existent (Schneider and Froggatt, 2016). 
Therefore, the idea goes, if a new reactor design is to be tried out at some scale, it 
would be possible only in China. As Charles Forsberg, executive director of the 
MIT Nuclear Fuel Cycle Project, puts it, “There have been studies that indicate that 
if reactors are mass-produced, they can drive down costs…The Chinese market is 
large enough to make that potentially possible” (Martin, 2016).
Second, there is the idea that the Chinese nuclear regulatory system might be 
more open to licensing non-traditional reactor designs (Eaves, 2017). One example 
of a non-traditional reactor design that some in China are working on, and where 
U.S. nuclear advocates have been pointing to China as the role model, is the molten 
salt reactor (Halper, 2015; Martin, 2015; Reischer, 2016). Some of the proponents 
are Chinese but there are also a number of foreign designers, many from the United 
States, who seek to have their designs first be commercialized in China. 
Two other designs with a connection to China are the High Temperature Gas 
Cooled Reactor (HTGR) and the Travelling Wave Reactor. In an article in Issues in 
Science and Technology, for example, Richard Lester, another MIT professor, lists 
several features of the way the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission carries out 
regulation of new reactor designs and offers the Travelling Wave Reactor design 
promoted by Bill Gates and Nathan Myhrvold as an example of a technology that 
was going to be developed in China because of the stricter and more rigid safety 
regulatory regime in the United States (Lester, 2016). 
The saga of the HTGR is also relevant. This reactor design was first proposed in 
the 1940s and was extensively researched by German technologists, who built two 
reactors based on this design, but who eventually abandoned the effort to com-
mercialize the technology. In the 1990s, South Africa set up a major program to 
develop a commercial HTGR called the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR). This 
effort was to collapse a decade later, and the South African government abandoned 
the project (Thomas, 2011).
In China, work on the HTGR design started in earnest after the country signed 
a cooperation agreement with Germany in 1984 (MacDougall, 1984). The pilot 
scale HTR-10 reactor reached its criticality in 2000, achieved full power operation, 
and began to supply power to the grid in 2003 (Zhou and Zhang, 2010). Soon after 
the HTR-10 attained criticality, in 2001, the commercial scale design, called the 
high-temperature gas cooled reactor pebble-bed module (HTR-PM) project, that 
is capable of generating 250 MW of electricity, was launched (Zhang and others, 
2009). The development of this reactor became a high priority under the “Chinese 
Science and Technology Plan” for the period 2006–2020. 
In February 2008, the implementation plan and the budget for the HTR-PM 
project was approved by the State Council of China. The HTR-PM received final 
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approval from China’s cabinet and its national energy bureau around two weeks 
before the Fukushima accidents (Bradsher, 2011). However, in the aftermath of 
Fukushima, all nuclear construction was frozen. In December 2012, construction 
of HTR-PM commenced at Shidaowan in China’s eastern Shandong province 
(IAEA, 2019). The reactor was “expected to start commercial operation in late 
2017” (WNN, 2016b).
Chinese HTR proponents have painted an ambitious future for that reactor de-
sign. When construction of the plant was starting, there were plans for eventually 
constructing a further 18 units of the same type at the same site (NucNet, 2013). 
There are also plans to export these reactors to other countries, and China has 
entered into exploratory agreements with Saudi Arabia and Indonesia (Can, 2016; 
WNN, 2016a; WNN, 2016b), but has not completed construction as of January 
2019 (IAEA, 2019). 
China’s construction of the HTR-PM and more generally its pursuit of this reactor 
design has been much lauded by nuclear advocates around the world, especially 
by those who seek to promote a focus on HTGRs or other advanced reactors as a 
way to rescue nuclear power from its declining fortunes. Andrew Kadak, formerly 
President and CEO of the Yankee Atomic Electric Company (YAEC) that operated 
the Yankee Atomic Nuclear Power station, said: “The industry has been focused on 
water-cooled reactors that require complicated safety systems. The Chinese aren’t 
constrained by that history. They’re showing that there’s another way that’s simpler 
and safer. The big question is whether the economics will pay off” (Reiss, 2009). 
Unfortunately, for the proponents, the economics doesn’t seem to be working 
out—even prior to the commencement of operations. According to the trade 
magazine Nuclear Intelligence Weekly, the high cost of generation (60 fen (¢0.9) per 
kilowatt hour, higher than the average 43 fen/kWh for Gen III reactors) is among 
the “key challenges” confronting HTGRs in China (Yu, 2016, p. 6). The high cost 
is no surprise; even HTGR proponents estimate that the capital cost will be about 
20% higher than LWRs, although they typically will also claim that this cost will 
come down as more plants are built (Zhang and Sun, 2007). Another key challenge 
that the HTGR faces is the fact that there are a host of other small modular reactor 
technologies under development in China (Ramana and others, 2013; Yu, 2016). 
Two such designs, the ACPR50 and ACPR100 from CGN and the ACP100 from 
CNNC, have been in the news recently, as a result of an announcement that China 
was going to build maritime nuclear power platforms in the South China Sea (NEI, 
2016). In part as a result of these challenges, it appears that Chinese policy makers 
have dropped the plan of building 18 reactors at the Shidaowan site (WNN, 2016b). 
The idea of exporting HTGRs also appears to be somewhat wishful thinking. 
The Indonesia case provides a good illustration. News reports suggest that Wang 
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Shoujun, chairman of China Nuclear Engineering Group Corporation visited Batan 
(Badan Tenaga Nuklir Nasional, Indonesia’s National Nuclear Energy Agency) in 
June 2016 in order to better understand the Indonesian market (Can, 2016). Despite 
such agreements—for example, Batan also has signed an agreement with the Japan 
Atomic Energy Agency on research and development of HTGRs in 2014 (WNN, 
2014)—the odds of Batan being able to construct a commercial scale HTGR in 
Indonesia in the foreseeable future are essentially nil. Indeed, in December 2015, 
then Energy and Mineral Resources Minister Sudirman Said announced publicly 
that the government had concluded that “this is not the time to build up nuclear 
power capacity. We still have many alternatives and we do not need to raise any 
controversies” (NEI, 2015). 
Other countries that have been targeted by China also have lengthy histories 
of ambitious announcements followed by little action; for example, over a decade 
ago, Argentina declared that it was embarking on “an eight year nuclear energy 
development program with the purpose of increasing the number of atomic plants 
plus resumption of uranium enrichment production” (Mercosur, 2006). Little was 
achieved by this program apart from the commissioning of the Atucha-II reactor 
in 2014, construction of which started in 1981 (IAEA, 2014b). There is little to in-
dicate that Argentina will indeed embark on massive nuclear construction; instead 
it seems to be heading towards expanding its renewable energy sector (Maxwell, 
2016). Indeed, in May 2018, the trade magazine Nuclear Intelligence Weekly reported 
that Argentianian officials have put plans for Chinese supplied reactors on hold 
(NIW, 2018b).
The pattern that may be discerned is of making tall claims about numerous 
reactors of one design or the other, raising hopes among nuclear power supporters 
for a revival of the technology based on this new design. However, these initial an-
nouncements are almost always followed by a process of slowing down, and often 
abandonment, with the latter steps done quietly with little fanfare. This appears 
to be what has happened to the HTGR design and may well be the fate of the plans 
to construct floating power plants, unless the real reason for the latter are to raise 
the stakes on the south China sea disputes. In any case, it seems hard to visualize 
China as a laboratory for successfully developing a reactor design that solves the 
problems of nuclear power.
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7 Drivers for reduction
In light of all these problems, then, it is not surprising that China’s current nuclear 
target of 58 GW by 2020 is much lower than the earlier high value of 114 GW by 
2020. But problems with constructing the current generation of nuclear reactors 
do not constitute the only reason for this change in the outlook for nuclear power 
in China. There are at least three additional reasons for a lowering of targets for 
nuclear deployment (Ramana and King, 2017). 
The first is that energy demand in China is not growing at the same fast rate it 
has in the past. The underlying reason for this is the deliberate shift in the nature 
of the Chinese economy, from one primarily focused on increasing manufacture, 
especially by heavy industry, to one that is actively promoting service sector and 
less energy-intensive sectors (Green and Stern, 2015; Green and Stern, 2016). At 
the same time, because of ambitious plans in the past, there is a real glut in power 
capacity. Most power plants, including nuclear reactors, are not being utilized at 
optimal levels. This trend might result in further reduction in the number of hours 
that nuclear reactors are operated: in March 2017, the National Energy Administra-
tion announced new rules on the priority order for different kinds of generators to 
supply electricity to the grid; Chinese nuclear companies are already complaining 
about being forced to reduce how many hours grid operators are willing to absorb 
the power outputs of reactors (Yu, 2017a).
The second reason is that there are very few coastal sites available for new nuclear 
plants to be set up. There is a limit to how many reactors can be built on existing 
sites. There is real and justified resistance to building nuclear power plants in in-
land sites, next to rivers and large lakes, water from which is already in demand 
for drinking, agriculture, and other higher priority uses (King and Ramana, 2015). 
Finally the government seems to be paying attention local opposition to nuclear 
facilities; this is, again, entirely justifiable. Opposition to nuclear facilities has been 
growing in China since the Fukushima accidents (Buckley 2015; Lok-to 2016). One 
study that explored the Chinese public’s willingness to pay to avoid harm found 
that those surveyed were “particularly concerned about the development of nuclear 
power in the aftermath of the Fukushima disaster and generally regard nuclear 
power as unsafe power generation technology” (Sun and others, 2016, p. 692). At 
least two nuclear facilities that were supposed to be constructed were cancelled 
after public protests, the most prominent being the decision in 2016 to cancel a 
100 billion yuan (US$15 billion) nuclear reprocessing plant that was proposed for 
a location near the city of Lianyungang, Jiangsu province (Green 2016).
There is independent evidence that even industry insiders within China do 
expect a decline in nuclear construction going forward. For example, imports of 
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uranium by China from other countries has been declining, from nearly 21,300 
tons of uranium concentrate in 2014 down to 19,200 tons in 2015, to under 16,000 
tons in 2016 (Chaffee, 2017).
8 Effect on global prospects for nuclear power
What might be the impact of a reduction in China’s nuclear targets on the future 
of nuclear power? One handle on this is provided by critically examining the pro-
jections put out by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The IAEA’s 
projections have historically been well in excess of what actually materialized (IPFM, 
2007, p. 85). Nevertheless, its projections are worthy of examination because they 
provide an indication of the nuclear industry’s own outlook. Each year, the IAEA 
puts out two sets of projections, a low case and a high case. The first “represents 
expectations about the future if current market, technology and resource trends 
continue and there are few additional changes in explicit laws, policies and regulations 
affecting nuclear power” (IAEA, 2013, p. 6). In contrast, the “high case projections 
are much more optimistic, but still plausible and technically feasible. The high case 
assumes that current rates of economic and electricity demand growth, especially 
in the Far East, continue. Changes in country policies toward climate change are 
also included in the high case” (emphasis added). In other words, the high case 
projections represent something like a best case scenario for nuclear deployment. 
Table 2 below lists the high case estimates for the Far East region and the world 
as a whole from the last seven years. Since 2010, all of the projections—for nuclear 
power globally and for the Far East, which is defined as China, Japan, and Republic 
of Korea—have been declining. Even for the IAEA, the realities of the market cannot 
be completely ignored. However, barring a few years, although the projected nuclear 
capacity in the region is declining, the fraction of global capacity constituted by 
the countries of the Far East has been increasing. The IAEA’s low estimates also 
assume that similarly large fractions (35 to 40%) of the global nuclear capacity will 
be in the Far East. In other words, if there is to be a big revival of nuclear power, it 
would have to be fueled by construction in this region.
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in 2050 around 
the world
2010 450 1415 31.80% 21.60% 17.00%
2011 450 1228 36.64% 19.10% 13.50%
2012 417 1137 36.68% 16.90% 12.20%
2013 412 1113 37.02% 16.60% 12.10%
2014 398.7 1091.7 36.52% 15.10% 11.50%
2015 355 964 36.83% 14.40% 10.80%
2016 351 898 39.09% 14.50% 10.00%
Sources: (IAEA, 2010; IAEA, 2011; IAEA, 2012; IAEA, 2013; IAEA, 2014a; IAEA, 2015; 
IAEA, 2016)
The IAEA does not break up its estimates by country. But the much larger size 
of China as compared to the other two countries in the region implies that it is 
likely to be the dominant contributor to the IAEA’s projections for the Far East. 
In its latest projections, the high case involves 351 GW of nuclear capacity in this 
region, much of which has to be in China. Even with this massive buildup, nuclear 
power loses market share; nuclear power contributes a slightly smaller fraction to 
all electricity generated in 2050 than now. 
9 Conclusions
Nuclear power in China has grown dramatically in the last decade or more, in large 
part because of high level political decisions to promote the technology even if it 
was not really technically or economically justified. This rapid expansion and the 
ambitious targets announced by the Chinese nuclear establishment have led to the 
expectation that China might give the nuclear industry a new lease on life. But, as 
the IAEA’s projections show, even if this trend is to change, and China does restart 
another phase of rapid expansion, nuclear power will become a smaller contributor 
to global electricity production than today. 
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This chapter has argued that because of the kinds of shifts seen in recent years, 
China will likely never build up the kind of nuclear power capacity that was foreseen 
for it even just a decade or less ago. The country is not on track to meet its current 
target of 58 GW of nuclear power capacity in 2020. And unless there is a substan-
tial shift in various policies, for example, a deliberate effort to build up nuclear 
capacity even if it is uneconomical or otherwise undesirable, it is quite likely that 
the targets set in future years will, if they are to be realistic, reflect a much slower 
pattern of growth. There are many reasons to expect that such a policy reversal, 
namely for Beijing to actively promote the rapid construction of nuclear plants 
around the country, will not occur. In particular, there are shifts in the pattern of 
energy demand growth and growing public concerns about nuclear facilities that 
impacts the siting of reactors negatively.
The export market is not growing fast either. Despite much talk, Pakistan re-
mains the only country to which China has exported nuclear power plants. With 
the rapid reductions in the costs of renewable energy technologies, especially solar 
photovoltaic panels, and the continued pattern of high costs and lengthy construc-
tion periods of nuclear reactors, the demand for nuclear plants is likely to decline. 
One way by which nuclear enthusiasts have held on to their hope for a major 
revival of nuclear power is to postulate that alternate reactor designs will be intro-
duced and constructed in large numbers. In this scenario too, China is presumed 
to be the main actor because of two factors: its presumed large market for nuclear 
reactors and the expectation that its regulatory process will approve new reactor 
designs more easily. But these scenarios of new reactor designs coming in to save 
nuclear power ignore the lengthy history of failed experiments with alternate de-
signs and the multiple challenges faced by nuclear power, which pose conflicting 
priorities on reactor designers (Ramana and Mian, 2014).
Put together, these trends suggest that China is unlikely to rescue the global 
nuclear industry from its ongoing gradual decline. 
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Three Decades after Chernobyl:  
Technical or Human Causes?
Nikolaus Muellner1
Abstract
The accident of unit 4 at the NPP Chernobyl from 1986 was arguably the worst 
disaster of a nuclear power plant that happened so far. It became apparent to 
the broader public that the vast amount of radioactive fission products that 
accumulate during operation of a nuclear reactor have the potential to render 
large areas inhabitable. The root cause of the accident was therefore of major 
interest for all countries who operated nuclear power plants, or who had nuclear 
power plants in its vicinity. Considering all information available today it is safe 
to draw the conclusion that the reactor design was too complex at that time, 
and therefore errors have been made. It is not so easy to exclude that this could 
happen with other designs in other countries as well.
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1 Introduction
Thirty years after the disaster at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant (NPP), all 
details of the accident seem to be known. The Chernobyl reactor was a pressure 
tube reactor of the type RBMK, which has been built several times in the Soviet 
Union. Experts from regulatory authorities and research institutes have analysed the 
existing accident data and results from accident simulations and gave their view in 
many published reports (GRS 1996, USNRC 1987, Snell and Howieson 1991, Sehgal 
2012 – and many others). The International Atomic Energy Agency IAEA and the 
“Nuclear Energy Agency” of the “Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development” organized conferences and published the resulting experts’ opinions 
(INSAG 1986, INSAG 1992, OECD/NEA 2002). In most cases, the authors conclude 
that human error combined with weaknesses in the reactor design of the RBMK 
reactor have led to the accident. In this content the term “human error” indicates 
violation of operating procedures and lack of knowledge of the operators of the 
reactor. Deficiencies in the safety culture of the power plant are typically identified 
as root cause for the transgressions of the operators. The long prison sentences for 
the main engineer Fomin of the Csernobyl NPP and his deputy Diatlov add to 
this picture.
This narrative of the accident and its root cause, as presented in many books, 
reports and papers, can be traced back to an IAEA meeting. A few months after 
the accident, 25th to 29th of August 1986, the IAEA organized a “Post Accident 
Review Meeting” were Soviet experts gave detailed information on the accident 
to a large number of experts from IAEA member states. The IAEA issued a report 
that summarized the meeting, the first report of the “International Nuclear Safety 
Advisory Group” (INSAG 1986). The report gave a clear statement on the reason for 
the accident: “… the accident was caused by a remarkable range of human errors 
and violations of operating rules in combination with specific reactor features 
which compounded and amplified the effects of the errors and led to the reactivity 
excursion.”, where “human errors” refers exclusively to operator errors.
Five years after the accident, the report INSAG-1 was revised by IAEA and reissued 
as INSAG-7 (INSAG 1992). The new version is based on two Russian reports: One 
report (Shteynberg 1991) was issued by a commission, appointed by the Soviets’ 
“State Committee for the Supervision of Safety in Industry and Nuclear Power”. 
Said commission had the task to reassess the events of the Chernobyl accident. The 
other report (Abagyan et al., 1991) investigates in detail the cause of the accident 
and is authored by prestigious Soviet institutes, such as the Kurtchatov Institute 
or the Scientific Research and Design Institute for Power Technology (Russian 
abbreviation NIKIET). Both reports are annexed to INSAG-7. These reports present 
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a completely different picture of the accident. In particular, Shteynberg (1991) con-
tradicts the account of the accident of INSAG-1 regarding operator errors. Abagyan 
et al. (1991) draws a whole new picture on the RBMK designer organization. The 
conclusions of INSAG-7 are therefore different than INSAG-1, but retain a certain 
emphasis on lacking safety culture and operator errors.
The new perspective from Shteynberg 1991 and Abagyan et al., 1991 is rarely 
reflected in the current literature on the Chernobyl accident. Large, influential 
organizations such as US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) had already 
completed their analyses of the Chernobyl accident before the revised report 
INSAG-7 was published (e.g. USNRC 1987). Others, such as (OECD / NEA 2002), 
tend to follow the narrative of human error and violation of operating procedures 
notwithstanding their recent publication date. This leads to the fact that when-
ever the Chernobyl accident is portrayed based on literature, it is most likely that 
mistakes and violation of the operators are identified as main cause for the event.
References to accounts of the events given by participants in the accident night 
are rarely found (a counter-example can be found in Schmid 2011). The deputy chief 
engineer of the power station, Diatlov, who designed the test program that led to 
the accident of Chernobyl and who was present in the control room in the night of 
the accident published an article in a scientific journal after INSAG-7 was issued 
(Diatlov 1995). A book, which he wrote about the background and the course of the 
accident, was not published, but is available electronically from Internet libraries 
(Diatlov 2005). However, some aspects of the accident can only be understood by 
combining the information of the logs of the Chernobyl control system, the logbook 
entries, the interpretations of the various scientific institutes of the events, and 
the description Diatlov on the events of the night of the accident. By combining 
all information a new view on the root cause of the accident becomes apparent.
2 The Chernobyl reactor
The RBMK type reactor was not the first choice for the Chernobyl site (Shteynberg, 
1991). In fact the RBMK design was ranked third in a feasibility study. Nevertheless 
it was decided to construct a RBMK reactor since the required parts and components 
for the RBMK design were available, while components for the other two designs 
would have to be manufactured and long production times were expected. The de-
cision for RBMK reactors was taken in 1969, in 1972 it was decided to build a total 
of 4,000 MW electrical power (four reactor blocks). The Gidroproekt and NIKIET 
institutions worked together to develop the reactor design, which was subsequently 
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examined by the Soviet State Committee for Construction and Planning. Finally, 
the design was approved by the Council of Ministers. The blocks Chernobyl one 
to four went online between 1977 and 1983.
Fig. 1 Schematic of an RBMK reactor (Nuclear Energy Institute 1997)
Figures 1 to 3 show the schematic of the RBMK reactor, a section through the 
reactor, and the reactor core. RBMK is a Russian acronym for high-performance 
channel reactor and is designed as a boiling water reactor. In contrast to the western 
type boiling water reactors the RBMK does not feature a reactor pressure vessel. 
Instead it is equipped with approximately 1660 parallel vertical cooling channels 
(or pressure tubes). Each pressure tube can be loaded with a fuel element with an 
active region of about 7m, which represents the reactor core. The channels protrude 
vertically a graphite block (Figure 3, or (1) in Figure 2). Each single channel can 
be separated from the circuit by isolation valves at full load operation and a fuel 
element can be unloaded or loaded by the refuelling machine.
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Fig. 2 Cross-section through the RBMK reactor building (D’Auria 2005). (1) core, (2) 
pressure tubes leading tot he core, (3) lower biological shield (4) collector, (5) 
lateral biological shield (6) steam drum separator (7) pressure tubes (8) upper 
biological shield (9) refueling machine (10) upper core plate (11) upper pressure 
tubes (12) recirculation lines (13) collector aft er pump (14) collector before 
pump (15) main circulation pump
Th e reactor cooling circuit begins and ends with the steam separators (shown in (6) 
in Figure 2 and as a “steam (drum) separator” in Figure 1). Th e steam separators 
separate steam from water. Th e separated water, together with the feed water from 
the condenser (see “water from turbine” in Figure 1) is pumped to the reactor core 
by means of a total of six main circulation pumps (with two backup main circu-
lation pumps in total eight main circulation pumps are installed). Th e water is 
partially evaporated in the reactor core so that a two-phase mixture of water and 
steam is fed to the steam separator drum from the core exit. Th e steam separator 
drum separates the steam from the water, the steam is led to the turbine via the 
steam lines, while the water is mixed with the feed water and fed back to the core. 
A total of eight turbines and generators were installed at Chernobyl Nuclear Power 
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Plant for the four reactor blocks (two per block). It is important to note that during 
operation not only water, but also a certain fraction steam is present the reactor 
core (which is also called “void fraction”).
Fig. 3
RBMK reactor core 
(D’Auria 2005)
Reactivity initiated event
Th e Chernobyl accident was a so called “reactivity initiated event”, which means 
that the control over the reactor power was lost, and that the power output of the 
reactor increased tremendously in a short time period. Th e power control of a re-
actor is a complex issue, and even more so in case of an RBMK reactor. Th ere are 
a number of factors to consider:
Th e source of power in the RBMK nuclear reactor stems from the uranium-235 
in the fuel pellets, which, during operation, is hit by neutrons inducing fi ssion, a 
process during which thermal energy and further neutrons are generated for fur-
ther fi ssions (chain reaction). Th ose neutrons however, before being able to induce 
further fi ssions, must be slowed down (moderated). Unlike light water reactors 
(which use water for moderation of neutrons) the RBMK reactor uses the graphite 
block surrounding the fuel channels as moderator (the black tiles in Figure 3). Th e 
graphite off ers the advantage that a fraction of uranium 235 between 1% and 2% 
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in the fuel is sufficient, while water-moderated reactors need a fraction between 
3% and 5%. However, light water reactors have the advantage that the coolant is 
also the moderator at the same time. If a light water reactor loses its coolant (i.e., 
a pipeline breaks, the cooling water is lost and the reactor runs dry), the chain 
reaction collapses and the reactor power is sharply reduced. The RBMK reactor 
in such a situation has to rely on its neutron absorber rods (control rods), which 
control the power and have to be inserted into the core.
The power of a reactor is proportional to the number of neutrons which are 
generated in the chain reaction. An important parameter is therefore the so called 
“reactivity”, a measure of how the generation of neutrons is changing. Positive 
reactivity means more neutrons are going to be generated and the power will in-
crease. Negative reactivity means that less neutrons are going to be generated and 
the power will decrease. In principle, the following factors influence the reactivity 
in the RMBK reactor core: 
• Graphite as moderator and its temperature
• Temperature of the fuel elements
• Enrichment and burn-off of the fuel elements
• Presence of xenon in the reactor core
• The temperature and density of the cooling water when entering the reactor and 
the steam fraction (void fraction) in the cooling channels
• The control rods of the reactor and their positioning.
The Chernobyl accident was a so called reactivity initiated event, an event in which 
the reactivity (and the power) increased in an uncontrolled way. All factors above 
played a role in the accident, but the last two bullet points were of special impor-
tance for the Chernobyl accident.
Positive void coefficient
A key figure to characterize the behaviour of a reactor is the “power coefficient”, and 
in case of the RBMK reactor, the “void coefficient”. The power coefficient describes 
how the reactor is going to react to a power change: a positive power coefficient 
means that an increase in power will induce a further additional increase, a decrease 
in power a further decrease. It is desirable (although not necessarily required) to 
construct a reactor with a negative power coefficient: this means, an increase in 
power would lead to a reduction in power, a decrease to an increase. Such a reactor 
will by itself tend to regulate its power at a fixed power level. The other key figure, 
the “void coefficient”, describes the feedback of the reactor to an increase of steam 
in the core region. A positive void coefficient means that an increase of the steam 
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fraction in the pressure tubes in the core region leads to an increase in power, a 
negative void coefficient means that an increase in void leads to a decrease in power.
The light water cooled and moderated reactors have a negative power coefficient, 
as well as a negative void coefficient. The designers of the RBMK reactor aimed for 
a negative power coefficient, and accepted a positive void coefficient (during certain 
operational regimes). However, the designers of the RBMK were convinced that 
this effect was limited. Their design calculations showed that if the pressure tubes 
were to be filled with steam, the reactivity would first increase, but then decrease, 
and eventually become negative (see Figure 4, Abagyan et al., 1991). This calcula-
tion, although accepted by the regulatory authority, turned out to be wrong, as the 
Chernobyl accident showed.
Fig. 4 
Reactivity vs coolant 
density in a fuel channel. 
(1) Assumptions of the 
designers, reactivity 
negative for voided 
channel, (2) reality, 
reactivity strongly 
positive for voided 
channel (Abagyan et al. 
1991)
Shteynberg (1991) points out that the impact of the steam fraction in the cooling 
channel on the reactivity was only evaluated for performance levels above 50% of 
the nominal reactor power (i.e. 1600 MWth and upwards). The accident happened 
at an operating power of about 200 MWth, a region which should prove to be 
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particularly unstable. However, as Shteynberg (1991) concludes, the designers did 
not expect any problems with this power range (which, according to him, is shown 
by the lack of supporting calculations for this range) and the operators were also 
unaware of the risks of operating the reactor in this dangerous power region.
Control rods
As in most nuclear power plants the reactor power of the RBMK reactor is con-
trolled by control rods. The basic principle of control rods is simple – rods with a 
neutron absorbing material are inserted into the reactor to “slow down” the chain 
reaction, or withdrawn to “accelerate” it. By inserting the control rods the power 
is reduced (negative reactivity is inserted), by withdrawing the control rods power 
is increased (positive reactivity is inserted).
According to Shteynberg (1991), as well as by Abagyan et al. (1991), the design of 
the control rods triggered the accident. The RBMK reactor core is large compared 
to other cores, therefore a large number of control rods are necessary to ensure 
an even power distribution. The so called “operational reactivity margin” (ORM) 
is a very important operational parameter for RBMK reactors which played a key 
role in the accident. Roughly speaking it specifies for the RBMK reactor how many 
control rods are fully extracted at a certain point in time. More precisely, the ORM 
reports the “equivalent” withdrawn control rods, which means that two control 
rods withdrawn to 50% count as one. Furthermore not all control rods are equally 
effective, and furthermore effectiveness of a rod is not equal over the whole size. 
The algorithm for calculating the ORM takes those effects into account. Accord-
ing to the operating instructions, there is a minimum value for the ORM value, 
which must not be exceeded. There must always be 26–30 equivalent control rods 
withdrawn. The main engineer may permit operation also down to an ORM value 
of 15 equivalent control rods. Operation below this value is not permitted.
The reason for this rule (and especially its safety relevance) it is not immediately 
apparent. It seems safe to assume that the operators of the reactor at the night of 
the accident were not aware of the safety relevance of the ORM, because Diatlov, 
deputy chief engineer, who was present in the control room in the accident night, 
wrote (Diatlov 1995) regarding the purpose of the ORM: … “a guarantee that the 
reactor protection operates properly. At the same time the restriction is imposed 
not on the maximum, which would be natural, but on the minimum”. A restriction 
on the maximum would be, indeed, more intuitive: Inserted control rods mean 
that the power can be further increased as needed (by pulling them out). On the 
other hand, if the control rods are withdrawn from the core it means that, if need-
ed, more negative reactivity can be introduced to shut down the reactor. So one 
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would assume operating at power with the control rods withdrawn is safer, then 
with control rods inserted.
Another fact would lead the operators to neglect the ORM parameter. Usually 
safety relevant parameters are shown at prominent positions in the control room. 
The ORM value, on the other hand, was computed by the PRIZMA program 
(Shteynberg 1991), on a console which was usually out of view. The ORM com-
putation would take several minutes. It was also known that the calculated ORM 
value was not precise, since a group of rods was not considered. In principle the 
ORM value could also be derived manually from the indicated penetration depth 
of different control rods by a hand calculation (correcting for the various effects 
mentioned above). Either way it would be a lengthy procedure.
But the ORM value has a critical influence on the safe shutdown of the reactor. 
Due to the design of the control rods, the efficiency of the reactor SCRAM (the 
emergency shutdown) system was linked to the ORM value. When the reactor 
emergency shutdown was triggered at an ORM value of 30 and more, negative 
reactivity could very quickly be introduced to reduce the power; at an ORM value 
of 15 it took six seconds to introduce the relatively small value of 1$ of negative 
reactivity; and at an ORM value of 7 the introduced reactivity was positive over 8 
seconds (which means the reactor power increases further for eight seconds when 
the operator hits the emergency shutdown button). Only after that the power would 
decrease (Shteynberg 1991). The design of the control rod is the reason for this effect: 
to ensure better performance during normal operation when the control rods are 
fully withdrawn, displacement bodies made of graphite were fitted with telescope 
rods at the lower end of the control rods. This means that during normal opera-
tion the middle of the core region (approximately 7m) was filled with a graphite 
displacer of 5m (see Figure 5). Above and below the displacer in the reactor core 
was a 1 m water column. When a fully withdrawn control rod was inserted, the 
graphite displacer had to pass through 1m of water in the lower core region. However 
at this position the water acts as a neutron absorber, the graphite body acts as a 
moderator, which means that positive reactivity is introduced into the lower region 
of the reactor (power is increased). In the upper part of the reactor core, negative 
reactivity is inserted because the absorber material is introduced into the core (see 
Figure 5). If the rods are already one meter inserted, the graphite displacer will be 
at the bottom of the core, and no positive reactivity will be introduced. This is the 
reason why a minimum ORM value is enhancing safety – it means, that a certain 
number of rods are already inserted into the core.
According to Shteynberg (1991) the way the ORM value was displayed in the 
control room suggests that the designers of the RMBK reactor themselves were 
not aware of the critical role of the minimum ORM value. As a safety-relevant 
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parameter, the ORM would have been automatically calculated and displayed with 
constantly updated values. An automatic signal to shut down the reactor in case 
the ORM value drops below the allowed minimum would have been implemented 
in the reactor protection system.
Fig. 5 Design of the control rods of the reactor protection system (Abagyan et al. 
1991) (a) rod completely withdrawn with graphite displacer (b) situation while 
inserting the rod introducing positive reactivity over several seconds in the 
lower part of the core.
3 The Chernobyl accident
The course of the accident is described and commented in many places (see, for 
example, GRS 1996, Shteynberg 1991, Abagyan et al., 1991, USNRC 1987 and others). 
Here a shortened presentation is given, which focuses on the cause of the accident.
On April 25, 1986, the Chernobyl NPP Unit 4 was scheduled for a shutdown 
and maintenance. It was planned to carry out a test before shutting down the unit. 
Like all nuclear power stations, RBMK reactors need energy to cool the reactor core 
even after shutdown (the chain reaction is interrupted, but the decay heat, i.e. the 
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energy from the further decay of fission products, must be dissipated). Usually the 
power for the residual heat removal system is drawn from the electricity grid. If, 
as is possible and even probable in the case of an accident, this connection is tem-
porarily unavailable, emergency power generators (diesel generators) are put into 
operation. However, they need about a minute for starting up. In order to bridge 
the time between the loss of offsite power and connection to the emergency diesel 
generators, the output of the running down turbine generators should be used.
The test should confirm that this is actually possible. The experiment should 
start at reduced power, at between 700 and 1000 MW of thermal power (nominal 
power are 3200 MWth). Four of the eight main coolant pumps (six plus two reserve 
pumps) should remain in operation to ensure cooling of the reactor, four should 
be supplied by the generator connected to the running down turbine. It should be 
observed for how long those main coolant pumps could be supplied with power.
In attempting to reach the test conditions, the reactor power was inadvertently 
decreased to 30 MWth instead of the intended range. The operators decided to in-
crease the reactor power again to be able to conduct the test. In certain accounts of 
the accident this is portrayed as violation of procedure, but according to (GRS 1996) 
an immediate re-start of the reactor in this situation would have been permissible 
in principle, if the ORM value were at least 30 equivalent control rods before power 
reduction. Shteynberg (1991) quotes the operating procedure manual, which states 
it is permissible to restore the power, as long as the power was not reduced below 
the (not clearly defined) “minimum controllable power level”.
The attempt to increase the power to the planned range was not successful. The 
reason for this is that when the power in the reactor is reduced, more xenon is pro-
duced than is burned and there is a temporary increase in xenon. Xenon acts as a 
neutron poison and counteracts a power increase. Even though the ORM limit was 
violated again and significantly more control bars were withdrawn than planned (a 
breach of the operating regulations), the targeted power level could not be achieved.
The crew decided to stabilize the reactor power at 200 MWth instead and start 
the test from this level. In some reports, e.g. (GRS 1996, INSAG 1986), it is noted 
that the team in had changed the test conditions without proper consultation of 
the relevant departments. However, one must point out that the author of the test 
program, the deputy chief engineer Diatlov, was part of the team of operators at 
that night and present in the control room. It is, of course, a violation of procedure 
to modify the proposed test program ad-hoc without appropriate analysis and 
verification. In INSAG (1986) it was noted that a low power range for the RBMK is 
a particularly unstable region. However, as Shteynberg (1991) pointed out, this did 
not appear to be known to the designers of the reactor, nor to the operators before 
the accident. Furthermore INSAG (1986), and other reports referring to INSAG 
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(1986) states that continuous operation at that power level was forbidden. Shteyn-
berg (1991) explicitly referred to that statement as untrue, there was no such rule. 
Furthermore operation at house load was an event which would be automatically 
triggered on some occasions. House load operation at RBMK reactors corresponds 
to a power level of 200–300 MWth.
The range of power where the reactor was now operated was highly unstable. In 
addition the power distribution showed a maximum in the upper and lower regions 
of the reactor, instead of dropping from a maximum in the middle upwards and 
downwards. A reduction in the coolant density (such as steam formation) would 
lead to a strong increase in output, an increase in output to an accelerated reduc-
tion of Xenon and a further decrease in the coolant density and thus to a further 
increase in output. The power coefficient was strongly positive.
The test program was initiated. The operators had disabled the automatic 
shutdown signal, which would trigger a shutdown together with start of the test, 
in order to be able to repeat the test if something goes wrong. INSAG (1986) states 
“had these trips not been disabled, the insertion of the emergency rods would have 
terminated the transient regardless of all the other circumstances” (as turned out 
later this statement is wrong). Diatlov (2005) wrote, the operators had the impression 
that the test started as planned and that the reactor could now be shut down. Thirty 
seconds after the experiment was started, the chief operator, Akimov, gave the junior 
operator Toptunov the order to shut down the reactor. As again Shteynberg (1991) 
stated, up to this event, the manual shutdown, there were no processes which could 
have triggered the power excursion that destroyed the reactor.
In fact it was just the actuation of the emergency shutdown system (its particu-
lar design with graphite displacers at the bottom) that destroyed the reactor, and, 
contrary to the statement in INSAG (1986), would the system have been actuated 
automatically, it would have destroyed the reactor as well. The accident occurred 
at 1:24 and according to Shteynberg (1991) already at 0:30 the conditions in the 
reactor were such that a shutdown with the shutdown system was not possible 
anymore. As was said earlier, due to the particular design and low value of ORM, 
the shutdown system increased the reactor power for eight seconds, before causing 
a reduction. And at 200 MWth, the reactor power coefficient was strongly positive, 
which means that an increase in power would lead to a further increase. Those two 
circumstances together led to the power surge that destroyed the reactor.
A reactor power of more than 540 MWth was recorded seconds after the actuation 
of the system. The increase in power together with the test conditions, which in turn 
reduced the throughput continuously in four of the eight circulating pumps, led 
to increased steam formation, which in turn led to increased power. It is assumed 
(Shteynberg 1991) that in the lower part of the reactor the energy input in some fuel 
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elements exceeded 320 cal / g. This quantity of energy led to an explosion of the 
uranium fuel pellets, which led to a destruction of the fuel rods. The coolant came 
into direct contact with the hot fuel particles and evaporated spontaneously, which 
led to a local pressure rise. The increase in pressure resulted in the destruction of 
the fuel channels, which led to the formation of steam in the entire reactor core and 
to a further power excursion. Two loud explosions subsequently shook the entire 
building. The heavy upper-biologic shield (see (8) in Figure 2) was raised and turned 
to a vertical position. The temperatures in the reactor core rose to high levels and 
most likely the graphite moderator ignited, a fire that could not be extinguished for 
several days. The radiological releases still led to excessive limits in many hundred 
kilometres from the accident site. 
4 Conclusions and reason for the accident
INSAG (1986) mainly blamed the operators for the accident. The crew operated the 
reactor in a dangerous power range, forbidden by operating procedures, violated 
numerous regulations, and the extremely unlikely combination of violations along 
with design weaknesses led to disaster. Within this reasoning it was only logical that 
Fomin, the chief engineer of Chernobyl NPP, and Diatlov, his deputy and author 
of the test program, were sentenced to prison.
The updated report INSAG (1992) and especially the expert commission reports 
which are annexed to INSAG (1992) draw a completely different picture. Not only 
the operators, but also the designers did not know about the design weaknesses. 
The authorities who had to examine the design did not ask the right questions.
Before the accident, however, there were several indications of the problems of 
the RBMK, both with regard to the steam bubble coefficient as well as the design of 
the control rods and their graphite displacer (Shteynberg 1991). But the response to 
those warnings came to slow and in some cases the warnings were ignored right away.
After re-examination of the up-to-date accounts of the accident it seems to be 
safe to conclude that the accident was caused mainly by design weaknesses of the 
reactor, together with violations of procedures by the operators.
Important technical design weaknesses can be named:
• The problematic design of the reactor control rods triggered the reactor accident 
in Chernobyl.
• There was an unstable power range, and the designer of the reactor were not 
aware of it (at least at the time of design).
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• The way the central parameter ORM was displayed and the lack of automatic 
monitoring and response to a low ORM margin.
Essential violation of rules of the crew that can be named:
• The operational operating margin of the ORM (operational reactivity margin) 
was repeatedly not checked by the operating crew in the control room. If the rel-
evant regulations had been complied with, the accident would not have occurred.
• The operating team violated procedures by changing the test conditions on the 
spot and by executing the test at 200 MWth, without prior analysis.
• The test program itself contained control violations which, however, would not 
have affected the accident sequence.
The ORM parameter, the operational reactivity margin, was not defined precisely 
enough by the designer. Thus, the safety relevance of the ORM rule could not be 
known to the operators. The “peripheral” nature of the evaluation led the operators 
to believe that this value was not safety-relevant. There are indications that even 
the designers of the RMBK reactor were not aware of the critical function of the 
ORM, since otherwise they would have displayed the parameter to the operators 
in a better way.
Coming back to the question technical or human errors a safe conclusion would 
be that there were components of both. Yes, there were violations of procedures 
by the operating crew, and yes, there were weaknesses in the technical design of 
the reactor. However the training and experience of the crew in the control room 
complied with all standards of the Soviet Union at that time (Shteynberg 1991). One 
important parameter (ORM value) was ignored, but by a whole team in the control 
room. There is no evidence that another team would have behaved differently.
The design weaknesses were certainly not known at the time the RBMK design 
was developed. Although there were new calculations in the years 1980 and 1985, 
which suggested that a completely steam-filled channel would not lead to a fading 
of the chain reaction, but would lead to a power excursion. However, no proper 
attention was paid to these calculations. There were also references to the “positive”, 
i.e. reactivity-increasing effect of the control rods (Shteynberg 1991). It is therefore 
also important that there was no open technical debate on the technical weaknesses 
of the RBMK reactor in the Soviet Union, and that no consequences had been drawn 
by supervisory authorities and political authorities.
The lessons learned from the Chernobyl accident nowadays points toward the 
importance of operator training. While this is certainly a valuable lesson, there is 
another lesson to be learned. There were warnings on the design errors that did not 
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receive proper attention. There are enough examples in Western countries where 
a warning of a supposed design weakness led to a lengthy review, while affected 
reactors remained in operation. One example is the possible deboration of the pump 
seal of a pressurized water reactor in the case of a small leak. There was the fear that 
a power excursion might occur if a deborated coolant plug could be transported 
into the reactor core. The investigations have finally shown that the concern was 
unfounded – but the reactors were still operating until clarification. A further 
example of a safety – critical issue that has long been discussed in the “Western” 
world (and is still discussed): If a severe accident occurs, are the containment sump 
filters clogged because of their narrow mesh width, or can the cooling water be 
recirculated? Here, too, the reactors were operated without waiting for the complete 
clarification of the question.
The general perception of the Chernobyl catastrophe is still very much oriented 
along the lines of INSAG (1986). Human failure together with design weaknesses is 
determined as the root cause. Lessons for other nuclear power plants are generally 
confined to underlining the important role of safety culture. Chernobyl is perceived 
as a problem that is limited to the RBMK reactor in the Soviet Union. In Western 
nuclear power plants, an accident such as in Chernobyl is unthinkable. However, 
it is questionable whether this distinction is fully justified. Of course, an accident 
will not take place in exactly the same way – but undetected faults in the technical 
design can lead to accidents or severe accidents in other reactor designs as well. 
Warnings of design weaknesses in general do not lead to a shutdown of the affected 
units, even in the Western industries, but are examined while the plants continue 
operation or are sometimes even ignored. With all the differences between RBMK 
reactors and Western pressurized water reactors, there are similarities that are often 
overlooked. Reports such as D’Auria (2005) comparing the safety level (and related 
interpretations) of RBMK reactors to the safety level of Western reactor concepts 
without classifying the western designs as significantly superior are of little concern.
Designers of reactors are humans and humans make mistakes. The computer 
systems that the designers of the RBMK reactors had available led them in the 
wrong direction regarding the behavior of the reactor in the formation of steam 
in the pressure tubes. The supervisory bodies were not in a position to identify 
these errors. There was too little or no reaction to hints that the design calculations 
could be faulty. The operators, after all, did not follow instructions whose meaning 
they did not understand. All these are reasons for a catastrophic accidents against 
which also Western reactors are not immune. The RBMK reactor was designed 
and operated by humans. In view of the complexity of this machine, mistakes have 
been made – and the consequences of mistakes can be severe when dealing with 
nuclear power plants. 
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The Reality after Fukushima in Japan 
Actual Damage to Local People
Tadahiro Katsuta1 
Abstract
This study analyses the government’s efforts and the actual situation of the victims 
of Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident five years after the accident. 
As of September 5, 2015, about 99 thousand Fukushima prefecture residents had 
been forced to evacuate from their homes. Currently, the government is seeking 
to lift evacuation orders aggressively. However, evacuees have mixed feelings. 
The amount of legally required compensation for damages continues to increase; 
it reached 7.65 trillion yen (US$76.5 billion) in the latest review as of the end of 
March 2016. TEPCO is practically bankrupt and has been collecting funds from 
all Japanese citizens. As of the end of December 2015, 51 people were diagnosed 
with malignant or suspected malignant thyroid cancer in the second examina-
tion conducted by Fukushima Prefecture. Government measures, i.e., disaster 
recovery plans, compensation for damages, and scientific approaches, have been 
used as means to avoid taking responsibility through the use of power, the use of 
money to keep victims silent, and the use of science as an excuse; these measures 
are driving the victims into a corner instead of supporting them. Ultimately, 
two common causes of these problems are related to the nuclear energy policy 
of the past and the nuclear energy policy for the future.
1 Tadahiro Katsuta, School of Law, Meiji University, Tokyo, Japan, tkatsuta@meiji.ac.jp
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1 Introduction
Five years have passed since the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO)’s Fukushima 
Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant Accident (hereinafter referred to as the Fukushima 
accident) which occurred due to the magnitude 9.0 Great East Japan Earthquake of 
March 2011. Now, have the victims of Fukushima accident been able to get back to 
normal life without any problem? Unfortunately, they are still facing many problems. 
Recovery has been slow in Fukushima due to the existence of areas designated as 
evacuation zones, their dissatisfactions are suppressed by the compensation for dam-
ages, and they suffer from the fear of developing cancer through the participation in 
the thyroid examination. This study examined these three challenges as the current 
main issues faced by the victims to clarify the current status of the victims who are 
suffering not only from the effects of the Fukushima accident but also because of 
government measures. The complex current conditions are described in Chapter 2 
and the essential issues obscured by the current situation are clarified in Chapter 3.
2 Aspirations and the reality five years after the 
Fukushima accident 
2.1 Evacuation plan2 
The residents of Fukushima prefecture, in which Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear 
power plant is located, are exhausted from the prolonged evacuation and hope to 
be freed from the life as an evacuee. On the other hand, they have doubts about 
the hasty lifting of evacuation orders by the government due to their anxiety about 
radiation-related issues.
The Reconstruction Agency, which was established after the Great East Japan 
Earthquake, set the five years following the earthquake of 2011 as the intensive recon-
struction period, and the term from April 2016 to March 2021 as the reconstruction 
and creation period3. They emphasized that the number of earthquake evacuees 
2 Reconstruction Agency, Current Status of Reconstruction and Challenges, March 2016. 
http://www.reconstruction.go.jp/english/topics/Progress_to_date/image/20160307_Cur-
rent_Status_of_Reconstruction_and_Challenges_rev1.pdf
3 Reconstruction Agency, “The Process and Prospects for Reconstruction”, March 2016, 
http://www.reconstruction.go.jp/english/topics/Progress_to_date/image/20160307_pro-
cess_and_prspects.pdf
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from Iwate Prefecture, Miyagi Prefecture and Fukushima prefecture has dropped 
to 174 thousand people as of February 2015 from its peak at about 470 thousand.
But if we look at the figures closely, it becomes clear that Fukushima prefecture 
alone has been left behind. As of September 5, 2015, about 99 thousand Fukushima 
prefecture residents—the number is greater than half of the total number of evacu-
ees—had been forced to evacuate from their homes. Specifically, about 55 thousand 
people had evacuated to other areas within Fukushima prefecture; among these 
evacuees, approx. 51 thousand people had been compelled to live in temporary hous-
ing. The remaining approx. 43 thousand people had evacuated to other prefectures 
across Japan. According to the questionnaire survey involving 1,000 earthquake 
victims conducted in March 2016 by Japan Broadcasting Corporation (NHK), 310 
people had to evacuate more than 5 times; among these people, 250 people were 
Fukushima prefecture residents. Besides, the percentage of people who responded 
that they do not feel that disaster recovery has been achieved was 17.6 % in Iwate 
Prefecture, 18.2% in Miyagi Prefecture, and 49.9 % in Fukushima Prefecture4.
About 70 thousand people have evacuated from the designated evacuation zones 
due to the Fukushima accident: specifically, about 24 thousand people evacuated 
from the difficult to return zone, about 23 thousand people from the restricted 
residence zone, and 24 thousand people from the zone in preparation for the 
lifting of the evacuation order. The prolonged evacuation period has exhausted 
the Fukushima prefecture evacuees. As of the end of September 2015, the total 
number of disaster-related deaths—i.e. deaths that were not caused directly by the 
earthquake and tsunami but were due to indirect causes such as deterioration of 
physical conditions as a result of evacuation—was 3,407 people. These people had 
been living in 9 prefectures and Tokyo. Of these, Fukushima prefecture had the 
highest number at 1,979 deaths5. According to the latest information released by 
Fukushima prefecture, the number of deaths has risen to 2,038 (as of 1 April 2016)6.
Since the sum of deaths including deaths directly caused by the earthquake and 
tsunami is 3,866, the number of deaths caused by indirect reasons has exceeded 
that of the deaths caused by direct reasons. As the government hasn’t provided a 
4 NHK (Japan Broadcasting Corporation), Great East Japan Earthquake, A Survey of 
1000 Survivors, (in Japanese), http://www.nhk.or.jp/d-navi/link/shinsai5/shinsai5.pdf, 
accessed 26 April 2016.
5 Reconstruction Agency, “The number of disaster-related deaths due to the Great East 
Japan Earthquake” 25 December 2015. (in Japanese) see http://www.reconstruction.
go.jp/topics/main-cat2/sub-cat2-6/20151225_kanrenshi.pdf Accessed 12 April 2016.
6 Deaths and injuries due to the Great East Japan Earthquake (as of 1 April 2016), https://
www.pref.fukushima.lg.jp/uploaded/life/198319_445221_misc.xlsx, accessed 26 April 
2016.
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definition of the term “disaster-related death,” bereaved family members must prove 
with great difficulty that the death of the deceased family member is related to the 
disaster. Therefore, the potential number of disaster-related deaths may be higher.
According to the statistics collected by the Cabinet Office, the number of sui-
cide related to the Great East Japan Earthquake has decreased everywhere else but 
Fukushima prefecture. The number of suicides committed in Iwate prefecture and 
Miyagi prefecture in 2011 following the earthquake was 17 and 22, respectively; this 
number in 2015 dropped to 3 and 1, respectively. On the contrary, the number of 
suicides increased from 10 in 2011 to 19 in 2015 in Fukushima prefecture7.
Currently, the government is seeking to lift evacuation orders aggressively. 
Among the zones in preparation for the lifting of the evacuation order, orders 
covering a part of Tamura city and a part of Kawauchi city were lifted in 2014, and 
an order covering a part of Naraha town was lifted in September 2015. In June 
2015, the government announced that they will enable the lifting of evacuation 
orders for all restricted residence zones and zones in preparation for the lifting of 
the evacuation order by March 20178. If this plan materializes, 47 thousand people 
will be able to return to their homes. 
However, evacuees have mixed feelings. According to the results of the NHK 
survey, 45.8% of Fukushima evacuees responded that it is too early. For example, 
in February 2016, the government held a briefing in Minami-souma city and stated 
that they hope to lift the evacuation order in April. In response to this, numerous 
residents commented that it is too soon to lift the order since progress has been 
slow in implementing decontamination activities9. In March 2016, Fukushima 
prefecture released the results of its questionnaire survey. Among the people who 
had evacuated to other prefectures and had no home to return to in Fukushima 
prefecture after April 2017 which is when the program for offering rental houses free 
of charge will be terminated, about 70% of them did not wish to return to Fukushima 
while about 10% wanted to return to the prefecture and about 20% responded that 
7 Cabinet Office, “Number of suicides related to the Great East Japan Earthquake” 13 March 
2016. (in Japanese) see http://www8.cao.go.jp/jisatsutaisaku/toukei/pdf/h27joukyou/
jishin.pdf Accessed 12 April 2016.
8 Nuclear Countermeasures Headquarters, “Accelerating post-nuclear disaster Fukushima 
recovery efforts” (Revised version), 12 June 2015. (in Japanese) see http://www.meti.
go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/kinkyu/pdf/2015/0612_02.pdf Accessed 12 April 2016.
9 Tokyo Shimbun, “Residents oppose plan to lift evacuation order in April at an explan-
atory meeting in Minami-souma city”, 21 February 2016. (in Japanese) see http://www.
tokyo-np.co.jp/article/national/list/201602/CK2016022102000126.html Accessed 12 
April 2016.
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they are still debating on whether or not to return10. These response results may be 
due to the following reasons: the fact that their lives at the evacuation destination 
have taken root, concerns over changing the children’s living conditions, and fear 
of radiation-related issues. 
Decontamination work in the designated areas to be decontaminated under 
the direct control of the government has finished in 6 municipalities among the 
11 municipalities within Fukushima prefecture and the plan is to finish decon-
tamination in the remaining municipalities by the end of FY201611. But anxiety in 
Fukushima prefecture is strong. According to the NHK survey, 38.7% of evacuees 
responded that their fear of exposure had not changed even five years after the 
accident. In December 2015, the Ministry of the Environment announced that 
they will not decontaminate areas more than 20 km away from daily activities area 
in Fukushima prefecture12. However, as a result of local opposition, the ministry 
changed the policy to carry out decontamination in satoyama areas—border zones 
of agricultural land and forested land traditionally regarded as one area—where 
people may enter easily13.
2.2 Compensation for damages
TEPCO continues to pay compensation for nuclear damages to the people who 
suffered damages such as individuals, sole proprietors, and corporations.
Legally required compensation costs have continued to increase and the total 
reached 7.65 trillion yen (US$ 76.5 billion) in the latest review as of the end of March 
2016. Out of that total, the amount of the agreed-upon compensation was 5.92 
trillion yen (US$ 59.2 billion). Compensation costs include medical examination 
10 Fukushima Prefecture, “Interim report on the residence intentions survey”, 25 March 
2015. (in Japanese) see https://www.pref.fukushima.lg.jp/uploaded/attachment/158116.
pdf Accessed 12 April 2016.
11 Ministry of the Environment “Progress map of decontamination activities implemented 
under the direct control of the government” 4 March 2016. (in Japanese) see http://josen.
env.go.jp/material/pdf/josen_gareki_progress_201603.pdf Accessed 12 April 2016.
12 Environmental recovery review meeting, “Direction of radioactive materials management 
measures for forests (draft)” 21 December 2015. (in Japanese) see http://www.env.go.jp/
jishin/rmp/conf/16/mat05.pdf Accessed 12 April 2016.
13 Project team of relevant ministries and agencies for recovering forests and the forest 
industry in Fukushima, “Comprehensive approach for recovering forests and the forest 
industry in Fukushima”, 9 March 2016. (in Japanese) see http://www.reconstruction.
go.jp/topics/main-cat1/sub-cat1-4/forest/160309_3_siryou1.pdf Accessed 12 April 2016.
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costs, compensation for psychological damages, voluntary evacuation expenses, 
and business loss expenses14. In terms of the number of claims, approx. 899 thou-
sand cases by individuals, approx. 1.3 million cases by individuals (losses due to 
voluntary evacuation), and approx. 4.02 million cases by corporations and sole 
proprietors had been filed as of April 201615.
TEPCO has been showing consideration for the circumstances and feelings of 
the victims16. However, according to the Nuclear Damage Compensation Dispute 
Resolution Center, which was established as means to provide Alternative Dispute 
Resolution (ADR) by mediating disputes between victims and TEPCO to enable 
them to reach agreements without having to go to court, 4,239 claims were made in 
2015 and the mediation process is still ongoing indeed for 2,746 of those claims17.
Reparation does not cover the only TEPCO. The company has received the finan-
cial assistance from the nuclear power operators and government. That is, TEPCO 
has been bankrupt substantially and has attracted funds not only the consumer of 
electric companies without TEPCO but also the entire Japanese people.
According to the Nuclear Damage Compensation and Decommissioning Facil-
itation Cooperation, which was established newly to manage compensation funds, 
the cooperation received 508.3 billion yen (US$ 5.1 billion) from nuclear power 
operators including TEPCO, an additional 110.0 billion yen (US$ 1.1 billion) from 
TEPCO alone, and 9 trillion yen (US$ 90 billion) of government bonds from the 
government as of FY201418.
According to the estimation released in March 2015 by the Board of Audit of 
Japan, the government will need 30 years at the maximum to collect the debt owed 
14 TEPCO, “New Comprehensive Special Business Plan” 31 March 2016. (in Japanese) see 
http://www.meti.go.jp/press/2015/03/20160331005/20160331005-1.pdf Accessed 12 April 
2016.
15 TEPCO, Records of Applications and Payouts for Indemnification of Nuclear Damage 
(as of 22 April 2016). http://www.tepco.co.jp.cache.yimg.jp/en/comp/images/jisseki-e.
pdf, accessed 26 April 2016.
16 TEPCO, Five Promises to the Afflicted, https://www4.tepco.co.jp/en/images/5promises.
pdf, accessed 26 April 2016.
17 Nuclear Damage Compensation Dispute Resolution Center, Activities Report, March 
2016. http://www.mext.go.jp/component/a_menu/science/detail/__icsFiles/afield-
file/2016/04/20/1347876_009.pdf
18 Nuclear Damage Compensation and Decommissioning Facilitation Corporation, FY2014, 
Business Report (in Japanese), http://www.ndf.go.jp/soshiki/zai_h26jigyo.pdf, accessed 
26 April 2016.
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by TEPCO when it is assumed that the government provides financial assistance 
at the maximum government bond amount of 9 trillion yen (US$ 90 billion)19.
2.3 Thyroid cancer diagnosis
In contrast to Fukushima prefecture’s responses to evacuation plans and compen-
sation, the prefecture has continued to deny the possibility of children’s thyroid 
cancer together with the government. This may be because of the involvement of 
the government in the diagnosis process.
Fukushima prefecture is continuing its health survey which includes surveys of 
external and internal doses and thyroid examinations20 . In regard to the thyroid 
examination, the preceding survey—ultrasonic wave examination for residents 
who were under 18 years old and lived in Fukushima prefecture at the time of 
the accident—was conducted from FY2011 to FY2013. Of the about 370 thousand 
subjects, 300 thousand people were examined (participation rate: about 82%)21. 
As of the end of June 2015, 113 people were diagnosed with malignant or suspected 
malignant thyroid cancer22. Of these, 99 people underwent surgery. Although this 
result is higher than the Japan’s thyroid cancer statistics, the Fukushima Prefectural 
Citizens Health Survey Committee has not recognized these thyroid cancer cases 
as the result of the Fukushima accident; the Committee’s reasoning is that these 
people were exposed to less radiation when compared with the case of Chernobyl 
accident and that some of the subjects may have been over-diagnosed. 
A full-scale survey has been started involving the subjects of the preceding 
study and children who were born after the accident. If nodules or cysts that are 
19 Board of Audit of Japan, “Report on the results of the accounting audit regarding the 
implementation status of government’s assistance provided to TEPCO for compensation 
for nuclear damage” March 2015. (in Japanese) see http://www.jbaudit.go.jp/pr/kensa/
result/27/pdf/270323_zenbun_01.pdf Accessed 12 April 2016.
20 According to an estimation of external exposure dose rate based on a questionnaire 
survey, 93.8% of the respondents were exposed to doses between 0 to 2mSv as of De-
cember 2015. However, only 560 thousand people responded out of the 2.05 million 
subjects (27.4%). As for internal exposure measurements using a whole body counter, 
281,228 people were exposed to less than 1mSv while 26 people were exposed to doses 
between 1mSv to 3mSv. Source: “Overview of the residents health survey” https://www.
pref.fukushima.lg.jp/site/portal/43-7.html (in Japanese) Accessed 12 April 2016.
21 ibid.
22 Fukushima Prefectural Citizens Health Survey Committee, “Interim report on the 
prefectural citizens health survey”, March 2016. (in Japanese) see http://www.pref.
fukushima.lg.jp/uploaded/attachment/158522.pdf Accessed 12 April 2016.
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larger than a predetermined size are found in the first examination, those people 
undergo a second examination. As of the end of December 2015, 51 people were 
diagnosed with malignant or suspected malignant thyroid cancer in the second 
examination. Unfortunately, only 29 of them submitted a basic survey questionnaire 
that provides data on their exposure dose at the time of the accident. Among these 
values, the highest dose was 2.1 mSv23.
In May 2015, a research group of Okayama University published a paper of epi-
demiological studies related to frequent occurrence of childhood thyroid cancer24. 
According to the group, based on the results of the screening tests of Fukushima 
Prefecture, at the maximum, the number of thyroid cancer incidences in a certain 
area of Fukushima prefecture was 50 times higher than Japan’s average annual 
number of thyroid cancer incidences. Accordingly, the group concluded that exces-
sive occurrence of thyroid cancer has already been detected. However, this paper 
has received criticism and the academic debate on this issue has been continuing25.
Diagnosis results are reviewed by the Fukushima Residents Health Survey Com-
mittee for the purpose of obtaining professional advice from experts belonging to 
research institutes and universities across Japan. 
In October 2012, it was revealed that this committee had held secret preparatory 
meetings prior to the open review meeting to pre-arrange the discussions of the 
committee members; it was also discovered that they had created a scenario to lead 
the discussion at the time of the meeting26. Furthermore, it was revealed that the 
former Chair of the committee had sent out a document to thyroid specialists across 
Japan in January 2012 to urge them not to respond to requests from the parents of 
23 Prefectural Citizens Health Survey Committee, “Thyroid examination (full-scale ex-
amination) implementation status” 15 February 2016. (in Japanese) see http://www.pref.
fukushima.lg.jp/uploaded/attachment/151272.pdf Accessed 12 April 2016
24 Tsuda, Toshihide et al., “Thyroid Cancer Detection by Ultrasound Among Residents Ages 
18 Years and Younger in Fukushima, Japan: 2011 to 2014”, Epidemiology: May 2016 – Vol-
ume 27 – Issue 3 – p 316–322., see http://journals.lww.com/epidem/ Citation/2016/05000/
Thyroid_Cancer_Detection_by_Ultrasound_Among.3.aspx Accessed 12 April 2016.
25 Takahashi, Hideto et al., “Re: Thyroid Cancer Among Young People in Fukushima”, 
Epidemiology • Volume 27, Number 3, May 2016, see http://journals.lww.com/epidem/
Fulltext/2016/05000/Re___Thyroid_Cancer_Among_Young_People_in.36.aspx Accessed 
12 April 2016.
26 Management Investigation Committee, Correction of survey results concerning the man-
agement of the meeting of Fukushima Residents Health Survey Committee. November 
15, 2012, (in Japanese) http://www.pref.fukushima.lg.jp/uploaded/attachment/45898.pdf
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the examination participants for a second opinion – an approach in which patients/
guardians choose the treatment by obtaining the opinion of several experts27.
3 Challenges indicated by the reality 
3.1 Problems of accident response measures
1. Evacuation issues: The government is giving higher priority to the external 
foreign policy over the lives of the evacuees and is trying to take advantage 
of the Fukushima accident. For example, the government announced in 2015 
that it would communicate to the whole world at the Tokyo Olympic Games in 
2020 that Japan has recovered from the 2011 disaster by regarding the event as 
a symbol of Japan’s recovery28. Plans for lifting evacuation orders and decom-
missioning activities are scheduled around the 2020 Tokyo Olympic Games in 
the government’s disaster recovery plan29.
2. Compensation issues: The future of compensation payments by TEPCO is 
uncertain. From now on, TEPCO will have to become competitive and operate 
its business more efficiently due to the liberalization of electricity retail sales 
in April 2016. Although the government has not announced the total cost of 
Fukushima accident yet, it will reach at least about 13.3 trillion yen including 
decommissioning and decontamination cost according to a calculation using 
data released by TEPCO30. 
27 Michiyuki Matsuzaki, Opinion, What is happening to the children in Fukushima?, May 
2015 (in Japanese). http://1am.sakura.ne.jp/Nuclear/kou131Matsuzaki-opinion.pdf
28 Press Conference by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe on the Upcoming Fourth Anniversary 
of the Great East Japan Earthquake, March 10, 2015. accessed 26 April 2016. http://japan.
kantei.go.jp/97_abe/statement/201503/1210209_9916.html
29 See Ref.2
30 (1) Decommissioning and contaminated water treatment costs of 2 trillion yen: Although 
TEPCO has already set aside a reserve of 1 trillion yen (US$ 10 billion), the government 
has asked the utility to secure another 1 trillion yen (US$ 10 billion) within 10 years. 
(2) Compensation costs of about 7.1 trillion yen (US$ 71 billion): The total of legally 
required compensation costs according to the latest data is about 7.7 trillion yen (US$ 
77 billion, see Table 3). (3) Decontamination costs of 3.6 trillion yen (US$ 36 billion): 
The Ministry of the Environment has estimated the decontamination cost at about 2.5 
trillion yen (US$ 25 billion) and the interim storage facilities cost at about 1.1 trillion 
yen (US$ 11 billion). See Ref. 13.
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3. Thyroid cancer diagnosis: Due to lack of clear information about the relationship 
between radiation exposure and cancer, the anxiety of people about the effects 
of radiation has increased more by the responses of the government and Fuku-
shima prefecture. Although the health investigation committee of Fukushima 
prefecture is operating with the Fukushima prefectural health fund, since this 
fund received grants of 78.2 billion yen from the Ministry of the Environment31 
and 25 billion yen from TEPCO32, the neutrality of this committee is unclear.
Traditionally, the Japanese government has tended to avoid dealing with radiation-re-
lated problems. For example, on October 20, 2015, Fukushima Bureau of Ministry 
of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW) recognized the leukemia developed by 
a worker who worked on decommissioning tasks after the Fukushima accident 
as an occupational disease33. However, MHLW stated that “this recognition does 
not prove scientifically the causal relationship of radiation exposure and its health 
effects.” The government’s responses imply that it is trying to avoid an increase in 
workers’ compensation due to recognition of occupational diseases.
After the Fukushima accident, the government created and released a quick refer-
ence table of radiation exposure in order to eliminate the people’s radiation-related 
concerns. However, it was discovered that they had secretly corrected the figures 
without providing sufficient explanation. In the table, the level of natural background 
radiation in Japan was changed from 1.5 mSv/year of the April 2011 version to 2.1 
mSv/year in the May 2013 version. Furthermore, the comment “No observable 
increase in cancer incidence” for exposure levels under 100mSv was deleted34.
3.2 Common factors
The results obtained are shown in Table 1. Government measures, i.e., disaster 
recovery plans, compensation for damages, and scientific approaches, have been 
used as means to avoid taking responsibility through the use of power, the use of 
31 Ministry of the Environment, Support of Fukushima prefecture health research business, 
accessed 26 April 2016. http://www.env.go.jp/chemi/rhm/support.html
32 See Ref. 13.
33 Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, “Result of review at the ‘review meeting on 
occupational/non-occupational ionizing radiation disease’ and approval as occupational 
disease/injury” 20 October 2015. (in Japanese) see http://www.mhlw.go.jp/file/05- 
Shingikai-11201000-Roudoukijunkyoku-Soumuka/kouhyousiryou.pdf 
34 National Institute of Radiological Science, Dose scale, accessed 26 April 2016, http://
www.nirs.go.jp/data/pdf/hayamizu/e/20130502.pdf
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money to keep victims silent, and the use of science as an excuse; these measures 
are driving the victims into a corner instead of supporting them. Furthermore, it 
seems that these efforts are being made to obscure the responsibility rather than to 
resolve the problems, and in hopes that the victims will give up on seeking solutions. 
Ultimately, two common causes of these problems are related to the below 
described past and future nuclear energy policies.
Common factor 1: Promotion of the aggressive nuclear energy policy of the past
The cause of the current confusion concerning Fukushima accident responses 
is the claim aggressively made by the government and power companies in the past 
that a nuclear accident will not occur. As a result, the responses by the government 
and TEPCO were slow. The victim’s and general citizens’ distrust in the government 
and TEPCO still remains.
Common factor 2: Promotion of an aggressive nuclear energy policy for the future
The government is trying to forcefully settle all problems related to the Fuk-
ushima accident at an early stage because it is trying to maintain the already set 
out nuclear energy policy for the future. From that standpoint, evacuation, com-
pensation and exposure problems are all inconvenient facts and the government 
is afraid that these facts will have a negative effect on its efforts to maintain the 
nuclear energy policy. On the other hand, victims and the general public continue 
to have anxiety about the future.
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4 Conclusions 
At present, five years after the Fukushima accident, the government’s responses so 
far to the evacuation problems, compensation issues and the risk of thyroid cancer 
have been insufficient. It is obvious that the government’s intention behind these 
insufficient measures is to maintain the nuclear energy policy. 
Therefore, the victims have been hurt not only by the impact of the Fukushima 
accident but also by the government’s responses. People affected by the nuclear 
disaster caused by the nuclear promotion policy of the past are now suffering from 
the current promotion of the nuclear energy policy for the future. 
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4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits 
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Distributing the Costs of Nuclear Core Melts
Japan’s Experience after 7 Years
Eri Kanamori, and Tomas Kåberger1 
Abstract
The costs of managing the consequences of the Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear have 
been significant already, and the estimated total future costs have increased over 
time. The immediate payments have been possible by direct payments from the 
Japanese government. However, most these payments are not acknowledged as 
government spending. Instead, a complicated system of envisioned re-payments 
have been created.
Based on the three Special Business Plans published by TEPCO since the 
nuclear disaster, this evolving perception of the economic consequences and 
the increasingly complicated repayment schemes are described. 
The conclusion of the authors are that the repayment schemes are not com-
patible with a future efficient, competitive electricity market.
It is suggested that other governments who implicitly or explicitly accepting 
economic liabilities for nuclear accidents prepare themselves in order to avoid 
un-necessary indirect cost after future reactors accidents.
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1 Background
In this paper, we attempt to describe the way the Government of Japan (GOJ) and 
Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) have managed to cope with the successively 
increasing acknowledged costs of the Fukushima core melts-downs, and following 
radioactivity leaks in 2011. The evolving scheme of dealing with the cost are found 
in TEPCO’s special business plans. 
But first, in this paper, a short description of the consequences of the core melts 
and of Japan’s national energy policy. This, as a background in order to understand 
the challenges of TEPCO and the design of their recent special business plans:
It was on March 11, 2011 that the three operating TEPCO reactors at Fukus-
hima-Daiichi nuclear power plants proved unable to cope with the effects of an 
earthquake. The nuclear reactor core melts in Fukushima and consecutive explo-
sions resulted is emission of radioactive substances into the air and water. Despite 
winds bringing most of the air emissions out into the Pacific, there was also some 
contamination on land, and over a hundred thousand people were instructed to 
evacuate their homes, while many in addition relocated at their own initiative, 
without evacuation orders.
Systematic, comprehensive studies of health effects are not published. Only 
increased thyroid cancer among children in the affected areas are documented 
[Tsuda et al. 2015], but sometimes denied to have any relation to the contamina-
tion. Thus economic measures of health costs are uncertain and not included in 
the official cost estimates.
The efforts to control the emissions are still engaging in the order of 5 000 people 
at Fukushima-Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. This is many more than the number 
of people employed when the plant produced electricity.
Removing spent fuel from damaged fuel pools, pumping contaminated water 
into new-built storage tanks by 2018 containing a million cubic meters, building 
treatment plants extracting as many radioactive isotopes as possible, and constructing 
an ice wall around the reactors in order to reduce the amount of water flowing into 
the most contaminated parts of the plant are some of the short-term efforts. For 
the longer term, attempts are made to find out where the melted reactor fuel is, and 
then to develop technologies and strategies for the long term decommissioning of 
the plant. The work can be followed at the web-site of TEPCO. [TEPCO 2011–2018]
Estimating the total cost from the accident until all the remains of the reactors 
are brought to a condition where further spreading of radioactivity will be avoided 
in the very long term is difficult.
The purpose of this paper is not to describe the long-term technical solutions, 
nor the long term financial solutions. This introduction was intended as a sketchy 
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background to the financial challenges of managing the consequences. The intention 
with this paper is to provide a description of how the short-term costs have been 
managed in Japan since the accident.
Similarly, a brief background of the energy policy follows to understand the way 
the consequences have been managed: 
Japan’s energy policy since the 1970s has focused on the development of nuclear 
power. Despite the absence of domestic uranium reserves, the import of this fuel has 
been seen as less problematic than dependence on fossil fuel imports. Uranium is 
easier to store, and a reprocessing ambition, making breeder reactors or production 
of mixed oxide fuels possible, made the envisioned future import volumes small 
compared to oil dependence. 
Despite strong political backing, the nuclear strategy encountered problems. 
New reactors were expensive, slowing down the expansion. Even operation of ex-
isting reactors have faced problems and the peak in nuclear electricity generation 
was as early as 1998, with 327 terawatt-hours (TWh) delivered. Still, the last full 
year before the 2011 Fukushima failure, more than 290 TWh were produced by 54 
nuclear reactors in Japan. [BP, 2017]
The Fukushima-Daiichi failure was a serious disaster. Still the “4th Strategic 
Energy Plan” [GOJ, 2014], a cabinet decision made in April 2014, which is the basic 
and comprehensive Japanese energy policy today, aims at the “Re-establishment of 
nuclear energy policy” (p.47). The plan says that “Nuclear power is an important 
base-load power source as a low carbon and quasi-domestic energy source, con-
tributing to stability of energy supply-demand structure, on the major premise of 
ensuring itś  safety” (p.24). It also says that “Even after the TEPCO’s Fukushima 
nuclear accident, use of nuclear energy is expected to expand in the world. The scale 
of the expansion is particularly remarkable in Asian nations where energy demand 
is rapidly increasing. Japan, with its experience of the accident, is expected to make 
contributions in the fields of safety, nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security 
as an advanced nuclear nation” (p.50). The latest “5th Strategic Energy Plan” [GOJ, 
2018] holds the same attitude.
From these statements, it is obvious that Japan’s energy policy is still supporting 
nuclear power. Under this national policy, TEPCO’s special business plans have 
been made and, as we shall describe below, approved by the Government. In the 
national policy, allocation of the Fukushima costs is not explicitly dealt with. Thus 
the costs are not visible in the national budget, and not described as a cost of the 
government. Instead, the matter has been included in TEPCO’s special business 
plans. It is assumed in Japan from provisions of the “Act on Compensation for 
Nuclear Damage” that only TEPCO is responsible for the accident while the Gov-
ernment is not.
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While the government is prescribing how to manage the costs, and in fact pro-
viding the necessary funds, the roles of the current government and future tax- and 
ratepayers are not clearly presented and rarely debated in public.
This paper is an analysis of how the three consecutive special business plans for 
TEPCO, published after the accident, have evolved; How they present the solution 
of the challenging task of finding the money necessary to manage the immediate 
costs of the failure in reactor control after the earthquake.
2 TEPCO’s special business plans 
In the 2012 special business plan of TEPCO, the acknowledged costs for Fukushima 
were estimated as 25 billion euros.2 (Figure 1) This is to pay compensation to victims 
who were ordered to evacuate from defined areas in the Fukushima prefecture. 
In the 2014 plan, the estimated costs became 106 billion euros and it included 
not only compensation but also some decontamination, interim storage, and de-
commissioning. And in the 2017 plan, the total costs were assessed as 215 billion 
euros. The scheme of dealing with these costs will be explained chronologically.
Fig. 1 The estimated cost of Fukushima accident
2 In this paper, 1 trillion yen is assumed equal to 10 billion euros. In 2018, this is only the 
right order of magnitude as one Euro is close to 130 JPY.
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2.1 The 2012 TEPCO Special Business Plan
In the 2012 plan (TEPCO, 2012a), called “Comprehensive Special Business Plan”, 
Fukushima costs were seen as only compensation and estimated at 25 billion euros. 
In the financial year ending 31 March 2011, TEPCO recorded a 12 billion euros 
net loss. This net loss was mainly from asset impairment and efforts to cool and 
control reactors. Because of the proven loss, TEPCO’s equity was eroded from 21 
billion euros in 2009/2010 to 12 billion euros in 2010/2011 (non-consolidated), 
despite raising a few billions from issuing new shares in October 2010. So, the 25 
billion euros of compensation was already bigger than TEPCO’s equity. Thus, this 
early estimated expense was unaffordable for the company. Under normal economic 
conditions of limited liability companies in the world, this should have resulted in 
a bankruptcy where shareholders lost their assets in the company.
However, the government of Japan, instead, decided to rescue the shareholders. 
The government provided 25 billion euros to TEPCO, for the company to be able to 
pay compensation, and an additional 10 billion euros in exchange for TEPCO’s new, 
emitted shares giving the government ownership of 54.69%. This prevented TEPCO 
from going bankrupt and gave incumbent shareholders an opportunity to stay as 
owner. At the same time the government avoided making unlimited commitments.
The 10 billion euros payment was mainly to make TEPCO able to pay for its 
ongoing business activity, such as buying additional fuels and paying interests to 
banks. Strictly speaking, the government did not do it directly, but through the 
“Nuclear Damage Liability Facilitation Corporation” (NDF) which they created 
after Fukushima. As a result, it is the NDF that holds 54.69% of TEPCO’s shares 
and TEPCO is now controlled by the Government via the NDF.
The scheme of 2012 plan is shown in Figure 2, above. The two government aids 
are shown as arrows 1 and 2. Arrow 1 shows that the NDF provided 25 billion euros 
for TEPCO to pay compensation to victims. In order to do this, the Government 
provided its bonds of 50 billion euros to the NDF. These government bonds were 
issued for special purpose of supporting compensation and had three features 
which are different from ordinary bonds: yielding no interests, prohibited to be 
transferred to a third party, and ready to be redeemed at any time on demand for 
the purpose. Therefore, when the NDF needed cash in order to assist TEPCO pay-
ing compensation, and the NDF demanded it officially to the GOJ, the NDF could 
acquire cash at any time. From 2012 onwards, the redemption has been repeated 
monthly. The Government derived the cash from its annual energy budget. It seems 
that there was already a concern that 25 billion euros might not be sufficient for pay-
ing compensation, since the government special purpose bond was up to 50 billion 
euros already at this stage. At the same time, as arrows 2 show, the NDF invested 
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10 billion euros in 54.69% of TEPCO’s share. To finance this additional aid, the 
NDF borrowed the money from banks based on a guarantee from the government.
Fig. 2 The scheme of the 2012 plan
The money for compensation to victims, it is said, will be paid back to the NDF in a 
complicated way. A new law was imposed whereby the responsibility to contribute 
to repayment was shared between all nuclear operators. 
In other countries, the liable party would be a matter for courts under existing 
laws. Here, the Japanese government and diet retroactively distributed the economic 
liability to all nuclear operators. It may be seen as a retroactive insurance fee that 
could have been imposed on them beforehand. 
As the electricity system, at the time, was operated by regional, vertically inte-
grated, monopolies, costs were easily passed on to electricity customers. While an 
insurance fee, in a competitive market economy, would have given consumers the 
opportunity to opt for lower cost sources of electricity, the retroactive charge and 
the monopoly in the market simply forced customers to pay.
In Figure 2, arrows with the number 3 represent the planned process of re-
payment. The money is called “contributions.” There are “general contributions” 
from TEPCO and other nuclear operators and “special contributions” only from 
TEPCO. In the year of 2016, TEPCO and other operators paid about 1.6 billion 
euros as general contributions and TEPCO paid an additional 1.1 billion euros. It 
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was considered that the payment of contributions would last for ten years or so. 
Of course, this money is expected to continue to come from electricity consumers.
2.2 The 2014 TEPCO Special Business Plan 
In 2014, the “New Comprehensive Special Business Plan” was established which 
disclosed that not only compensation payments would be needed, but also paying 
for decontamination, interim storage and decommissioning (TEPCO, 2014). The 
estimated compensation cost was doubled from 25 to 50 billion euros. Decontam-
ination costs of 25 billion euros, interim storage of 11 billion euros and decommis-
sioning of 20 billion euros were now taken into consideration.
Fig. 3 The scheme of the 2014 plan
Arrows with the number 1, in Figure 3, show how TEPCO was expected to pay 50 
billion euros in compensation to victims, the NDF provides the same amount in 
order for TEPCO to do this. The system for planned repayments stayed the same 
as in the 2012 plan. The obvious change being that total “contributions” increased 
to 50 billion euros (arrows numbered with 3).
As for decontamination and interim storage, the two costs are shown together in 
Figure 3 for practical reasons, and the total amount was 36 billion euros. The NDF 
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directly makes payments for decontamination and interim storage, not through 
TEPCO’s financial statements. To cover this 36 billion euros, GOJ issued additional 
special purpose bonds of 40 billion euro. Therefore the total bonds provided to NDF 
increased from 50 to 90 billion euros (arrow numbered 1 from GOJ to the NDF). 
The next question was how to arrange the pay back of this latter amount. As 
seen before, the contribution from TEPCO and other nuclear operators remained 
50 billion euros, which is the same amount of compensation (arrows numbered 3). 
Nuclear power companies would not want to, and could not, increase electricity 
charges further, as a re-regulation process introducing some competition in the 
electricity sector had started and such obligations would weaken the competitiveness 
of the companies with nuclear power. 
Instead new ways of repayment were invented; capital gain and a special tax. It 
was planned that 25 billion euros for decontamination is to be covered by imagined 
future capital gain of TEPCO’s share which the NDF holds, termed capital gain. 
The 11 billion euros of interim storage costs shall come from the Government 
energy budget (arrows 4). 
As for the last category of Fukushima cost, 20 billion euros of decommissioning 
of Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear power plant is planned to be financed by TEPCO’s 
management effort through cost reduction and sales of assets (arrow 5). This is a 
very ambitious task for TEPCO management, considering the plans to increase 
competition in the Japanese markets. And all this, while electricity consumption is 
falling, and decentralised solar electricity is increasing its’ market share. To be able 
to collect the benefits of efficiency as profit, the achieved efficiency improvements 
must not only cover this cost compared to today operations, the improvements must 
be so much better than improvements among competitors, in order to generate the 
profit necessary to cover the costs.
In addition, there was one more important feature in the decommissioning 
scheme of 2014 plan. GOJ began to support research and development (R&D) 
of decommissioning methods applicable to the crippled reactors in Fukushima 
(arrow 6). It is unknown how much the NDF will pay for R&D of Fukushima 
decommissioning. The law was changed and NDF before abbreviation was, as a 
consequence, renamed as “Nuclear Damage Compensation and Decommissioning 
Facilitation Corporation”, and the function of decommissioning facilitation was 
added to NDF. (GOJ, 2014, p.48)
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2.3 The 2017 TEPCO Special Business Plan
The 2017 plan revealed that Fukushima estimated cost increased to 215 billion 
euros (TEPCO, 2017). Compensation, decontamination, interim storage and de-
commissioning were given as 79 billion, 40 billion, 16 billion, and 80 billion euros 
respectively. The scheme to cover costs became even more complex. 
Fig. 4 The scheme of the 2017 plan
Firstly, compensation of 79 billion euros is provided by the NDF as in the 2014 plan 
(arrows 1). But changes were made in the repayment process. The contribution did 
not go up to 79 billion euros. Instead, a part of the compensation was to be repaid 
through a new channel: from a transmission charge (arrows 7). This, in practice, 
means that the economic liability for the nuclear accident consequences will be paid 
also by customers who are buying no nuclear electricity at all. The interpretation 
that the contribution was a retroactive insurance payment by all nuclear operators 
is now no longer possible. Instead all electricity consumers are paying.
TEPCO’s consumers split into two groups after April 2016 when some compe-
tition was introduced in the Japanese electricity retail market. Some consumers 
remained TEPCO’s customers and continued to pay electricity charges to TEPCO. 
Others switched retailers and are now paying electricity charges to other suppliers. 
TEPCO could not collect money from the latter consumers anymore. 
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So, the new way of collecting money from these consumers by using transmission 
charge was invented. Now, TEPCO’s customers pay additional charges to TEPCO. 
And PPS who use transmission services of TEPCO also pay an extra charge. This 
charge is set to yield the 24 billion euros needed to pay back to the NDF and GOJ 
together with the contributions. Accordingly, the contribution becomes 55 billion 
euros in total. In other words, 55 billion euros (arrows 3) and 24 billion euros 
(arrows 7), both charged on consumers, will be used to pay back to the money of 
compensation.
Next is decontamination and interim storage. In the 2017 plan, the total cost of 
the two was 56 billion euros. But this amount cannot be financed by the 90 billion 
which the NDF provided to TEPCO in the 2014 plan, because from that sum, they 
already pay compensation of 79 billion euros. So, in the 2017 plan, the Government 
decided to provide additional bonds of 45 billion euros, resulting in total amount 
of 135 billion euros (arrows 1). The repayment scheme of the two costs is the same 
as 2014 plan: Decontamination of 40 billion euros is to be paid back from capital 
gain, while interim storage of 16 billion is from Government’s energy budget which 
means from other tax income or further national borrowing.
It might be necessary to note here that the anticipated capital gain of 40 billion 
euros is not a credible expectation in the absence of any privilege given to TEPCO 
in the future competitive electricity market. The NDF holds 54.69% of TEPCO’s 
share, after paying about 10 billion euros. In order to get 40 billion euros capital 
gain, the share price must increase to 50 billion euros. 50 billion euro for half of 
TEPCO means around 100 billion euro for 100% of the company. Therefore, TEP-
CO’s market value in the future must become more than 100 billion euros. This 
is hard to imagine if customers in Japan are to enjoy electricity at prices that can 
make industrial customers competitive, and give households a decent standard. The 
reality among large peers in Europe is that Edf, with roughly the dubble installed 
generation capacity to TEPCO had a market value of some 20 billion euros at the 
end of 2016.
Finally, decommissioning costs, that are estimated to be 80 billion euros in the 
2017 plan, will be financed by TEPCO’s management efforts. There is no change 
about this scheme. Then, what is TEPCO’s management efforts in 2017 plan? In 
Fuel/Thermal Power business, TEPCO plans to reduce maintenance cost by 30% 
(TEPCO, 2017, p.28). This, again, is very ambitious. It is so, not only considering 
the Fukushima events but in relation to the track record of TEPCOs management 
before 2011. Pursuing cost cuts must not affect the safety of its business and the 
efforts to avoid more accidents. This is particularly relevant in the nuclear business, 
where they are planning to restart of Kashiwazaki-Kariwa nuclear power station 
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(TEPCO, 2017, p.37), a plant that has experienced severe difficulties in operation 
even before the Fukushima failure. 
In Transmission and Distribution business, the plan says that TEPCO will 
raise 1.2 billion euro/year on average through rationalization (TEPCO, 2017, p.30). 
Rationalization, again means cost reductions. If this is possible, one may ask why 
it has not been done already.
3 Discussion
The full costs of the Fukushima nuclear reactor core melts are not yet possible 
to quantify. Still, the costs already identified and acknowledged by the Japanese 
government are so large they are beyond the paying capacity of any reactor owner 
in the world, and clearly beyond the paying capacity of TEPCO.
In a stepwise process, the unavoidable costs of the Fukushima disaster have been 
identified and distributed by the Japanese government. Worth noting, is that in 
this process the government has protected TEPCO owners from bankruptcy. This 
could be seen as introducing a moral hazard: While the report by National Diet of 
Japan Accident Investigation Committee has concluded TEPCO is responsible for 
the consequences by neglecting warning of earthquakes and tsunamis, pointing out 
that “Risk of the arrival of a tsunami was known by both Nuclear and Industrial 
Safety Agency and TEPCO in 2006, but TEPCO neglected this risk and no meas-
ures were taken” (1.2 of PART 1), TEPCO has been protected from the economic 
consequences by the government. The government has placed the economic cost 
and responsibility on the customers and tax payers, but not on the owners of the 
plant. The moral hazard appear as other industries may come to expect similar 
protection and abstain from taking costly precautions when learning about risks 
in their activities.
Now, the Japanese people are compelled to pay for most of the costs. Still, the 
schemes set up for this purpose. The complexity of the plans, and the lack of trans-
parency in reporting the use of money provided by the Governments or regulated 
contributions collected from ratepayers, makes public debate and democratic 
control difficult or impossible.
Some part of the plan deserves public scrutiny as the current government plans 
may appear unrealistic, thus creating problems and deficits for future Governments. 
It is for example hard to believe that a 40 billion euros capital gain will be secured 
by TEPCO in the competitive electricity markets that exists in most countries and 
that is now also said to be developed in Japan. Similarly, it is hard to believe that 
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significant profits can be made by cost reducing management efforts if the markets 
are really competitive. These plans seem to rely on assumptions about electric 
power companies being able to in some way tax consumers rather that supplying 
in a competitive market.
Thus one may see these plans as only postponing the understanding of what the 
government is going to have to provide through increasing taxes on the Japanese 
people in an already weak government budget situation.
4 Conclusions
Seven years after the nuclear core melts the experience shows a lack of readiness, 
and absence of any plan for how to manage the economic consequences of an 
accident of this magnitude. 
Still, the improvised solutions, have for the seven years both kept the govern-
ment’s borrowing capacity intact, and allowed TEPCO to avoid going bankrupt. 
We dare predict that the 2017 TEPCO Special Business Plan will be impossible 
to fulfil. Further improvised and complicated solutions may follow. However, it is 
increasingly unlikely that the current idea of nuclear power companies in different 
ways paying will be compatible with the global development of low cost renewable 
electricity generation technology and competitive electricity markets. Instead the 
development appears likely to make it impossible to generate profits by nuclear or 
other large scale thermal power plants. Even without the Fukushima related liabil-
ities, Japan’s electric power companies would have economic challenges.
A less complex solution, worth investigating further, would be that the gov-
ernment directly takes over all the nuclear liabilities from the power companies 
and have the power companies paying by transferring the transmission network 
to a government controlled national transmission system operator. That solution 
would support, rather than conflict with, the ongoing electricity market reform, 
and transition to low cost electricity. It would, in one move, unbundle transmission 
from generation and create the conditions necessary for an efficient electricity 
market reducing costs for Japan’s future electricity supply.
The experience is also relevant when considering restarting reactors, re-introduc-
ing the risks of further reactor accidents in Japan. Had Japan seen winds bringing 
more contamination over land – or even worse, in the direction of Tokyo – the 
financial consequences may not have been manageable by the government or the 
Japanese society by itself. 
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This observation leads to the need to find market based solutions that will 
distribute costs globally. Here the idea of a compulsory insurance via catastrophe 
bonds appears as an option deserving further consideration [Radetzki & Radetzki 
2000, Kåberger 2018].
The experience of Japan may prove valuable for consideration also in other 
nuclear countries. Though many of these are operating under different legislation 
and international conventions regarding liability for reactor accidents, the real 
magnitude of the economic consequences are often not understood by people 
within the democratic decision making processes in Europe or North America.
References
BP, 2017. Statistical Review of World Energy. http://www.bp.com/statisticalreview (accessed 
2017–07-01).
Government of Japan (GOJ), 2014. 4th Strategic Energy Plan, April 2014, http://www.
enecho.meti.go.jp/en/category/others/basic_plan/pdf/4th_strategic_energy_plan.pdf 
(accessed 2017–10-05).
Government of Japan (GOJ), 2018. 5th Strategic Energy Plan, July 2018, http://www.meti.
go.jp/english/press/2018/pdf/0703_002c.pdf (accessed 2018–09-04).
Kåberger, T., 2018. Economic Management of Future Nuclear Accidents. In Haas, R., 
Ajanovic, A., Mez, L. (ed.): The Technological and Economic Future of Nuclear Power. 
Springer VS 2019.
National Diet of Japan Accident Investigation Committee, 2012. The Report by National Diet 
of Japan Accident Investigation Committee (Kokkai Jiko Cho), Tokuma Shoten (in Japanese).
Radetzki M. & Radetzki M., 2000. Private Arrangements to Cover Large- Scale Liabilities 
Caused by Nuclear and Other Industrial Catastrophes. Geneva Papers on Risk and In-
surance, Vol. 25 No 2, April 2000. 
Tsuda, T., Tokinobu, A., Yamamoto E. Suzuki E., 2015. Thyroid Cancer Detection by Ultra-
sound Among Residents Ages 18 Years and Younger in Fukushima, Japan: 2011 to 2014. 
Epidemiology • Volume 27, Issue 3, p 316–322, doi: 10.1097/EDE.0000000000000385
Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), 2011–2017. http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/index-e.html
Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), 2011. Financial Report for the year ending 31 
March 2011 (in Japanese), http://www.tepco.co.jp/ir/tool/yuho/pdf/201106-j.pdf (accessed 
2017–10-05).
Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), 2012a. Comprehensive Special Business Plan, May 
2012, http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/betu12_e/images/120509e0104.
pdf (accessed 2017–10-05).
Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), 2012b. Financial Report for the year ending 
31 March 2012 (in Japanese), http://www.tepco.co.jp/ir/tool/yuho/pdf/201206-j.pdf 
(accessed 2017–10-06).
366 Eri Kanamori, and Tomas Kåberger 
Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), 2013. Financial Report for the year ending 31 
March 2013 (in Japanese) http://www.tepco.co.jp/ir/tool/yuho/pdf/201306-j.pdf (accessed 
2017–10-06).
Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), 2014. New Comprehensive Special Business 
Plan, 15 January 2014, http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corpcom/release/betu14_e/
images/140115e0206.pdf (accessed 2017–10-05).
Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings (TEPCO), 2017. Outline of the “Revised Compre-
hensive Special Business Plan (The Third Plan), http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corpcom/
release/betu17_e/images/170518e0101.pdf (accessed 2017–10-05).
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons  Attribution 
4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits 
use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long 
as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the 
 Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s 
 Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If 
material is not included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license and your intended 
use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to 
obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.
Alternatives
369
On New Thinking and Designs  
of Electricity Markets 
Heading towards Democratic and  
Sustainable Electricity Systems
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Abstract
In recent years increasing shares of variable renewable energy sources (RES) 
have changed the structure of electricity markets in several countries. The core 
objective of this paper is to provide insights into the conditions necessary to 
bring about a more democratic and sustainable electricity system by integrating 
even larger quantities of variable RES. Our major finding is that a market-based 
approach would ensure that competitive forces rather than governmental in-
terferences – such as capacity mechanisms – shape the future of the electricity 
markets. This transition towards a competitive and sustainable future electricity 
system will be based on an approach of “new thinking” which requires a par-
adigm shift in the whole electricity system. This includes switching to a more 
flexible and smarter concept allowing a greater scope for demand participation, 
storage options and other flexibility measures. 
1 Reinhard Haas, Technische Universität Wien, Austria, haas@eeg.tuwien.ac.at; Hans 
Auer, Technische Universität Wien, Austria, auer@eeg.tuwien.ac.at
© The Author(s) 2019
of Nuclear Power, Energiepolitik und Klimaschutz. Energy Policy
and Climate Protection, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-25987-7_18
R. Haas et al. (Eds.), The Technological and Economic Future 
370 Reinhard Haas, and Hans Auer
1 Introduction
For a long time the electricity system has been determined by the generators. Until 
the mid-1990s, and in many countries even longer, large generation companies, 
which were oft en highly vertically integrated, dominated the electricity system. 
Th is was supported by the assumption of existing economies-of-scale. Huge power 
plants, mainly nuclear and hard coal, were constructed along the lines “the bigger, 
the cheaper”. Th is strategy was accompanied by high growth rates in electricity 
consumption. 
Over the course of time these patterns have changed. At fi rst, growth rates fell 
from 10% per year in the 1960s to about 5% in the 1980s and 90s and to almost 
zero (in some OECD countries) in recent years. Th at is to say, today, there is less 
cake to be shared between generators, especially, given the preference for renewable 
generation.
Th e fi rst signs of criticism of such a generation-focused paradigm emerged 
already in the 1970s. Lovins (1978) was one of the fi rst to predict three major de-
velopments: (i) that future electricity consumption rates would decrease; (ii) that 
decentralized generation mainly from PV systems would increase, and (iii) that 
the importance of demand-side issues would grow. In addition to this, with the 
liberalization of electricity markets the picture began to change. Th e core objective 
of liberalization was the introduction of competition in generation in order to 
harvest the full benefi ts of electricity supply for both citizens and industry. Due to 
huge excess capacities aft er the fi rst phase of liberalisation, the principle of “prices 
equal short-term marginal costs” in spot markets emerged. 
Fig. 1 “Old” thinking in electricity markets 
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It is important to note that in this first phase of liberalized markets the old “one-way-
thinking” still prevailed,. which was characterized by the fact that the generators 
were at the core of the system and of the thinking of the policy makers, see Fig. 1. 
In recent years, mainly due to the increase of variable renewables the capacity 
(factors) of the conventional plants has decreased leading to losses in revenues 
for their owners. This has resulted in growing concerns that most of these plants 
will be shut down thereby leading to decreases in supply reliability. Consequently, 
energy-only markets* have been questioned and calls for capacity payments have 
been launched. 
The core intention of this paper is to serve as a primer for introducing truly 
competitive, democratic and sustainable electricity systems in every country world-
wide. It is motivated by the current discussion on how to integrate large shares of 
variable RES but the basic intention goes beyond that. The aim is to show how to 
attain real competition in electricity markets, including all dimensions such as 
generation and storage as well as demand-side options. 
In addition, the European Commission has set ambitious targets for increasing 
the share of electricity from renewable energy sources (RES), e.g. EC (2009). Indeed, 
in the EU-28, in recent years electricity generation from variable sources such as 
wind and solar has increased dramatically, with Germany, Spain, Italy leading. In 
the EU-28, between 1997 and 2016 “new” renewables (excluding hydro) mainly from 
wind grew from less than 1% to about 16%. For 2030, the EU has set further goals 
of a share of 27% (compared to about 14% in 2016) energy from RES. This target 
is for all uses – heating, electricity and transport. Consequently, also electricity 
generation from RES will grow, as documented in the National Renewable Energy 
Action Plans (NREAPs), however, it is not clear to which absolute level. Another 
major motivation for this paper is to show what is needed in order to integrate these 
higher quantities into the electricity system. 
These increasing shares of variable RES have especially in Germany changed 
the usual pattern of electricity markets in Western Europe. Yet, variable RES-E do 
not provide electricity simultanously with demand. It is important to note, that 
almost all other generation technologies do not either. The fact that these must 
run capacities are offered at Zero costs over a large time per year have led to the 
argumentation that fossil plants like Combined-cycled gas turbines (CCGT) or coal 
power stations become economically less attractive because of the lower fullload 
hours per year. This argument has led to the call for capacity mechanisms (CM) 
in addition to the current “energy-only” markets. The idea is that specific owners 
of a flexible power plant should be paid for holding the plant ready for operation.
Due to these developments, currently, the whole electricity system is at a crucial 
crossing. On the one hand, the way to a sustainable electricity system based mainly 
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on RES could be paved in the next years. In this context we emphasize especially 
the considerable price decreases of PV which has brought this technology close 
to cost-effectiveness on household level, see Haas et al (2013). On the other hand, 
there are forces which try to retain the old centralized fossil and nuclear-based 
generation planned economies. Capacity mechanisms (e.g. in France and England) 
should help to freeze this anachronistic pattern. 
The core objectives of this paper are: (i) to explain how a truly competitive mar-
ket-based electricity system can be brought about in the future without continous 
governmental interferences; (ii) to explain why capacity payments do not contrib-
ute to such a system but rather preserve the present system and (iii) to show that 
generators will no longer be the heart of the system but rather balancing groups 
and the suppliers. 
A specific intention of this paper is to bring together all important aspects for 
heading towards a sustainable as well as competitive future electricity system. It 
considers technical options and aspects of market design and applies it to a further 
increase of RES in the electricity system. Moreover, it links the concept of residual 
load to price signals from the wholesale markets, the relevance of flexibility meas-
ures on the demand-side as well as demand response due to these price signals.
2 How prices in electricity spot markets come about 
To analyze the impact of variable RES on the prices in wholesale electricity markets 
it is first important to understand the current market rules and market structures, 
see Auer/Haas (2016). Of key relevance is to understand how prices in European 
electricity markets currently come about. In this context it is important to look at the 
historical dynamics. The liberalization process in Europe started in the late 1980s in 
the UK and gradually migrated to continental Europe with the implementation of 
the EU-directive on Common Rules for the Internal Electricity Market (EC, 1997). 
One of the major features of the liberalized electricity markets was that the pricing 
regimes changed. In former regulated markets, prices were established by setting 
a regulated tariff, which was calculated by dividing the total costs of electricity 
provided by the number of kWhs sold – with some differences between different 
groups of customers. The major change that took place after liberalization was 
that prices on the wholesale electricity markets were now expected to reflect the 
marginal costs of electricity generation. Since then the price formation is mainly 
based on a fundamental approach where the intersection of a merit order curve on 
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the supply-side and the demand curves results in the corresponding market price 
at every point-of-time, see Haas et al (2013b) and Fig. 2. 
Fig. 2 Merit order supply curve with and without additional PV capacities at on-peak 
time of a bright summer day with short term marginal costs for conventional 
capacities
Th e typical historical pattern of electricity generation in the Western Central Eu-
ropean electricity market consisted since decades of conventional fossil, nuclear 
and hydro capacities. Since the late 1990s in western central Europe, most of the 
time nuclear contributed the largest share, followed by fossil and hydro. Non-hy-
dro renewables were not a signifi cant factor until recently. However, since 2013 
renewable electricity contributes the largest quantity in the EU-28. At the time 
when liberalization started huge already depreciated excess capacities existed in 
Europe. Th is led to the expectation that prices will (always) refl ect the short-term 
marginal costs (STMC) as illustrated in Fig. 2. 
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Fig. 3 Development of spot market (day-ahead) electricity prices in several European 
wholesale markets (1999-2017, 2017 preliminary)
3 The impact of variable RES on prices in electricity 
spot markets
Between 2011 and 2016 remarkable decreases in day-ahead prices at the Western 
European power exchanges were observed see Fig. 3. Th e major reason for this 
decline in day-ahead prices was the increase of variable RES with zero short-term 
marginal costs. 
It is the remarkable rise Th is increase of renewables has started to impact spot 
prices, trading patterns and the dispatch of conventional generation by about 2011. 
Th e explanation is simple. Assume e.g. a sunny day with ample solar generation. 
Th en the supply curve is shift ed to the right as schematically shown in Fig 2, which 
essentially pushes nuclear and fossil fueled generation “out of the market”, Haas 
et al 2013b. 
Th is impact of variable RES on electricity prices is already known since volatile 
hydro power was used for electricity generation. Th e best example is the Nordic 
market, mainly Norway and Sweden, where since decades almost only technologies 
with Zero short-term marginal costs meet the whole supply. Since about 2007–2010 
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– in Denmark already earlier – there was experience with temporarily high wind 
in the systems, see e.g. Nicolosi (2010). In recent years increasing generation from 
photovoltaic systems was added to the production portfolios, mainly in Germany, 
Italy and Spain, and has contributed to temporarily very low – sometimes even 
negative – prices. 
4 The end of the myth of base load
The core question is, what the impact of the aggregate of various variable RES on 
the wholesale electricity markets is. Aside from the above-described effects, variable 
RES will also influence the costs at which fossil generation – especially natural gas 
– is offered. The reason is that they would lead to much lower fullloadhours, e.g. 
only 1000 instead of 6000 h/yr before. Yet, the revenues earned from these hours 
must cover both the fixed and variable costs, see also Haas et al (2013a). Hence, in 
a market with large shares of renewable energy sources the role of conventional 
capacities will change see e.g. Nielsen et al (2011).
This leads to the following categories of presumed “problems”: (i) Prices decrease 
to Zero or become even negative at a number of days; (ii) a lack in contribution 
margin to fixed costs for conventional flexible power plants. However, it is not yet 
clear, on how many days very high and on how many days very low (or negative) 
prices will prevail and how high or how low these prices will be. 
Of further relevance in this context is how the price spread in European markets 
will evolve in the future as larger amounts of PV, solar thermal and wind genera-
tion are added to the network. The consequence for electricity prices are shown in 
Fig. 4 where a hypothetical scenario with high levels of generation from wind, PV 
and run-of-river hydro plants over a week in summer are depicted using synthetic 
hourly data for an average year in Austria. The figure leads to significant volatilities 
in electricity market prices with total costs charged for conventional capacities – 
black solid line –within very short-term time intervals.
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Fig. 4 Development of variable RES from wind, PV and run-of-river hydro plants over 
a week in summer on an hourly base in comparison to demand and resulting 
electricity market prices with total costs charged for conventional capacities 
(Source: own analysis, adapted from Auer/Haas 2016)
Our method of approach is based on the following principles: (i) Most relevant is the 
coverage of residual load which is the diff erence between fi nal electricity demand 
and generation provided by non-fl exible electricity generation from variable RES as 
well as coal and nuclear power plants, see Fig. 5; this is modeled on an hourly base 
over a calendar year based on historical RES electricity generation; (ii) Deduction 
of available conventional and backup capacities including must-run; (iii) fl exibility 
on the demand side based on consumer behavior incl. fl exibility instrument such 
as storage etc.; (iv) hourly electricity prices equal to short-term marginal costs and 
scarcity as well as excess pricing.
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Fig. 5 New thinking: Th e concept of residual load referring to Fig. 4
For the residual load shown in Fig. 5 a price pattern as described in Fig. 4 may 
emerge. Hence, in the long run the impact of variable RES on the price spread is 
that it will increase. Th e intuitive explanation is that when renewables are plentiful, 
say during windy or sunny periods, the prices will be extremely low, approaching 
zero or possibly going negative, while at other times – when demand is high and 
renewables are scarce – prices can be much higher due to strategic bidding by fossil 
generators exercising market power. 
While Fig. 5 shows the concept of residual load over a week, Fig, 6 shows the 
corresponding graph over a year classifi ed by magnitude in decreasing order. In 
Fig. 6 the classifi ed residual load curve over a year in the case of high shares of 
variable renewables is described including the relevant areas for the discussion. 
Th e crucial areas in this load duration curve are on the top left  and on the bottom 
right. In the circle on the top left  the question is how to cover under shortage on 
these hours, in the circle on the bottom right the question is how to use this excess 
generation of electricity. 
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For both areas there are in principle two options:
• By regulated capacity payments ?
or
• By competition between supply-side and demand-side technologies and behav-
iour (incl. Storages, grid and other fl exibility options)?
Important remarks: Flexibility measures will contribute in a competitive way 
to reduce these price spikes and consequently the price spreads and lead to new 
equilibria between supply and demand!
As an example in Fig. 6 the profi le of residual load in Austria 2013 and the 
development in a scenario up to 2030 with a much higher share of variable re-
newables is described. Th e major fi nding of Fig. 6 is that the duration curve of the 
residual load profi le will become steeper and that the number of hours with excess 
generation will become higher. Th is eff ect will lead straightforward to higher price 
spreads and will also increase the attractiveness of storage, fl exible peaking units 
and other fl exibility options. 
Fig. 6 Development of residual load in Austria 2013 and in a scenario up to 2030 with 
high share of variable RES
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5 The core problems of regulated capacity payments 
If the price pattern described above in Fig. 4 is not accepted by politicians another 
option are capacity payments. The fact that the renewable must run capacities are 
offered at Zero costs over a large time per year have led to the argumentation that 
fossile plants like CCGT or coal power stations become economically less attractive 
because of the lower fullload hours per year. This argument has led to the call for 
“capacity” payments in addition to the current “energy-only” markets. The idea is 
that specific owners of a flexible power plant should be paid for holding the plant 
ready for operation.
The major reason, why at least currently there is no need for centralized CP in 
Europe that there are still many other options in the market, which we think are 
by far not yet exhausted. However, to exhaust these options some dogmas has to 
be changed. Especially the historically prevailing and still existing definition of 
supply security – that every demand has to be met at every point-of-time regard-
less of what are the costs – has to be revised in a way that compares the costs of 
(all) supply-side and demand –side options as well as customers WTP for capacity 
depending on time.
The major open questions regarding centralized capacity payments are, see 
Haas (2014):
• Which quantity of capacity should get payments and where? 
• How to split in existing and new capacity? 
• How to tune with grid extention? Every grid extention has undoubtedly an 
impact of necessary capacities in a specific area
• Who would plan? On national or international level?
There are three core problems regarding CP: 
1. All regulatory capacity payments for power plants destort the EOM and lead to 
wrong price signals for all other options
2. Price peaks at times of scarce resource should revive the markets and lead to 
effective competition 
3. We should strive to retain system resource adequacy by ensuring correct price 
signals and without capacity payment
4. Every capacity payment reduces the shares of the variable renewables 
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6 A market design approach for supply security 
One major argument for the call for centralized CM is to retain supply security in 
the electricity system. The historical (anachronistic) definition of supply security is: 
At every point-of-time every demand has to be met regardless of the costs. In this 
context it is important to note that supply security is an energy economic term. It 
is different from technical system reliability.
The core problem is that so far world-wide the demand-side has been neglected 
widely with respect to contributing to an equilibrium of demand and supply in elec-
tricity markets. Major exceptions are: (i) in the 1980s and 1990s in the U.S., Sweden, 
Denmark and other advanced countries DSM-measures have attracted attention. 
After the liberalization of the electricity markets most of these programmes disap-
peared. (ii) In Denmark – the leading country for integrating variable renewables 
especially wind – has integrated a lot of power-to-heat technologies, that now play 
an important role in energy markets.
The major reason for this ignorance of the demand-side is that in times of reg-
ulated monopolies every demand could be met due to significant excess capacities. 
And still in the liberalized markets huge excess capacities remained. This aspect 
– to develop the impact of demand-side and customers WTP – is essentialy for a 
real electricity market and it is actually regardless of the aspect of an integration 
of larger shares of RES.
Such a market-based approach would take into account customers willing-
ness-to-pay (WTP). The equilibrium between demand and supply would come 
about at lower capacities. It is also important to note that at points-of-time where 
WTP is lowest, e.g. in the evening, the marginal costs (MC) of providing capacity 
could be highest, see also Auer/Haas (2016).
7 Flexibility: The key term of the future 
Our major findings for integrating large quantities of variable RES-E into the 
electricity system by using market-based principles and how, straightforward, a 
sustainable electricity system could work, are that the following conditions have 
to be fulfilled, see also EC (2015): 
• Of core relevance for integrating larger shares of RES-E in a competitive way is 
a pricing system in revised energy-only markets where the prices signal provide 
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information on scarcity or excess capacities at every point-of-time (at least at 
quarters of an hour); 
• Another important issue is that the demand-side market is developed, see 
above. So far consumers have never been asked what the value of capacity is 
for them and what they are willing to pay for specifi c quantities of capacity. An 
important analysis in this context has been conducted by Praktiknjo (2013). 
He clearly identifi es two fi ndings: (i) there is a quite diff erent WTP between 
diff erent groups of customers; (ii) it is very unlikely that generating electricity 
is always cheaper than saving capacity. 
Fig. 7 Dimensions of electricity markets
• More fl exibility in the organization of the market is required: To better integrate 
electricity from RES in the market the time intervals in markets should be reduced 
(more emphasis on intraday markets, shorter trading intervals (from hours to 
¼ hours); shorter ahead leading times for market clearing and forecasting of 
electricity generation from variable RES); 
• Most important to balance variations in residual load is to implement an optimal 
portfolio of fl exibility options which already exists today. A very comprehensive 
review of energy system fl exibility measures to enable high levels of variable 
renewable electricity is provided in Lund (2015). Currently these potentials are 
not fully harvested due to low economic incentives, see next chapter. Th e most 
important fl exibility options to balance variations in residual load are, see Fig. 7:
382 Reinhard Haas, and Hans Auer
• short-term and long-term storages such as batteries, hydro storages, or chemical 
storages like hydrogen or methane;
 ◦ Technical demand-side management measures conducted by utilities like 
cycling, load management, e.g. of cooling systems; 
 ◦ Demand response due to price signals mainly from large customers to price 
changes, time-of-use pricing;
 ◦ Transmission grid extention leads in principle to flatter load and flatter 
generation profiles;
• Smart grids: They allow variations in frequency (upwards and downwards regula-
tion) and switch of voltage levels and contribute in this context to load balancing 
• Balancing groups will play a key role in this new concept. These are the entities 
which finally have to balance generation, flexibilities and demand options. 
8 New vs old thinking: Further development  
of the wholesale electricity market design 
Regardless of the issue of increasing quantities of variable RES in the electrici-
ty system there are some measures to be introduced which would improve the 
wholesale market structure and competitiveness basically. In addition to a revised 
EOM these are: 
• more flexibility in the organization of the market is required; 
• shorter ahead leading times for market clearing and forecasting of RES-E 
production; 
• long term contracts (futures, forwards) should be made available even for longer 
time periods than 6 years if the market needs it.
Finally we state that the transition towards a competitive and sustainable future 
electricity system will be based on the following principle of “new thinking”, which 
is to accept a paradigm shift of the whole electricity system – including switching 
from an inflexible and one-way system where variable load is met with changes 
in generation to a more flexible and smarter system allowing two-way electricity 
flows – to our understanding – a greater scope for demand participation by con-
sumers needs to be included. In addition, suppliers (or balancing groups) are the 
most important part of the whole energy service providing chain, see also Fig. 8.
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Fig. 8 New thinking in electricity markets: a supply-oriented bidirectional system 
with very high fl exibility
As indicated in Fig. 8 in future decentralized PV systems along with decentral 
battery storages may play an important role. Th e astonishing changes in the solar 
industry epitomize the over-all way PV is heading to. (WNISR 2015): “Th ere seems 
to be a general recognition that the fall in production costs of RE technologies, 
particularly of PV, coupled with the expected falling costs of electricity storage 
will accelerate the transformation of the power sector.” 
And the IEA, which has been tradionally skeptical with respect to RES states in 
the WEO (2017): “PV is on track to become the cheapest source of new electricity 
in most countries world-wide”.
9 Conclusions 
Th e major conclusions of this analysis are:
• Th e key to a sustainable competitive electricity system is the full exhaustion 
of fl exibility options based on correct price signals in the wholesale as well as 
in the retail market. Currently on both levels the market does not yet provide 
proper price signals to trigger fl exibility options (e.g. technical demand-side 
management, economic demand-response due to price signals as well as short-
term and long-term storage options) which would balance the residual load 
profi le more eff ectively. 
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• It is not possible to force variable RES into the system by means of technical 
planning. Proper financial incentives are necessary. Correct price signals are 
crucial in a revised energy-only market along with scarcity and excess pricing 
signals; the only “negative” aspect of a market without a capacity component 
would be that, at least in the short run, prices higher or lower than short-term 
marginal costs may occur temporarily. After some time the market would learn 
to benefit from these higher costs and also from the very low costs at times when 
RES are abundant. A reasonable price spread would emerge providing incentives 
for different market participants to benefit.
• Regarding market design, more flexibility in the organization of the market is 
required: To better integrate RES-E in the market, time intervals in markets 
should be reduced (i.e. more emphasis on intraday markets, shorter trading 
intervals – from hours to quarters hours; faster market clearing and shorter 
forecasting times regarding wind and solar). 
In conclusion, 
This transition towards a competitive and sustainable future electricity system 
will be based on an approach of “new thinking” which requires a paradigm shift 
in the whole electricity system where no longer the generators are the centre but 
the balancing groups respectively the supply companies. This includes switching 
to a more flexible and smarter concept allowing a greater scope for demand par-
ticipation, storage options and other flexibility measures. 
Finally we state is that the evolution of such a creative system integrating var-
iable RES in Western Europe may also serve as a model for RES-based electricity 
supply systems world-wide. 
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